# Burden Sharing QPQ and Entrapment DA

### Notes

This file contains 2 different strategies:

1. A cp that conditions the plan on European Countries increasing their defense spending. There are internal (burden sharing good for defense) and external (entrapment, politics) reasons why that would be beneficial to unconditionally offering security cooperation

2. A DA that says that security cooperation overassures allies and ensures that they will get the US entangled into conflict. This DA probably is not very strategic with the status quo (because we do security cooperation with NATO now), but could very easily be paired with this cp or with a cp that ceases security cooperation with NATO. Uniqueness for this DA is pretty minimal, but if there is a cp that provides uniqueness, it could be viable

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# Neg

## \*\*\*QPQ CP

## 1NC

### 1NC QPQ

#### The United States federal government ought condition its defense cooperation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization over [plan area] on increased alliance contribution ratings from North Atlantic Treaty Organization member states.

#### Conditioning cooperation increases burden sharing—empirics prove it convinces allies to increase defense spending

Blankenship ’18 [Brian; Then PhD Candidate, now Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Miami. Ph.D. in Political Science from Columbia University, B.A. in Political Science from Indiana University, Bloomington; 2018; "Promises under Pressure: Reassurance and Burden-Sharing in Asymmetric Alliances"; Columbia University; https://www.proquest.com/openview/661c7c6284955ee055ca12745326b485/1?cbl=18750&pq-origsite=gscholar; Accessed 7-5-2022; AW]

Great power patrons frequently reassure allies of their protection, whether by stationing troops abroad, visiting allied countries, or making public statements. In the case of the United States, observers and practitioners alike have emphasized the need to instill confidence in U.S. allies. However, **allied reassurance is** fundamentally puzzling **because it gives away a key source of bargaining leverage: the threat of abandonment.** **Patrons should ideally strive to limit the extent to which they are perceived as committed to allies, lest they encourage allies to free-ride on their protection and contribute little to the common defense**. Existing literature tends to either treat reassurance as a secondary effect of deterrence, or to focus on understanding how patrons can reassure their allies rather than why. Studies that do provide explanations for reassurance, for their part, often regard **reassurance as** strategically suboptimal, and emphasize domestic political factors that drive reassurance. The causes of reassurance are thus poorly understood. I argue that although reassurance can have adverse consequences, patrons have incentives to reassure to the extent that allies have the capacity to exit the alliance. The more credible an ally’s threat to pursue outside options, and the more costs that doing so would impose on the patron, the more reassurance it will receive. **Patrons thus face a dilemma, trading off between withholding reassurance to drive hard bargains with allies and reassuring allies to dissuade them from exiting the alliance**. This dilemma may be mitigated, however, if a **patron can make its** assurances conditional on allied burden sharing **by combining its assurances with threats of abandonment. These threats are more potent to the extent that a patron faces domestic pressure to retrench from its foreign commitments**, and that **allies face** severe threat environments. I **test the theory using a mixed-method approach that combines statistical analysis of an original dataset on American reassurance and allied burden-sharing** between 1950 and 2010 with qualitative historical case studies. In Chapters 1 and 2, I introduce the concepts of alliance reassurance and burden-sharing and review the literature on both concepts. I argue that reassurance is puzzling in light of existing theories of alliance bargaining which stress the threat of abandonment as a source of leverage. The “reassurance dilemma” that patrons face, however, is that withholding reassurance may encourage allies to distance themselves from the alliance and seek outside options. In Chapter 3, I present a theory of bargaining leverage in asymmetric alliances in order to identify the conditions under which this dilemma is most severe—and thus to explain variation in patron reassurance and allied burden-sharing. I posit that reassurance serves the purpose of discouraging allies from leaving the alliance; the more credible allies’ threats of exit, the more reassurance they will receive. However, **patrons can make their assurances** conditional on allies’ burden-sharing efforts **if their own threat of exiting the alliance is credible as well**. I present a simple formal model illustrating both the tradeoffs between reassurance and burden-sharing, as well as the conditions under which patrons are more likely to reassure and allies are more likely to increase their contributions to the alliance. I then introduce hypotheses for testing the theory’s observable implications. Chapter 4 presents the quantitative analysis on the determinants of patron reassurance and allied burden-sharing. First, using an original dataset of U.S. reassurance collected and analyzed with automated text analysis, I use statistical models to identify correlates of U.S. willingness to offer reassurances. Second, I study allied burden-sharing using data on allies’ military spending, support for U.S. military bases, and participation in U.S. foreign military interventions. In Chapters 5-8, I conduct case studies on U.S. reassurance and burden-sharing pressure toward West Germany, Japan, South Korea, and the United Kingdom during the 1960s and 1970s. Process-tracing of these cases shows that the United States saw reassurance as a way of discouraging its allies from pursuing outside options—in particular nuclear weapons and rapprochement with the Soviet Union. However, the **United States was simultaneously able to extract significant burden-sharing efforts, especially from West Germany and South Korea owing to their geographic vulnerability, and during the early 1970s due to doubts about U.S. reliability in the aftermath of the Vietnam War.** Finally, Chapter 9 concludes with a summary of the analysis, as well as a discussion of implications and avenues for future research. My findings suggest that by withholding reassurance and deliberately casting doubt on its protection, a patron makes its allies prone to reconsidering their reliance on it and to insteadpursue outside options.

#### Say yes—alliance contribution rating is politically palatable and encourages effective European defense

Martin et al. 17, \*Garret Martin is a Professorial Lecturer at the School of International Service of American University. He specializes in transatlantic security, NATO, the European Union and E.U. foreign policy. \*Balazs Martonffy formerly served as a civilian defense official in the Hungarian Ministry of Defense, working on NATO policy and transatlantic security issues. He is currently pursuing his doctorate in international relations at American University in Washington, D.C. (May 19th, 2017, “Abandon the 2 Percent Obsession: A New Rating for Pulling Your Weight in NATO”, https://warontherocks.com/2017/05/abandon-the-2-percent-obsession-a-new-rating-for-pulling-your-weight-in-nato/)

These alternative proposals and metrics are a start, but they present their own set of problems. Where von der Leyen’s idea lacks in precision, Ischinger’s suggestion would downplay the importance of building adequate military capabilities. Intense political horse-trading likely played as much as a role as pure military considerations when it came to choosing the internal metrics, and those do not completely address all of NATO’s core tasks. The input/output metrics remain, in any case, [essentially classified, aside from a few exceptions like Denmark](https://nato.usmission.gov/ambassador-lute-on-a-panel-the-cost-of-european-security-at-the-carnegie-endowment-for-international-peace/). In other words, the search for a better metric to replace the 2 percent guideline continues. From our standpoint, any credible alternative should a) be simple and intelligible, b) provide a more nuanced assessment of the contribution of states to NATO’s three core tasks, and c) be politically acceptable.

Our proposal starts from the assumption that no single metric is sufficient to capture allied member states’ contributions to NATO, and complex ones, such as [Ischinger’s](http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21717391-under-pressure-donald-trump-herbivores-are-thinking-about-eating-meat-europe-starting), have failed to gather political momentum. We suggest instead a composite metric as a solution: the Alliance Contribution Rating. This rating, similar to the credit assessment used by Moody’s and others in the financial world, would provide a differentiated and nuanced picture of each state’s contributions to NATO.

We argue that all three of NATO’s core tasks laid out in the alliance’s current [Strategic Concept](http://www.nato.int/strategic-concept/pdf/Strat_Concept_web_en.pdf) — collective defense, crisis management, and cooperative security — are “mission critical” at any given moment. Collective defense, enshrined in the Washington Treaty’s Article 5, encapsulates the idea that an attack on one member state is an attack on all allies, and remains the cornerstone of NATO. Another of NATO’s fundamental security tasks, crisis management, involves political and military tools the alliance employs in response to a wide range of crises globally. Finally, the third core task, cooperative security, advocates for the alliance to take a proactive stance toward anticipating changes in the international security environment, working mainly through partnership programs with other countries and organizations. For the rating, states would receive a grade on each of NATO’s core tasks, ranging from A through F, with the final rating forming a three-letter grade.

This rating system is still a work in progress and one that would need to be fine-tuned. But we believe that this system would be politically palatable because member states prioritize the three core tasks for NATO very differently. As such, individual member states could showcase the part of the rating they care about, and hopefully do well on, while still allowing for the broader metric to be useful for NATO as an organization. Furthermore, this rating system allows NATO to clearly identify areas where member states can focus to improve their contributions to the alliance. This rating also provides a snapshot in time of alliance contribution by a specific member state. If the priorities of the alliance shift, the indicators used for the ratings could change, while keeping the rating system consistent.

Each of the three parts of the rating would rely on a number of independent indicators, some already in use, some novel, to measure performance for allied member states. These indicators would be then weighted and combined to form one part of the letter grade for the rating. The indicators for each of the three core tasks could include the following:

Collective Defense Grade Rating

This part of the rating centers on a member state’s mainly passive contributions to NATO’s collective defense tasks. It measures how much an ally spends, but also how well they do so, because not all defense spending is created equal. In our view, collective defense contributions must reflect an allied military’s robustness, readiness, and preparedness for the future, along with the political will necessary for sustained defense spending. Even so, not all spending is captured in the defense budget. Participating in programs that are central to NATO’s defense and deterrence also are important.

Possible indicators we suggest for this part are:

* Percentage of a member state’s GDP spent on defense,
* Proportion of defense spending committed to major equipment, including research and development (both of these are in line with [NATO’s Wales Declaration](http://www.nato.int/cps/ic/natohq/official_texts_112964.htm)), and
* A qualitative assessment of a member state’s passive contributions to collective defense, including, but not limited to: hosting NATO bases or Force Integration Units; participating in NATO’s nuclear deterrence through assets or the nuclear-sharing program; and taking part in NATO-the-organization’s capabilities, for example [NATO’s Airborne Early Warning and Control Force](http://www.e3a.nato.int/) or the [Alliance Ground Surveillance System](http://www.nato.int/cps/sl/natohq/topics_48892.htm).

Crisis Management Grade Rating

In the post-Cold War security environment, NATO is no longer only interested in maintaining a defense deterrent, as missions and crisis management form a second and important role the alliance has taken on. We are attempting to determine to what degree a member state is capable of taking part in missions if the need arises along with whether it actually does so, as capacity itself is not the same as intent and implementation. Moreover, sustaining these alliance contributions to crisis management functions is vital as well, thus our indicators include a control for time commitment.

The indicators we propose for this core task are the following:

* The ratio of mission-ready, deployable assets that a member state possesses,
* The ratio of these deployable assets that are actually deployed in NATO missions (these two metrics form part of NATO’s internal [input/output metrics](http://www.fmn.dk/nyheder/Documents/Input-Output-Metrics-Fact-Sheet-Denmark-2013-14.PDF) as land forces/sea vessels/airframes),
* The proportion of NATO missions an allied state contributes to, and
* The number of years in total a member state has spent participating in NATO missions, accounting for years of membership in the alliance.

Cooperative Security Grade Rating

Finally, NATO does more than deter conflict through passive resource commitments and manage crises through active mission participation. The alliance is also committed to fostering cooperative security through actively anticipating changes in the security environment. Our metrics here measure individual member states’ involvement in inter-NATO anticipation processes, such as exercises, and peri-NATO activities, including confidence and security building measures.

Our proposed metrics are the following:

* Proportion of NATO exercises a member state has taken part in,
* A qualitative assessment of member state future planning activities, such as hosting [NATO Centers of Excellence](http://www.act.nato.int/centres-of-excellence) and other [Allied Command Transformation](http://www.act.nato.int/) contributions, and
* A qualitative assessment of member state contributions to NATO’s partnership initiatives, such as the [Istanbul Cooperative Initiative](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_52956.htm) or the [Partnership for Peace](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_50349.htm), or to NATO’s [defense capacity building efforts](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_132756.htm).

It took 18 years for NATO, once it committed to building a new headquarters, to follow through and complete the project. Let us hope that it will not take so long for NATO to find an alternative to the 2 percent guideline, once it decides to shed that flawed metric.

#### That deters war with Russia and China—lack of burden sharing exploits US inability to respond to a two-front war

Binnendijk et al 22 (Hans Binnendijk, Distinguished Fellow - The Atlantic Council; Daniel S. Hamilton, Nonresident Senior Fellow - Foreign Policy, Center on the United States and Europe; Alexander Vershbow Distinguished Fellow - The Atlantic Council Former NATO Deputy Secretary General (2012-16), Assistant Secretary of Defense (2009-12) and US Ambassador to NATO, Russia and South Korea. “Strategic responsibility: Rebalancing European and trans-Atlantic defense” 6/24/22 <https://www.brookings.edu/articles/strategic-responsibility-rebalancing-european-and-trans-atlantic-defense/>)

Taken together, these developments underscore the need for Europe and the United States to find a new path forward. Europe’s long-standing aspiration to develop more effective ways to act militarily is now intersecting with the long-standing U.S. aspiration that Europeans shoulder more of the common burden. Stated simply, Europe has wanted autonomy without providing adequate defense resources, while the United States has wanted greater European defense contributions without diminishing NATO and U.S. political influence. Now it is time to unite these two debates and find a new balance for both. As Europe grapples with new and complex strategic realities, it can no longer afford its excessive reliance on the United States, either for collective defense or for crisis management and cooperative security missions beyond Europe’s borders. The U.S. will have to pay increasing attention to China and limit its involvement in the wider Middle East. The United States will therefore increasingly look to European allies to shoulder more of the common burden and encourage greater contributions to security by the European Union.[8] Of course, European allies have already shouldered considerable burdens in the context of the war in Ukraine. They have been coping with the quickest and largest flow of displaced people in Europe since World War II. They have ramped up economic assistance to Ukraine, and are likely to take on the lion’s share of the eventual task of recovery and reconstruction. They are managing an historic effort to wean themselves off their dependence on Russian energy. Many European allies have also stepped up their defense investments considerably in the wake of Russia’s renewed aggression, with Germany the most dramatic example in establishing a special 100 billion euro fund to upgrade its armed forces and finally committing to meet the 2%-of-GDP goal that allies set after Russia’s first invasion of Ukraine in 2014. In the short term, much of these funds are needed to address immediate issues related to Ukraine or to simply replenish depleted European militaries. Longer-term, however, these pledges of enhanced spending must be tied to clear and ambitious goals. Over the next decade, the trans-Atlantic partners must rebalance their relationship so that Europe assumes greater strategic responsibility, even as both parties work to reinforce the trans-Atlantic link. Setting the goal of a rebalanced partnership would move the United States and its European allies and partners beyond contentious arguments over burden-sharing and embrace Europe’s longstanding ambition to play a larger role in its own defense, while sidestepping semantic sideshows over the meaning of “strategic autonomy.” Advancing greater European strategic responsibility starts by defining the concept in a way designed to strengthen the Atlantic alliance. It should focus on two military goals: The first should be to enhance the European allies’ conventional military capabilities to a level that would provide half of the forces and capabilities, including the strategic enablers, required for deterrence and collective defense against major-power aggression. Should a conflict simultaneously break out with China in Asia and Russia in Europe, the United States may not be able to deploy adequate reinforcements to Europe. European allies need to be able to pick up the slack. The second goal should be to develop European capabilities to conduct crisis management operations in Europe’s neighborhood without today’s heavy reliance on U.S. enablers such as strategic lift, refueling, and C4ISR. The EU’s goal in its Strategic Compass released in March of this year of developing the capacity to generate an “intervention force” of 5,000 individuals who could deploy beyond EU boundaries is a small yet useful start. Meeting these two goals would allow Europe to become the first responder to most crises in its neighborhood, acting through NATO, through the EU, or through ad hoc coalitions of the willing. It would permit the United States to shift some of its forces and strategic focus to the Indo-Pacific region without any significant reduction in the capabilities needed to deter Russia. Given Russia’s poor initial showing during its 2022 assault on Ukraine, some may believe that Russia is weaker than expected, that its strength will be sapped by the war, and that stronger European defense is therefore not needed. This would be a dangerous conclusion. Despite Moscow’s missteps, the Russian military will be able to reconstitute its losses quickly and learn from its mistakes. Russian military capabilities remain formidable, and Moscow has demonstrated repeatedly its intent not only to intervene militarily in other countries but to weaponize food, energy, digital, and other flows connecting it to various countries. Russia’s ongoing revanchist threat, and the more robust forward presence of allied forces being prepared for approval at NATO’s June 29-30 Madrid summit, will place increasing demands on all allies for high-readiness forces. This will add to the urgency of European allies assuming a greater share of the burden across the board — greater numbers of forces, higher readiness, and enhanced mobility, all with critical enablers. Finally, one critical lesson emerging from the war is the importance of sustainability. A drawn-out conflict will drain and ultimately deplete Ukraine’s resources — unless it receives ongoing assistance. The United States is carrying the largest sustainability load when it comes to resupplying Ukraine. Strategic responsibility must include the ability not just to be ready and have the mobility to get to the fight, but to sustain it. Europe is weak here. Should the United States be caught in an Asian war, sustainability would be a critical issue for European forces, and is thus key to European strategic responsibility.

## Solvency

### 2NC Say Yes—Carrot—Want SC Over AI

#### NATO countries want AI – econ and military benefits

Edward Christie et al, 6-10-2022, non-resident Senior Fellow with PSSI's E&F Threat Program An economist by training, he has held roles in research, industry, and the government sector. He served as a NATO official from 2014 to 2020, including as Defence Economist and Deputy Head of NATO’s Innovation Unit;"NATO and Artificial Intelligence," *Routledge Companion to Artificial Intelligence and National Security Policy*, <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4133397//> pg. 4-5 EZAY

3. Military AI and its strategic implications for NATO . AI is a general purpose technology, that is, “a single generic technology, recognizable as such over its whole lifetime, that initially has much scope for improvement and eventually comes to be widely used, to have many uses, and to have many [positive economic] spillover effects”, see Lipsey, Carlaw, and Bekar (2005, p.98). Like previous general purpose technologies (such as the steam engine or aviation or computers), AI holds great promise for enhancing both economic productivity and military capabilities. As with computing and information and telecommunications technology (ICT) more broadly, the current development of AI is dominated by the civilian corporate sector. This inverts the traditional relationship between state institutions and the civilian corporate sector: technologies that have comparatively narrow uses or that are quite immature are typically dependent on extended periods of state support before they may be spun off into commercial applications. GPS is a typical example of a successful traditional transfer from the military to the civilian sector (Schroeer, 2018). With ICT, and with the current wave of AI, the technology is of general purpose and at a high level of maturity. This allows for mass production and diffusion to the civilian sector, indeed internationally, leading to a strong dominance of civilian private revenues over state and military revenues in the total sales volumes of leading producers of these technologies, and ultimately to a dominance of the latter in R&D and innovation. As a result, the state sector, including defence institutions, are dependent on and have to follow the technology frontier that emerges from the civilian corporate sector to a far greater degree than is the case with narrower purpose or less mature technologies (Christie, Buts & Du Bois, 2021). In many respects, the drive to adopt AI can be seen as an opportunity to improve and enhance capabilities in ways that mirror developments in the civilian economy (Fischer, 2021; Sayler, 2019). AI-enhanced software applications already enrich people’s lives in direct ways, from auto-completion of emails to helpful recommendations on social media platforms. In the corporate world, a large range of back-office applications and business function support applications are already quite well developed. Predictive analytics for business functions such as maintenance, inventory management, and logistics are common – as is the ability to sift through and analyse vast volumes of data of all kinds, including audio, image, and video data. For defence institutions, failing to “adapt to adopt” such obviously efficiency-enhancing opportunities would be difficult to justify in any international security landscape. In addition, the rise of AI is occurring in a context of revived great power competition. From a global perspective, China has already overtaken the United States on certain metrics of economic and industrial power (O’Rourke, 2021), and it is rational to expect that power to translate increasingly into potential military power and foreign policy influence (Kania, 2017). From the perspective of European security, Russia is back on the world stage, with large, modernised and capable armed forces. Both powers have clearly signaled that they understand the potential of AI and both are taking active steps to adopt AI for multiple uses, including defence and security (Schmidt et al., 2021; Soare, 2021). Due to its digital nature, AI diffuses extremely rapidly across sectors of activity as well as across borders. In practice, it is difficult to see how any great power in the international system could prevent other nations, or indeed non-state actors, from adopting AI for a wide range of purposes, including potentially hostile purposes. This poses serious challenges for traditional security policy efforts in areas such as non-proliferation and export controls. From a strategic perspective, it is also clear that every major power faces a strong incentive to adopt AI rapidly for all purposes, including for defence and security purposes. This general dynamic is a race of a particular kind – not an arms race, since AI is not a type of armament – but rather a technology race, or a “technological adoption race”, as expressed by NATO’s Head of Innovation (Murray, 2020).

#### European Countries are pushing for increased AI cooperation

Arcuri ’22 (Gregory Arcuri, Research Assistant at the Renewing American Innovation Project, “How Is the U.S. Cooperating with Its European Allies on Issues of Technology?”, <https://www.csis.org/blogs/perspectives-innovation/how-us-cooperating-its-european-allies-issues-technology>) //sethlee

Optimism for meaningful cooperation, though, is still warranted. The TTC is the most promising forum for technology and innovation collaboration in recent memory. Launched in June 2021, the TTC’s [explicit goal](https://www.state.gov/u-s-eu-trade-and-technology-council-ttc/) is “to lead global, like-minded [democratic] partners in promoting an open, interoperable, secure, and reliable digital space, and to remain leaders in developing and protecting tomorrow’s technology.” Importantly, the Council’s agenda intentionally avoids topics of long-standing disagreement and tension between the U.S. and Europe (so-called “[iron rice bowls](https://www.csis.org/analysis/meeting-ttc)”) which have doomed previous forums for negotiation, such as agricultural subsidies, the Boeing-Airbus dispute, and Trump-era steel and aluminum tariffs. The Council established ten working groups to promote high-level dialogue on a variety of issues where collaboration appears possible, including: Technology standards Climate and green technology Secure supply chains Information and communications technology and services security and competitiveness Data governance and tech platform regulation Misuse of technology threatening security and human rights Export controls Investment screening Promoting access to and use of digital technologies among small and medium enterprises Global trade challenges The Council’s first meeting in September 2021 led to a series of notable outcomes on issues where significant agreement already exists. For example, on the issue of the [global semiconductor shortage](https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/09/29/u-s-eu-trade-and-technology-council-inaugural-joint-statement/), both sides are committed to “identify[ing] gaps in the semiconductor value chain” and enhancing their respective semiconductor ecosystems. The U.S. and Europe have already begun taking important steps towards this shared goal. Of note, the European Commission has [drafted legislation](https://optics.org/news/13/2/14) to mobilize over €43 billion in public and private funds to double its share of the global semiconductor manufacturing market by 2030. Meanwhile, in the United States, lawmakers continue to debate the [CHIPS for America Act](https://www.csis.org/blogs/perspectives-innovation/chips-america-act-why-it-necessary-and-what-it-does) and the [FABS Act](https://www.csis.org/blogs/perspectives-innovation/fabs-act-essential-component-incentivizing-semiconductor-manufacturing), which provide lump-sum and tax-based incentives for chip manufacturers to “onshore” their operations. While these appear to be self-serving initiatives, the two sides view them as critical to ensuring mutual resiliency in a critical strategic industry. In artificial intelligence (AI), the U.S. and E.U. affirmed their commitment to responsibly developing AI which is used in a way that respects democratic values and universal human rights. The European Union has already proposed sweeping legislation, known as [the AI Act](https://artificialintelligenceact.eu/), which would serve as the first comprehensive law on artificial intelligence use and development worldwide. While the U.S. has no similar legislation making its way through Congress, the White House has established [several bilateral initiatives](https://www.whitehouse.gov/ostp/news-updates/2021/12/08/white-house-announces-launch-of-the-international-grand-challenges-on-democracy-affirming-technologies-for-the-summit-for-democracy/) through U.S. embassies and federal agencies with European partners to promote “democracy-affirming technologies” and responsible artificial intelligence and machine learning. The next TTC meeting is scheduled for May 15-16, 2022, and this event will be the first dialogue since the Russian invasion, providing the TTC with a sense of urgency and seriousness that some analysts suggest might instill a spirit of compromise. Already on March 25, the President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen released [a joint statement](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/statement_22_2043) with President Biden announcing “an agreement in principle on a new framework for transatlantic data flows,” an agreement that the TTC will likely be tasked with fleshing out. Kenneth Propp with the Atlantic Council argues that this could mean a [softening of Europe’s position](https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/europe-should-take-aim-at-its-true-data-threat-russia/) on the issue of data privacy, acknowledging that the biggest threat to European data security is Russia, not U.S. tech companies. This could represent a significant breakthrough in cooperation on an issue where the two sides have struggled to find common ground, possibly heralding a wave of collaborative activity across a variety of other domains as well. Putin’s wanton aggression in Ukraine has united a previously fractured Western world in a way that appeared impossible just months ago. The May meeting of the TTC provides a chance to build upon previous points of compromise. The United States and its European allies have a remarkable opportunity to harness the current political momentum to forge cooperation in securing their shared leadership in the technologies of the future.

### 2NC Say Yes—Carrot—Want SC Over Cyber

#### European Leaders want SC over cyber BUT burden sharing is key

Brzozowski ’21 (Alexandra Brzozowski, “EU and NATO leaders aim to expand cooperation, despite dreams of ‘strategic autonomy’”,<https://www.euractiv.com/section/defence-and-security/news/eu-and-nato-leaders-aim-to-expand-cooperation-despite-dreams-of-strategic-autonomy/>) //sethlee

“We are committed to cooperating closely with NATO,” EU leaders stated in a joint summit declaration, reiterating their intention to strengthen the EU’s partnership with NATO and work closely with the new US President Joe Biden. According to a senior EU official, EU and NATO leaders in the meeting reiterated that “EU-NATO cooperation is of strategic importance” on areas such as reinforcing capabilities, military mobility, cybersecurity and hybrid threats as well as challenges in the immediate neighbourhood. NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg joined the video summit to lay emphasis on cooperation in the face of worries from some member states that the EU’s push could undermine the US-backed alliance as President Biden is looking to rebuild it. “I’m totally convinced that the new Biden administration offers a unique opportunity to renew the strong alliance between Europe and the United States,” European Council President Charles Michel said ahead of the talks. “A strong partnership requires strong partners – that’s why I’m convinced that a stronger EU is a stronger NATO,” he added. “We share very much the same population, the same members and the same neighbourhood and the same challenges,” said Stoltenberg, speaking alongside Michell. He added that this cooperation had already reached “an unprecedented level” in the past few years and could be expanded further in areas such as cyber threats, climate change and migration issues. However, the conflict over Cyprus remains one of the main stumbling blocks towards closer cooperation between the two institutions. EU leaders stressed that their aim is to reaffirm the goal of “increasing the EU’s capacity to act autonomously” in defence and that “in the face of increased global instability, the EU must take on more responsibility for its security.” Debate has raged for decades over what role EU institutions should play on defence, while confusion remains what the word “strategic autonomy” actually means in practice. Security and defence policies remain largely in the hands of member states, which have often been reluctant to agree on moves to integrate military capabilities at European level and transfer competencies in the policy field. “Security and defence will be kept under regular review by the European Council,” EU leaders pointed out, what can be seen as a reaffirmation of their intention to keep capitals’ grip on the policy area. France, in particular, has been the most vocal proponent of the bloc’s push for “strategic autonomy”, arguing that a resurgent Russia and China and former US President Donald Trump’s threats to withdraw security guarantees from Europe over defence spending show Europe has to be able to stand alone. However, initial signals from Washington have already indicated that Biden’s government is also likely to make demands on the Europeans to make a greater contribution to their own security. Senior EU officials admit the push for European autonomy has worried some in the bloc – especially Eastern European and Baltic states – who look towards NATO as a bulwark against a more aggressive Moscow. “The capacity for the EU to act in a more autonomous way unnerves member states on the front line against Russia because they fear a disengagement from NATO,” one official said. R&D and new threats “We need to continue reinforcing European military capabilities, under the European Defence Union. Because the global technological race is on and I want Europe to lead,” European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen told reporters. EU leaders said they want to focus on a ‘drive-by’ Europe to better protect itself from cyberattacks, and ask Brussels to come up with a roadmap on the development of strategic technologies.

#### Ukraine means cybersecurity coop is high priority

Roussi & Cerulus ’22 (Antoaneta Roussi, Cybersecurity Reporter for POLITICO, Laurens Cerulus, Leader of POLITICO’s cybersecurity reporting team “NATO aims to take on Russia with its own cyber military-industrial complex” <https://www.politico.eu/article/nato-plans-to-build-a-cyber-military-industrial-complex-russia-china-hacking/>) //sethlee

Western military allies want cybersecurity and defense technology firms to step up in countering digital threats from Russia. The war in Ukraine has put technology front and center of armed conflict. Satellite network firms like [Elon Musk’s Starlink](https://www.politico.eu/article/elon-musk-ukraine-starlink/), drone-makers like [China’s DJI](https://www.reuters.com/technology/chinese-drone-maker-dji-suspends-business-activities-russia-ukraine-2022-04-26/), [citizen-supported information-sharing apps](https://choice.npr.org/index.html?origin=https://www.npr.org/2022/03/31/1089660395/ukraine-is-inventing-a-new-way-to-fight-on-the-digital-battlefield) and a [raging fight to control the online narrative](https://www.politico.eu/article/ukraine-russia-disinformation-propaganda/) have shaped the war since its start in February. Now, NATO leaders want to set out a plan to win the war for tech supremacy and cyber defenses in the long run. The defense alliance meets Wednesday to Thursday for a summit in Madrid and will present a “Strategic Concept” for how it plans to protect the bloc from threats and attacks for the next few years, including in cyberspace. According to several officials who spoke to POLITICO on the condition of anonymity because talks are ongoing, that strategy would include: — Ways to directly involve the private-sector cybersecurity industry in NATO’s responses to Russian hacking groups and security services, including by setting up a platform to share cyberattack information and intelligence; — Funding of over a $1 billion to go into emerging technologies like quantum computing, artificial intelligence and space tech, including through a “transatlantic DARPA” called the [Defense Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_194587.htm), or DIANA, and through a new investment fund that will go toward “deep tech and startups” on defense technology; — And setting up virtual joint cybersecurity teams to deploy in the event of a large-scale cyberattack and to go into member countries to help protect networks. “The Strategic Concept quite clearly puts cyber also into the context of Russia as a threat to allies’ security, and that cyber is one of the means it uses to threaten our partners,” a NATO official said, adding that the text of the strategy is still to be finalized. Ukraine has been under “a nonstop attack, on government services, on military command-and-control, on regular internet and internet communication,” the official said. “The fact that they weren't successful in knocking it all out doesn't mean they didn't try.” The [last iteration of the Strategic Concept](https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_publications/20120214_strategic-concept-2010-eng.pdf) was agreed upon in 2010, and only touched on cyber, stressing the need for NATO countries to increase cooperation and coordination to face evolving cyber threats. Since then, the new version of the document, which lays out threats to NATO and strategies to address these concerns, is certain to include language on cyber deterrence. Following a summit in Brussels last year, NATO [endorsed a new cyber defense policy](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_185000.htm) that recognized that a major cyberattack against a member state would be considered an attack against all on a “case-by-case basis.” Cybersecurity coordinators for NATO nations met in Brussels last month for a special cyber session of NATO’s North Atlantic Council. Anne Neuberger, the White House deputy national security adviser for cyber and emerging technology, at the time [reiterated](https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/05/21/statement-by-nsc-spokesperson-adrienne-watson-on-deputy-national-security-advisor-anne-neubergers-travel-to-brussels/) the need for better coordination among NATO countries to confront cyber threats. In the days leading up to the summit, NATO member Lithuania [faced a barrage](https://www.politico.eu/article/russia-hackers-killnet-attack-lithuania-over-kaliningrad-sanction/) of distributed denial-of-service attacks from pro-Kremlin hacktivist group Killnet, which brought down some government websites by sending an excess of internet traffic to their servers. To counter the online threat coming from Russia, the alliance wants to set up a “more structured relationship between the civilian and the military world,” the official said. Ahead of and in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, U.S. and Western government services and cybersecurity giants like Microsoft were heavily involved in the response to Russian cyberattacks, with Microsoft engineers in Washington state detecting the first cyberattack launched against Ukraine well before any Russian tanks crossed the border. “How they can bring [the] industry together to do threat-monitoring and awareness and possibly even advise on responses for cyber defense will definitely be a multiplier effect,” said Fabrice Pothier, chief executive officer of consultancy Rasmussen Global, which was founded by former NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen. “Cyber is so privatized now, you need to bring the big players together,” Pothier said. Kenneth Lasoen, a specialist on security and intelligence at Clingendael Institute, said NATO members could form a consortium to negotiate support with private companies on offensive strategies — something the alliance has suggested [in the past](https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2019/02/12/natos-role-in-cyberspace/index.html). “More countries are looking into bolstering their cyber capabilities, and a lot of the companies helping them are based in the U.S.,” said Lasoen. “Of course, it would be advisable for the EU to have its own know-how, but for now it is in the U.S.”

#### Say yes---Security cooperation in cyber is key to NATO operations

Efthymiopoulos, 19 [Marios Panagiotis Efthymiopoulos, Designated Dean and Associate Professor of International Security and Strategy of the College of Security and Global Studies, at the American University in the Emirates AUE, advisor to the President of Cyprus through the Geostrategic Council of the Republic of Cyprus and CEO of Strategy International, 6-20-2019, Journal of Innovation and Entrepreneurship, ‘A cyber-security framework for development, defense and innovation at NATO’, <https://innovation-entrepreneurship.springeropen.com/track/pdf/10.1186/s13731-019-0105-z.pdf> /alundy]

Vulnerabilities and threats considering multidimensional challenges such as cyber-security require NATO to be truly, strategically and operationally agile. It requires NATO to be adaptable to conditions unforeseen. Considering technological advancements, we are yet to acquaint ourselves, our institutions, governments, and international organizations with true phenomena of a new, yet networked global society. In this borderless society, where electric grids, information, or installations failures may have in the past solely affect a country, now affect a region and possibly a larger area. Our abilities are limitless to point out challenges and face them. We also have the ability to innovate through methodological approaches and security cooperation utilizing the constant upgrade of technology. However, when decisions come to being, this may not be easy. Lack of sound and constant decision making may affect global financial systems and social structures. Current financial situations in regions and areas, such as in the Balkans or South of Europe, like Greece, Italy, and Portugal among others, affect the larger European Union as a community of union states. Conflict areas, such as Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan, do surely provide the impetus for NATO’s direct involvement and or cooperation with external allies, yet does not seem to positively affect leadership in taking decisions that are so much needed for the benefit of security resilience and business continuity. Humanitarian issues, such as the refugee issue and the fear of mass illegal migration, deriving from current wars in Syria, Iraq, and other areas such as Afghanistan, affect countries, giving rise to suspicion on cooperative effectiveness, participation in defense against threats and challenges. Even more so, when a global society is e-wired, in which education, training, health but also security are part of this “grid,” the threats and challenges are greater. In this new virtual world of things, where the internet has managed to innovate, eliminate, distances and borders but also time, NATO should be set to comply with the new “global rules and standards of operational business-minded and political efficiency.” It should create agile and limitless policies, security basic and specialized military and civilian installation if NATO is to continue to be a crisis management institution.

### 2NC Say Yes—Carrot—Want SC over Tech

#### Say yes --- allies recognize the need for cohesive framework and unity on emerging tech in order to combat adversaries

Soare, 21 [Simona R. Soare, PhD in political science, US DoS fellowship on US Grand Strategy, served as advisor to the Vice-President of the European Parliament, research focusing on US security policy, transatlantic security and EU-NATO relations, 6-11-2021, German Marshall Fund of the US, ‘Innovations as Adaptation: NATO and Emerging Technologies’, https://www.gmfus.org/news/innovation-adaptation-nato-and-emerging-technologies /alundy]

Throughout NATO’s history, defense innovation has been critical to its technological edge and its deterrence and defense posture against multiple threats. The unprecedented progress in emerging and disruptive technologies (EDTs) offers the prospect and challenge of transformative defense innovation for allied armed forces and societies at large. Technological progress in artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning, advanced robotics, biotechnologies and human enhancement, quantum technologies, big-data analytics, and fifth-generation telecommunication systems, as well as growing autonomy in the critical functions of military systems, promise to change how wars are fought, how fast, where, and by whom. These technologies enable new forms of military presence, coercive action, and power projection in and across old and new domains (for example, cyberspace and outer space) and below and above the conventional threshold of armed conflict.

However, NATO and the transatlantic allies are neither the only nor the most agile actors investing in emerging and disruptive technologies. China and Russia already invest substantially in and have accelerated their adoption of these technologies in military applications. To maintain its strategic advantage against China and Russia, NATO needs to become an agent of innovation and be more agile and strategic in supporting allies to jointly exploit new technologies for deterrence, defense, and resilience purposes. NATO has prioritized EDTs and signaled it has joined “the technological adoption race” against China and Russia.1 Much work remains to be done. Allies remain divided on the ethical and legal specifics of the military use of EDTs and by their national-industrial preferences. Technological capacity across the alliance also varies significantly and, as always, funding is in short supply. Concrete decisions on how to consolidate innovation in EDTs, a critical task for NATO’s mission and future adaptation, are expected at this month’s Brussels summit. Specifically, allies will respond to calls for a “strategic surge” in EDTs2 innovation by establishing a Defense Innovation Accelerator, an opt-in instrument funded through dedicated national contributions, which NATO hopes will incentivize innovation and transatlantic cooperation on emerging technologies.3

As NATO prepares to embark on the adoption of emerging and disruptive technologies, this brief takes stock of its ongoing efforts in this field. It examines what drives the alliance’s efforts to exploit EDTs for defense innovation and what it would take for NATO to become an innovator in an environment of unprecedented technological progress and great-power competition. NATO’s ongoing efforts in innovation and EDTs are a step in the right direction. However, to survive in a world of multipolar great-power competition and deliver security to its members, it needs to innovate, not just to adapt incrementally.

### 2NC Say Yes—Carrot—AT: Not Big Enough

#### Security Cooperation provides sufficient leverage

Tecott 21, PhD in Political Science @ MIT (Rachel, “The Cult of the Persuasive: The U.S. Military’s Aversion to Coercion in Security Assistance,” Proquest Dissertations)

\*SFA = “Security Force Assistance”

Recipients are more likely to follow U.S. direction when the United States combines teaching and persuasion with bargaining and/or direct command. Bargaining is well suited to the context of SFA. Bargaining is in a sense a much simpler, less ambitious influence strategy than persuasion. This study argues that the United States has ample bargaining power in most cases of security assistance, and is therefore well-positioned to wield carrots and sticks to shape recipient decision-making. Bargaining power, in Glenn Snyder’s framework, varies as a function of the 54 two sides’ relative dependence, commitment, and interest in the object of bargaining.59 Lumpy (each variable could be further subdivided into many constituent pieces), subjective, and consequently hard to measure as those variables are, the argument that recipients of United States SFA, particularly in the context of severe internal threats, have more bargaining power than the United States, does not hold up to scrutiny. Recipients of SFA may not always depend for their survival on the United States, but they are almost always far more dependent on the United States than the United States is on them. With respect to relative commitment, SFA recipients often view the U.S. commitment to an SFA partnership, or to the leaders themselves, as fickle. In such cases, the United States’ relative lack of commitment should be a bargaining asset, because it should help increase the credibility of its threats to withdraw support or to replace the leadership. Moreover, is as conducive to the establishment of credibility with respect to promises of carrots and threats of sticks as any international partnership can be. Providers need not rely on the nuclear threats of complete support or total abandonment. Rather, SFA relationships create myriad opportunities for the application of calibrated carrots ranging from the provision of additional ammunition to a particular unit, to a dramatic increase in the scale of U.S. assistance to the recipient military as a whole, and calibrated sticks ranging from the disbanding of a particular unit, to a dramatic decrease in assistance, to the ouster of the civilian leader. SFA relationships are also typically long-term, and involve iterated interactions between provider and recipient. There is, therefore, an extended shadow of the future,60 and opportunities for the United States to demonstrate the credibility of its promises and threats through consistent follow-through. These two features of SFA relationships—the opportunities for calibrated carrots and sticks, and the shadow of the future—should help to resolve the credibility problem that plagues, for instance, the challenge of extended nuclear deterrence. In the context of SFA, threats to decrease support to a unit or increase support to a unit, or even to support or oust a civilian leader, are far less difficult than the challenge the United States faced in its efforts to convince the Soviet Union that it would trade New York for Paris. SFA is the United States trying to convince brigade commanders that their interests are better served following U.S. direction to remove a corrupt battalion commander than ignoring that direction. It may not be an easy task, but the United States certainly has the carrots and sticks to do it, and the context of SFA is more conducive than most

#### Making support conditional is more likely to induce states to join US-led efforts

Gannon and Kent 21, PhD in Political Science @ UC-San Diego, \*\*PhD in Political Science @ Ohio State (“Keeping Your Friends Close, but Acquaintances Closer: Why Weakly Allied States Make Committed Coalition Partners,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 65.5)//BB

Because alliance membership is a club good, not a pure public good, worries about being excluded from the security benefits of an alliance can incentivize a state to try to shore up the alliance by sending a costly signal of their commitment to their alliance partners. “Today, we should expect the European allies to find that the best way to strengthen (or avoid weakening) their bonds with the United States is to contribute to out-of-area operations like ISAF. According to this line of reasoning, the allies who put the highest premium on NATO’s traditional products should be the ones—together with the United States—shouldering the heaviest burdens in Afghanistan” (Ringsmose 2010, 331). Yet the Afghanistan case demonstrates this is not just a story about club goods in formal alliances, but security cooperation more generally. States may use war efforts as a signal of their willingness to accept large costs in the hopes that this will improve their relationship with the coalition leader in the future. States use conflicts that are not of immediate strategic importance to— hopefully—gain the attention and respect of important international players. Closer alignments may be valued inherently, for unspecified reasons, or to help the state acquire side payments or policy concessions on unrelated issues. Henke (2019a) argues that states contribute to coalition conflicts when the “pivotal state”— what we call the coalition leader—provides side payments as incentives to contribute. This highlights our broader logic about variation in club goods and public goods in alliances and coalitions. States contribute to coalition warfare when there are benefits to contributing troops that fall outside the traditionally understood alliance mandates or security concerns. In US-led conflicts since the Korean War, Henke (2019a) find that future benefits offered by pivotal states can induce coalition participation. We extend upon this finding by arguing that states with unrealized alliance potential are most likely to be moved by that logic. Furthermore, they will go above and beyond in their coalition participation to try to secure future benefits— whether side payments or unrelated payments—that extend from a closer relationship with the coalition leader.

### 2NC Say Yes—Stick—Pressure Key

#### European allies want to increase burden sharing but continued US pressure is key

Kupchan 6-29-2022, Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and Professor of International Affairs at Georgetown University. He is the author of Isolationism: A History of America’s Efforts to Shield Itself From the World. (Charles, “NATO’s Hard Road Ahead,” Foreign Affairs, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ukraine/2022-06-29/natos-hard-road-ahead)//BB>

THE EUROPEAN PILLAR The war in Ukraine has been a geopolitical wake-up call for Europe—and NATO should capitalize on this moment. Europe has made numerous false starts over the years at acquiring more geopolitical strength and responsibility, but this time, thanks to Russia, the effort may well yield more impressive results. Russian aggression has already prompted Europeans to make new and substantial investments in military capability. Germany has allocated 100 billion euros to upgrade its dilapidated military and has agreed to meet NATO’s benchmark of spending 2 percent of GDP on defense. Other European nations have announced sizable increases in their defense budgets. Translating these investments into war-fighting capability will take time and require coordination across national boundaries and between NATO and the EU. But these investments, and Germany’s turnaround in particular, have the potential to be a game-changer, finally endowing Europe with the greater geopolitical heft that that it needs in a world in which great-power rivalry is back. The United States should keep the pressure on its allies and work with them to take full advantage of their new readiness to shoulder greater defense burdens. A more capable Europe will make for a stronger Atlantic partnership. Democrats and Republicans alike have long complained that NATO needs a sturdier European pillar. Whatever party is in power in Washington, the Atlantic link will be in better shape if Europe brings more geopolitical heft to the table. With Russia now threatening NATO’s eastern flank and tensions in the western Pacific also putting new demands on U.S. resources, Washington will appreciate having more European capability. And even though a renewed Russian threat will keep U.S. forces in Europe for the foreseeable future, Europe needs to be able to act on its own when necessary.

#### U.S. political pressure motivates allies to increase burden sharing and defense activities

Schnaufer 21, Tad A. Schnaufer II is a Ph.D. candidate in Security Studies at the School for Politics, Security, and International Affairs at the University of Central Florida and is a captain in the Florida Army National Guard, “The US-NATO Relationship: The Cost of Maintaining Political Pressure on Allies,” January 15th 2021, Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, Conflict & Security, <https://gjia.georgetown.edu/2021/01/15/the-us-nato-relationship-the-cost-of-maintaining-political-pressure-on-allies/>

The Trump administration has threatened NATO allies to the point that they fear the United States may withdraw from the organization or not fulfill its obligations to Article V unless the allies meet the objective of spending two percent of their GDP on defense. [Past administrations](https://www.cnn.com/2018/07/04/politics/trump-us-presidents-nato-defense-spending/index.html) have called for NATO allies to contribute more to the alliance for decades. However, they have never called into question the US commitment to Europe. Yet, this pressure has forced the European allies to start taking greater ownership of their security at the cost of warm relations with the United States as seen through [allied leader’s statements](https://www.rferl.org/a/france-says-eu-should-not-rely-us-military-defense-reach-out-russia/29456958.html).

In order to pressure allies, the United States has to send costly signals, such as withdrawing troops from Europe, to demonstrate that their security interests have diverged. This political pressure acts as a forceful method to motivate NATO allies to do more because it provides a credible threat of exclusion from the benefits of US protection. Within NATO, only the United States maintains and controls the conventional and nuclear capacity to deter and defend against existential threats to the alliance. No other ally has the expeditionary military capacity to do so. For example, Estonia is not worried about being abandoned by Romania, Portugal, or even [Germany](https://www.economist.com/the-economist-explains/2018/08/09/why-germanys-army-is-in-a-bad-state), knowing none of them could bring a sizable military force to bear in response to a Russian invasion or fait accompli. In this case, Estonia’s chief concern revolves around the United States’ guarantee of their sovereignty through NATO. Suppose the United States can make credible claims that it is willing to abandon an ally and not fulfill its treaty obligations. In that case, the ally will experience a drastic incentive to increase its military capabilities to defend itself.

It may seem that these tensions and fears will only lead to negative outcomes, but some disunity within an alliance can yield positive results. [Several articles](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/10242690302924?needAccess=true) researching the implications of free-riding and burdening-sharing in alliances have supported this notion. In [Olson and Zeckhauser](https://www.jstor.org/stable/1927082?casa_token=LNnMkX9AICMAAAAA%2525253AeEvi83ZoGnUTlEYpdVE2BFCN6VcWckfyrA7bsKjl5t6nLMRrj5pID97p13-d-Anh4WwfqtbRkXF4EiNREDpdbEa5qdzHThxqJR8mvSvvWe0vdGHclzXA&seq=1%23metadata_info_tab_contents)’s seminal article on burden-sharing, they wrote, “This fact leads to the paradoxical conclusion that a decline in the amity, unity, and community of interest among allies need not necessarily reduce the effectiveness of an alliance…” and “The United States, at least, should perhaps not hope for too much unity in common ventures with other nations. It might prove extremely expensive.” Similarly, [Plumper and Neumayer](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0738894214522916) note in reference to the smaller allies (non-US allies), “Unless the interests of alliance members are independent, the existence of NATO allows the smaller allies to free-ride to some extent.”

#### NATO has shown willingness to increase burden sharing but continued US pressure is key to actualize spending increases

**WSJ 22** [The Wall Street Journal Editorial Board; oversees the Journal's editorial page, dictating the tone and direction of the newspaper's opinion section; 3/21/22; “The Rearming of Europe”; <https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-rearming-of-europe-nato-summit-defense-spending-joe-biden-france-germany-italy-11647900481>]

The **Russian invasion of Ukraine has finally motivated European leaders to say they’ll spend more on defense, but promises are the easy part**. One task for President Biden at this week’s NATO summit will be pushing the Europeans to be specific about how much they’ll spend and what they’ll buy. **European Union heads of state or government** said in a March 11 declaration that “**we must resolutely invest more and better in defence capabilities.”** After a two-day meeting, the leaders vowed to **“increase substantially defence expenditures” and “invest further in the capabilities necessary to conduct the full range of missions.”** European **NATO allies and Canada increased defense spending overall** for six years through 2020, **but many still don’t hit NATO’s commitment to contribute 2% of gross domestic product to defense. This target should be a floor, not a ceiling, given the Russian threat.** Germany, **Europe’s biggest economy and its most notorious defense free rider, has led the charge to change.** Berlin hadn’t spent more than 2% of GDP on defense since the end of the Cold War, but Chancellor Olaf Scholz said last month his country will meet its commitment from now on. And it’s starting with a €100 billion down payment. **Smaller countries are stepping up too. Poland, which already meets the NATO target, recently passed a law increasing defense spending to at least 3% of GDP in 2023.** Frontline nations Romania, Latvia and Lithuania have publicly set clear goals or passed legislation to boost military budgets. **Yet too much of Europe has only vaguely promised to do more.** French President Emmanuel Macron said this month that Paris would increase spending because of Vladimir Putin’s invasion, but without precise numbers. Italian Prime Minister Mario Draghi said the war is “an incentive to invest more in defense than we have ever done before” but it’s unclear how far Rome will go. Spain, which barely spends above 1% of GDP on its military, has vowed to hit 2% but hasn’t said when. Countries have different political pressures and processes, and some may be quietly studying what’s feasible. **But Mr. Biden can encourage his European counterparts to step up like Mr. Scholz and set the terms of debate in their own countries. Germany showed it’s possible to hit NATO’s modest spending goals immediately, and there’s no reason for others to phase in spending over long stretches.** It’s also important to ensure inflation doesn’t wipe out the gains. The U.K. approved spending increases in 2020 and 2021, but with rising prices the budget in real terms could decline in 2023 and 2024. It’s also easy to spend money on items labeled “defense” that don’t really enhance a country’s security. **As a defensive alliance, NATO is primarily concerned with defending Europe and perhaps some counterterrorism missions. Ukraine has offered a useful template of how to defend from a Russian attack. Every NATO country should be competent with the basic tools to resist an invasion.** That means a ready arsenal of tanks, helicopters, fighter jets and other heavy equipment. As the Ukrainians have shown, antitank and short-range air-defense systems are highly effective. Drones and loitering munitions, even relatively low-tech, are critical to success on the modern battlefield. Europeans can also invest more in the sophisticated coastal- and air-defense systems and long-range precision fires that Ukraine wishes it had now. The danger is that two of Mr. Macron’s fixations—industrial policy and “strategic autonomy”—could collide to make Europe less safe. There should be an emphasis on divesting from Soviet-era equipment, such as MiG jets and air defense systems, and replacing them with European and American systems. As Ukraine is showing, a mix of U.S., European and Turkish platforms can work well together to make life difficult for Russians. But Europeans will have to avoid the temptation to invest in lesser products out of solidarity. **Europe doing more for its own defense is good news, but the U.S. has more to do as well. On top of nudging the Europeans in the right direction**, major increases to American defense spending are essential and would set the right example.

### 2NC Say Yes—Stick—Reputation

#### Conditioning solves and states say yes—reputational costs and threat perceptions

Joel R. Hillison 14, professor of National Security Studies at the U.S. Army War College and an Adjunct Professor at Gettysburg College, November 2014, “Stepping Up: Burden Sharing by NATO's Newest Members,” <https://publications.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/2306.pdf>, RH

**The** collective action **literature suggests that freeriding behavior is likely to increase as organizations increase their membership.** Article 10 of the NATO treaty provides modalities for new members to join the Alliance.11 During the Cold War, NATO expanded from 12 original members to 16 members over a 40 plus-year period. After the fall of the Soviet Union, **NATO** expanded **from 16 members in 1998 to 28 members by 2009. While all members face** incentives **to** free-ride**, these incentives increase as the size of the organization increases.** In the absence of a commonly identified threat, **the rational** incentives **to** free-ride **are even more** pronounced**.**

A salient characteristic of NATO enlargement is that all of the new members are smaller than either the United States or the Big Four European members, (Germany, the United Kingdom (UK), France, and Italy). The logic of collective action suggests that larger, more powerful states bear a greater proportion of the costs in producing a public good.12 Therefore, **the new members would be expected to free-ride in relative** contributions **to the** Alliance**. However,** free-riding **by smaller** states **has not been the case. Something other than collective action theory is required to explain this phenomenon**. As expected, **the capability and willingness to share burdens varies from the largest European NATO members** (in terms of population and geography) **to the smallest.** Likewise, burden sharing, as a percentage of the gross domestic product (GDP), **varies based on the level of national** economic output**.** However, the sharing of risks, as measured by military commitments to NATO operations, less closely follows the collective action model. When national interests more closely aligned with Alliance-wide goals, **NATO** members **were** more willing **to** increase **their** contributions**.**

This analysis of burden sharing behavior also revealed that **new NATO** members **demonstrate a** greater willingness **to** bear **the burdens of the Alliance than older members,** all things being equal. Consequently, free-riding behavior increased with the length of membership in NATO. **When states’** reputations **were on the line, they were** more willing **to** share **the** burdens **of the Alliance.**13 In addition, **though many of these new** members **still view** Russia **as a potential threat and thus favor a greater focus on territorial defense**, their level of military spending was not correlated to Russian military spending. These same nations also contributed their best equipped and most combat ready units to NATO missions in such places as Afghanistan.

These phenomena can be attributed to two explanations. First, **new members are concerned with establishing a good reputation, not only within the Alliance, but also with the leader of the Alliance, the United States.** By providing troops to NATO missions, new members demonstrate their ability to make credible commitments. **By** demonstrating **their** loyalty **to the** United States **and the** NATO **Alliance, they hope to compensate for their historic** fear of abandonment. The other explanation is that **NATO has invested a great deal of effort into socializing new** members **and** partners **on Alliance norms of** burden sharing. Thus, it is not surprising that new members explain troop contributions in terms of appropriate behavior for Alliance members, rather than in terms of rational, self-interest.

Finally, this book examines burden sharing behavior in the aftermath of NATO enlargement. The logic of collective action suggests that free-riding behavior should have increased due to the increase in the number of members. However, the actual record is mixed. **Even though NATO expanded its scope and membership significantly, all NATO** members **are** contributing**, to some extent, to the various on-going Alliance missions**. In explaining this result, this work provides a contribution to the extensive literature on burden sharing.

**Another plausible rational explanation of burden sharing behavior by new member states is that their calculations are conditioned by their history**. Most of the new member states of NATO were previously occupied by Soviet troops following World War II. These former Warsaw Pact countries consequently fear that Russia might try to reassert itself in their affairs. **These states also have an** historic **and deep seated** fear of abandonment **by the** West**.** Certainly, there is a historic legacy in states such as the Czech Republic, whose sovereignty was sacrificed to appeasement policies prior to World War II; and Poland, which was left alone to face the onslaught of Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union in 1939, despite existing security assurances from France and the United Kingdom (UK). States such as Hungary and the Czech Republic also suffered military interventions by the Soviet Union in 1956 and 1968, respectively. With their unique history, this explanation is less applicable to Albania and Croatia, since these states were outside of the Warsaw Pact. **Given this history, new** member states **would feel** threatened **by a weakened NATO or a reduced U.S. presence in NATO.** Thus, there is some merit to the rationalist argument that **these states** retain **a fear of abandonment and act accordingly**.28 Glenn Snyder’s work on security dilemmas in alliances demonstrated that states’ interests might converge over a fear of abandonment.29 Therefore, new NATO members might support out of area Alliance operations, even in the absence of intrinsic national interests. In any case, **the** fear of abandonment**, combined with a pursuit of** credibility **and** side payments**, all represent plausible explanations for** norm complying behavior. However, as Alastair Johnston points out, “the presence of strategic behavior does not undermine the possibility of persuasion,” nor does it rule out the impact of socialization.30

### 2NC Say Yes—Stick—Populist Fears

#### The cp leverages burden sharing against populist fears—ensures say yes

Daniel H. Nexon and Jeffrey A. Stacey 12-3-20 -- Daniel H. Nexon is a Professor in the Department of Government and at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. Jeffrey A. Stacey was a State Department official in the Obama administration. His forthcoming book is titled Rise of the East, End of the West? (“Fear of Trump’s Populism Might Save American Alliances” <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2020-12-03/fear-trumps-populism-might-save-american-alliances>)

The United States that President-elect Joe Biden will inherit on January 20 faces a crisis of credibility. After four years of erratic behavior by President Donald Trump’s administration, the **international community** widely **views the** **U**nited **S**tates **as an unreliable power**. Even many of Washington’s closest and longest-standing allies no longer believe they can count on U.S. diplomatic or military support. **Biden cannot** easily **undo** **this damage** to U.S. credibility. **But he can make** U.S. **alliances** and security relationships **more resilient**. Paradoxically, **Trump has made this task easier** for the incoming president. **His rise** **to power** **revealed** that issues such as collective defense spending and **burden sharing**—long sticking points in transatlantic relations—**can inflame populist sentiments** **and thereby threaten long-standing alliances**. The **Biden administration should use that threat**, **and the prospect of another Trump-like populist, to build more equitable security relationships**. After all, countries such as France, Germany, Australia, and South Korea face a dangerous and uncertain future if U.S. security arrangements continue to deteriorate. More than 73 million Americans voted to reelect Trump. That number should serve as a powerful reminder to U.S. partners around the globe that the American system of alliances and security relationships is always just one election away from collapse. **Biden must persuade** these **partners to contribute more** to their alliance with the United States—**or else risk a resurgence of American populism that would leave them vulnerable and exposed in the long run**. LEMONS OUT OF LEMONADE One lesson of the Trump years is that friction over burden sharing, especially defense spending, presents a genuine threat to transatlantic relations. In 2006 and again in 2014, NATO members committed to spending two percent of their GDP on military capabilities, but less than half of them have hit that target. On the campaign trail in 2016, Trump railed against the failure of NATO allies to meet their spending obligations, even going so far as to question whether the United States would defend them in the event of a Russian attack. Once in office, he continued to harp on NATO allies’ spending shortfalls in order to pressure them to increase their military budgets and to help defray U.S. expenditures. He made similar demands of long-standing allies in Asia, supposedly in exchange for the presence of U.S. forces. This heavy-handed approach not only strained core U.S. alliances but underscored the fact that without real change on the part of U.S. allies, these relationships could become embroiled in U.S. electoral politics. According to a poll released by the Pew Research Center, by 2017 almost half of Americans thought NATO wasn’t doing enough to solve global problems. **This issue** **is unlikely to go away anytime soon**. **Biden will need to convince** major democratic **allies such as France and Germany to** **make significant progress** **toward** bringing their defense **budgets** in line with established commitments. **Although some U.S. allies will doubtless protest or continue to drag their feet, the Biden administration has considerable leverage**. Unlike, say, Pakistan, liberal democratic **partners don’t want to turn to Russia or China** for security guarantees. **Nor are they close to being able to go it alone. Biden can make U.S. alliances and security relationships more resilient.** This precarious position means that European allies should be willing to take the lead in buoying the Biden administration from day one. The long-standing pattern of **partners shirking** their defense-spending **responsibilities**—one week telling U.S. officials it would be most effective to pressure them publicly, the next week insisting that private persuasion is preferable—**needs to come to an end**. Berlin’s recent offer of a “new deal” on burden sharing, in which Germany would markedly increase its spending, enabling it to lead overseas military operations without the United States, along with its recent decision to crack down on Chinese telecommunications firm Huawei amounts to a strong start. But Biden needs to persuade Germany to go further: canceling the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline linking Russia and Europe and fully harmonizing Berlin’s positions on Russia and China with those in Washington would be productive next steps. Biden should also press France to increase its defense spending to meet or exceed NATO’s two percent threshold and to sharpen its condemnation of Russian aggression in Ukraine, support for reactionary populists, and efforts to subvert Western democracies. In exchange, Biden can offer European allies full support for closer U.S.-EU ties, much greater transatlantic cooperation, and U.S. backing for an independent EU military headquarters that would closely coordinate with NATO. Given that British Prime Minister Boris Johnson has already called for significant increases in military spending since the U.S. election, Biden’s approach to the United Kingdom should be slightly different and calibrated to temper that country’s populist surge. Brexit has damaged the country’s economy and international standing, and its fallout presents a threat to U.S. and European interests. Biden should make clear there will be no “special relationship”—and certainly no preferential trade agreement—unless London agrees to a Brexit arrangement that preserves the Good Friday peace agreement in Northern Ireland and keeps the United Kingdom closely tied to the rest of Europe. Although democratic treaty allies in Asia generally don’t shirk their military burdens in the way European states often do, the Biden administration should still look for some early wins in the Pacific. Agreements on subsidies for U.S military bases in Japan and South Korea would be a good place to start. The Biden administration should also stress that deteriorating relations between both countries are not helpful when it comes to justifying the U.S. presence in Northeast Asia. TRUMP-PROOF These initiatives in Europe and Asia should be part of a broader Biden administration effort to “Trump-proof” its entire alliance network. That this system survived the past four years at all is a testament to the importance of institutionalized ties between ministries and departments worldwide. Even as Trump threatened to abandon U.S. allies, U.S. military and civilian officials continued to cooperate with their counterparts overseas. These professional networks made it difficult for Trump to quickly end U.S. security commitments and likely saved many other agreements as well. As part of this broader plan, the United States needs to strengthen and enhance intergovernmental relationships, especially with European allies. NATO should further develop its civilian capabilities so that the alliance can effectively hand off postconflict reconstruction and stabilization missions to the EU. In turn, the latter should finally establish its own modest yet fully deployable military force to deal with security crises closer to home. Germany and France, in particular, could spearhead this process as part of their offer to overhaul and reinvigorate the transatlantic relationship. **Without rapid progress, the U.S. alliance network will remain vulnerable to another populist wave.** The United States and its European allies should also make a point of holding increasingly frequent joint military exercises and air-policing patrols that involve more equipment and personnel. At the same time, they should expand the number of U.S. and allied troop rotations in central Europe and dramatically increase the number of U.S. officials seconded to NATO and EU political and military headquarters. Doing so would strengthen connections between allied policymakers and refocus U.S. attention on Europe. In the Indo-Pacific, the Biden administration should push for more multilateral joint military exercises with regional allies, with an eye toward building stronger military and diplomatic relationships, akin to those that exist in Europe. On this front, Trump largely left Australia to fend for itself when it came to China. Now, Biden should push for Canberra to play an important role in Trump-proofing Asian alliances and for the governing Liberal-National Coalition to tackle its own right-populist streak. Australia, along with U.S. allies such as Japan and South Korea, will likely support greater cooperation immediately, and these efforts can provide a basis for expanding strategic engagement with India and other players currently outside the U.S. alliance system. Finally, Biden’s first overseas trip should be to Brussels for an unprecedented joint EU-NATO summit in the spring. He should follow that with a trip to Tokyo in the fall for a meeting with democratic Asian allies and a subsequent final joint summit that would include both European and Pacific partners in early 2022. In the past, the United States has preferred to maintain distance between its two sets of allies. Now, though, economic integration, global security challenges, and common membership in the U.S. security system make such an approach increasingly anachronistic. **THE NEXT SHOCK Without measurable, public, and rapid progress over the next four years, the U.S. alliance network, especially in western Europe, will remain vulnerable to another populist wave**. Trump-proofing these alliances and partnerships will require even more of U.S. partners than they likely realize. In an ironic twist, the fate of the U.S. security system will turn as much on how U.S. allies respond to the Biden administration as on how the Biden administration itself behaves. Early overtures to the Biden administration suggest that **U.S. democratic allies**, especially **in Europe, understand that returning to the status quo will mean risking another populist shock**—**one that could finally break the system**. **This means that Biden will have significant leverage in negotiations to overhaul long-standing relationships.** Although **Trump’s “America first**” approach left the world a more dangerous place, its repercussions fell disproportionately on U.S. partners, not on the United States itself. This **gives the leadership of countries such as France and Germany an incentive to demonstrate that a more cooperative approach can succeed where Trump’s combative one failed.** Old habits die hard, however. If democratic allies drift into complacency, the Biden administration will need to remind them that nothing less than the survival of U.S. security guarantees is at stake—not because Biden fails to see their value but because the next U.S. president might not.

### 2NC Say Yes—Stick—Public Good

#### NATO says yes—they value defense spending as a public good

Anika Binnendijk 19 — (Anika Binnendijk; senior fellow with the Scowcroft Center’s Transatlantic Security Initiative, a political scientist at the RAND Corporation, Published: 2019; "An Attack Against Them All? Drivers of Decisions to Contribute to NATO Collective Defense"; RAND Corporation; Accessed: 7-9-2022; https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1080712.pdf)//Pen-SY

NATO members might worry about alliance collapse or the exit of powerful allies, such as the United States, for reasons beyond homeland defense. Either could compromise NATO’s ability to conduct other operations, including humanitarian relief, counterterrorism, and enforcement of international law. For European security elites who have incorporated NATO into their core national security cultures, the existence of NATO and its associated organizations has significance beyond pure rational calculation. Although the United Kingdom might rely heavily on alliance security guarantees, behavioral and normative factors might also lead the United Kingdom to prioritize the U.S.-British “special relationship” and NATO, leading it to contribute to alliance operations in Afghanistan and elsewhere.92 Germany also values NATO for a mix of rationalist and cultural reasons.93 Therefore, while Germany chose not to participate in the NATO campaign in Libya directly, it indirectly supported the effort by sending by sending German NATO AWACS crews to Afghanistan, freeing other NATO crews for operations in Libya. The German Ministry of Defense described the move as a “political sign of our solidarity with the alliance.”94 Ultimately, states that place higher value on the “public goods” provided by the existence of the NATO alliance might be willing to bear a share of the burden during a military campaign.95

### 2NC Say Yes—Stick—Ukraine

#### Ukraine puts allies on the brink.

Zannella, 20 [Anthony Zannella Seton Hall University, majored in Political Science and Philosophy, 4-7-2020 "An Analysis of Burden Sharing in NATO and the Problem of Free Riding," Political Analysis: Vol. 21 , Article 5, [https://scholarship.shu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1058&context=pa#](https://scholarship.shu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1058&context=pa) /alundy]

Hans Binnendijk explored the problem of free riding within NATO from an historical standpoint. Binnendijk reviewed the pros and cons of spending within the alliance since its inception, and he discussed how the United States had attempted to address budgetary issues with its allies in the past. He concluded that recent Russian aggression toward Ukraine could provide an opening for the United States to put more pressure on its European allies. The increased pressure could, in turn, coerce European allies to commit more to defense spending and effectively lessen the burden being placed on the U.S. Binnendijk also went through multiple policy proposals that would help initiate this pressure, and he also delved into how each facet would help to equalize burden sharing. Part of Binnendijk’s broader argument is that European NATO is changing because new geo-political considerations have become more important since the fall of the Soviet Union (Binnendijk 2016).

### 2NC Say Yes—Stick—Hedging

#### Allies are more likely to hedge than realign---Europe needs America.

Shapiro 18, Director of Research at the European Council on Foreign Relations, (Jeremy, May 15th, 2018, “Why Trump Can Safely Ignore Europe”, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/europe/2018-05-15/why-trump-can-safely-ignore-europe)

THEY NEED IT MORE

The simple answer is that Europeans need the alliance more than the Americans do. For Europe, the transatlantic alliance is its rock of stability in an otherwise ever-changing world and the foundation on which it has constructed [European security and European integration](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/europe/2017-11-30/europes-readiness-problem). Shared values and interests, much more so than with authoritarian powers such as Russia and China, also drive the bond.

The United States does value the transatlantic alliance. It wants help on international security issues such as Afghanistan or Syria, and U.S. officials certainly enjoy proclaiming that the United States leads the world. But the reality is that the United States doesn’t need the European alliance for its own security. As Trump has implied many times, the United States can simply walk away from the relationship.

In theory, Europeans could simply band together and provide for their own security.  Combined, they have as much economic weight and military power as the United States and far more than any of their potential rivals, including Russia. In practice, they still prefer relying on the United States for their security rather than relying on one another.

The United States, after all, is a distant power with only a passing interest in the internal affairs of Europe. EU countries, by contrast, are deeply involved in one another’s affairs—they have multiple internal disputes that range from how to deal with their common currency to how to manage immigration. They look to their relationship with the United States not simply for security from external threats such as Russia or terrorism but also for a potential ally in their internal disputes with other EU states. Surveys by the European Council on Foreign Relations show that at least 11 European governments believe they have a “special relationship” with the United States that gives them advantages they can’t get from their European partners.

In Greece, for example, policymakers look to Washington for protection not from Russia or terrorism but from [Germany’s stringent economic policies](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/greece/2015-01-25/so-long-austerity). In Poland, the government’s distrust of the EU and other European nations, especially Germany, is palpable even as Warsaw relies on them for economic support. The Polish government does not want to increase its dependence by relying on its EU partners for protection from Russia as well. Its relationship with the United States is, in part, a diversification strategy.

In short, Europeans, working together, could provide for their own security from external threats. The problem is that they also want political protection from one another. And only the United States can provide that.

This asymmetric dependence lies at the [heart of the alliance](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2018-03-05/world-after-trump) and means that so far Europeans have had to make their peace with the Trump administration. Yes, European leaders frequently resort to rhetorical broadsides aimed at Trump’s numerous sins. Merkel told a campaign audience nearly a year ago that the United States could no longer be relied upon and that “it was time for Europe to take its fate in its own hands.” French President Emmanuel Macron recently took Trump to task on climate change in front of the U.S. Congress. But beyond these principled stands, they have done precious little to counter Trump.

### 2NC Say Yes—Stick—New Metric

#### Alliance contribution rating is broad, politically palatable, and effective—that’s Martin

#### A broader metric is iterative and improves NATO burden sharing.

Raji 18, a senior fellow at the University of California, Berkeley, served as the U.S. ambassador to Sweden (2016 to 2017). She is an investor, philanthropist, and a former Wall Street banker, (Azita, February 26th, 2018, “Salvaging Trump’s Legacy in Europe: Fixing NATO Burden-Sharing”, https://warontherocks.com/2018/02/salvaging-trumps-legacy-europe-fixing-nato-burden-sharing/)

When it comes to NATO defense spending, as with any strategically smart investment, the objective should be optimal allocation of resources by factoring in each ally’s comparative and competitive advantages, both domestically and internationally, and by leveraging these strengths toward overall effectiveness of NATO’s objective in achieving collective security. Using this framework, the international actions of an ally in other areas would be included toward creating a more whole, multidimensional, and ultimately more useful and accurate picture of a country’s true contribution to security, a more nuanced picture that can help identify the real laggards, as well as flaws in the model and opportunities for further improvement of metrics and results. Meanwhile, by proposing a more representatively broad metric capable of reflecting the actual ways allies contribute to security and defense, the Trump administration would, at least in this one instance, enjoy the additional benefit of digging itself out of its unforced error, namely drawing a line in the sand without having considered a response to nations who have no choice but to cross it.

### 2NC Say Yes—Stick—Empirics

#### threats are good---trust history---best European defense spending efforts have empirically tailed threats of abandonment.

Glaser 17, director of foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute. His research interests include grand strategy, U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East, the rise of China, and the role of status and prestige motivations in international politics, (John, February 8th, 2017, “Encouraging NATO Burden Sharing: What Works?”, https://www.cato.org/blog/nato-burden-sharing?queryID=97dfb598d2a4e01f4ad80dde059b0c82)

President Donald Trump has repeatedly complained that the United States carries too much of the economic and military burden in NATO. He has even gone so far as to call the European alliance “[obsolete](http://www.cnn.com/2017/01/16/politics/donald-trump-times-bild-interview-takeaways/)” and to suggest that his administration might not fulfill the treaty’s Article 5 obligation that commits NATO countries to come to the defense of any member that is attacked (Note: administration officials have repeatedly sought to reassure NATO allies that we remain committed to the collective defense of Europe, and Trump has contradicted himself on this score).

Many think this provocative rhetoric is just a ploy to get our NATO allies, who habitually underspend on defense and free‐​ride on America’s security guarantees, to pay more of their fair share of the burden. At the Washington Post’s Monkey Cage blog, Andrea Gilli argues this approach is unlikely to jolt NATO allies into spending more on defense, though. Among other reasons, most NATO allies “face financial and political constraints to increasing military expenditure” in part because U.S. security assurances “have freed up state funds in Europe for other priorities, including a robust system of social services.” And since cutting welfare benefits is typically a political non‐​starter, we shouldn’t necessarily expect NATO countries to boost defense spending due to Trump’s abrasive rhetoric.

But the historical record seems to contradict Gilli’s argument. According to the [RAND Corporation](http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1200/RR1210/RAND_RR1210.pdf), Europe has historically spent between 43 percent and 78 percent of U.S. spending on defense. The ratio reached its peak in 1980, and then again in 2000 — years that were at the tail end of periods of defense budget cuts. And according to the RAND report, one of the the most successful techniques in getting NATO allies to share more of the burden was “threats by Congress to withdraw its troops from Europe.”

The only period of signficant real growth in European defense spending was during the 1970s; otherwise European defense expenditure has been remarkably flat in real terms…

Historically, efforts to create incentives or to manage the burden‐​sharing problem have taken four different approaches. The first approach (1966 to the mid‐​1980s) was based on the threat of U.S. troop withdrawals. With a series of resolutions and amendments from 1966 to 1975, Senator Mike Mansfield sought to use the threat of U.S. troop withdrawals to force Europe to contribute more and to lessen U.S. costs. As noted, that effort—plus other factors relating to economic growth and the Soviet threat—may have had a positive effect: European defense spending grew by 44 percent between 1970 and 1984.

Certainly other factors contributed to this period of growth in NATO burden sharing — higher rates of economic growth, increased perceptions of the Soviet threat, defense budget cuts as we withdrew from Vietnam, etc. But U.S. threats to pare back its commitment to the region seem to have had a significant impact.

### 2NC Say Yes—Stick—AT: Sticking Point

#### Burden sharing is no longer a sticking point

Chandran, 17 [Nyshka Chandran, former writer for CNBC.com, who focused on Asia-Pacific politics, 06-07-2017, “Defense Secretary Mattis welcomes Beijing’s help on North Korea, prods on South China Sea,” CNBC, <https://www.cnbc.com/2017/06/02/us-criticizes-beijings-activities-in-south-china-sea.html> /alundy]

President Donald Trump has criticized NATO members for failing to contribute more to defense spending but Mercier said the issue wasn’t a contentious one.

Sharing the burden of defending the North Atlantic community is a defining concept of NATO, Mercier stated. “This is not new,” he said pointing to the Washington Treaty — the organization’s founding agreement — as an example.

Article 3 of the Treaty stipulates members must maintain and develop an individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack. Thus, the responsibilities lie with the nations, Mercier said.

### 2NC S—Interoperability

#### Conditioning on interoperability solves

Ross and Dalton 20, Tommy Ross, non-resident senior associate at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and Melissa Dalton, directs the Cooperative Defense Project and is a senior fellow and deputy director of the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, (“A ROADMAP FOR BETTER CHOICES FROM SECURITY PARTNERS,” *War on the Rocks*, <https://warontherocks.com/2020/01/a-roadmap-for-better-choices-from-security-partners/>)

Some will object that this approach and the obligations it implies for both U.S. planners and foreign counterparts are unrealistic, and that such obligations attached to U.S. assistance could drive partners to alternative security providers. In our experience, many U.S. partners not only want to work with the United States as their security partner of choice but are also motivated by a desire to improve the effectiveness and governability of their own security sectors. Yet, it is also important to acknowledge that this approach will unquestionably require more diplomatic engagement by senior policymakers to achieve and sustain partner buy-in. That is both necessary and appropriate. Security sector assistance is a fundamentally political activity. It should be buttressed by engagement between political stakeholders on both sides to identify political objectives, requirements, and obstacles in relation to an assistance program. Indeed, the lack of this type of persistent political dialogue is a prominent cause of many security sector assistance failures. Looking Ahead Incentivizing security partners’ progress toward common outcomes and objectives will enable the United States to get more out of its security sector assistance investments. Such an approach will be vital to building strong, accountable, and interoperable partnerships globally. It may be particularly important in fragile states, where security sector assistance may otherwise inadvertently fuel predatory behavior by security actors. While political realities will inevitably disrupt routine plans, and policymakers will demand instant or tangible “deliverables,” such as lethal assistance, the only remedy to mitigate against unintended consequences is to institutionalize a smart, incentives-based planning framework with continuous opportunities for adaptation and adjustment. The United States will need to pilot this approach to experiment and fine-tune a viable framework. This in turn will require bipartisan support in the U.S. Congress for the security sector assistance enterprise to “fail forward” on a pathway to success. Several indicators suggest that Congress is ready to move in this direction. In recent years, it has passed several bills — most notably the Fiscal Year 2017 National Defense Authorization Act and the Foreign Aid Transparency and Accountability Act of 2016 — that have established important foundations for positive conditionality, including mandates for assessment, monitoring, and evaluation of foreign military assistance, more flexible planning horizons for Defense Department assistance, and tighter collaboration between the Defense and State Departments in planning and implementing military aid. A new legislative initiative, the pending Department of State Authorization Act of 2019, would take several additional steps forward. Recently passed by the House Foreign Affairs Committee with strong bipartisan support, the bill would create several new tools supporting positive conditionality, including strengthening assessment, monitoring, and evaluation of military assistance, authorizing “Security Assistance Compacts” similar to the bilateral compacts discussed above, and bolstering planning processes to achieve greater strategic focus and prioritization in U.S. assistance. Passage of this legislation would represent a watershed moment for U.S. security sector assistance, particularly aid provided by the Department of State. The urgency of adopting a new, more strategic approach to security assistance is growing by the day. American partnerships are under increasing pressure from declining resources, domestic isolationist trends, and strategic competition. Meanwhile, the range of global security challenges for which the United States turns to partners to contribute grows in diversity and complexity. Positive conditionality offers policymakers, diplomats, and operators a tool to shape partners’ behaviors in a manner that offers an opportunity to produce greater return on American investments, simultaneously strengthening partnerships and growing global capacity to deter, prevent, and respond to crises and conflict.

#### Burden sharing and interoperability are empirically interconnected.

Davies, 13 [Andrew Davies, Senior Analyst and Director of Research Australian Strategic Policy Institute, written on ADF capability and force structuring issues, post doctoral fellow in physics at Melbourne University and the ANU, twelve years in the Department of Defence in the areas of capability analysis and intelligence, 2/2013, United States Studies Center at the University of Sydney, Alliance 21 Program, ‘Alliance Burden-Sharing and Force Ineroperability’, <https://united-states-studies-centre.s3.amazonaws.com/attache/99/e7/46/b1/a9/2e/4e/ce/df/14/f3/ad/d8/28/ed/04/alliance-21-report-united-states-davies.pdf> /alundy]

Australia has a long-established relationship in intelligence cooperation through the five-eyes UKUSA relationship, where interoperability is effectively seamless and information exchange is deep and routine. The result of that cooperation is a very effective burden sharing arrangement, with various of the partners taking primary responsibility for their part of the world, resulting in a global capability in which the whole is greater than the sum of its parts. Such a cooperative arrangement also means that there is a collective surge capability in the case of major events— the response to the terrorist attacks of September 2001 being a good example. To make this happen, the intelligence relationship has a variety of mechanisms that facilitate cooperation, including regular personnel exchange, the sharing of technologies and techniques and common data and encryption standards for moving information around. This is a useful example for thinking about the benefits of interoperability in the ‘traditional’ military domains—the same basic ideas apply. For example, if partner nations have platform systems that can communicate securely to share situational awareness data, then the overall surveillance and reconnaissance capability of all of them is improved. Effectiveness is improved. In today’s resource constrained world, efficiency is also important. There are at least two aspects to that. First, having the confidence that a partner has the capability to look after a designated task (or area) while providing accurate data across a shared net allows for a division of labour, the same way that the intelligence world is ‘carved up’. Second, with the increasing cost of military platforms and their support arrangements, economies of scale become ever more important. For the larger partner, sales of equipment to allies and friends amortises costs over larger production runs. For the smaller partners, the can avoid the increasingly prohibitive R&D costs and still acquire highend equipment. The notion of burden sharing also translates across. At least since the articulation of the Nixon/Guam doctrine in 1969, the United States has made it clear that, while the United States will honour its alliance commitments, its partners and allies also have a responsibility for providing for their own defence. That means in practice that they will field defence forces that are at least locally capable, even if they lack the long range power projection capabilities the United States operates. In many cases, this gives them the ability to take responsibility for security activities in their local region.

### 2NC S—Cohesion/Alliances

#### If we win say yes, it proves: 1. The cp solves the aff’s internal links to alliance cohesion- that’s sufficient to solve their impacts 2. The cp doesn’t collapse the alliance because Allies are willing to increase burden sharing

#### Effective burden-sharing creates a durable US political commitment to alliances

Tankel 17, assistant professor at American University and Melissa Dalton, senior fellow and the deputy director of the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (Stephen, “How to Improve Return on Investment for Security Assistance,” *Lawfare*, <https://www.lawfareblog.com/how-improve-return-investment-security-assistance>)//BB

The critics have a point. The reality is, the U.S. government has few mechanisms to reliably track how its security assistance dollars are performing in terms of return on investment for meeting strategic and policy goals. There have been a number of steps taken in the last three years to start to change that, through executive and legislative branch action. However, even the most ardent supporters of alliances and partnerships must acknowledge that the return on security assistance is often lower than it could be. More than merely wasting taxpayers’ dollars, this damages U.S. credibility and reinforces the belief that maintaining alliances and partnerships is simply not worth the costs involved. We firmly believe security assistance should remain a critical pillar of U.S. statecraft. We also believe the United States could get a better rate of return on some of these programs by changing the way it conditions assistance. Changing the way the United States conditions assistance could change that for the better. This will not solve the problem of how to optimize our relationships with other countries—there is no silver bullet for that—but it would help the United States get more bang for its buck. This is a sentiment that should appeal to the dealmaker-in-chief.

#### Burden sharing sustains the alliance—equity is key

Keating 22 (Dave, American-European journalist writing for the World Politics Review, “NATO Finds a New Sense of Purpose in an Old Mission” 6/30/22 <https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/trend-lines/30648/to-counter-russia-nato-gets-back-to-basics>)

NATO leaders gathered this week at a summit in Madrid to adopt a New Strategic Concept, a framework that sets out the alliance’s core priorities for the next decade. But the Madrid gathering was in other ways historic, ushering in further expansion of the alliance after Turkey lifted its veto of Sweden’s and Finland’s membership bids. The U.S. also pledged to deploy more troops, warplanes and naval vessels as part of the alliance’s largest military buildup since the Cold War, in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The ramifications of the summit will be most obvious on NATO’s eastern flank, with the announcement of a new, permanent headquarters in Poland and the bolstering of rotational deployments to the Baltic states. The dizzying details of NATO’s buildup in Europe mark a remarkable turnaround for an alliance that looked listless and even near collapse just a few years ago, when former U.S. President Donald Trump raised doubts about Washington’s commitment to NATO and French President Emmanuel Macron declared it “braindead.” Over the past few years, many expected the new strategic concept to pivot away from NATO’s original focus on defending Europe against Russia and instead turn the alliance’s sights on China and international terrorism. There was also considerable talk of building a European Defense Union that would give Washington’s European allies the autonomous capability to defend themselves without U.S. assistance. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on Feb. 24 changed all that, making it clear that in practical terms, Washington’s security umbrella is the only real defense option Europe has at this time. In the span of a few months, NATO went from being considered a Cold War relic badly in need of a reboot to being an essential collective defense alliance that must double down on its original intent. The New Strategic Concept adopted yesterday by NATO leaders mentions Russia 17 times. By comparison, it mentions China 10 times and terrorism seven times, while Afghanistan is mentioned only once. The last strategic concept, signed in 2010 in the presence of then-Russian President Dimitry Medvedev, referred to Russia as a “strategic partner.” Fast forward 12 years, and the new strategic concept has reclassified Russia as a major threat to world peace. As for China, it is deemed a source of “systemic challenges” with which the alliance “remain[s] open to constructive engagement,” as some alliance members objected to labeling it a “threat.” Nevertheless, the newfound enthusiasm for NATO will not paper over difficult realities that the war in Ukraine has done nothing to ameliorate. European leaders appear to know that Biden’s Atlanticism is more likely a blip for Washington than a “return to normal,” as Trump or someone just as skeptical of U.S. security commitments like NATO could win the presidency in 2024. Former Trump aides have said he planned to withdraw the U.S. from NATO had he won reelection to a second term in office. For their part, Western European leaders were keen to stress at the Madrid summit that proposals for an autonomous European defense are not being abandoned, nor are they meant to compete with NATO. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen noted that NATO will become “more European” with the accession of Finland and Sweden into the alliance. If their bids are successful, only four EU member states will not also be members of the alliance: Ireland, Austria and Malta, all of which have longstanding positions of neutrality, and Cyprus, because of Turkey’s veto. The EU’s eastern members, however, remain wary of an autonomous European defense mechanism for fear that it will undermine NATO. They were likely reassured by this week’s summit, which gave new impetus to getting NATO back to its core mission of countering Russian aggression. For those who harbor the long-term ambition of creating an equitable alliance, rather than one that effectively functions as a U.S. protectorate, more work on European defense will be needed.

#### Without comprehensive burden sharing, politics within the alliance fails.

Kivimaki, 19 [Timo Kivimaki, 2-13-2019, professor of International Relations and Director of Research at University of Bath, European Security, Volume 28, ‘Power, Contribution, and Dependence in NATO Burden Sharing’, <https://researchportal.bath.ac.uk/en/publications/power-contribution-and-dependence-in-nato-burden-sharing> /alundy]

One of the key themes of NATO Summits in recent years has been the question of burden sharing in Western defence.[1](https://www-tandfonline-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1080/09662839.2019.1578750) Are US allies paying their fair share towards common security? Some scholars feel that clarity on the fairness of contributions is necessary for the efficiency of any cooperation (Tyler [2003](https://www-tandfonline-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1080/09662839.2019.1578750)), while others claim that too much emphasis on distributional issues can hamper efficiency in the production of Western security (Cooper and Zycher [1989](https://www-tandfonline-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1080/09662839.2019.1578750), p. 7, Kreps [2010](https://www-tandfonline-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1080/09662839.2019.1578750)). These two positions are not necessarily contradictory, as clear principles on burden sharing could be a condition for effective defence and focus on common security rather than on divisive internal discussions on distribution. The focus on distribution issues may well lead to internal divisions (Techau [2015](https://www-tandfonline-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1080/09662839.2019.1578750)), but it is the lack of clarity that causes both the focus and the friction, and thus, without clarity in the alliance, politics cannot be efficient.

#### Sharing the burden is a critical feature of successful cohesion and interoperability.

Dufour, 18 [Martin Dufour, Colonel in the Canadian Army, currently working with NATO, 12-10-2018, NATO Defense College, <https://www.ndc.nato.int/news/news.php?icode=1239>/alundy]

Cohesion, often mentioned as the Alliance’s center of gravity, lies at the heart of NATO’s success. Underwriting this cohesion is the ability of member states to share the burden of producing military capabilities to service the whole, and the burden of conducting operational missions. To do this successfully, members have to be able to undertake military actions in concert with each other in a fully coordinated, and as much as possible integrated manner. This is referred to as interoperability, defined as “the ability of systems, units or forces to provide services to, and accept services from other systems, units or forces and to the use the services so exchanged to enable them to operate effectively together”.1 This definition implies that there are several layers to interoperability which need to be addressed to ensure forces are able to operate together effectively in a military context. These include technical features permitting systems to physically connect to one another and exchange information; and the alignment of procedures and processes to allow military personnel to function within the same space and achieve common goals without fratricide. It also implies that this takes place at various levels of operation, from tactical to strategic. A high level of interoperability allows allies to effectively exchange intelligence and information, cooperatively plan complex military operations, and conduct integrated missions with fully exchangeable force packages.

### 2NC S—AT: Domestic Politics

#### Public opinion is malleable and shaped by threat perception, domestic preferences for social spending is overstated, and overriding national elites is the key variable.

Schilde et al. 19, \*Kaija E. Schilde is an Associate Professor at the Frederick S. Pardee School of Global Studies at Boston University. She is the author of The Political Economy of European Security (Cambridge University Press 2017). \*Stephanie B. Anderson, Professor of Political Science, Ph.D. University of Cambridge (UK), M.Sc., The London School of Economics, and B.S.F.S. at Georgetown University. Her research focus is on the European Union (EU) as an International Actor, International Relations and Security Issues. \*Andrew D. Garner is an Associate Professor at the University of Wyoming, Laramie, WY, USA, whose research focuses on the effect of Political, Social, and Media Environments on public opinion and voting behavior. (Kaija E. Schilde, Stephanie B. Anderson & Andrew D. Garner (2019) A more martial Europe? Public opinion, permissive consensus, and EU defence policy, European Security,28:2, 153-172, DOI: 10.1080/09662839.2019.1617275)

Indeed, there may be an intuitive logic to EU defence–particularly with regard to pooling and sharing defence burdens–that resonates amongst the public with little persuasion. In recent history, Europe might well have been turning inward, losing its foreign policy influence, and diminishing its role in security and defence. However, these developments cannot be understood as driven by popular opinion. A better explanation for stagnation in defence integration might be that national elites, such as defence bureaucrats and or protected national industries, benefit from the status quo.

An additional implication emerges: it is possible that Europeans may be more supportive of the use of force at the European than the national level. Negative preferences on the use of force and interventions may be capturing low levels of support for national military interventions. Conventional wisdom assumes that individuals support national defence over collective defence, stretching negative opinion results on intervention to the logic of defence cooperation. While their states spend less on defence than the US, it appears that most Europeans are not content with the status quo, nor have they become used to spending less on the military as a matter of principle. Europeans are not so exceptional when it comes to defence preferences. Also, the idea that Europeans inherently prefer butter to guns–allowing the US to subsidise their security with no concerns–appears shaky at best.

This study has clarified the nature of individual support for EU defence, but it has not yet identified the conditions under which individuals support integration. In order to identify more granular determinants of individual support for EU defence, we propose sub-sequent experimental surveys on the topic. We suggest two additional mechanisms at work for future research that are mutually constitutive. The first is that there may be a latent European identification amongst the European public supportive of EU defence. It may not be well-captured by extant public opinion polls, because those questions have historically framed European identity as either layered with national identity or contrasted with it (i.e. are you European, national, or both?).

The second is that this proto-European identity may be activated and driven by threats from outside of Europe. There are certain kinds of threats–of many origins but from outside of Europe–that may provoke a default support for a common European security and defence policy. Perceived threats may take different forms, from competition with the US, reactions to immigrants, instability outside Europe, or Russian geopolitical developments. If true, this could help explain why support for EU defence is so consistent and robust: it may be driven by a succession of threats–from different sources at different points in time–that create logical preferences prioritising European security responses and solutions. We propose testing these additional hypotheses of identity and external threats in future research designs.

## AT: Perm and Theory

### 2NC AT: Perm Do Both

#### Links to the external net benefit:

[Entrapment]- It guarantees security cooperation happens even if allies don’t burden share- that signals unconditional US assistance

[Politics]- It shows congress that the US is not interested in restraining unconditional assistance abroad

#### Doing both collapses credible leverage – that encourages free-riding and risk-taking from NATO members, increases the risk of war

Blankenship 18 (Professor of Political Science at the University of Miami in Coral Gables, PhD political science at Columba, MPhil & MA political science at Columbia “Promises under Pressure: Reassurance and Burden-Sharing in Asymmetric Alliances,” Columbia University PhD dissertation, <https://academiccommons.columbia.edu/download/fedora_content/download/ac:b8gtht76k9/content/Blankenship_columbia_0054D_14562.pdf>, Published 2018)

In a May 2017 visit to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) headquarters, U.S. President Donald Trump declined to affirm his support of NATO’s Article 5, which obligates its members to come to each others’ defense.4 Indeed, this was no accident; in his speech, Trump deliberately removed a passage expressing his support for Article 5.5 U.S. allies – as well as members of Trump’s own administration – were taken aback, with German Chancellor Angela Merkel arguing that it was time for Europeans to “really take our fate into our own hands.”6 In the wake of the uproar surrounding Trump’s speech – and his treatment of allies more generally – one question that has largely been neglected is why one should even expect the United States to reassure its allies in the first place. Indeed, reassurance is fundamentally puzzling because it surrenders a key source of bargaining power: the threat of abandonment. Bargaining leverage within an alliance depends on the credibility of states’ threats to abandon their partners, and thus great power patrons should limit the extent to which they are perceived as committed to their allies (Snyder, 1997; Jervis, 1997: ch. 5; Crawford, 2003).7 Reassurance measures, however, are intended to have exactly the opposite effect. Why, then, would a patron deliberately weaken its bargaining position? Other stands of literature similarly suggest that reassurance can have undesirable consequences. Theories on defense burden-sharing in asymmetric alliances stress that as long as a great power’s protection is relatively assured, allies have little incentive to increase their military contributions (Olson and Zeckhauser, 1966; Oneal, 1990; Palmer, 1990a,b; Sandler, 1993). By reassuring them, the patron effectively encourages its allies to free-ride. Furthermore, reassuring allies can run the risk of moral hazard. Allies confident in their patron’s support may be prone to take risks such as confronting their adversaries because they expect that the patron will bail them out, thus increasing the probability that the patron will be entrapped or entangled in allies’ conflicts (Christensen and Snyder, 1990; Fearon, 1997; Posen, 2014). In the years leading up to World War I, for example, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Sazonov cautioned against reassuring Serbia of Russia’s support too strongly, lest the Serbian government be encouraged to take a more intransigent stance vis-à-vis its territorial disputes with Austria-Hungary. He lamented that this was rendered more challenging by the attitudes of other senior Russian officials – including the ambassador to Serbia – whose support for Serbia’s pan-Slavic ambitions in the Balkans ran the risk of encouraging Serbian adventurism (Jelavich, 1991: 244-245, 250). The puzzle of reassurance is only magnified in asymmetric alliances. In his seminal book, Waltz (1979) argues that unlike in symmetric alliances between great powers, where each ally is a crucial component of the overall balance of power, in asymmetric alliances weak states are comparatively much less important, as their allegiance is less likely to influence the course of a war. Recent scholarship suggests that great powers can shape their alliance treaties and withhold support from their allies as a means of reducing the risks of moral hazard (Kim, 2011a; Benson, 2012; Mattes, 2012). Beckley (2015: 19), for one, claims that the United States “is unlikely to incur major costs to display loyalty to allies that depend on U.S. protection and patronage for their survival,” as none of its allies are inherently important for its own security. This asymmetry becomes even more pronounced in bipolar and unipolar systems, where the gap between the capabilities of the superpowers and other states is even wider and small states have even fewer patrons to choose from (Snyder, 1997; Kim, 2016). It may be understandable, then, that Walt (2005: 242) would conclude: “the credibility of U.S. commitments is not [the United States’] problem”; rather, it is “a problem for those who are dependent on U.S. help.” Yet Trump’s treatment of allies has come as such a surprise because reassuring allies has, in fact, been historically common in U.S. foreign policy. Former U.S. Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger, for one, argued that “both the size and the specific elements of [American] forces are driven more by the need to reassure those that we protect under the nuclear umbrella than by U.S. requirements alone” (Murdock et al., 2009: 9). Since 1945, the United States has stationed hundreds of thousands of troops on allied soil, and U.S. officials make countless foreign visits and public statements to demonstrate interest in and support for American partners (Lebovic and Saunders, 2016). Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter, for example, made such an effort to communicate U.S. commitment through numerous overseas trips that the New York Times dubbed him the “secretary of reassurance” in the summer of 2015.8Indeed, the historical record is replete with examples of weaker allies extracting support despite their patron’s reluctance. U.S. policymakers during the early years of the Cold War, for example, did not envision the U.S. troop presence in Europe as permanent, with Dwight Eisenhower arguing that “If in ten years, all American troops stationed in Europe for national defense purposes have not been returned to the United States, then this whole project will have failed” (Sheetz, 1999: 32). Nevertheless, allies resisted American withdrawal, leading to what Zimmermann (2009) calls the “improbable permanence” of the U.S. troop presence. Similarly, East Germany was able to pressure a reluctant Soviet Union into building the Berlin Wall by threatening to align itself more closely with China (Harrison, 2005; Crump, 2015). However, reassurance remains understudied in the scholarly literature. Academic studies often treat great power patrons’ use of reassurance as a byproduct of deterrence, where the primary intended audiences are adversaries (Schelling, 1966; Morgan, 1983; Benson, Meirowitz, and Ramsay, 2014; McManus, 2017). To the extent that the academic literature has considered reassurance, it has largely been in the context of how states reassure their allies rather than why. Policy prescriptions, for their part, tend to either deny the importance of reassurance (e.g., Posen, 2014) or assume its importance and focus on how to reassure allies (e.g., Flournoy and Davidson, 2012).9 As a result, existing literature has not offered a theory of reassurance. 1.2 ArgumentIn this dissertation, I address the following questions: What explains variation in great powers’ use of reassurance measures toward allies? And under what conditions can patrons make their protection conditional on allied burden-sharing? Here, I define reassurance as acts made by a patron that are intended to convince an ally that its assistance will be forthcoming in the event of an attack from another state. In other words, assurances are intended to reduce allies’ fears of patron abandonment.10 The theory I present here is intended to be generalizeable; however, for reasons discussed below I focus on American alliances. Thus I use the terms “patron” and “United States” interchangeably. Although reassurance can have adverse consequences, patrons have incentives to reassure to the extent that allies can credibly threaten to exit the alliance. By exit, I refer to attempts by states in an alliance to loosen themselves from the partnership by pursuing outside options. In its most extreme form, alliance exit can take the form of treaty abrogation, allying with a hostile third party, or a refusal to provide support in wartime. More commonly, patrons fear that their allies will take more incremental steps that allow them to distance themselves from the alliance by exploiting outside options. The more credible an ally’s threat to pursue outside options, and the more costs that doing so would impose on the patron, the more incentive patrons have to reassure allies. Patrons face a dilemma, trading off between withholding reassurance to drive hard bargains and reduce free-riding, on the one hand, and reassuring allies to discourage them from pursuing outside options, on the other. This dilemma can be mitigated, however, if a patron can make its assurances conditional on allied burden-sharing by combining its assurances with threats of abandonment. Like those of its allies, the patron’s threats are more potent to the extent that they are both credible and salient to its allies. Thus, reassurance and burden-sharing are the product of bargaining, where each side’s leverage is shaped by its threat of exit. Studying the effects of exit, however, is difficult owing to the issue of endogeneity. An ally’s desire for outside options may be a function of its patron’s behavior – including its use of reassurance (or lack thereof) – and states are also likely to anticipate the risk of exit and tailor their actions accordingly. As such, I look at factors affecting the propensity of patrons and allies to exit.

#### The credibility of the threat matters—the perm’s diminished credibility means there won’t be burden-sharing

Blankenship 20 (Brian,Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Miami in Coral Gables, PhD political science at Columba, MPhil & MA political science at Columbia. February 2020, The Price of Protection: Understanding Coercive Alliance Burden-Sharing http://www.bblankenship.com/uploads/6/6/2/1/66215933/blankenship\_priceofprotection.pdf)

How, then, do we explain variation in the success or failure of coercive alliance burdensharing? Since the pioneering work of scholars like Olson and Zeckhauser in the 1960s, the dominant research program on burden-sharing has treated security in alliances as a public good.8 The primary claim advanced by this literature is that the larger members of an alliance will tend to over-contribute to the costs of the alliance, since its success by-and-large depends on their efforts. Smaller members, by contrast, will under-contribute, or “free-ride.” 9 This argument has generated considerable insights into the distribution of burdens in U.S. alliances – particularly in NATO – both during and after the Cold War.10 However, there is much variation that it has difficulty accounting for. It cannot explain why France withdrew from NATO’s military command in 1966, despite being among NATO’s largest members; why Germany since the end of the Cold War has been among NATO’s lowest spenders on defense as a percentage of its GDP; or why, by contrast, smaller NATO members in the 2010s – namely Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania – have punched above their weight. Likewise, the economic theory of alliances cannot account for the rise in allied burden-sharing in 1970s and its subsequent fall in much of 1980s.11

In this article, I present a theory which focuses explicitly on a great power’s (or “patron’s”) ability to influence burden-sharing contributions of its junior allies (“allies,” or “protégés”). In particular, the theory explains the conditions under which a patron’s burden-sharing pressure is more or less likely to be effective. I argue that a patron’s burden-sharing leverage is greatest when its threat to abandon the alliance is both *credible* and *salient* to its partners. Specifically, a patron can most credibly threaten to abandon allies when it faces constraints on the resources it can devote to its foreign commitments, and when allies are of limited strategic value. The consequences of abandonment, in turn, are most severe for allies that are highly vulnerable to attack.

In order to test the theory, I conduct statistical tests on U.S. alliances from 1950-2012, using data on allied military spending. Three key findings emerge from the results. First, I find that allies are more likely to increase their military spending when the United States faces resource constraints and pressure to retrench in the aftermath of costly foreign wars. Second, allies which are geographically vulnerable spend more on defense than allies with a large margin of security. Third, allies in geostrategically valuable locations near maritime chokepoints spend less on defense. I further illustrate the theory’s causal mechanisms using short case studies on U.S. burden-sharing pressure toward South Korea and the United Kigndom during the 1960s and 1970s.

This article makes a number of contributions. For one, I directly draw attention to the bargaining process that shapes alliance burden-sharing. With few exceptions, the literature on freeriding and burden-sharing in asymmetric alliances has not emphasized the conditions under which great power patrons pressure their allies to pick up the burden. Instead, the literature has almost exclusively focused on three questions: first, whether smaller allies free-ride more than larger allies12; second, whether alliance benefits such as deterrence and defense are truly “public” goods13; and third, how factors outside the context of the alliance itself may influence allies’ defense efforts.14 Studies generally adopt at most a tacit bargaining framework in which allies’ military expenditures are assumed to be responsive to changes in the military expenditures of the largest member.15 This article, by contrast, explicitly focuses on why and when patrons have bargaining leverage for extracting burden-sharing.

Second and more generally, the theory has implications for understanding how great powers – and especially hegemonic powers – manage their partnerships, deter adversaries, and maintain influence in the international system. Classic works in the international relations literature argue that free-riding is inherent in great powers’ alliances with weaker partners, and that the costs of maintaining these asymmetric partnerships can even contribute to overextension and long-term economic decline.16 Moreover, a lack of allied burden-sharing may make it more difficult for hegemonic states to compete with rising powers, and for great powers to deter their rivals more generally.17 Understanding how great powers encourage burden-sharing in their alliances thus has implications for understanding their ability to avoid “imperial overstretch” and navigate power transitions.18

#### Obama proves---failure to intimidate allies collapses leverage.

Jakobsen 17, an Associate Professor at the Royal Danish Defence College and a Professor (part-time) at the Center for War Studies at University of Southern Denmark, (Dr. Peter Viggo, March 2nd, 2017, “Doomsday Cancelled: Trump is Good News for Allies and World Peace”, https://warontherocks.com/2017/03/doomsday-cancelled-trump-is-good-news-for-allies-and-world-peace/)

Trump is Scaring Allies into Spending

But if the costs of abandoning allies are prohibitive, why is Trump threatening to do so? Nobel Prize laureate Thomas Schelling’s work on game theory suggests an answer. Schelling demonstrated in his seminal [Strategy of Conflict](https://www.amazon.com/Strategy-Conflict-Thomas-C-Schelling/dp/0674840313) (1960) that it may be advantageous to appear mad or unpredictable, because it may induce your negotiating partners or opponents to give greater concessions that they otherwise would. In this perspective, Trump’s statements and seemingly erratic behavior make a lot of sense as a negotiation tactic aimed at pressuring U.S. allies to increase their defense spending. Trump’s predecessors in the White House have tried to do this for years without success; previous administrations have repeatedly warned its European allies that [NATO was in danger of becoming irrelevant](http://archive.defense.gov/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=4839) if the Europeans continued to cut their defense spending. Yet most European allies paid scant attention to demands from the Obama administration [to stop freeriding](https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/04/the-obama-doctrine/471525/) and honor their own commitments to spend 2 percent of GDP on defense. Few European governments saw a pressing need to increase defense spending because the Obama administration reacted to the Russian annexation of the Crimea by enhancing its military presence in Europe.

Trump has changed the game completely. In line with Schelling’s expectations, his perceived unpredictability is adding credibility to the threat that he might actually withdraw U.S. forces even if it is not in the United States best interest to do so. There is genuine concern among U.S. allies about what Trump might do if they do not take immediate steps to increase their defense spending. Many have already taken steps in this direction, or signaled their intention to do so. In December 2016, Japan adopted a [record high defense budget](https://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2016-12-22/japan-approves-record-defense-spending-amid-china-tensions), which allocated considerable funds to the procurement of American equipment, notably F-35s and missiles. The South Korean government reacted to Trump’s election by vowing to [increase defense spending significantly](http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-korea-trump-idUSKBN13G1XY) if he insists on it. Likewise, the Danish Prime Minister Lars Loekke Rasmussen promised to [increase defense spending](http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-usa-trump-denmark-security-idUKKBN13B2MI) after his first phone conversation with Trump. In Germany Trump’s election triggered a hitherto [unthinkable debate on whether Germany should develop nuclear weapons](https://www.ft.com/content/277695dc-ec52-11e6-ba01-119a44939bb6).

### 2NC AT: Perm Do the CP

#### The perm is either severance or you should vote neg on T-

#### A. “Resolved” is certain

OED 89 — Oxford English Dictionary, 1989 (“Resolved,” Volume 13, p. 725)

a. of the mind, etc.: Freed from doubt or uncertainty, fixed, settled. Obs.

#### B. So is “should”

Nieto 9 — Henry H. Nieto, Judge on the Colorado Court of Appeals, 2009 (“People v. Munoz — The People of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Raymond Munoz, Defendant-Appellant,” Colorado Court of Appeals Number 07CA0697, August 20th, Available Online at <http://caselaw.findlaw.com/co-court-of-appeals/1385406.html>, Accessed 04-05-2017)

“Should” is “used to express duty, obligation, propriety, or expediency.” Webster's Third New International Dictionary 2104 (2002). Courts interpreting the word in various contexts have drawn conflicting conclusions, although the weight of authority appears to favor interpreting “should” in an imperative, obligatory sense. A number of courts, confronted with the question of whether using the word “should” in jury instructions conforms with the Fifth and Sixth Amendment protections governing the reasonable doubt standard, have upheld instructions using the word. In the courts of other states in which a defendant has argued that the word “should” in the reasonable doubt instruction does not sufficiently inform the jury that it is bound to find the defendant not guilty if insufficient proof is submitted at trial, the courts have squarely rejected the argument. They reasoned that the word “conveys a sense of duty and obligation and could not be misunderstood by a jury.” See State v. McCloud, 257 Kan. 1, 891 P.2d 324, 335 (Kan.1995); see also Tyson v. State, 217 Ga.App. 428, 457 S.E.2d 690, 691-92 (Ga.Ct.App.1995) (finding argument that “should” is directional but not instructional to be without merit); Commonwealth v. Hammond, 350 Pa.Super. 477, 504 A.2d 940, 941-42 (Pa.Super.Ct.1986).

Notably, courts interpreting the word “should” in other types of jury instructions have also found that the word conveys to the jury a sense of duty or obligation and not discretion. In Little v. State, 261 Ark. 859, 554 S.W.2d 312, 324 (Ark.1977), the Arkansas Supreme Court interpreted the word “should” in an instruction on circumstantial evidence as synonymous with the word “must” and rejected the defendant's argument that the jury may have been misled by the court's use of the word in the instruction. Similarly, the Missouri Supreme Court rejected a defendant's argument that the court erred by not using the word “should” in an instruction on witness credibility which used the word “must” because the two words have the same meaning. State v. Rack, 318 S.W.2d 211, 215 (Mo.1958).

#### c. “Substantially” is without material qualifications

**Black’s Law 91** (Dictionary, p. 1024)

Substantially - means essentially; without material qualification.

#### d. It’s unconditional entitlement and not a QPQ

Munson 13, senior vice president for preventive services and global crisis management for a private sector corporation and a retired U.S. Marine Corps officer (Peter, “The Limits of Security Cooperation,” *War on the Rocks*, <https://warontherocks.com/2013/09/the-limits-of-security-cooperation/)//BB>

\*SC = Security Cooperatoin

If SC is incapable in many cases of building meaningful partner capacity or creating real influence, then wonks will argue that SC and especially military aid payments are needed to secure much more black-and-white U.S. interests: overflight and transit agreements and peace treaty compliance. Yet, this is another instance where the bankruptcy of SC ideology is demonstrated. SC funding and services are generally not initiated as a quid pro quo for overflight and transit. Once the flow of cash has started, however, threats of closing off cooperation in the form of overflight, transit, or other agreements become tools of extortion in the hands of the foreign partner. No matter how inefficient or expensive, the U.S. cannot turn the spigot down or off. SC thus is not a tool to condition partner behaviors, but rather an entitlement—a fee for maintaining the status quo—a baseline bribe that creates a market of fees-for-service for the most mundane issues.

#### Our interps are best—letting the aff be uncertain, delayed, and conditioned is the worst of all worlds—to beat the qpq cp the neg just needs a card that says certainty or immediacy is key to their advantage- to beat the qpq aff the neg needs an entirely separate case neg that has DA’s to delayed action or a strategy vs the rollback good aff

### 2NC AT: Functionally Intrinsic Perm

Perm is intrinsic because it adds a function that is neither in the plan or cp-- that makes cp competition impossible because the aff will spike out of any da link

Links to [insert external nb you’re reading] because it includes the plan unconditionally

CP’s only have to be functionally competitive—

1. Predictability—debates are about if the action of the plan is good or bad, not the words used by the plan

2. Scramble perms bad—they distort the meaning of cp and plan texts and encourage the aff to write plans with extraneous words in order to spike out of neg offense or fiat new advantages—they turn debates into mad libs instead of arguments about opportunity costs

3. Textual competition bad—encourages word pics which encourage shallow debating and makes “ban the plan” noncompetitive which is illogical and should be rejected on face

Defense-

1. We don’t justify the worst cp’s- the neg still has to win that the cp is an opportunity cost to a mandate of the plan

2. Contrived net benefits will lose to smart defensive arguments and aff deficits about certainty or immediacy

## External Net Benefits

### 2NC AT: Links to Entrapment

#### Conditioning protection on burden-sharing allays moral hazard risks---it walks the fine line between reassurance and abandonment.

Blankenship 18, Professor of Political Science at the University of Miami in Coral Gables, PhD political science at Columba, MPhil & MA political science at Columbia, (Brian Dylan, 2018, “Promises under Pressure: Reassurance and Burden-Sharing in Asymmetric Alliances,” <https://academiccommons.columbia.edu/download/fedora_content/download/ac:b8gtht76k9/content/Blankenship_columbia_0054D_14562.pdf>)

1.1 The Puzzle of Reassurance

In a May 2017 visit to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) headquarters, U.S. President Donald Trump declined to affirm his support of NATO’s Article 5, which obligates its members to come to each others’ defense.4 Indeed, this was no accident; in his speech, Trump deliberately removed a passage expressing his support for Article 5. 5 U.S. allies – as well as members of Trump’s own administration – were taken aback, with German Chancellor Angela Merkel arguing that it was time for Europeans to “really take our fate into our own hands.”6

In the wake of the uproar surrounding Trump’s speech – and his treatment of allies more generally – one question that has largely been neglected is why one should even expect the United States to reassure its allies in the first place. Indeed, reassurance is fundamentally puzzling because it surrenders a key source of bargaining power: the threat of abandonment. Bargaining leverage within an alliance depends on the credibility of states’ threats to abandon their partners, and thus great power patrons should limit the extent to which they are perceived as committed to their allies (Snyder, 1997; Jervis, 1997: ch. 5; Crawford, 2003).7Reassurance measures, however, are intended to have exactly the opposite effect. Why, then, would a patron deliberately weaken its bargaining position?

Other stands of literature similarly suggest that reassurance can have undesirable consequences. Theories on defense burden-sharing in asymmetric alliances stress that as long as a great power’s protection is relatively assured, allies have little incentive to increase their military contributions (Olson and Zeckhauser, 1966; Oneal, 1990; Palmer, 1990a,b; Sandler, 1993). By reassuring them, the patron effectively encourages its allies to free-ride. Furthermore, reassuring allies can run the risk of moral hazard. Allies confident in their patron’s support may be prone to take risks such as confronting their adversaries because they expect that the patron will bail them out, thus increasing the probability that the patron will be entrapped or entangled in allies’ conflicts (Christensen and Snyder, 1990; Fearon, 1997; Posen, 2014). In the years leading up to World War I, for example, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Sazonov cautioned against reassuring Serbia of Russia’s support too strongly, lest the Serbian government be encouraged to take a more intransigent stance vis-à-vis its territorial disputes with Austria-Hungary. He lamented that this was rendered more challenging by the attitudes of other senior Russian officials – including the ambassador to Serbia – whose support for Serbia’s pan-Slavic ambitions in the Balkans ran the risk of encouraging Serbian adventurism (Jelavich, 1991: 244-245, 250).

The puzzle of reassurance is only magnified in asymmetric alliances. In his seminal book, Waltz (1979) argues that unlike in symmetric alliances between great powers, where each ally is a crucial component of the overall balance of power, in asymmetric alliances weak states are comparatively much less important, as their allegiance is less likely to influence the course of a war. Recent scholarship suggests that great powers can shape their alliance treaties and withhold support from their allies as a means of reducing the risks of moral hazard (Kim, 2011a; Benson, 2012; Mattes, 2012). Beckley (2015: 19), for one, claims that the United States “is unlikely to incur major costs to display loyalty to allies that depend on U.S. protection and patronage for their survival,” as none of its allies are inherently important for its own security. This asymmetry becomes even more pronounced in bipolar and unipolar systems, where the gap between the capabilities of the superpowers and other states is even wider and small states have even fewer patrons to choose from (Snyder, 1997; Kim, 2016). It may be understandable, then, that Walt (2005: 242) would conclude: “the credibility of U.S. commitments is not [the United States’] problem”; rather, it is“ a problem for those who are dependent on U.S. help.”

Yet Trump’s treatment of allies has come as such a surprise because reassuring allies has, in fact, been historically common in U.S. foreign policy. Former U.S. Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger, for one, argued that “both the size and the specific elements of [American] forces are driven more by the need to reassure those that we protect under the nuclear umbrella than by U.S. requirements alone” (Murdock et al., 2009: 9). Since 1945, the United States has stationed hundreds of thousands of troops on allied soil, and U.S. officials make countless foreign visits and public statements to demonstrate interest in and support for American partners (Lebovic and Saunders, 2016). Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter, for example, made such an effort to communicate U.S. commitment through numerous overseas trips that the New York Times dubbed him the “secretary of reassurance” in the summer of 2015.8

Indeed, the historical record is replete with examples of weaker allies extracting support despite their patron’s reluctance. U.S. policymakers during the early years of the Cold War, for example, did not envision the U.S. troop presence in Europe as permanent, with Dwight Eisenhower arguing that “If in ten years, all American troops stationed in Europe for national defense purposes have not been returned to the United States, then this whole project will have failed” (Sheetz, 1999:32). Nevertheless, allies resisted American withdrawal, leading to what Zimmermann (2009) calls the “improbable permanence” of the U.S. troop presence. Similarly, East Germany was able to pressure a reluctant Soviet Union into building the Berlin Wall by threatening to align itself more closely with China (Harrison, 2005; Crump, 2015).

However, reassurance remains understudied in the scholarly literature. Academic studies of-ten treat great power patrons’ use of reassurance as a byproduct of deterrence, where the primary intended audiences are adversaries (Schelling, 1966; Morgan, 1983; Benson, Meirowitz, and Ram-say, 2014; McManus, 2017). To the extent that the academic literature has considered reassurance, it has largely been in the context of how states reassure their allies rather than why. Policy pre-scriptions, for their part, tend to either deny the importance of reassurance (e.g., Posen, 2014) or assume its importance and focus on how to reassure allies (e.g., Flournoy and Davidson, 2012).9As a result, existing literature has not offered a theory of reassurance.

1.2 Argument

In this dissertation, I address the following questions: What explains variation in great powers’ use of reassurance measures toward allies? And under what conditions can patrons make their protection conditional on allied burden-sharing? Here, I define reassurance as acts made by a patron that are intended to convince an ally that its assistance will be forthcoming in the event of an attack from another state. In other words, assurances are intended to reduce allies’ fears of patron abandonment.10The theory I present here is intended to be generalizeable; however, for reasons discussed below I focus on American alliances. Thus I use the terms “patron” and “United States” interchangeably.

Although reassurance can have adverse consequences, patrons have incentives to reassure to the extent that allies can credibly threaten to exit the alliance. By exit, I refer to attempts by states in an alliance to loosen themselves from the partnership by pursuing outside options. In its most extreme form, alliance exit can take the form of treaty abrogation, allying with a hostile third party, or a refusal to provide support in wartime. More commonly, patrons fear that their allies will take more incremental steps that allow them to distance themselves from the alliance by exploiting outside options. The more credible an ally’s threat to pursue outside options, and the more costs that doing so would impose on the patron, the more incentive patrons have to reassure allies.

Patrons face a dilemma, trading off between withholding reassurance to drive hard bargains and reduce free-riding, on the one hand, and reassuring allies to discourage them from pursuing outside options, on the other. This dilemma can be mitigated, however, if a patron can make its assurances conditional on allied burden-sharing by combining its assurances with threats of abandonment. Like those of its allies, the patron’s threats are more potent to the extent that they are both credible and salient to its allies.

#### The cp exerts alliance discipline by establishing a reputation of conditional reliability.

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To make alliances work for its interests, the United States should restore what used to be part of its repertoire as a great power —the imposition of conditions on its protection, and the credible threat of abandonment. In other words, contrary to the standard orthodoxy often invoked by Trump’s critics, a critical ingredient in an effective patron-client relationship is the cultivation of a reputation for limited reliability, if not unreliability. Thus, the United States should make clear that it is willing to walk away and that its alliance commitments are conditional on its ally’s prudent behavior. In a world of worsening rivalries, the U.S. ability to control escalation and limit inadvertent spirals depends partly on its capacity to restrain third parties and keep its initiative. To make this threat credible, it may require the United States occasionally to terminate an alliance relationship.

There are fine lines to be walked here. The United States has alliances for the most basic purpose of augmenting its power, its reach and the totality of its presence. From this perspective, it is in Washington’s interests to have militarily proficient friends. But its alliances have other rationales that cut against that simple desire. Another central historical purpose of American alliances in the postwar period is to contain its allies. By providing security, Washington in theory removes incentives for its allies to rearm and reassert themselves as challengers. This imperative, to depress allies’ defense expenditure, requires in turn that Washington must establish a reputation for being a reliable security provider. Failure to maintain that baseline of confidence could lead the client to pursue belligerent self-help, or even other allies in lieu of the United States. Yet, establishing a reputation for reliable security provision can and does have a perverse result—it creates a moral hazard. Allies’ confidence in American backing can embolden them to behave recklessly in ways that Washington dislikes. Conversely, the dependency Washington forms on the alliance, as an indispensable platform for its power projection, creates reverse leverage, making Washington reluctant to attempt to impose itself with threats of abandonment or even public criticism.33

Some allied states have tested the possibilities of this relationship with a spirit of adventure, tolerating or encouraging militant Islamist activity, suppressing peaceful protests, committing human rights violations, locking up citizens of allied countries in humiliating and brazen fashion, and threatening or carrying out military campaigns against Washington’s wishes with strategically corrosive results, such as the present onslaught in Yemen. Even the most outspoken supporters of the U.S.-Israel alliance will admit that U.S. guarantees have not restrained Tel Aviv from settlement expansion. As Asia becomes more competitive, a rearming Japan could also start to test alliance boundaries, either because of lost faith in American security guarantees or because it takes them for granted. In Eastern Europe, the cast-iron guarantee built into NATO could lead states to miscalculate and behave recklessly against Russian minorities in their own territory, quickly fomenting a cross-border crisis.

There is a difficult balancing act to be struck here, if the United States chooses to maintain allies to increase its material strength while containing those same allies. The threat of abandonment, or withdrawal of patronage, was once a greater part of U.S. diplomatic repertoire behind the scenes.34 The United States explicitly threatened West Germany, South Korea and Taiwan in order to prevent nuclear proliferation, for instance. It seems to have receded to an extent, after the Cold War, when the sense weakened of the need to keep allies in line coercively. Trump’s public humiliation of and threats to allies, usually followed swiftly by increased U.S. commitment, are probably too hollow and less effective in the long run than the quiet threats made by past administrations.

Certainly, the United States has an interest in preventing allies being complacent about American guarantees, or worse, of the United States being so anxious about losing access and influence that it dare not exercise it. One of the superpower’s greatest advantages is its ability to leave. This is a possibility it should deftly exploit. Against traditional orthodoxies about “global leadership,” the overall U.S. position would benefit from the possibility that Washington might not have an ally’s “back” if it behaves recklessly against the superpower’s stated preferences, or if it hedges too much in favor of rivals. In other words, U.S. alliances are likely to serve U.S. interests better if it ceases fetishizing them.

#### Lack of burden sharing causes entrapment—encourages allies to act aggressively because they don’t bear the cost

Zannella, 20 [Anthony Zannella Seton Hall University, majored in Political Science and Philosophy, 4-7-2020 "An Analysis of Burden Sharing in NATO and the Problem of Free Riding," Political Analysis: Vol. 21 , Article 5, [https://scholarship.shu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1058&context=pa#](https://scholarship.shu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1058&context=pa) /alundy]

Discussions of free riding within NATO on the American side argue that the United States is simply being fooled into providing defense. They believe the U.S. should be wary of supporting wealthy European nations that don’t want to spend as much on their militaries. Alan Tonelson’s early 2000s article highlighted this mood as he explored how changes in international geo-politics appear to be putting the U.S. at greater risk. Tonelson conveyed the risk associated with NATO through both material and non-material causes. He argued that U.S. actions leave the country exposed to more precarious situations. Tonelson mentioned that there is a greater risk that the U.S. can be dragged into “non-article 5” conflicts even though America’s original objective was to keep the power of Russia in check through its military presence. Tonelson pointed to the example that U.S. troops stationed in European countries are at risk of injury in an attack (particularly from terrorists or irregular forces) and could be stuck in the middle of an unnecessary conflict. Tonelson also pointed to Kosovo as an example: the U.S. was influenced to become involved simply to strengthen NATO’s credibility even though its European member nations were contributing far less to the alliance operations in comparison to those of the U.S. (Tonelson 2000). From a financial perspective, an earlier article written by Jyonni Khana and others indicates that alliance members in NATO, and in the U.N., are in fact free riding on larger nations such as the United States. The authors concluded that there is a wide gap in the equity of burden sharing. Their analysis focused heavily on peace keeping expenditures between 1976 and 1996. Jointproduct models and collective action theory were employed to study the financial contributions of the various countries. The level of fiscal support from the larger countries far outweighed those of the smaller nations and indicated a great level of free riding (Jyonni Khanna et al 1998). More recent studies have tried to take a more mixed methods approach; this is apparent in Jo Jakobson’s article. Jakobson attempted to draw on the collective action approach and the risk-responsibility sharing school. Jakobsen ultimately factored in the different variables both schools use, but he comes to differing conclusions. He started the study with the standard input measure, (where one looks at what countries put into the alliance alone) and it became obvious that European NATO free rides from this analytical perspective. Furthermore, Jakobsen found that non-material free riding can occur when a U.S. presence in the country of operations is significant as compared to its allies. A further observation demonstrated that other allied countries showed a low willingness to fight. He also mentioned that the importance of United States military spending has to do with other variables. The United States was engaged in various operations throughout the world, especially in Europe. The United States’ projection of power could essentially outweigh the lessened spending of European NATO allies. Jakobsen’s conclusion is to remain cautious when attempting to decipher whether European NATO in fact free rides (Jakobsen 2018).

#### Conditional assistance avoids entrapment—empirics, flexibility proves it avoids fears of abandonment.

Lanoszka ’17 [Alexander Lanoszka; Assistant Professor of International Relations at the University of Waterloo; 12-18-2017; "Tangled up in rose? Theories of alliance entrapment and the 2008 Russo-Georgian War"; Taylor & Francis; https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13523260.2017.1392102; Accessed 7-11-2022; AW]

Entrapment risks may be a function of the commitment that the defender supplies to its ally. As Snyder (1997, p. 44) argues**, if the defender** offers too strong of a commitment**, then the benefiting ally might become so confident of its support as to pursue a** much more aggressivethan it otherwise would. **Strong alliance commitments entail a moral hazard problem insofar as they might** shield the ally **from the true costs of its actions**, thus making it more reckless (Benson, 2012, pp. 43–70; see also Benson, Bentley, & Ray, 2013). One **exemplary case is arguably Germany’s blank check to Austria in July 1914 during the latter’s crisis with Serbia. By failing to condition its military support, Berlin might have encouraged Vienna to** behave more aggressively **towards Serbia** than it would have otherwise. Some argue that **German leaders subsequently found themselves entrapped by Austria** since they did not wish to fight a major power war at that time (North, 1967, p. 107; for an alternative view, see Fischer, 1974). **Institutionalist explanations of entrapment, therefore, imply that** entrapment fears should not exist **if the arrangements undergirding the military alliance are** loose and flexible. Entrapment is far less likely with informal, unwritten alliances because the defender can always disclaim responsibility for its ally. The **solutions** for mitigating entrapment risks thus **tend to be institutional**. Snyder (1997, p. 185) **posits that one option** involves **weakening the commitment itself, though this remedy might engender** fears of abandonment on the part of the ally instead. Another solution is to demand consultations with the ally or access to exchanges between it and the adversary. **Defenders can use greater conditionality in outlining the obligations that characterize the alliance commitment** (Kim, 2011, pp. 358–359). Conditionality can also mitigate entrapment risks (Benson, 2012, pp. 90–127). The United States **added a secret clause in its 1955 defense treaty with Taiwan**, asserting that it would aid Taiwan only if it was attacked (Christensen, 2011, p. 239). Common in these proposed solutions is that the **defender can adjust its commitments to signal varying levels of support and to minimize risk**.

#### Conditional alliance management avoids entrapment

Porter and Shifrinson 20, \*Joshua R. Itzkowitz Shifrinson, an Assistant Professor of International Relations, Boston University, \*Patrick Porter, Professor of International Security and Strategy at the University of Birmingham, also Senior Associate Fellow at the Royal United Services Institute, London and a Fellow of the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, “Why We Can’t Be Friends with Our Allies”, https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2020/10/22/why-we-cant-be-friends-with-our-allies-431015)

By falsely equating alliances with friendships, Biden and his team run serious risks. The rhetoric of friendship obscures the reality of U.S. foreign policy to the American people. For a campaign that prides itself on restoring the public’s trust in government, this is a serious problem, risking public backlash if Biden is elected while forgoing an opportunity to improve the quality of policy discussions.

Equally important, the approach risks undermining international stability by giving U.S. partners ill-placed faith in U.S. commitments. After four years of the Trump administration’s bullying, allies from Canada to Germany to South Korea worry about American reliability and seek a course correction. In pledging fidelity to its “friends,” however, the Biden approach risks going too far in the opposite direction. It could create a false expectation among allies of a restored friendship with Washington without conditions. It could even tempt allies to take U.S. support for granted and behave recklessly.

At a time of geopolitical change, a sounder approach instead would acknowledge the reality that alliances hinge on common interests and, as such, are neither permanent nor inviolate. One does not need to support Trump’s foreign policy to accept this point. Ultimately, America’s allies would be foolish to expect that under a Biden presidency, America would replace self-interest with friendship.

Likewise, Americans should not expect their allies to align their interests with Washington consistently. The underlying goal should be to embrace a prudent alliance-management strategy, one that avoids bullying allies at the drop of a hat yet recognizes that—unlike friendships—coercion, pressure, and threats of abandonment are often the coin of the realm. Only if policymakers act upon this messy reality can we hope for a more peaceful world and sounder American policy.

### 2NC AT: Links to Politics—BBB

#### The cp avoids BBB—the squo overstretches biden’s negotiating agenda

Kupchan 3-2-2021 (CHARLES A. KUPCHAN is Professor of International Affairs at Georgetown University and a Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations “Colossus Constrained,” Foreign Affairs, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2021-03-02/colossus-constrained>)

BUILDING BACK BETTER After Trump and the COVID-19 pandemic, Biden has no choice but to concentrate his presidency on domestic renewal. Repairs at home are essential not just for preventing a return to the angry and self-destructive illiberalism of the last four years but for rebuilding the political foundations of steady U.S. statecraft. Only if the United States gets its own house in order will it have the political and economic wherewithal to provide purposeful leadership beyond its shores. The demands of renewal at home require that Biden be forthright with the American people about the powerful domestic and international constraints he faces on foreign policy. After Trump’s trashing of U.S. credibility and his willful divorce of rhetoric from reality, truth in advertising will be vital to restoring trust in the U.S. presidency, both in the United States and around the world. Washington should still lead, but with a lighter touch that reflects the profound changes that have transpired at home and abroad since the United States arrived on the global stage during the 1940s. In the years after World War II, the U.S. economy was singularly dominant and its international engagement rested on bipartisan agreement. Today, the United States contributes less than 25 percent of global GDP, and Democrats and Republicans share almost no common ground on either domestic or foreign policy. As Biden embarks on an urgent effort to repair the nation, he is right to reject much of Trump’s errant statecraft—reorienting U.S. foreign policy toward international teamwork, diplomatic reengagement, and the defense of the nation’s core democratic principles. But Biden must not throw out the baby with the bathwater. Instead, he should continue Trump’s effort to rectify the overmilitarization of U.S. engagement abroad, trim the nation’s foreign commitments, choose its fights more carefully, and press allies to do much more. The justifiable ambition of Biden’s domestic agenda needs to be matched with judicious modesty in his foreign policy. That’s the formula for “building back better,” both at home and abroad.

### 2NC AT: Links to Politics-- General

#### Demanding burden sharing creates PC for domestic policies

Kupchan 3-2-2021 (CHARLES A. KUPCHAN is Professor of International Affairs at Georgetown University and a Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations “Colossus Constrained,” *Foreign Affairs*, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2021-03-02/colossus-constrained>)

Biden also faces economic constraints on foreign policy. The proposed $1.9 trillion pandemic relief package, along with the $900 billion approved by Congress in December, represents, according to former U.S. Treasury Secretary Larry Summers, “the boldest act of macroeconomic stabilization policy in U.S. history.” It is a drop in the bucket, however, compared to what Biden envisages for the next four years. The nonpartisan, nonprofit Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget estimates that the administration is poised to pour over $11 trillion into infrastructure, green technology, childcare and education, health and long-term care, social security and social welfare, and other domestic investments. Even with the added revenue from planned tax reform (and not including any further pandemic relief packages), these programs will add up to $8 trillion to U.S. debt over the coming ten years—potentially harming long-term growth. For now, deficit spending makes sense to get the economy back on its feet. But domestic expenditures on the scale envisaged will cut into the resources available for tasks abroad. It is a tall order to justify further stabilization efforts in Afghanistan amid an economic crisis at home and over 500,000 Americans dead from COVID-19—a death toll well beyond that from any of the nation’s foreign wars. Even if the roughly $750 billion defense budget stays more or less intact, the days of spending some $6 trillion on “forever wars” in the Middle East are long gone. Biden’s priority should therefore be to lighten the nation’s military burdens abroad and convince allies to pick up the geopolitical slack. Although his administration may adjust the timeline, Biden should continue Trump’s effort to withdraw U.S. troops from Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria and downsize the United States’ military footprint in the Middle East. Avoiding unnecessary interventions and scaling back military commitments in peripheral conflicts will help Biden sustain a robust military presence where it matters most: namely, in Europe and the Asia-Pacific, where checking Russian and Chinese ambition remains a vital U.S. interest. Assuming Biden can convince allies to shoulder heavier defense burdens, he should be able to reconcile these core obligations with the need for more domestic investment.

#### It's reverse causal—burden sharing is bipartisan and lack of it causes domestic political fights

Aybet 20 (Gülnur Aybet is Senior Advisor to the President of the Republic of Turkey and Professor at the National Defence University. “TURKEY, NATO, AND THE FUTURE OF THE TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONSHIP IN A DECLINING LIBERAL ORDER” 9/4/20 http://turkishpolicy.com/article/1015/turkey-nato-and-the-future-of-the-transatlantic-relationship-in-a-declining-liberal-order)

Another area that NATO is perpetually adapting itself is a very old issue that has been around since the 1960s—that of burden sharing. The unequitable bearing of defense costs between European members and the US has for a long time been an issue of contention in American domestic politics. Burden sharing has been a bi-partisan issue of long standing in the US that has preceded the current Trump administration’s very vocal laments over the issue of late. European states have constantly promised to correct the inequitable balance in defense expenditure, but this response has been slow and sometimes very difficult to realize given public pressure and electorate sensitivities on the issue not to mention economic pressures. Yet an increasingly affluent Europe that has repeatedly been unable to provide for its own defense has been a constant source of resentment on the other side of the Atlantic. The Defence Investment Pledge agreed at the 2014 NATO Summit in Wales, has led to real increases in defense spending but many European allies are still beneath the 2 percent of GDP as promised.[7] Turkey is one of the NATO members close to achieving this target, with a defense expenditure of 1.89 percent of GDP.

## Internal Net Benefit

### 2NC INB—UQ—European Defense Low

#### Current European Defense increases are insufficient – new negotiations are necessary

Braw ’22 (Elisabeth Braw, Senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, “Judy Asks: Is Europe Serious About Defense?”, <https://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/87231>) //sethlee

However, really ambitious steps forward in EU defense are hampered by disagreement between states on how best to invest in it. Some see a future of large-scale collective investments in defense on a par with the union’s game-changing COVID-19 recovery plans, whereas others insist that defense spending should be a national affair only. The truth is that the EU and European NATO desperately need to ramp up production of capabilities and no single government can cope with this alone. It is time to think big. The EU should first of all strengthen its role as a security actor in non-defense related areas where it can play a substantial role that is accepted among all of the member states.

The union can use its economic power toward adversaries by imposing sanctions and shaping economic relations. It can play a supportive role in building resilience in the member states in areas such as critical infrastructure. It can also use, to a greater extent, its transformative power through [enlargement](https://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/87114) and cooperation policy in the Western Balkans and Eastern Partnership countries.

In the wider neighborhood, the EU can play a bigger role in crisis management by adopting a wide political, military, and civilian approach. There is no will among the member states for the union to become a defense alliance. This role is reserved to NATO, but the EU can play a supportive role here.

The bloc should expand its focus from enabling European defense industry integration to encompass also support for NATO’s collective defense efforts. This could be done by increasing the EU’s financial and administrative engagement in enhancing military mobility, developing military infrastructure, prepositioning of military equipment, and purchasing needed capabilities, among other actions.

We are maybe seeing the start of it, however there is still a long way to go. The European Commission recently presented a gloomy but frank assessment of the lack of European defense capabilities and investments. Hence, Europe must focus on more collaborative actions in defense and joint procurement to overcome the problems of the past. Russia’s war in Ukraine implies, as stated by the leaders in the European Council, a “[tectonic shift in European history](https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/54773/20220311-versailles-declaration-en.pdf)” and Europe now needs to take a quantum leap (for real this time) in defense. To invest and procure together is the way forward for European countries.

#### NATO summit shows issues with current burden-sharing

Graham ’22 (Thomas Graham, Distinguished fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, “NATO Countries Signal Resolve at Summit: What Does It Mean for Russia?”, <https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/nato-countries-signal-resolve-summit-what-does-it-mean-russia>) //sethlee

NATO’s new force posture and strategic concept are not likely to prompt Putin to rethink his Ukraine strategy. He is making slow but steady progress on the battlefield in the east and south. Nothing suggests that he believes that the West’s provision of more sophisticated weaponry is going to shift fortunes on the ground. But the new circumstances in Europe do pose a long-term strategic challenge to Russia. Increasingly isolated in Europe, Putin was surely pleased to attend the recent summits of the BRICS grouping (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) and of the Caspian states to underscore that Russia has friends and allies elsewhere. Whether they can compensate for the loss of European ties is another matter.

The summit was an impressive show of resolve to counter Russia’s aggression, including through continued diplomatic, economic, and military support for Ukraine. NATO pledged to further expand its military support for its vulnerable allies along the Russian frontier. In particular, the [United States announced](https://www.thefirstnews.com/article/permanent-hq-for-us-armys-v-corps-to-be-set-up-in-poland-says-biden-31386) that it will establish a permanent headquarters for its V Corps in Poland. Most important was the eleventh-hour agreement that Turkey reached with Finland and Sweden, by which Ankara lifted its objections to their joining the alliance and allowed NATO to begin the accession process.

However, challenges remain. Burden-sharing is a perennial issue: Even after Russia’s assault on Ukraine, the majority of members fall short of their commitment to spend at least 2 percent of their gross domestic product (GDP) on defense. The laggards include, most importantly, Germany, although it has taken steps recently to meet that target as a multiyear average. Moreover, in the weeks ahead, the alliance’s resolve will be tested, as strains over rising inflation and concerns over energy and food supply mount across the Euro-Atlantic region. In recent weeks, France, Germany, and Italy have expressed interest in finding a negotiated settlement to the conflict, which would likely leave some seized Ukrainian territory in Russian hands. That position is vehemently opposed by Poland and the Baltic states, among others. Though those differences were pushed into the background during this summit, they have not gone away.

### 2NC INB—UQ—European Defense Low—AT: Ukraine

#### Current Burden-Sharing is uncertain given Ukraine

Eyal ’22 (Jonathan Eyal, Associate director at the Royal United Services Institute in London, “Yes, Nato has a new vitality. But its united front could collapse when it has to deal with Russia“, <https://www.theguardian.com/profile/jonathan-eyal>)

Nato calculates that its members have promised to spend £172.6bn in [additional defence expenditure](https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/06/29/remarks-by-president-charles-michel-before-the-nato-summit-in-madrid/) on top of existing defence budgets, with Germany accounting for perhaps half this amount. But the question is how this will be spent and over what period. The easiest way to improve European capabilities would be to use this cash to buy US equipment off the shelf: this offers substantial economies of scale and time. Yet such an approach will go against European aspirations to boost their defence industries; French diplomats are warning that the Ukraine war must not end up as a bonanza for US arms manufacturers. Chances are high that Nato’s eternal “burden-sharing” debate will continue, even if more cash is available. Across the Atlantic, Donald Trump and his disciples are poised to argue – as “The Donald” did when he was in the White House – that Nato is a scam to fleece American taxpayers. Even if he does not stage a comeback, the idea that the US is spending far more than it should to defend fat, wealthy Europeans is likely to feature prominently when a new Congress is elected this November.

The sheer audacity of the Russian aggression has allowed the Biden administration to get the cash it needed from Congress. Still, it is taken for granted in Washington that the [$40bn package](https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/live/2022/may/16/us-ukraine-aid-bill-vote-joe-biden-baby-formula-inflation-latest-news) recently approved by Congress for security assistance to Ukraine is unlikely to be repeated. And a future Nato burden-sharing debate is bound to get more acrimonious when it is joined with a parallel discussion about paying for Ukraine’s postwar economic reconstruction, a project estimated at an eye-watering $500bn.

Nato has also set itself a huge objective by pledging to increase the number of high-readiness forces to more than 300,000. For this still does not answer the fundamental question of whether, to deter further Russian aggression, the alliance must position significant forces in the countries near Russia permanently. Not doing so could expose existing Nato members to the danger of a Russian occupation for at least a period until help arrives to liberate them, a risk that, given the [horrors of Bucha](https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/ukraine-crisis-bucha-killings-soldiers/), no alliance nation is ready to contemplate. But keeping multinational troops deployed permanently in central and eastern Europe will be hugely expensive, well beyond current raised spending plans.

### 2NC INB—I/L—Conditions Solve Burden Sharing

#### Only the counterplan can solve—credibility from binding conditions is key and Ukraine creates a low threshold for solvency—empirics prove.

Jakobsen and Ringsmose ’17 [Peter Viggo Jakobsen and Jens Ringsmose; Professor at the Royal Danish Defence College and Center for War Studies, University of Southern Denmark and a researcher at the University of Southern Denmark; 2017; "Burden-sharing in NATO: The Trump effect won’t last"; Norwegian Institute for International Affairs; https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/resrep17625.pdf; Accessed 7-5-2022; AW]

Introduction The **Trump Administration has adopted a more confrontational and transactional approach to burden-sharing in NATO.** It has **threatened to “moderate” its commitment to the Alliance unless the European members increase their defence spending** (US Mission to NATO 2017), and contribute more to out-of-area operations. Since President Trump entered the office, **European defence spending has** risen at a quicker pace**, and the nature of the defence debate in Europe has changed**. The Europeans are no longer debating **whether they need to increase their spending; the questions discussed are how fast and how much. Is this evidence of a “Trump effect”, and will it last? This is the question addressed in this policy brief.** Because it is hard to predict the future, we adopt an historical perspective. Two **structural factors have conditioned the burden-sharing games** since the creation of the Alliance in 1949: (1) External threats giving the Americans and the Europeans a shared interest in establishing and maintaining the Alliance. (2) The asymmetric power relations between the United States and the Europeans, giving all European allies except France and Great Britain, who needed their own military capabilities to underpin their great power ambitions, a strong incentive to free-ride and spend less on defence. These factors **set the stage for a transatlantic burden-sharing game, which had the Americans constantly pressuring its European allies to do more, and the Europeans responding by doing what they deemed necessary to keep the Americans in Europe** – but little more. The European willingness to contribute to the Alliance was primarily driven by American pressure and the Soviet threat. It was about keeping the Russians out and the Americans in as NATO’s first Secretary-General Lord Ismay once put it. A combination of shared interests and the liberal values mentioned in the Washington Treaty has prevented this burden-sharing game from tearing the Alliance apart until now, and it is our conclusion that they will continue to do so in the foreseeable future. The Trump effect is therefore limited – if it exists at all. In the analysis below, we show how **different levels of external threats have affected NATO’s mission sets, the burdensharing indicators adopted by the Alliance to ensure that all did their fair share, and the credibility of the American threats to reduce their commitment unless the Europeans did more**. The analysis reveals a continuity corroborating our claim that the Trump Administration will be unable to make a major difference to European defence spending. The Cold War: Burden-sharing as input NATO was a response to the Cold War. Concern that the Western European countries would be unable to deter and, if need be, defeat a Soviet attack induced American decision-makers to deploy a large number of troops to Europe on a permanent basis. But already in 1949, **Washington realized that its commitment to defend Europe would give the European NATO members an** incentive to spend less **on defence**. They therefore inserted Article 3 in the Washington Treaty to prevent this. The emphasis of Article 3 on individual capacity and self-help, Secretary of State Dean Acheson told Congress during the NATO ratification hearings in 1949, was to “ensure that nobody is getting a meal ticket from anybody else so far as their capacity to resist is concerned” (cited in Ringsmose 2010, 321). **Defence spending in proportion to GDP was the principal indicator employed to ensure that “nobody got a free meal ticket”. Yet the choice of this indicator set the stage for continuous transatlantic conflict, because the United States spent far more on defence in proportion to GDP than the Europeans. Asymmetric defence spending led to increased frustration in the United States** as the Europeans recovered economically from the destruction of World War II. In the 1960s and 1970s, U.S. Senator Mansfield introduced a series of amendments in Congress proposing that the United States should reduce the number of troops permanently stationed in Europe, in order to induce the Europeans to do more themselves. These **threats to withdraw a substantial number of U.S. forces had** little credibility**, because the resolutions failed to pass. However, the congressional pressure did help U.S. Administrations from the 1960s onwards achieve some** success with a quid-pro-quo approach **promising to maintain their military commitment in Europe in return for increased European defence spending**. Yet, the **Europeans never met the U.S. demands fully, realizing that the U.S. had no interest in leaving.** The Post-Cold War era: Output trumps input The disappearance of the Soviet threat transformed NATO’s strategic environment and the nature of the transatlantic burden-sharing game. NATO’s principal mission shifted from deterrence and defence to out-of-area operations. While the Cold War input burden-sharing indicator remained in use, the United States introduced a set of additional measures to pressure the Europeans to transform forces to more deployable ones. The Defence Capabilities Initiative from 1999, the Prague Capabilities Commitment agreed at NATO’s summit in Prague in November 2002, and the NATO Response Force launched that same year, all served this purpose (Rynning 2005: 102–140). **American threats to reduce their commitment to NATO also played an important role in the new burden-sharing game.** “Out of area or out of business”, the slogan popularized by U.S. Senator Lugar (1993), captured the new dynamics. These **threats induced the Europeans to accept greater use of force and make larger force contributions than they would have done otherwise (Jakobsen 2014). The credibility** of U.S. threats to withdraw was higher **than it had been during the Cold War because Russia no longer posed an existential threat to NATO**. The introduction of new output indicators culminated at the Istanbul Summit in June 2004 with the endorsement of the so-called usability targets. The agreed aim for national land forces was that 40% had to be structured, prepared and equipped for deployed operations, and 8% had to be undertaking or planned for sustained operations. The 40/8 target was adopted at the Riga Summit in 2006, and it was subsequently revised upwards to 50/10 (Ringsmose and Rynning 2009: 23–24). The Riga Summit also dusted off the traditional GDP input measure, as the members committed themselves to work towards spending 2% of GDP on defence. The United States pressured its European partners to make this commitment to stem the fall in European defence spending that had occurred since the end of the Cold War (Ek 2007). In addition to these formal measures, an informal one – the willingness to put one’s troops into harm’s way (risk-sharing) – emerged as a key burden-sharing measure as NATO became involved in combat missions. To give an example, Denmark’s willingness to do high-risk combat missions in Southern Afghanistan, resulting in 43 fatalities, and its contribution in Libya earned it a lot of praise from the United States (Jakobsen 2016: 201). By contrast, Germany, the third largest force contributor to NATO’s Afghanistan mission (5.000 personnel), was heavily criticised for its unwillingness to do combat in the South, and for its unwillingness to contribute to NATO’s Libya mission. The Danish example illustrates how the Europeans exploited the new set of formal and informal burden-sharing measures to “keep the Americans in” without meeting all the U.S. burden-sharing demands. On the one hand, the Europeans made their forces more deployable and increased their contributions to out-of-area operations. On the other, they refrained from spending more on defence. The Post-Crimea era (2014–2016): Input trumps Output This changed when Russia’s annexation of the Crimea in 2014 turned the strategic environment in Europe upside down. Suddenly, the military threat to NATO’s European territory had reappeared, and this put NATO Cold War missions – territorial defence and deterrence – back in the driver’s seat. Although out-of-areas missions did not vanish from NATO’s radar completely, they now played second fiddle. The United States played a key role in shaping the Alliance’s response to the rising Russian threat. The Obama Administration sent aircrafts and soldiers to Eastern Europe, increased U.S. participation in NATO exercises and took steps to enable the swift deployment of major U.S. reinforcements in Eastern Europe. The U.S. was also the key architect behind the Readiness Action Plan adopted at the 2014 Wales Summit. The rise of the Russian threat **facilitated the American efforts to pressure its European allies to spend more on defence. Frustrated with European free-riding during the Libya campaign, the Obama Administration had pushed hard since 2011. These efforts made little progress prior to the Russian annexation of the Crimea**. After Crimea, the Europeans promised at the Wales Summit to “halt any decline in defence expenditure” and to “aim to move towards the 2% (GDP) guideline within a decade”. The European members also committed to meet another existing NATO target to devote 20% of defence expenditures to military procurement and research and development (NATO 2014). Input measures had reappeared as trumps in the transatlantic burden-sharing game. Yet, **the Obama Administration’s attempts to pressure its allies to spend more had limited success.** While the collective decline in European defence expenditure was halted, there was little positive movement towards the 2% target as the Europeans’ collective defence spending remained constant at 1.45% of GDP between 2014 and 2016 (NATO 2017: 8). Two factors accounted for this: diverging threat perceptions of Russia, and the strong American response to Crimea. **While the Russian behaviour in the Ukraine scared the European NATO members bordering Russia into spending more on defence, the majority of the European members did not view Russia as a** direct military threat **to the their national security (Jakobsen and Ringsmose 2018). Paradoxically, the Obama Administration’s strong reaction to Crimea reinforced this perception, as the American show of force removed the need for the Europeans to do more themselves.** The Trump era (2017–): Spend 2% and contribute more out-of-area or NATO dies. While the threat environment and NATO’s mission set remained unaltered, the election of Mr Trump changed the dynamics of the burden-sharing game. Before his election, Trump called the Alliance “obsolete” and said that he only would defend allies spending 2% of GDP on defence. These threats did not go away after his election. His Secretary of Defense Mattis made clear in February 2017 that the United States would “moderate” its commitment to the Alliance unless the allies spending too little made clear progress towards honouring the commitments made at the Wales Summit. Secretary of State Tillerson added another output measure the following month demanding greater European assistance in the fight against terrorism (U.S. Department of State 2017). Thus, the Trump Administration not only demanded more input, it also wanted more output, and it used harsher rhetoric and threatened more drastic measures if the Europeans did not comply. While previous administrations had made NATO’s longer-term survival conditional upon greater European burden-sharing, a U.S. Administration had never before made the defence of an ally facing an immediate threat contingent upon its defence spending. European diplomats have criticised the Trump Administration severely for its unfair and inaccurate portrayal of their NATO contributions. Yet defence spending is on the rise in most the European member states. 23 of America’s 27 European allies (+ Canada) will increase their spending in 2017, and their combined spending is projected to increase by 4.3% (NATO 2017:2).

#### Conditioning security cooperation on burden sharing solves

Tankel 17, assistant professor at American University and Melissa Dalton, senior fellow and the deputy director of the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (Stephen, “How to Improve Return on Investment for Security Assistance,” *Lawfare*, <https://www.lawfareblog.com/how-improve-return-investment-security-assistance>)//BB

Finally, where capacity building—vice cooperation or reform—is the objective, positive conditionality can ensure that the partner is investing its own funds to support or sustain the capacity being built. Investing early—i.e., before a crisis—provides additional space to take a firmer line with partner forces. This is not always possible. Where it is, the United States should seize these opportunities.

### 2NC INB—I/L—Threats K2 Burden Sharing

#### Threats of abandonment by the United States increase burden-sharing—credible threats enable successful burden-sharing.

Blankenship ’21 [Brian Blankenship; Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Miami. Ph.D. in Political Science from Columbia University, B.A. in Political Science from Indiana University, Bloomington, in May 2012; 12-30-2021; "The Price of Protection: Explaining Success and Failure of US Alliance Burden-Sharing Pressure"; Taylor & Francis; https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09636412.2021.2018624; Accessed 7-4-2022; AW]

This article presented a theory of burden sharing in asymmetric alliances. I argued that **allies are more likely to burden share when their patron can more** credibly threaten to abandon them **and when the consequences of abandonment would be** more acute **for the**m. Specifically, allies are less likely to burden share when they are more strategically valuable to their patron and **more likely when they have a higher perception of threat, which renders them in greater need of protection. I tested these expectations using data on US allies’ military expenditures between 1950 and 2010 and found that US allies vulnerable to attack spend more on defense**, whereas strategically valuable allies near key maritime chokepoints spend less. My findings suggest numerous avenues for future research. For one, although this study focuses primarily on **the effects of** fears of abandonment **as a source of variation in burden sharing, further research could investigate the effectiveness of other instruments. These include but are not limited to economic coercion, inducements, and “naming and shaming” undercontributing states**. A related line of research could focus on allies’ willingness to contribute to collective goods for reasons unrelated to bargaining or the contributions of other allies, such as normative considerations and values.118 Additionally, more research could be done on when patrons actually want their allies to assume more responsibility for their own defense, as well as on explaining change over time since my independent variables are relatively static year to year. Finally, my findings have **implications for debates over US grand strategy. Alliances are central in the debate between those favoring a grand strategy of “restraint,” who advocate reducing US alliance commitments to encourage burden sharing, and those favoring “deep engagement**,” who argue that reducing support for allies is likely to lead them to become less cooperative with US preferences and inflame regional security dilemmas.119 This article suggests **that US officials may** need to lean into allies’ fears of abandonment **if they hope to encourage allied burden sharing. However, the United States is** not helpless **in shaping allies’ burden sharing** even when it goes to some length to reassure them by, for example, stationing troops in their territory. Many of the same conditions that make **assurances of protection more necessary—doubts about US credibility, concerns about external threat—are also favorable for burden sharing**. In these conditions, **US policymakers may be able to effectively combine assurances of protection with threats of abandonment, whether tacit or explicit.** Thus, the trade-off between reassuring allies and encouraging burden sharing is not absolute.

#### Empirics prove threats of decreased SC are the best explanation for increased burden sharing

Blankenship ’21 [Brian Blankenship; Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Miami. Ph.D. in Political Science from Columbia University, B.A. in Political Science from Indiana University, Bloomington, in May 2012; 12-30-2021; "The Price of Protection: Explaining Success and Failure of US Alliance Burden-Sharing Pressure"; Taylor & Francis; https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09636412.2021.2018624; Accessed 7-10-2022; AW]

My **hypotheses’** predictions fare better **than those of alternative explanations**. First, whereas a **pure internal balancing explanation would have predicted all indicators of shared threat to be positively associated with allied military spending, my theory suggests that shared external threat has cross-cutting effects**: **higher allied perception of threat increases the chances of successful burden-sharing pressure by making allies** more vulnerable to threats of abandonment, whereas higher patron perception of threat has the opposite effect by making allies more valuable and thus undercutting the credibility of the patron’s abandonment threats. **Shared threat is only likely to produce greater burden sharing** to the extent that the former effect outweighs the latter. Thus, I predicted that land contiguity should have a positive effect on allied military spending, but that the effects of other indicators of shared threat are theoretically indeterminate and likely null (see Table 4). The evidence provides some support for the internal balancing proposition but on balance more strongly supports my expectations. Consistent with both explanations, land contiguity with shared adversaries predicts higher allied military spending. However, whereas shared adversary capabilities are positively associated with allied military spending, which is consistent with internal balancing, the rest of the indicators of shared threat have no clear effect, which is more consistent with my theory. The effect of shared adversary hostile behavior is negative and does not reach statistical significance at conventional levels, whereas allies contiguous to shared adversaries by sea spend no more than allies not contiguous to a shared adversary. Allied proximity to shared adversaries in general has no significant effect; only contiguity to land does (per H1b). This is consistent with my expectation that allies’ proximity to shared adversaries can actually undercut the United States’ ability to pressure them to spend more on defense by making them more strategically valuable to it, but is not consistent with a purely threat-based, internal balancing explanation. Moreover, it is consistent with arguments about the “stopping power of water”; separation from shared adversaries by water insulates allies from attack and thus from the patron’s threats of abandonment.94 Additionally, there is no evidence that democracies spend substantially less on defense than nondemocracies, while GDP does not have the positive effect on defense burdens that Olson and Zeckhauser’s economic theory of asymmetric alliances would predict. Finally, there is no evidence that the size of US troop presence reduces allied military spending. Taken together, these results suggest that the ex ante **possibility of US abandonment is a** better predictor **of allied burden sharing than alternative explanations.** Robustness Checks Next, in Table A4 in the online appendix, I test the findings’ robustness by using both broader and narrower codings of my main independent variables—proximity to maritime chokepoints and shared US adversaries. First, I use alternative proxies for allies’ vulnerability to threat and their geostrategic value that include fewer allies in the coding. For chokepoints, in some models, I exclude those near China and Russia in the post–Cold War years, as neither had the power-projection capabilities of a peer competitor such as the Soviet Union, and China’s capability for power projection by sea significantly grew only in the later years of the sample. In another model, I expand the coding to include as a key maritime chokepoint the Strait of Hormuz, as Iran may have had the ability to at least disrupt access through the Strait—though its ability to substantially project conventional power outside the region was quite limited.95 For shared adversaries, in some models I shrink the coding to include as shared Cold War adversaries only those countries that had a defense pact with the Soviet Union; this excludes countries such as China after the 1970s, and Albania after the late 1960s. In other models, I expand the coding to include during the post–Cold War period Libya, Serbia, and Syria, as the United States periodically considered them “rogue states.”96 The results are consistent with the original findings: allies contiguous by land to shared adversaries spend more on defense, whereas those contiguous to maritime chokepoints spend less. Exploring Causal Mechanisms: Fear of Abandonment versus Internal Balancing One challenge in evaluating my theory is that the predictions of H1a and H1b (the presence of and land contiguity with shared adversaries) are identical to those one might make purely on the basis of allies’ perceptions of external threat. To distinguish my findings from this alternative explanation, my approach is twofold. First, I use an alternative dependent variable: allies’ host-nation support (HNS) for US military presence in their countries. Because HNS is compensation to the United States, it is both likely to be the result of American pressure and unlikely to be an internal balancing response. I use US Department of Defense data on allies’ HNS between 1995 and 2002.97 The findings (shown in Tables A5–A6 in the online appendix) suggest that countries that share a US adversary and border it by land provide more HNS. Second, I present qualitative evidence **from West Germany and Japan during the 1960s and early 1970s**. I selected these cases to concentrate on variation in the threat environment by holding other factors as constant as possible; both countries were large, democratic, close to strategic chokepoints, hosted the most US troops of any allies, and had post–World War II legacies that contributed to US fears about a return to militarism. However, West Germany bordered the Communist bloc by land, whereas Japan was separated by water. I chose **the period because it was one of intense burden-sharing interest: the economies of US allies had recovered, and meanwhile** US dominance was eroding**, its resources constrained by the Vietnam War, and US officials faced congressional pressure for greater burden sharing.**98 In these cases, I look for evidence that **West Germany feared abandonment more than Japan, that this fear motivated its defense efforts, and that it** responded more to US burden-sharing pressure. West Germany Like their predecessors, President John F. Kennedy and his successor Lyndon Johnson favored a strong West German contribution to NATO, and throughout the 1960s the FRG spent upward of 1 percent more of GDP on defense than the rest of European NATO, on average (see Figure 4). Kennedy and Johnson put particular emphasis on the FRG’s purchase of US arms and military equipment, which was dual-purpose: (1) bolstering West German military capability while also making it more dependent on US arms; and (2) reducing the US balance of payments deficit, which produced a large supply of foreign-held US dollars and put pressure on American gold stocks due to the dollar’s convertibility to gold at $35/ounce.99 US and West German policymakers negotiated a series of biannual “offset” agreements wherein the FRG would purchase around $1 billion in US military equipment. Figure 4. West German military spending, 1961–75. Display full size **Kennedy and Johnson** frequently threatened to withdraw **US forces from West Germany to pressure it into greater cost sharing. West German officials repeatedly indicated that they faced budgetary pressure that would constrain the FRG’s military budget and its offset purchases. However, US officials made it clear to them that the continued presence of US forces would be contingent on the size of the FRG defense budget and its offset purchases**.100 In late 1962, for example, Kennedy warned Chancellor Konrad Adenauer of “disastrous consequences” if the FRG did not upwardly revise its budget and follow through on its purchases.101 Likewise, the following year **Kennedy and his advisers pursued a sustained pressure campaign that included threats of withdrawal** in response to lower-than-expected FRG defense spending plans.102 Johnson continued wielding the threat of withdrawal when he took office following Kennedy’s assassination, culminating in 1966 when his insistence on a larger FRG defense budget with the agreed-upon offset purchases, combined with recession and budget deficits in the FRG, contributed to the collapse of West German chancellor Ludwig Erhard’s government and his removal as chancellor.103 Johnson’s successor **Richard Nixon was, if anything, even more committed to seeking greater West German burden-sharing contributions**. During **Nixon’s presidency, FRG military spending rose sharply, from 3% of GDP in 1970 to 4.6% of GDP** in 1975. Like his predecessors, **Nixon leaned on the threat of troop withdrawals.** He **instructed NATO officials in 1970 that US contributions to NATO would be partly dependent on their own contributions**, and he and other US officials made similar warnings to FRG chancellor Willy Brandt directly. The following year, all **NATO capitals were informed that their burden-sharing contributions would influence US force levels in Europe. This** pressure yielded commitments **from the FRG and other NATO members to increase their defense spending** and improve their forces.104 The evidence suggests that FRG **policymakers took the US threat of abandonment seriously and tailored their defense contributions to assuage American pressure**. One US official noted in 1969 that the Europeans saw “their defense requirements primarily in terms of what they need to provide to keep the Americans committed,” and in 1970 the West Germans requested “an indication … of the minimum European defense contribution” necessary “to constrain [US] budgetary and congressional pressures.”105 Indeed, dating to the 1950s, **Chancellor Adenauer and his successors pursued burden sharing not only to hedge against the possibility of abandonment but also** to explicitly curry favor with the United States.**106 Because of their country’s vulnerability, FRG officials found it difficult to turn down US burden-sharing requests, and US policymakers exploited this**.107 Secretary of State Dean Rusk, for example, cautioned the German ambassador in January 1963 that geography made it very dangerous for the FRG to risk defying the United States, while in 1968 National Security Adviser Walt Rostow stressed the “simple fact” of German vulnerability to coerce the FRG into signing the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.108 A State Department report similarly pointed to the FRG’s position as “an exposed country, with a contiguous border with the Soviet bloc.”109

### 2NC INB—I/L—Threats K2 Burden Sharing—AT: Not Credible

#### Allies perceive US exit as a possibility—threats are credible

Anika Binnendijk 19 — (Anika Binnendijk; senior fellow with the Scowcroft Center’s Transatlantic Security Initiative, a political scientist at the RAND Corporation, Published: 2019; "An Attack Against Them All? Drivers of Decisions to Contribute to NATO Collective Defense"; RAND Corporation; Accessed: 7-9-2022; https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1080712.pdf)//Pen-SY

Given the length of the U.S. commitment to NATO and NATO’s central role in U.S. grand strategy since World War II, a U.S. exit might, at times, have seemed remote.99 However, several factors could make some allies see it as a possibility. First, because of overwhelming U.S. power advantages, its alliances are asymmetric: U.S. allies are more dependent on the United States for security than vice versa. This means that the United States could see changing the status of its alliance commitments as less costly than a weaker ally might. Second, as noted in Chapter One, changing domestic politics in the United States have led to calls from U.S. senior leadership for making U.S. alliance commitments more contingent on allied burden-sharing.100 Allies might therefore be concerned that failure to contribute to a mission that directly threatened the territory of a NATO member—a core function of NATO—would lead the United States to further question the value of the alliance.

### 2NC INB—L—SC = Freeriding

#### Aff causes free riding but the cp solves it

Reveron 15, PhD, Professor @ Naval War College (Derek, “Examining Department of Defense Security Cooperation,” Committee on Armed Services Hearing, Lexis)

The rationale for security cooperation has been based on the as- sumption that instability breeds chaos, which would make it more likely that the U.S. or the international community would face pressure in the future to intervene. Given America's global foreign policy, many countries have large expectations for assistance from the United States. But the U.S. also derives benefits from security cooperation. Among these are obtaining base access as a quid pro quo; augmenting U.S. force structure by providing logistics and in- telligence support to coalition partners in the Middle East; pro- moting a favorable balance of power by selling weapons systems and training programs to Gulf Cooperation Council countries to balance Iran; harmonizing areas of cooperation by working with Japan and Israel on missile defense; promoting self-defense through the Georgia Train and Equip Program; reinforcing sov- ereignty, like programs such as the Merida Initiative with Mexico; and supporting the U.S. industrial base and creating interoperable air forces through the F—35 program. At times, security cooperation can be limitless, dissatisfying, and futile. Further, risks abound. First, the non-exclusive nature of these activities will produce more failures than successes, which negatively impacts confidence in security cooperation as a tool. Second, the personnel system is not producing sufficient talent to support these missions. American forces no longer operate in isolation and need an appreciation of the historical, cultural, and polit- ical context of where they operate. Third, there is a tendency to over-rely on partners, thinking they can accomplish U.S. objectives when they either lack the political motivation or the skills to do so. Without indigenous political legitimacy, programs can only have a marginal impact on a country's security and stability. Finally, other countries will rely on the U.S. to subsidize their own defense budgets, creating a free rider problem. Given the disappointments in Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan, there is the potential for the value of security cooperation to be ignored. But these programs are not confined to combat zones alone. When thinking about security cooperation, we should look at how international partners contribute to coalition operations, peacekeeping, and global security. U.S. budgetary declines will likely reinforce the importance of security cooperation, as the U.S. will need more partners and allies to augment its own defense capacities.

#### Deep engagement causes free riding—conditions solve

Alley, Joshua Keegan, 8-1-2020[Postdoctoral Research Associate (Politics) UVirginia Ph.D. Political Science (Department of Political Science) Texas AM B.A. International Affairs/Political Science Gettysburg college) “Alliance Participation and Military Spending. “Doctoral dissertation, Texas A&M University. Available electronically from <https://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/189551>.] //EZAY

5.1 What Did I Do? This dissertation addressed the question of alliance participation and military spending. First, I reassessed an alternative to my bargaining-focused argument— the public goods model of alliances. After noting that existing empirical tests of the public goods logic suffer from model specification and generalizability problems, I offered an improved empirical test. My examination of the association between economic weight in alliances and percentage changes in military spending found little evidence that small states decrease military spending and large states increase military spending due to alliance participation. In the second chapter, I showed that deep alliance treaties often decrease non-major power military spending, but participation in shallow alliances is more likely to increase non-major power military spending. Last, I explored the sources of alliance treaty depth. I argued that states use treaty depth to assuage allied concerns about treaty reliability in a way that minimizes the domestic audience costs of international commitment. Because democracies have higher audience costs from military support, they use treaty depth to increase alliance credibility. I then showed that democracies are more likely to form deep alliances using a statistical analysis and illustrative case study of NATO. 5.2 What Did We Learn? We learned four things from this dissertation project. First, we learned that alliance participation can increase or decrease military spending. Second, we learned that a crucial prediction of free-riding in alliances based on economic size has limited empirical support. Third, we learned that the impact of alliance participation on military spending depends on the relative bargaining leverage of alliance members difference alliance members state capability and alliance treaty design. Therefore, claims that alliance participation only increases or only decreases military spending are incomplete, because each applies in a specific set of circumstances. Last, we learned that deep treaties follow from attempts to establish a credible commitment of military support between alliance partners while managing the risk of entrapment. All told, my findings suggest that bargaining between alliance members and the credibility of commitment shape the connection between alliance participation and military spending. States’ leverage over allied military spending depends on how they design alliances in response to abandonment and entrapment concerns. Put differently, efforts to ensure credible commitment through alliance treaty design affect alliance members’ military spending. 5.3 Why Does it Matter? My argument and findings contribute to scholarship on alliance politics and international relations. I first address two implications for alliance politics scholarship. After that, I turn to two implications for research on international institutions and international relations more generally. In alliance politics, the conventional wisdom about non-major powers, alliances, and military spending should be revised. While conventional wisdom expects regular non-major power free-riding, I find that alliance participation often increases or has little effect on non-major power military spending. Some alliances do reduce non-major power military spending, but these alliances are unusually deep and capable. The findings about when non-major powers can reduce military spending in alliances should also inform debates about US alliances. If the United States wants allies to spend more on defense, it may need to change the nature of its alliance commitments. By increasing the credibility of US commitments, deep US alliances may undermine attempts to encourage higher allied defense spending. The United States formed deep alliances to reassure allied states, but reassurance may be incompatible with demanding more investment in military capability. Therefore, reconciling competing views of alliances in US grand strategy will be difficult. If the United States wants allies to spend more on defense, less emphasis on credible commitments may be necessary. If allies have low defense spending, deep alliances like NATO rarely encourage increases. This means that deep engagement to reassure partners may lead allies to maintain low defense spending, which is a common criticism of US alliances in the restraint school. In addition to alliance politics, this dissertation makes two contributions to international relations scholarship. First, the results provide new evidence about how states use different policy tools as complements and substitutes. Arms and alliances are a classic example of substitutes, but I find that they are complements for non-major powers in shallow alliances and substitutes in deep alliances. Therefore, even if policies provide the same good, substitution is unusual. It may be hard to find empirical evidence of substitution in foreign policy (Starr, 2000) because substitution is rare and highly conditional. Second, the argument and findings in Chapter 3 reinforce the importance of accounting for differences in institutional design. Studies of trade e.g. (Allee and Scalera, 2012; Tomz, Goldstein and Rivers, 2007), bilateral investment treaties (Blake, 2013; Simmons, 2014) and the rational design of institutions literature (Koremenos, Lipson and Snidal, 2001) all acknowledge this point. Translating theories of institutional heterogeneity into research design is challenging, however. Many studies of international institutions rely on state-level aggregate measures. When scholars are interested in inferring how institutional characteristics modify the consequences of participation, they could employ variants of the multilevel model in Chapter 3. If scholars are only interested in estimating the specific effects of individual institutions, and states are not neatly nested within institutions, the model in Chapter 2 could facilitate inferences.

#### CP solves free riding by increasing European defense spending

**HUSERAȘ 21** [Alin HUSERAȘ\*; 2021; “STUDY ON THE EVOLUTION OF DEFENSE EXPENSES IN NATO MEMBER STATES FOR THE PERIOD 2010-2020. "FREE RIDER" BEHAVIOR AMONG ALLIES”; <https://sciendo.com/it/article/10.2478/kbo-2021-0043>]

Regarding **the variable share of defense expenditure in GDP,** it is observed that when the defense expenditure of states is related to the variable GDP, a new set of data is obtained. This new series practically reflects the specific weight of defense spending in the GDP of each state, **in order to maintain the functioning of the armies and implicitly to benefit from defense.** From the econometric study of the influence of the independent variable the share of defense expenditure in GDP on the dependent variable defense expenditure, estimated by the PLS method, **it was observed that between the two variables there is a linear and positive dependence. The variable share of defense spending in GDP reflects the concept and approach (policy / strategy / doctrine) to the public good of defense, the alliance partners,** found by the two sides of the Atlantic. This aspect can be easily appreciated by analyzing the evolution of the data series of the analyzed expenses, as well as by following the policies of international military intervention**. The way in which countries determine the share of defense spending in GDP may reflect "free-rider" behavior, in which each country tries to rely on the defense spending of the other members of the Alliance. Consequently, there is an effect of replacing the country's defense spending with that of the entire Alliance**. This is especially **evident in the case of military spending by European countries** compared to the military spending of North American countries, and especially the United States.

### 2NC INB—Turns Alliances

#### Turns case—lack of burden sharing causes US abandonment

Jermalavičius and Lawrence 11 (Tomas Jermalavičius and Anthony Lawrence, INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR DEFENCE AND SECURITY, “From the Cold War and Hot Peace to the Long War and Beyond: What Are Our Armed Forces (Good) For?” 2011 <https://abcd.icds.ee/2011-3/summary-2/>)

Prompted by the crisis, we often talk about spending on new capabilities such as cyber, but this cannot become a substitute for investing in real capabilities (cyber would have been of little use in Libya or against the Taliban) and doing it in a collective, coordinated manner. New approaches are needed to obtain those capabilities, especially doing away with many duplicate programmes in Europe. In the United States, despite the inherent waste of a large defence organisation, the military manage to derive a greater value from their investments than the Europeans. If Europeans continue in their current approach of just shrinking their “total war” force instead of reconfiguring it properly for the age of “limited wars”, the Americans will simply turn away and leave. Their executive branch and the military realise very well that even the United States cannot achieve everything alone and must cooperate with its allies and partners in Europe, but this may not arrest the growing sentiment of giving up on Europe felt in the legislative branch. On the other hand, some of the fault for the capability gaps and the steep decline in conventional heavy capabilities in Europe rests with the United States: many Europeans wanted to shine in the “coalitions of the willing” led by the Americans and therefore developed capabilities which bought influence instead of producing military effectiveness.

### 2NC INB—Turns Emerging Tech

#### Effective burden sharing turns case—key to all aspects of the topic

Keil 21 (Steven, Senior Fellow, German Marshall Fund of the United States, “Chapter 10: NATO Burden Sharing in a New Geopolitical Era” in *NATO 2030: Towards a New Strategic Concept and Beyond* edited by Jason Blessing, Katherine Kjellström Elgin, Nele Marianne Ewers-Peters, published by Foreign Policy Institute/Henry A. Kissinger Center for Global Affairs, Johns Hopkins University, 2021 ISBN: 978-0-9997406-0-6)

Beyond these more traditional issues, NATO members must also consider how to jointly address challenges in disruptive new domains. Advances in big data, artificial intelligence, hypersonic systems, and quantum technologies are reshaping how NATO Allies think about deterrence and conflict, while simultaneously increasing the scope and speed of threats. Concerns around issues like disinformation, infrastructure vulnerabilities, and espionage are being heightened. Specifically, the use of cyber technologies can adversely impact critical infrastructure vital for collective defense (see Blessing’s chapter in this volume). In response, leaders endorsed a Cyber Defense Policy at the 2021 Brussels Summit which affirmed the domain’s impact on NATO’s core tasks and its implications for Article 5 commitments.7 Advancement in these new technologies, alongside growing challenges emanating from traditionally non-kinetic or non-military domains like space, will complicate and potentially undermine NATO’s territorial defense commitments. The increased militarization of space could create uncertainties around strategic deterrence, while also threatening various communication technologies vital to territorial defense (see Johnson’s chapter in this volume). NATO’s new military strategy highlights significant risks around many of these technologies and domains, characterizing a “strategic competition for advantage.”8 Assertive developments in Russian foreign policy (e.g., Ukraine and Georgia), alongside its military modernization efforts, will require NATO to assess how its competitive edge maintains deterrence and bolsters collective defense (see the chapter by Simakovsky and Williams in this volume). Russia’s investment in more expensive technologies like hypersonic systems and efforts to infuse conventional capabilities with hybrid tactics is one facet of this assertive behavior. China’s military modernization efforts and increased engagement in Europe’s neighborhood could also create significant challenges for NATO’s core tasks of crisis management and cooperative security (see the chapter by Bērziņa-Čerenkova). The new security environment poses difficult questions for NATO resilience across core tasks and domains. Consequently, resilience will increasingly be featured as a priority in Alliance thinking.9 As such, an unclassified read-ahead document for a conference on NATO’s Warfighting Capstone Concept (NWCC) argued that to project power, NATO must integrate a multi-domain defense. This means “the Alliance Military Instrument of Power will need to possess a spectrum of non-lethal, non-kinetic to lethal kinetic all-domain options to shape the battlespace to NATO’s strengths.”10 The COVID-19 pandemic demonstrated key resiliency gaps disrupting NATO’s training mission in Iraq, while wreaking havoc on military exercises and readiness. Looking toward the future, other environmental issues like climate change—alongside disruptive technological developments—will transform the security environment. Efforts to increase resilience across all domains will be critical. This should include a focus on layered resilience as outlined by the NWCC that spans military, military-civilian, and civilian spheres.11 Consequently, NATO member efforts that increase national and broader institutional resilience should be considered important contributions to the Alliance’s security. Burden Sharing for a New Strategic Environment Shifts in the strategic environment and emerging challenges put pressure on NATO’s capacity to service its core tasks and mission. How Allies share the burden in the face of these challenges will be central to NATO’s ability to adapt. The toxicity of defense spending debates over the past few years have demonstrated certain deficiencies in the current debate, often putting Alliance disunity on full display and undermining political will within the alliance. Central to these tensions is the frequently discussed spending metric of 2 percent of GDP on defense, which also includes a 20 percent allocation of these funds on major equipment and research and development. Given its pivotal role in Alliance burden sharing discussions its worth unpacking how successful this target has been and whether it needs to be reassessed as the NATO 2030 process and Strategic Review moves forward.

#### Reverse causal—lack of burden sharing waters down the plan

Dufour, 18 [Martin Dufour, Colonel in the Canadian Army, currently working with NATO, 12-10-2018, NATO Defense College, <https://www.ndc.nato.int/news/news.php?icode=1239>/alundy]

Historically NATO has had the tendency to focus on procedural and technical interoperability between systems. To do so, it has employed a standards-based approach and developed hundreds of Standardization Agreements (STANAGs) which provide member states agreed-upon processes, procedures and platform compliance specifications rather than stipulating what to build and how. While this approach has allowed member states to equip themselves but still successfully train and operate together for decades, the last 25 years has witnessed a growing rift in the military capabilities of different nations. Rapid technological evolution and the increasing cost and complexity of contemporary military systems have made it progressively more difficult for several countries to keep pace with the systems of the bigger allies. For instance, some countries have invested heavily in advanced systems allowing them to collect and process intelligence, designate targets and strike them at will with standoff, precision-guided weapons, day and night in any weather conditions. The level of investment necessary to acquire such capabilities, as well as various politico-strategic concerns such as the protection of a country’s military-industrial base and resultant unwillingness to sell or transfer advanced technologies, have prevented other allies from remaining current with some of these innovations. These allies therefore lack the ability to gainfully partake in certain military operations and equally share the burden with other members of the Alliance.

### 2NC INB—Turns AI Interoperability

#### Burden sharing solves AI Interoperability

Dufour, 18 [Martin Dufour, Colonel in the Canadian Army, currently working with NATO, 12-10-2018, NATO Defense College, <https://www.ndc.nato.int/news/news.php?icode=1239>/alundy]

NATO has arguably been the most successful alliance of its kind, and much of this success can be attributed to its cohesion in the face of various threats. At the heart of this cohesion lie two important notions: burden sharing between members; and interoperability. The Alliance’s cohesion however has increasingly come under pressure over the last two decades, and there are growing challenges with the level of interoperability between member countries. While numerous technical and political factors influence interoperability, the emergence of disruptive technologies such as genetic engineering, nanotechnology, additive manufacturing and robotics, are likely to make this challenge more acute in the next two decades. Of the many technologies rapidly emerging, none is likely to have as significant an impact as that of artificial intelligence, which combines with other technologies and multiply their effect by allowing the development of advanced autonomous systems. And while the latter holds the promise of developing new classes of weapons with great military potential, its asymmetrical adoption among the various NATO allies could also lead to significant interoperability problems.

### 2NC INB—Turns Cyber

#### Burden sharing turns case—solves cybersecurity in NATO

Nietsche, Townsend, and Kendall-Taylor 20 (Carisa Nietsche, Associate Fellow, Transatlantic Security Program; Jim Townsend, Adjunct Senior Fellow, Transatlantic Security Program; Andrea Kendall-Taylor, Senior Fellow and Director, Transatlantic Security Program; “Enlisting NATO to Address the China Challenge” 10/5/20 Center for New American Security <https://www.cnas.org/publications/commentary/enlisting-nato-to-address-the-china-challenge>)

To address these challenges, the Department of Defense should work with NATO partners to pursue a strategy that tackles the risks China poses to the NATO alliance. DoD should work more effectively through NATO on the shared China challenge. Encourage burden sharing, but rethink what counts toward the 2 percent. In order to free up U.S. military resources for the Indo-Pacific and potentially help offset the impending U.S. defense budget decline, the United States should continue to press the issue of burden sharing with allies. In doing so, however, the United States and its allies should together revisit what defense expenditures can be applied to the 2 percent target upon which the NATO allies agreed at the 2014 Wales Summit. The threat landscape in Europe is evolving. To prepare for this, NATO can use defense spending targets to encourage allies to take steps, including investing in secure 5G networks, cybersecurity, infrastructure and other areas that improve military mobility in Europe. These measures will help NATO adapt to meet the China challenge and other evolving threats in Europe’s security landscape.20

#### Burden sharing turns cyber

DOD 11 (DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE STRATEGY FOR OPERATING IN CYBERSPACE July 2011 <https://csrc.nist.gov/CSRC/media/Projects/ISPAB/documents/DOD-Strategy-for-Operating-in-Cyberspace.pdf>)

As international cyberspace cooperation continues to develop, DoD will advance its close cyberspace cooperation with its allies to defend U.S. and allied interests in cyberspace. DoD will work closely with its allies and international partners to develop shared warning capabilities, engage in capacity building, and conduct joint training activities. Engagement will create opportunities to initiate dialogues for sharing best practices in areas such as forensics, capability development, exercise participation, and public-private partnerships. Further, the development of burden sharing arrangements can play to each nation’s core strengths and capabilities; this will bolster areas where partners are less proficient, increase capacity, and strengthen collective cybersecurity.

### 2NC INB—Turns Hybrid War

#### Burden sharing solves security cooperation over cybersecurity, tech, and hybrid war

Melissa Dalton 20, directs the Cooperative Defense Project and is deputy director and a senior fellow with the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C; Hijab Shah, associate fellow with the International Security Program at CSIS, May 2020, “Partners, not Proxies: Capacity Building in Hybrid Warfare

Partners **will be vital to the allies’ ability to compete effectively in** hybrid warfare **environments.** Pursuing partnerships through a principled approach provides the allies with an asymmetric advantage in contrast to rivals that resort to autocratic, deceptive, and extra-legal tactics. **Allies’** laws**,** principles**, and values are strategic** advantages **in** hybrid warfare. Investing in partners rather than casting them as proxies will increase allied strategic action and operational effectiveness. **The allies should select, design, and** pursuesecurity partnerships **based on the following guidelines**:

Be the Partner of Choice: **The allies should be the** partners **of** choice. **They should be reliable, committing up front to common outcomes and objectives defined with the partner, with clear** communication **as to** expectations**,** red lines, **duration of the partnership, and** steps **that will be** taken **if the partner makes choices that depart from a principled approach (e.g., undermining legitimate civilian authorities, human rights violations, or extra-legal actions)**. **They should provide quality training, advising, and equipment to enable** interoperability **with the allies and other partners and sustainment to provide actual** military capability**.** They should be transparent with the partner, civilian authorities, and public about the purpose of and expectations for the partnership. • Select Partners to Increase “Portfolio Strength”: The allies are fortunate to have a strong network of partners. **In seeking new or strengthened partnerships in hybrid warfare environments, the allies should be more selective of partners, seeking fewer, higher-quality partners to fortify collective strengths important for competition in hybrid warfare environments, such as good** governance **and** transparency**.** Partners should be selected for these attributes and incentivized to make choices that reinforce them. Recognizing that some partnerships will be transactional, the allies should calculate risk thresholds and diminishing returns at the outset and be upfront with the partner to avoid unmet expectations that may do more damage to allied and partner interests than the value of the transactional relationship. If a high-quality partner cannot be found, then allies should determine whether to intervene militarily at all.

Identify Sources of Partner Legitimacy: **Partner capacity to perform security missions and political will to complete them are essential ingredients for successful** security partnerships. Partner legitimacy is paramount in hybrid warfare environments in terms of how the civilian authorities and population view local security forces and, relatedly, the partner’s relative control of territory. As competitors seek to discredit, corrupt, and alienate security actors that do not accord with their interests, partner legitimacy will be an important source of resiliency. Defining thresholds and criteria for determining legitimacy in particular country contexts will be important for the allies to decide where best to place their engagement and investment. Working with the partner in parallel to identify ways to regulate corrupt actors within the partner’s governance system will also be important to strengthening legitimacy.

Plan and Execute Capacity Building Jointly: **Allies should work directly with partners to identify** outcomes**,** objectives**,** milestones**, and** conditions **for capacity building.** This serves to strengthen the basis of the partnership, distinguishes it from a proxy relationship, clarifies intent and expectations, and gives the partner ownership of the consequences of working with the allies—and vice versa. Ideally, **the** security partnership **can be codified in a** bilateral compact **spelling out these terms.** It also serves as the basis for the allies to address partner transgressions and to offramp the relationship if the partner deviates from the joint plan. Capacity-building plans should be made as transparent as possible to sustain political support through transitions in government in allied and partner countries and to hold them accountable to strategic, fiscal, and principle-based goals.

Engage the Partner at the Right Level When Political Choice is Involved: **Even in** transactional relationships**, the allies may have to ask the partner to operate in new territorial areas, build relationships with new or difficult local actors, or refrain from taking actions in order to achieve common goals.** These decisions may transcend the operational authority of the partner, particularly in contested environments where the partner’s sources of legitimacy are threatened. **The allies should seek to engage the partner at the right level where political decisions can be made, such as when the partner may have to assume short-term risk to accomplish** shared objectives. Such engagement will necessarily involve not only allies’ military commanders but, more importantly, its diplomats. **It will require close coordination among allied civilian-military leadership, identification of incentives to persuade the partner, and a credible explanation of what withdrawing allied support will mean** if **the partner** says no **or** deviates **from agreed upon next steps.**

Integrate Security Partnerships into a Campaign Approach: **Security partnerships should be nested within an adaptable campaign approach to compete with rivals in support of civilian capabilities**. Partnerships should not be planned or executed in siloed security or operational communities but rather fully integrated to achieve political outcomes and objectives and tailored for specific hybrid warfare environments. This includes designing and implementing military and intelligence information operations in support of civilian public diplomacy and strategic communications to counter disinformation and misinformation from rivals. Information should be elevated as a “good” to subvert rivals’ agenda by encouraging open and transparent societies and strengthening the role of and communication with civil society. Necessarily, a campaign approach will need to adapt over time to changes in the environment, allies’ priorities, and rivals’ tactics and behavior. Allies accordingly should take a long-term view to the return on political investment in security partners.

In addition, the **allies should take several concrete steps to be more** strategic **and** effective **in** working together **while capacity building in** hybrid warfare **environments:**

Clarify Definitions, Interests, and Comparative Advantages: The allies are not on the same page in defining what constitutes hybrid warfare or capacity building, complicating efforts to work together, deconflict, and avoid duplication or the undermining of each other’s activities. At a minimum, the allies must decide where hybrid warfare poses risks to individual state interests and where they can work most usefully together to reduce their vulnerabilities. This should also include a shared calculation of where each ally can bring its relative comparative advantage in planning, resourcing, partner engagement, and deployment of specific capacity-building tools in support of a civilianled integrated approach to countering rivals. The allies will have to exercise humility to be transparent with each other about where they have shortcomings and where other allies may be better suited for a mission, capability, or task.

Identify How Burden-sharing **Creates** Opportunities: Burden sharing **enables allies to optimize for their comparative advantages based on** political**,** economic**, cultural, operational, and** informational **capabilities**. **It not only makes fiscal and** strategic sense**, but it also can open opportunities for future** combined approaches **to planning, resourcing, and execution.** For example, pooled donor funds used for northeast Syria stabilization enabled coalition civil-military operations to proceed even as direct U.S. political and fiscal support waned. **This model could be replicated in terms of its** bureaucratic **and** financial **structures for other contexts.**

Create Dynamic Campaign Approaches: Hybrid warfare **environments will move swiftly past static coalition plans**, as competitors routinely test the boundaries and thresholds of what the allies will abide, **including** coercion **of partner institutions,** disinformation **and** misinformation **operations, and** cyber intrusions**.** The allies must create dynamic campaigns with an adaptable mandate for partners that can flex to the evolving threats from competitors while bound by the guidelines discussed above. Combined allied planning for campaign design and monitoring and evaluation of its implementation will be important to calibrate priorities and investments over time.

Invest in “Frontline” Allies to Build Their Capacitybuilding Competencies: **Allies with first-hand** experience **countering hybrid warfare threats domestically may be well suited to lead capacity building with** security partners **in other** hybrid warfare **environments.** Investing in those allies and giving them a leading role with partners thus can leverage proven strategies and tools. For example, Canada’s cooperation with Latvia and Lithuania has strengthened the Baltic allies’ ability to provide capacity building in Ukraine, thereby also reinforcing NATO’s collective strength and competencies, which can be applied in other theaters.

### 2NC INB—Turns Peace Ops

#### Good burden-sharing alleviates excessive duties from the US, strengthens alliances, and promotes peace--- empirically proven by successful UN burden-sharing.

Lagon & Moreland, 19 [Mark P. Lagon, American political scientist and practitioner expertise in human rights, global health, human trafficking, and global institutions and governance, Will Moreland, former project manager and associate fellow with Foreign Policy at Brookings, focus on the future of U.S. alliances and multilateralism in a more geopolitically competitive world, 2-14-2019, The National Interest, ‘Burden-Sharing Doesn’t Need to Be Burdensome’, <https://nationalinterest.org/feature/burden-sharing-doesn%E2%80%99t-need-be-burdensome-44572> /alundy]

Peacekeeping by the United Nations offers an important example of what burden-sharing means and what elicits it. During the Cold War, UN peace operations were confined to interposing a deployment between formerly warring parties. The clash of the Cold War superpowers as veto-wielding United Nations Security Council (UNSC) members meant that was all the traffic would bear. In settings like Cyprus and Lebanon, long-standing deployments kept additional military duties off the U.S. plate through decades of the Cold War. The Cold War’s end ushered in more numerous and ambitious UNSC mandates—as the United States and Russia were more often willing to align on authorizing peace operations. In the 1990s, along with a couple of dramatic failures marred by murky mandates (in Bosnia and Rwanda, where excessive impartiality left atrocities to occur on peacekeepers’ watch), an array of peace operations took hold with a variety of governance and post-conflict goals beyond the traditional interpositional model.

Before even addressing questions of who pays what and who contributes how many troops, peace operations are by nature an exercise in burden-sharing benefiting the United States. With collective defense, expeditionary and stabilization deployments globally, the U.S. military footprint is immense. Whether midwifing a new nation in East Timor or containing conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, UN peace operations provide for other functions to be outsourced with quite limited U.S. roles**.** A February 2018 Government Accountability Office study found that a hypothetical U.S. peacekeeping operation in the Central African Republic of the same size and duration as the UN’s Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) operation would cost the United States some eight times more than its share for MINUSCA. And this good bargain affords the United States a major voice as a member of UNSC’s permanent five (P-5) on what missions will and will not be approved to boot.

### 2NC INB—China—Asia Pivot Now

#### Asia pivot under Biden now

Sun 6/23 (Yun Sun, Senior Fellow of the East Asia Program at the Stimson Center on U.S-China relations, 7/4/22, “After Biden's pivot to Asia, China feels the chill”, <https://www.politico.com/newsletters/politico-china-watcher/2022/06/23/after-biden-pivots-to-asia-china-feels-the-chill-00041590>) //sethlee

The Biden administration, hoping to counter China’s growing influence in Asia, has initiated several high-level engagements with Asia in recent months, ranging from summits to a presidential visit to the region. Despite lukewarm reception at home, it’s now clear that Washington’s Asia pivot caused much anxiety in China.

The administration's outreach started with Southeast Asia — the U.S.-ASEAN Special Summit in Washington in mid-May followed by President JOE BIDEN’s high-profile visit to South Korea and Japan on May 19-24. In Japan, Biden attended a summit with leaders of Japan, Australia and India (the Quad) and launched the long-expected[Indo-Pacific Economic Framework](https://www.politico.com/news/2022/05/23/asian-nations-biden-indo-pacific-economic-framework-00034247).

Despite the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the administration has tried to keep its focus on China as the most consequential strategic challenge of the U.S.; Russia by comparison is considered the “acute” yet short-term threat. Washington is confident that it can walk and chew gum at the same time, namely countering both Russia and China simultaneously in two theaters.

China was not directly included in last month’s Asian activities but its presence loomed large over them. The focus on the Asia campaign came at a time of China’s “strategic low tide,” as it dealt with myriad domestic issues, including the Covid-19 pandemic.

The anxiety that the outreach generated in Beijing was not limited to Biden’s comment in Tokyo that the U.S. will intervene militarily if China attacks Taiwan. More unsettling for Beijing was the public commitment by U.S. allies — South Korea and Japan — to the peace and stability of the Taiwan Strait, which implied potential roles for them in a future Taiwan contingency.

China has gradually grown to the prospect of Japanese involvement, given U.S. military bases there. However, Beijing is much less prepared for a similar South Korean role.

### 2NC INB—China—Burden Sharing Solves

#### An independent EU successfully manages and de-escalates Sino-U.S. hegemonic competition.

Besch et al. 20, \*Sophia Besch is a senior research fellow at the Centre for European Reform. She works on European defence issues, with a focus on EU Common Defence and Security Policy, European defence industry co-operation, NATO and German foreign and defence policy. \*Ian Bond joined the Centre for European Reform as director of foreign policy in April 2013. Prior to that, he was a member of the British diplomatic service for 28 years. (September 21st, 2020, “Europe, the US and China: A love-hate triangle?”, https://www.cer.eu/publications/archive/policy-brief/2020/europe-us-and-china-love-hate-triangle#section-summary)

Conclusion

The US and China both have a tendency to treat the EU as an object of international relations rather than a subject – competing to enlist it on their side, or to prevent it aligning with the other side, but not treating it as having agency. The EU often plays to this image of passivity, seeming always to follow others in reacting to crises – its initial response to the COVID-19 pandemic being an example of that. But in reality, the EU has power, if it can agree internally on how to use it. As Charles Michel, President of the European Council, said after the EU-China leaders’ videoconference on September 14th, Europe needs to be a player, not a playing field.

Europe should not get sucked into a contest between China and the US for global hegemony. Instead, the EU should use whatever influence it can to ensure that both sides exercise their power with restraint and in a framework of rules, not simply on the basis (as Thucydides wrote) that “the strong do what they can, while the weak suffer what they must”.

Europe should also accept that China is not converging with the West politically or in terms of its values: the ‘responsible stakeholder’ era is over almost before it began. Chinese and Western interests will sometimes align, but Xi has shown less willingness than his predecessors to slot China into the existing international system.

At the same time, it is impossible to know where Xi’s policies will lead China in the long term. Some scholars argue that the Chinese Communist Party’s rule has been made dysfunctional and brittle by Xi’s centralisation of power.[51](https://www.cer.eu/publications/archive/policy-brief/2020/europe-us-and-china-love-hate-triangle#FN-51) Other analysts believe that China’s rise is world-transforming and its growing influence irresistible.[52](https://www.cer.eu/publications/archive/policy-brief/2020/europe-us-and-china-love-hate-triangle#FN-52) Europe should remember the (possibly apocryphal) story of Chinese Prime Minister Zhou Enlai’s 1972 verdict on the results of the French revolution: “Too early to tell”. It will be a long time before Xi’s policies can be judged successful or otherwise. Meanwhile, the EU should remain open to economic and other forms of co-operation with China where they are to Europe’s benefit; resist Chinese activity that harms European states and institutions or their allies; and invest resources and diplomatic effort in enabling international organisations to adapt to the rise of China without breaking.

The Trump era has made the EU’s job harder: Trump has deprived Europe of its most important partner in defending the rules-based international order and universal values. But the EU cannot afford to leave the future of the world to be settled in a series of trials of strength between Beijing and Washington. When relations between the US and China looked rosier, there was talk of a ‘G2’ to deal with the problems of the world. That was never a realistic construct. For the foreseeable future, the three big economic and political powers in the world will be China, the EU and the US, and the triangular relations between them will contain elements of attraction and elements of hostility. Western firms will still want to tap the Chinese market, while governments worry about threats to national security; Chinese families will still want their children to study in the West, while the Communist Party worries about the ideological contamination they might bring back; and Europe and the US will still be each other’s most important security and economic partners, while bickering about defence budgets and food safety. In the absence of a friction-free utopia, the EU’s best option is to work with Beijing and Washington to pursue pragmatic policies that maintain stable relations between the three.

#### Burden sharing is key

Mohan ’21 (Raja Mohan, a senior fellow at the Asia Society Public Institute, “A New Pivot to Asia”, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/01/15/biden-china-asia-allies-strategy-pivot/>) //sethlee

On globalization, the United States cannot continue to let China play fast and loose with the ideas of economic internationalism and national sovereignty. Beijing clothes its ambition for regional economic dominance in the rhetoric of globalization but at the same time champions state sovereignty when it’s convenient. Rather than frame its policies as a choice between the ideologies of “America First” and “globalism,” Washington needs to articulate the case for a new mix of sovereignty and internationalism. That is the only basis for designing a new set of rules for international economic cooperation that can win lasting domestic political support. After all, the difficult decisions on the equitable domestic distribution of economic globalization’s costs and benefits are intensely political—and must necessarily be made and owned by national governments.

Although burden sharing has long been part of U.S. foreign-policy rhetoric, it has always ceded ground to the presumed imperatives of U.S. leadership. Trump’s clumsy efforts to force the issue of burden sharing on U.S. allies has only made matters worse. But looking from the outside in, it is unrealistic for allies to expect that the American taxpayer and U.S. military will forever bear the burden of securing Europe and Asia. The last few years have seen both regions recognize this problem, but there will be a strong temptation to backslide, with allies betting that Biden will take them back to the happy, free-riding days of old. For the United States, too, it is important to recognize that its leadership is creating a moral hazard among its allies who refuse to take responsibility for their own security, expect the United States to do the heavy lifting, get complacent about threats, and criticize Washington for confronting these threats. Regional responsibility and burden sharing are critical for making the alliances survive the new challenges.

#### NATO burden-sharing allows the U.S to focus on Asia

Larsen ’21 (Henrik Larsen, Ph.D and senior researcher at the Center for Security Studies at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zurich, “NATO Shouldn’t Try to Do Too Much on China” <https://thediplomat.com/2021/07/nato-shouldnt-try-to-do-too-much-on-china/>) //sethlee

Second, NATO should clarify the meaning of “resilience” by linking it as closely as possible to collective defense and national security. China is not a territorial threat to NATO, but its acquisition of transportation hubs in Europe and future capacity to neutralize space-based navigation systems (like GPS) present vulnerabilities to NATO force mobility in a crisis situation. Moreover, it should not be forgotten that Chinese 5G networks threaten continued NATO intelligence sharing.

Conversely, NATO is not always the right actor to prevent the intrusion of illiberal powers into the domestic politics of its allies. Increased levels of espionage from [both China and Russia](https://www.businessinsider.com/russia-china-pay-spies-price-europe-us-2021-3?r=US&IR=T) call for increased cooperation across the NATO intelligence services. But NATO does not seem to have a natural role in, for example, bolstering police cooperation to fight other types of criminal activity, such as weaponized corruption, illicit party financing, and outsourcing of influence operations, as earlier [proposed](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russia-fsu/2017-12-05/how-stand-kremlin) by President Joseph Biden to face both Russia and China.

Third, NATO should contemplate how it can strengthen internal cohesion in the face of a China that seeks to co-opt elites in illiberal states like Hungary and Turkey. Democratic setbacks are a problem, but it is questionable whether [enhanced NATO monitoring and criticism](https://www.nato.int/nato2030/young-leaders/) of allies would make any difference. Rather, NATO should focus on military burden sharing as a formula for alliance cohesion. China’s rise highlights why the Europeans must contribute more to the [defense of their own continent](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00396338.2020.1851080) to allow the United States to focus its military resources on Asia.

In adapting to the China challenge, the United States stands at one extreme: It may have dropped the idea of a global NATO, but wants the alliance to expand into non-military security to contain its growing influence in Europe. The Eastern and many of the Central European countries stand at the other extreme, wanting NATO to remain focused on collective defense with Russia as the main threat. Reconciling the aspirations toward a “democratic bulwark” with the traditional role a defense alliance may strike an appropriate balance for NATO to agree on a realistic China policy by the summit next year.

#### Burden sharing allows the US to focus on China

Felde ’22 (Rainer Meyer zum Felde, Institute for Security Policy at Kiel University, 6/12/22, “Russia-China Relations”, 261-262, <https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/978-3-030-97012-3.pdf>) //sethlee

Europeans need to accept transatlantic burden shifting in order to “keep the Americans in”. While significantly fewer US forces and capabilities will be available for fighting and winning a regional war in Europe, some European NATO allies, including Germany as a key member, have long hesitated to fully implement their current commitments and were not even considering further upgrades in response to the deteriorating geopolitical situation (Meyer zum Felde, 2020b). US representatives have been clear in recent years that the US military is no longer able to fight and win two major wars simultaneously in Europe and the Asia-Pacific, and that the primary US focus is shifting toward China (Russia is perceived as the near-term, but China as the long-term and more difficult, bigger challenge; see Colby, 2021b). It follows that Europeans need to take on much more of the burden of deterring and defending NATO member states in Europe against Russia. Against this background, the NATO capstone documents for NATO defense planning agreed at Wales, Warsaw and Brussels have all been designed toward a fairer transatlantic burden-sharing and more European forces, capabilities and contributions. However, in terms of implementation, European member states—first and foremost Germany—have taken a steady but rather slow approach in their turnarounds and implementation efforts. What remains required in Europe vis-à-vis Russia is significant US military presence and power, particularly in critical capability areas—extended nuclear deterrence, critical enablers and force multipliers, air power, naval power, cyber. In return, Europeans need to accept the US request for burden shifting and take more responsibility for filling the gaps in NATO’s deterrence and defense posture. This applies particularly to Germany, despite its obvious unwillingness to keep its pledges and again play its role as the conventional backbone for collective defense in Europe. Whether or not Europe will be able to maintain its security depends first and foremost on the USA, and next on Germany. Both need to take their responsibilities seriously, and consequently accept that in military burden sharing and shifting, they have to take their fair share according to their political and economic weight. Above all, it is essential for Europe’s security that both give the Russian leadership no reason to change its risk calculus.

#### Equal burden sharing is key to US interests--- including presence in Asia.

Monie, 21 [Connor Monie, PhD student in political science at the Schar School of Policy and Government, 4-14-2021, Schar School of Policy and Government, George Mason University, ‘Perennial Friction: NATO and Burden Sharing Concerns’, <https://csps.gmu.edu/2021/04/14/perennial-friction-nato-and-burden-sharing-concerns/> /alundy]

President Biden comes into office with a similar gripe against wealthy European allies. Defense spending has increased in recent years, yet many European governments remain unwilling to allocate the amount of resource sought by their American counterpart. Geopolitical trends will only serve to intensify US entreaties for greater equality in defense burdens: the focus on Beijing as Washington’s primary adversary will continue to put budgetary pressures on US military commitments in Europe. President Biden will be forced to walk a tightrope between his stated goal of revitalizing the transatlantic community and the tradeoffs associated with a focus on the Indo-Pacific.

President Biden and his team face the same perennial problem vis-à-vis NATO that their predecessors faced: stronger allies tend to absorb disproportionate costs in providing security for all members and chafe at that imbalance. [Some scholars](https://www-tandfonline-com.mutex.gmu.edu/doi/full/10.1080/00396338.2015.1046229) argue that free-riding is less harmful than it is often described to be and that the rhetoric often distorts reality. [Others](https://www.csis.org/analysis/counting-dollars-or-measuring-value) contend that standard metrics of burden sharing measure the wrong things, resulting in biased estimates of national defense contributions. Still others posit that smaller allies rationally pay a smaller share of alliance costs, whether because [they offer different concessions](https://www-jstor-org.mutex.gmu.edu/stable/pdf/2111499.pdf?casa_token=VcMBq0JNp2oAAAAA:qHZ4m0-aT5eK5ehnQtwolNOOicZKmMf5wqLNIt3lw9V4h7mPny4ajDXYRfqlzWVdBrXaQeMO6TrNxHelFAbOCjtMoolSy5Gq3Nv6BMSkUOmI_FL7ppl2RQ) or because they are [incentivized by group dynamics to shirk costs](https://www-jstor-org.mutex.gmu.edu/stable/257966?sid=primo&origin=crossref&seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents). Whatever the case may be, the US interest in inducing Europeans to spend more on defense — and their disinclination to do so — will persevere throughout President Biden’s time in office.

Pleasing rhetoric notwithstanding, President Biden is likely to continue in the tradition of post-Second World War presidents by prodding the Europeans to expand their contributions to NATO. This tradition traces its roots through decades of American foreign policy all the way back to NATO’s inception. Moreover, current trends in US interests are likely to exacerbate the Biden team’s preference for greater European self-sufficiency in the defense sphere. Though the style of the new administration will certainly be a departure from President Trump’s antagonistic approach, this feature of US relations toward the NATO alliance will endure. The task of President Biden is to simultaneously placate European fears of US disengagement in light of its emphasis on the Indo-Pacificwhile appearing credible enough in its demands for European contributions that the Europeans take notice. This will be a difficult endeavor, but also a necessary one if the US is to synchronize its disparate commitments, interests, and regional force postures.

### 2NC INB—China—China War !

#### U.S.-China war goes nuclear---there’s no brakes on escalation.

Kulacki 16, the China Project Manager in the UCS Global Security Program, (Gregory, May 2016, “The Risk of Nuclear War with China: A Troubling Lack of Urgency”, https://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/attach/2016/05/Nuclear-War-with-China.pdf)

No Technical Exit As long as both sides remain committed to pursuing technical solutions to their unique strategic problems, they are condemned to continue competing indefinitely. But stalemate is not a stable outcome; rather, it is a perpetual high-wire act. Twenty-four hours a day, 365 days a year, the governments of the United States and China are a few poor decisions away from starting a war that could escalate rapidly and end in a nuclear exchange. Lack of mutual trust and a growing sense that their differences may be irreconcilable incline both governments to continue looking for military solutions—for new means of coercion that help them feel more secure. Establishing the trust needed to have confidence in diplomatic resolutions to the dis-agreements, animosities, and suspicions that have troubled leaders of the United States and the PRC for almost 70 years is extremely difficult when both governments take every new effort to up the technological ante as an act of bad faith. The bilateral dialogues on strategic stability aim to manage the military competition, but they do not seek to end it. Although the two governments work very hard at avoiding conflict, they have yet to find a way out of what Graham Allison called their “Thucydides trap”—the risk of conflict between a rising power and an established power invested in the status quo (Allison 2015). Allison’s warning not to minimize the risks of war is sage advice, even if he does not say how the United States and China can escape the trap he describes. PRC leaders believe it is possible to prosecute a major war without risking a U.S. nuclear attack. The leaders of the United States believe stopping the PRC from prosecuting such a war may depend, in certain contingencies, on a credible threat to use nu-clear weapons—a threat U.S. leaders state they are prepared to execute. These mismatched perceptions increase both the possibility of war and the likelihood it will result in the use of nuclear weapons. Well-informed U.S. officials tend to dismiss the possibility that the United States and the PRC could wander into a nuclear war. For example, Admiral Dennis Blair, a former Director of National Intelligence whose final military post was Commander in Chief of the U.S. Pacific Command, assured a large gathering of U.S. arms-control experts that “the chances of a nuclear exchange between the United States and China are somewhere between nil and zero.” J. Stapleton Roy, a former U.S. ambassador to the PRC, wholeheartedly agreed (Swaine, Blair, and Roy 2015). Similarly, PRC military strategists and arms control experts believe that the risk of nuclear war with the United States is not an urgent concern even if that risk may not be zero (Cunningham and Fravel 2015). This lack of urgency is troubling. For example, the United States reportedly told the PRC it would risk military escalation to prevent or stop a proposed PRC island reclamation project in the Scarborough Shoal (Cooper and Douglas 2016). The PRC reportedly responded by committing to move ahead with the project later in 2016 (Chan 2016). This particular contest of wills is part of a steadily increasing number of unresolved diplomatic spats that have escalated to the level of overt military posturing reminiscent of U.S.-Soviet jousting during the Cold War. The United States and the PRC are decades-old enemies, preparing for war and armed with nuclear weapons. Good faith efforts by the leaders of both nations have failed to stop accelerating preparations for war, including new investments in their nuclear forces. Miscommunication, misunderstanding, or poor judgment could spark a conflict that both governments may find difficult to stop. War between the United States and the People’s Republic of China is not inevitable, but failing to acknowledge the risks is certain to make it more likely. Both governments should confront these risks with a greater sense of purpose. Only then will they devote the same measure of creativity, effort, and resources to the diplomacy of reducing those risks as they now spend preparing for war.

### 2NC INB—Russia—Burden Sharing Deters Russia

#### European powers can deter Russia while the U.S pivots to Asia

Gerber ’22 (Jan Gerber, Research Associate at Defense Priorities, 2/18/22, “NATO SHOULD DEFEND EUROPE, NOT PIVOT TO ASIA” <https://www.defensepriorities.org/explainers/nato-should-defend-europe-not-pivot-to-asia>) //sethlee

EUROPE’S MAJOR POWERS CAN BALANCE AGAINST RUSSIA

Any European contribution, whether in deterring or fighting China in the Indo-Pacific, is not likely to offset the effort the United States expends on defending Europe. The reason for the dominant U.S. role in European security institutions has been to prevent a hostile power from overrunning enough of the continent to pose a threat to the United States. In contrast to their relative insignificance in the Indo-Pacific, the three main European powers jointly have the economic potential and political clout in key European institutions to lead the effort of building collective defense capable of deterring Russia. The United Kingdom, France, and Germany assuming the responsibility for the conventional aspect of European defense would serve the United States, as the U.S. military shifts focus to Asia. A better division of labor within NATO would also ensure the security architecture in Europe reflects the threats Europeans perceive, not those the United States decides for them.

Russia is the only plausible threat to the territorial integrity of Europe. The Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the war in eastern Ukraine resulted in a sustained increase in military spending in Europe’s major powers. The United Kingdom has increased its annual military spending by 13 percent in real terms since 2014, France by 16 percent, and Germany by 37 percent. Major European powers can spend even more if they perceive Russia to be threatening enough, but their combined military spending already exceeds Russia’s.

Even with spending increases, however, European militaries face readiness challenges that will require political attention and coordination. Germany still must address chronic equipment and staffing shortages. Twenty percent of its military personnel positions above the junior level remain vacant. Only a little more than half of France’s military aircraft are combat-ready—the “Achilles’ heel” of the French armed forces, according to the French defense minister, Florence Parly. Combat readiness is a problem that affects other branches of the French military, too, owing in part to France’s extended global posture from the Sahel to the Pacific. The pursuit of global power projection capabilities in the Indo-Pacific, especially if it increases, will distract from creating a conventional force calibrated to the task of deterring Russia in coalition with other European partners.

Another critical missing piece of collective European defense is interoperability between national militaries that would allow for rapid deployment of coalition forces to areas of conflict, such as northeastern Europe. Rather than devoting more attention to achieving interoperability in naval operations with partners such as Japan, India, and Australia, European powers should integrate their militaries with the overarching goal of defeating Russia in a high-intensity conflict.

#### Absent adequate burden sharing, NATO fails, and Russia is emboldened.

Sands, 18 [Carla Sands, US ambassador to Denmark, 6-13-2018 accessed and translation from U.S. Mission Denmark, published Berlingske, ‘In NATO, too, It is a matter of Giving before one can enjoy <https://www.berlingske.dk/kronikker/ogsaa-i-nato-gaelder-det-at-man-skal-yde-foer-man-kan-nyde> /alundy]

At the NATO summit in July in Brussels, heads of state and government will convene to evaluate our current defense capabilities.  One topic that will be high on the agenda is a discussion of burden sharing.  It is an undeniable fact that many  NATO allies are struggling to overcome years of declining defense budgets.   As a result of this prolonged underinvestment, several countries who boast cutting edge technolgies in other fields are risking their security and short-changing their soldiers, sailors, and airmen by leaving them to work  with aging and worn out military hardware.

In our dangerous world, we need all NATO members to invest so that our defense provides a robust and meaningful deterrent.  As every Danish taxpayer knows, the system only works if everyone is willing to pay their fair share of the bill – “man skal yde før man kan nyde.” (you have to make an effort because you can enjoy the benefits)

NATO is the bedrock of our collective defense and an unbreakable bond that unites us together.  At the NATO meeting in Wales in 2014, we all made a solemn pledge to reinforce our commitment to deterrence, defense and capabilities.  Four years later, however, less than one third of NATO’s members have achieved the mutually agreed upon goal to spend 2 percent of their GDP on defense.

In the meantime, while NATO has been waiting for Alliance members to meet their full and fair financial obligations, we have seen some startling developments on the international scene:  Syria’s Bashar Al-Assad has continued to slaughter his own people on an unprecedented scale, a resurgent Iran has increased its malign influence and destabilizing activities in the Middle East, and Russia has persisted in flouting international law, institutions and norms – not least on the Alliance’s eastern border.

Let’s make no bones about it, Russia’s aggressive behavior is a threat to stability and security, especially for European nations.  Its annexation of Crimea, its support for the separatists fighting Ukrainian forces in the country’s east, its military build-up, its threats to NATO members, its carpet bombing of Syrian opposition forces and civilians and its exploitation of Western vulnerabilities are all issues of grave concern that threaten our collective security.  We have to take this reality seriously.  America has to take it seriously.  And Europe has to take it seriously.  We are open to engagement, but we also must continue to raise the costs of aggression.

There can be no doubt that Denmark is one of the Alliance’s most crucial partner nations and one of America’s most enduring partners and allies.  For decades the United States and Demark have fostered deep bonds based on our mutual respect for international law, the principles of democracy and human rights.  Moreover, with bold and brave conributions, Denmark’s forces on missions abroad are vital to NATO.  In order for Denmark to continue to be able to provide its outstanding contributions, however, new investment is desperately required.  The United States welcomes Denmark’s decision to cease its defense cuts, as outlined in the new Danish defense agreement.  The agreement is a good start, putting the country on the right trajectory to increase needed investments, but much more remains to be done.  To make possible Danish contributions in the future and to ensure that “mand skal yde før mand kan nyde,” additional investment is needed.

The United States is a disproportionate NATO supporter.  Last year the American people spent a staggering 3.5 percent of their GDP on defense – nearly double the target of 2 percent that all NATO members agreed to in 2014.  In Denmark, Germany, Italy and many other member countries, the number barely crossed the one percent threshold.  Looking at these figures, it is difficult not to be reminded of the words, earlier this year, of Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis, when he noted it is unreasonable for our allies to ask Americans to care more for their children’s future security than they do themselves.

The United States has always stood by its NATO commitment and will continue to do so in the future.  Regardless of size, all NATO nations can be equally secure in US support for Article 5.  That said, as we approach the Brussels summit, it would be befitting for Denmark and other countries to develop a firm, credible and sustainable plan for how they intend to meet the pledge they gave in Wales just four years ago.

For the last 70 years, NATO has embodied the transatlantic bond of which we are all justly proud and, I for one, am ultimately confident that NATO will build a consensus around this difficult issue as it has succeeded in doing so many times before.  It is precisely this shared willingness to make sacrifices for the good of all that defines the Alliance**.**

By making the right choices now we can ensure the safety and prosperity of all our peoples in the years to come.  It is imperative that we commit clearly and emphatically to fair burden sharing – the futures of our children depend on it.

### 2NC INB—Russia—Europe Key

#### Interest asymmetry means only a resolved Europe signals NATO has a stake in Baltic defense.

Gopalan 18, a professor of law and pro vice chancellor for academic innovation at Deakin University in Melbourne, Australia. He previously was co-chairman or vice chairman of American Bar Association committees on aerospace/defense and international transactions, a member of the ABA’s immigration commission, and dean of three law schools in Ireland and Australia. He has taught law in four countries and served as a visiting scholar at universities in France and Germany. (Sandeep, July 11th, 2018, “A new security alliance might be better than NATO free-riders”, https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/395875-a-new-security-alliance-might-be-better-than-nato-free-riders)

The provision with bite is article 5 — that is, members agree “that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all,” and in response, NATO will assist by taking “such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force.” Yet, even this provision is not that strong. It doesn’t commit members to take military action in all cases of armed attack against a member. For example, Germany is not obligated to attack Russia if the latter invades Estonia. Collective self-defense is subject to pragmatic considerations of expediency and self-interest.

In other words, while NATO might provide limited deterrence against Russian adventurism, this is largely predicated on adversely impacting U.S. self-interest. Put differently, Russia is not so naïve as to be deterred by the prospect of a military response from Europeans when U.S. interests are not affected. Russia knows that the Germans and French are unlikely to sacrifice their troops or commercial interests and go to war if Russia acts aggressively against, say, Poland. Therefore, if deterrence is the goal, America must decide what price it is willing to pay to save Poland — and who should foot that bill.

At present, European states are gambling on the U.S. paying, even though they have more to lose than the United States from Russian aggression. It may be time for Trump to call that bluff and make them pay up if they really care about security. If they don’t, the United States might be better off creating a new alliance of willing states that are prepared to contribute to collective security against modern threats including cyber attacks and other forms of warfare. That might guarantee better protection for Poland and Estonia than do their free-riding neighbors.

#### European defense interests have diverged from the US---need for increased burden sharing

**Le Gleut 19** [Ronan LE GLEUT; senator for French people living outside France; 7/3/19; European Defence: The Challenge of Strategic Autonomy; [http://www.senat.fr/rap/r18-626-2/r18-626-2\_mono.html]](http://www.senat.fr/rap/r18-626-2/r18-626-2_mono.html%5d/AL)

Since 1945, **Europe has been in a situation that has never occurred since the fall of the Roman Empire: it has largely lost its responsibility for defending itself.** Several countries in Eastern Europe underwent Soviet domination from 1945 to the 1980s, which for half a century deprived them of the possibility of determining their own defence policy. In Western Europe, in the context of the Cold War, the **European countries by and large placed themselves under US protection, in the framework of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)** created by the Washington Treaty of 4 April 1949. Only two countries have chosen to maintain an autonomous capacity to defend their vital interests by rapidly acquiring nuclear arms: the United Kingdom (which has had nuclear weapons since 1952) and France (which has had them since 1960). Even today, the United States accounts for about two-thirds of NATO efforts. The situation now, however, is that faced with the growing challenge of China's hyper-power status, the United States has made clear to its European allies that it no longer intends to play such a substantial role in the defence of Europe. That is what the **United States means by its regularly repeated demand for “burden-sharing.” By the time of the 2006 Riga Summit, the allies had agreed to raise their national spending to a minimum of 2% of GDP.** It was in this context, that this prospect was confirmed at the 2014 NATO Summit held at Newport, by a specific commitment that the allies would make that figure the goal to be reached in 10 years.29(\*) A second goal was that at least 20% of these defence budgets would be allocated to equipment purchases. In fact, **the end of the Cold War led the European States to believe that they would be able to “collect the dividends of peace” by continuously reducing their defence efforts.** The significant element of this new context is that two developments not directly related to one another have met and converged: - On the one hand, **the United States has found itself facing challenges on a global level of a kind not seen since the Second World War, and has felt the burden of its commitment to European defence more acutely;** - On the other hand, the **European States have become increasingly aware of the threats they face, especially in the wake of Russia's annexation of Crimea. This was a symbolic shock, because it dramatically manifested Russia's will and ability to challenge internationally recognised borders,** including those that it had itself recognised until then. Source: NATO The graph above shows the increase in the share of defence spending in GDP for most European countries between 2014 and 2019. **Expenditures have increased for the fourth year in a row. However, for the time being, the majority of European NATO members still fall short of the 2%** of GDP criterion.30(\*) This is particularly the case in Germany, at 1.36%; Italy, at 1.22% and Spain, which is at 0.92% of GDP. **Here, American and European perspectives diverge. It is quite clear that for the United States there is no common measure between these two challenges. For the United States, China is a universal competitor, contesting American supremacy in all domains**: first of all in the economic domain, then in the financial domain, and in the cultural, diplomatic and strategic domains as well. In this competition, the military dimension does not dominate, although it is present. Russia has the opposite profile: it is a country with a weak economy, and a GDP between those of Spain and Italy - even though it is the largest country in the world and endowed with considerable natural resources. In addition to this, the Russian population is undergoing a net decline. Though **Russia's interventionist and sometimes provocative policies pose a clear and immediate threat to European countries, and are of course more urgent for those closest to it, it does not pose a threat to US pre-eminence worldwide.** These are the issues at stake in the organisation of the system for arms control in Europe, a matter that is of key importance for Europeans. In this light, the scheduled expiration of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty next August is extremely concerning. **Significantly, the issue is the subject of very broad consensus in Europe.** **This, then, is the deep root of the awakening of the European spirit of defence: our fundamental security and defence interests have diverged from those of the United States. But this divergence, of course, does not mean opposition.** Extremely strong ties unite the countries of Europe to the United States. These ties are multiple, and range across all the economic and social fields, but in general they may be considered as being of two fundamental types: - First there are blood ties, forged in common military engagements against common enemies. While these ties are particularly old in the case of France, it can be said that they include all European nations, in respect of the liberation of Western Europe in 1944-1945. As we have lately been commemorating the 75th anniversary of the Normandy landings, your rapporteurs here wish to take a moment to salute the memory of the thousands of American soldiers who gave their lives during the campaign in France. Their sacrifice cannot and will not ever be forgotten, and has forged an eternal bond between our two peoples. - Then there are ties of a political nature. The United States is a democratic regime, based, in the same philosophical and ideological tradition as the European countries, on the belief that every individual has inalienable rights, and that the rights and duties of all members of society are defined and protected by the rule of law. This is an abiding, fundamental difference between the United States and other powers like China or Russia. **The use of the term “burden-sharing” in regard to European defence would thus seem appropriate. In substance, then, it is difficult to see what could lastingly justify Europe's continued under-sizing of its defence efforts.**

#### European countries are accepting the need for burden sharing now---stability depends on it

**Shalal-Esa 14** [Andrea Shalal-Esa; Correspondent at Reuters; 1/9/14; Europe must step up on NATO defense burden -Norway defense chief; <https://www.reuters.com/article/norway-usa-nato/europe-must-step-up-on-nato-defense-burden-norway-defense-chief-idUSL2N0KK0G620140110>]

WASHINGTON, Jan 9 (Reuters) - **European countries must shoulder more of the political and economic responsiblity for NATO’s common defense to ensure the continued relevance of the alliance in coming years**, Norwegian Defense Minister Ine Eriksen Soreide said on Thursday. Soreide, who met with an number of U.S. lawmakers this week and is due to meet with U.S. Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel on Friday, said the **United States could not be expected to continue paying for over 70 percent of NATO’s defense needs. “European allies need to step up to the plate, take a bigger part of the political and economic burdens,”** Soreide told Reuters in an interview after a speech at the Center for Strategic and International Studies think tank. **“We need to do our part. We need to be more than a net importer of security. We need to export security,”** she said. In her speech, Soreide said her meetings with U.S. lawmakers revealed that both Democrats and Republicans in Congress were increasingly questioning the value of continued U.S. investments and engagement in Europe. Soreide said European fears of being abandoned by Washington had been fanned by U.S. plans to focus more on the Asian-Pacific region, but those concerns were likely overblown. Still, some **changes were clearly needed, she said, calling for greater investment in Europe’s own security, increased planning for future crises, and development of high-end capabilities that could be easily deployed if needed.** “Norway believes that **global stability depends on the ability of Europe and the U.S. to work together, and that this will become even more important in the future,”** Soreide told the think tank, citing threats from terrorists, emerging state powers and the re-emergence of old powers such as Russia. She called for increased NATO exercises and training, greater engagement in areas outside allied terrorities, and said European allies should be more willing to address U.S. security concerns outside Europe.The participation of **Norway and Denmark in efforts to destroy Syrian chemical weapons was a good example of “trans-Atlantic burden-sharing in practice,” Soreide said.**

### 2NC INB—Russia—Solves Baltics

#### European underinvestment in force structure and continental mobility primes Russian aggression in the Baltics---European focus undergirds the credibility of NATO’s deterrent.

Blachford 20, a Lecturer of International Relations at the Baltic Defence College, Estonia, (Kevin, February 7th, 2020, “Can NATO and The EU Really Defend the Baltic States Against Russia?”, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/can-nato-and-eu-really-defend-baltic-states-against-russia-121711)

Primarily, the challenge facing NATO is dealing with the possibility of Russia using the Baltics as a way to test the credibility of the NATO alliance. The Baltic states of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia currently rely on NATO’s enhanced forward presence and air policing missions to deter Russian aggression. But this provides only short term reassurance to the region and overlooks the lessons of the Cold War in which West Germany played a vital role in the credibility of NATO’s deterrence posture. The reluctance of Germany to think seriously about the military security of Europe is, therefore, becoming a hindrance to NATO’s deterrence capabilities. Germany has repeatedly emphasized its aversion to militarism in recent years and its military has faced numerous bouts of austerity. But this reluctance to be seen as a military power overlooks the role of the West German Bundeswehr which acted as the first line of NATO’s defense in the Cold War.

The history of the Cold War provides clues to how deterrence could be increased in the Baltic region today. The defense and deterrence capability of West Germany revolved not just around the nuclear deterrent, but on the ability of the United States and its allies to deploy forces quickly. This related to the logistic capabilities to move forces quickly to the border with East Germany. An important part of NATO strategy therefore relied on the West German autobahns as a way to move both goods and people. Today, the Baltic region lacks any meaningful infrastructure in which reinforcements could be moved quickly to the region. Train lines are outdated and travel between the Baltics to Poland or further to Germany is painstakingly slow. The Baltic states also do not have any significant capabilities to host allied forces in large scale numbers, particularly as access to the area in a conflict scenario would be limited due to Russian air superiority and anti-access, area-denial capabilities. The large placement of U.S. forces in this sensitive area would no doubt invite reprisals and escalation from Russia. But showing the capabilities to quickly respond to a crisis by having the capacity to move resources to the region would enhance NATO’s deterrence in the long term. NATO should therefore consider developing its forces in Germany and even Poland, but with the added caveat of being able to move these forces quickly to where they are needed in the Baltics.

The lack of infrastructure across the Baltic region, therefore, creates two main problems. Firstly, it limits NATO’s credibility to respond to a crisis on the border with Russia. Secondly, infrastructure serves a dual purpose in both war and peacetime. The lack of European investment and interest in the region creates opportunities for Russia to undermine the societies of the three Baltic nations. This shows the primary challenge facing NATO in European defense. The European Union needs to do more to show its commitment to the East. Continual expansion eastwards has not had the de-securitizing effect once expected. The lack of German commitment and Brussel’s interest in the region is also effecting NATO’s ability to defend the Baltics.

### 2NC INB—AT: Non-Numeric Metric Bad

#### Current burden-sharing strategies are based in too many skewed factors--- new burden sharing is necessary for fairness and recognition among allies.

Mattelaer, 16 [Alexander Mattelaer, 3-1-2016, Assistant Director of the Institute for European Studies (IES) in Brussels, Belgium. PhD in Political Science from the Vrije Universiteit Brussel, ‘Revisiting the Principles of NATO Burden-Sharing’, <https://press.armywarcollege.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2821&context=parameters> /alundy]

A thousand different ways exist for evaluating Alliance burden sharing. This has not only to do with methodology, but also with the tendency in all nations to discount the value of the efforts undertaken by others. Engaging in this debate, therefore, requires careful consideration of the available approaches and the broader purpose these serve. This section reviews the metrics currently in use and contrasts these with frequent criticisms and alternatives. It goes on to discuss their historical inspirations, which helps to transform a debate that tends to focus on defense accounting into one on military strategy. Commonly agreed principles of Alliance strategy are of greater importance than numeric details divorced from their historical and geographical context. At present, NATO defense planners evaluate burden-sharing on the basis of eleven metrics that measure financial inputs as well as military outputs. The best known of these are the investment parameters, namely the percentage of GDP spent on defense expenditure and the percentage of overall defense expenditure spent on major equipment and Research & Development, currently set at 2 percent and 20 percent. With respect to military capabilities, NATO planners track the percentages of any ally’s armed forces that are deployable and sustainable on expeditionary US Leadership and NATO Mattelaer 27 operations. They also evaluate the extent to which every ally implements the national capability targets assigned under the NATO defense plan- ning process.5 An additional guideline in this regard is that no ally can be asked to provide more than 50 percent of any individual capabil- ity set during the apportionment of national targets. The underlying idea here is to wean the Alliance off its near-exclusive reliance on a single ally—read the United States—for certain capabilities. A third set of metrics concerns actual contributions: the percentages of deploy- able land forces, airframes, and vessels that are effectively deployed on operations, the extent to which an ally fills assigned staff positions in the NATO Command Structure and NATO Force Structure headquarters, and the contribution made to filling the requirements of the NATO Response Force. Depending on what measurement parameters one prefers to look at, a different picture emerges. The share of GDP spent on defense often makes media headlines, but this metric draws frequent criticism on methodological grounds.6 Most importantly, it does not differentiate between defense spending for national and for Alliance purposes**.** It is no secret the United States—which scores the highest on this scale— also has significant national responsibilities that lie far beyond the remit of the Alliance, such as its security guarantees to South Korea and Japan. In some European capitals, it is a rhetorical question to ask whether the United States would spend a dollar less on its military if its allies were to spend more. In addition, alternative metrics are occasionally put forward. These would typically skew the balance in a particular direction. Measuring defense spending per square kilometer of national territory would constitute an extreme example of this kind. Last, but not least, there is the discussion on common funding. While small in size relative to overall defense spending, NATO’s common budgets arguably constitute the purest expression of how the bills of the Alliance are split. The cost-sharing arrangement for the civil budget, the military budget, and the NATO security investment program follows an agreed formula based on Gross National Income.7 One important exception to this formula is the United States, which assumes a 22.14 percent share of the total, whereas its economic weight within the Alliance accounts for more than 40 percent of the NATO total. Taking this discount into consideration, the largest proportional share of NATO common funding is thus borne by Germany (14.65 percent), the ally otherwise most notorious for not meeting investment targets. It is easy to get lost in the jungle of data that these metrics generate. They also bear little direct relationship to the changing security environ- ment the Alliance faces and the precise mix of military capabilities that is required for meeting future challenges. In other words, a focus on any particular parameter is akin to putting the cart before the horse. It is therefore well worth remembering that during the first decades of the Alliance’s existence, successive strategic concepts articulated a list of general principles deemed fundamental to the organization of a common defense. As coined by the 1949 Strategic Concept, the list ran as follows (emphasis added)

### 2NC INB—AT: Turn—Burden Sharing Inevitable

#### Burden sharing is inevitable- moving away from 2% is key

McInnis ’22 (Kathleen McInnis, a senior fellow in the International Security Program, “2 Percent Defense Spending Is a Bad Target for NATO”, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/06/10/2-percent-defense-spending-nato-budget-bad-target/>) //sethlee

It’s like clockwork: As NATO’s late June summit in Madrid [approaches](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_194990.htm), the debate over whether allies [spend too little on defense](https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/18717503/west-ukraine-defeats-russia/) grows louder. NATO defense ministers [pledged](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_67655.htm) in 2006 to spend at least 2 percent of their nation’s gross domestic product on their defense annually. Today that’s become a totemic object for the alliance—especially for Americans who insist that others are spending too little. There is a certain truth in that, but there are much more pressing concerns for NATO than tracking this figure. Leaders should be asking harder questions about how the money is being spent and how the security burden can be shared, not obsessing about who’s giving their fair share. The pledge was reaffirmed in 2014 at NATO’s Wales summit by alliance leaders, because NATO states were collectively failing to meet the 2006 commitment, thanks to decades of chronic underinvestment by European states on their militaries, which, unsurprisingly, led to significant capability gaps in their ability to conduct military operations. This, in turn, meant that the United States, which spends more than 3 percent annually, was absorbing the lion’s share of the costs associated with securing Europe. As the argument went in 2014, the United States would be much more [amenable](https://www.voanews.com/a/clinton-backs-gates-on-nato-burden-sharing-123686254/140618.html) to continuing its investment in trans-Atlantic security if NATO nations would just spend at least 2 percent of their GDP on defense. Getting all NATO heads of state to agree to the 2 percent minimum target was a laudable achievement—and one that might not have happened if Russia hadn’t invaded Ukraine earlier that year. But the 2 percent target has proved to be both operationally insufficient and strategically counterproductive. Ultimately, without some serious adjustments to the strategic debates, a focus on the 2 percent minimum target only severely hurts NATO’s relevance—and public support for the alliance. The 2 percent minimum target was largely intended as a political mechanism—for example, to help defense ministries fend off budget cuts imposed by finance ministers. But 2 percent is an input rather than an output metric. In other words, how that 2 percent is spent is considerably more important than whether countries are spending enough. Although there’s a hearty debate about how much of Russia’s ham-handed approach to its war against Ukraine is due to technological weakness versus Russian strategic incompetence, there is no question that some defense investments need to be rethought, including those needed for stronger territorial defense—including maritime and airspace defense—of a soon-to-expanded northeastern NATO border. With further Russian aggression likely and Afghanistan in the rearview mirror, there’s going to be a new emphasis on territorial defense and deterrence. That’s more people-heavy than expeditionary operations, and as any comptroller will tell you, people are surprisingly expensive. Yes, a number of European countries—[including Germany](https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/germany-coalition-government-cdu-agree-%E2%82%AC100-billion-military-boost/ar-AAXRMjZ?ocid=uxbndlbing)—have decided to increase their defense spending in the wake of Ukraine, but how will those monies be used? At the strategic level, the 2 percent minimum target has become even more problematic. Alliances are frameworks for communication and cooperation among states that extend much more deeply and broadly than just security and defense; NATO’s benefits for the United States go a long way [beyond](https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR500/RR518/RAND_RR518.pdf) military cooperation. Unfortunately, the 2 percent minimum target reframes the conversation about security burden-sharing into one about transactional cost-sharing. But the value of alliances cannot be measured in terms of dollars and euros. The danger of overemphasizing a minimum figure that European partners may not be comfortable with meeting is that it contributes to the impression the United States is somehow being cheated. Is it any wonder that after years of hammering Europe about the 2 percent minimum target that the previous U.S. president decided that his country was getting an unfair deal—and reportedly almost pulled the United States out of NATO? Support for NATO may be strong among the traditional foreign-policy establishment, but in a time of rapidly shifting U.S. domestic politics, it’s also potentially fragile. Nor does the 2 percent minimum account for the nonmilitary dimensions of contemporary security needs. Economic and political dynamics are critically important to a nation’s security—and from the perspective of the public in NATO states are perhaps even more important than military capabilities. European states have been at the forefront of coping with challenges such as disinformation and cyberwarfare—capacities and experience that are vital but not fully reflected in military budgets. This is, arguably, why NATO’s Article 2 exists: to underscore that economic and political policies must reinforce military alliance commitments. As the Chinese tech giant [Huawei’s investments](https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2020/09/30/nato-and-the-5g-challenge/index.html) in NATO countries demonstrate, failure to consider the security dimensions of commercial investments can have an adverse impact on the alliance. The conversation on burden-sharing must better account for the broader trade-offs and risks associated with choosing alliance security over commercial profitability. Those costs of NATO commitment in Europe are rarely visible in Washington discussions. When NATO governments meet in Madrid, they will endorse an updated “Strategic Concept,” a vision document for how the alliance views—and should prepare for—the current and emerging strategic environment. Yet in order to turn that concept into a meaningful and sustainable political reality, the alliance must then have a tough but necessary conversation on how to recalibrate burden-sharing—and embed that new understanding in any implementing guidance it develops for the Strategic Concept.

### 2NC INB—AT: Populism Turn

#### Failure to shore up defense spending causes European disintegration.

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AN END TO COMPLACENCY?

Europe’s predicament is clear. Without a common vision for defense, and with destabilizing pressures on its periphery, the continent will soon serve as a theater, rather than a participant, in a great-power competition. Russia actively supports European far-right parties and regularly interferes in European elections. In Ukraine, Russia has illegally annexed Crimea and fomented a slow-burning war that has killed 13,000 Ukrainians and displaced 1.5 million. Farther south, the Syrian civil war has driven millions of refugees to Europe’s shores, causing a [split over immigration](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/europe/2018-10-05/how-europe-can-reform-its-migration-policy) policy and fueling the rise of populist parties. China, for its part, has invested heavily in Europe’s ports and technology infrastructure, in part because it hopes to drive a wedge between the United States and Europe. The more internally divided Europe is, the more it will find itself at the mercy of these opportunistic great powers. This is a recipe for a Europe once again roiled by nationalism, an EU that is irrelevant, and a transatlantic alliance in which Europe has little influence and the United States lacks a strong partner.

The only prudent way to avoid this nightmare scenario is for Europe to shed its culture of complacency in favor of autonomy. It must develop the ability to better defend itself and pursue common European interests. The EU’s foreign service outlined this goal in its [2016 Global Strategy](https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/eugs_review_web_0.pdf), and leaders have echoed the same sentiment in speeches all over the continent. But that doesn’t mean getting there will be easy.

#### Economic insecurity doesn’t explain European populism.

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It’s Not the Economy, Stupid

The old standby explanation of populism is that it is a predictable response to economic oppression. Thus, the socialist pundit John Judis argues in 2016’s The Populist Explosion: How the Great Recession Transformed American and European Politics that populism rose in response to “the skewed distribution of jobs and income that neoliberal economics had created over the prior decades.”

Yet populists have surged in popularity or come to power in countries with very dissimilar economic conditions, including some with low unemployment and relatively high economic growth. Nor is the rise of populism a matter of age, with older people supporting right‐​wing nationalist populists and younger people supporting liberal cosmopolitanism: Plenty of young people have been voting for populist parties and candidates. Nor is the populist vote explained robustly by income levels.

The British political scientists Roger Eatwell and Matthew Goodwin point out in their 2018 book National Populism: The Revolt Against Liberal Democracy (Pelican) that a common driver in “national populism” is not falling wages but “relative deprivation—a sense that the wider group, whether white Americans or native Brits, is being left behind relative to others in society, while culturally liberal politicians, media and celebrities devote far more attention and status to immigrants, ethnic minorities and other newcomers.” Rapid change in the status of groups, notably through immigration, causes many people to experience relative downward mobility and to feel that the status of their group is threatened. When Britain voted to withdraw from the European Union, Eatwell and Goodwin write, polling data showed Remainers “talking endlessly about economic risks while Leavers were chiefly concerned about perceived threats to their identity and national groups.” (Brexit is a complex question, of course, and some classical liberals supported it because they feared an unaccountable E.U. bureaucracy. But the movement for Brexit was driven far more by populist concerns than by liberal ones.)

In the U.S., a deciding factor in Trump’s victory was the estimated 9 percent of voters who cast ballots for Obama in 2012 and then switched to Trump, according to survey data analyzed by George Washington University political scientist John Sides. Among white Obama voters who had not been to college, the share who later voted for Trump was a whopping 22 percent. As that past support for Obama suggests, their votes for Trump can’t be reduced to a simple story of racial backlash. Nor was it a simple matter of economics: For the most part, those voters’ incomes and living standards are higher than those of their parents.

But a common motivation for their support for Trump seems to be insecurity about their social status. A 2016 Brookings Institution survey showed that 66 percent of non‐​college‐​schooled American whites “agree that discrimination against whites is as big a problem today as discrimination against blacks and other minorities.” Anxiety about status—in this case a perception of an inversion of the status quo—seems to be a major factor, certainly much bigger than ideological racism. As political scientist Karen Stenner argued based on extensive data in her 2005 book The Authoritarian Dynamic, threats to “collective rather than individual conditions” trigger authoritarian “groupiness,” i.e., populism.

Here’s where classical liberals need to do some serious thinking. A mainstay of arguments for free markets is that when people’s incomes rise at different rates, the important thing is that they’re all rising. Even most left‐​wing egalitarians accept some inequality, as long as it’s necessary for the poor to become less poor. The philosopher John Rawls argued in A Theory of Justice, for instance, that inequalities can be just if they are to the “greatest benefit of the least advantaged,” because then, even the least well off could not complain. But human beings are concerned about more than how well they’re doing relative to how well they did in the past. They also care about how well they’re doing compared to others. They care about hierarchies and social status.

Relative status is quite different from absolute well‐​being. Libertarians have for many years celebrated the rise in status of women, racial minorities, immigrants, openly gay people, and others who had for very long periods of time suffered from low social status. Well, when it comes to relative social status, if some rose, others had to fall. And who perceived themselves as falling? White men without college degrees.

It isn’t just onetime outsiders rising in comparative status. As Charles Murray lays out in his 2012 book Coming Apart: The State of White America, 1960–2010, a decline in our collective emphasis on certain traditional virtues—hard work, marriage, and the like—has opened a gulf between college‐​schooled elites and high‐​schooled nonelites. The resentment felt by one side of the divide is, unfortunately, often matched by the arrogance and condescension shown by the other, which merely accentuates the resentment.

Similar divisions are happening in other countries as well, and they seem to be a major driver of populist sentiment. Pew Research Center surveys conducted in 2017 in 15 countries identified ethnocentrism and perceptions of national decline as characteristic of populist voters. In Germany, for example, 44 percent of the populist Alternative for Germany (AfD) party’s supporters say that life is worse than it was 50 years ago for people like them, compared to only 16 percent of other Germans. While data vary across countries and, as Berlin pointed out in 1967, no one factor can explain all populist movements, such fears of national decline and group status are common, especially in Europe and the U.S. The most important driver in Europe and the U.S. seems to be immigration and what Eatwell and Goodwin in National Populism call “hyper ethnic change”—that is, rapid change in the ethnic mix of a society, with multiple ethnicities joining the social order. (Some Americans have experienced feelings of dislocation and threat to their place in society upon seeing that their old Piggly Wiggly store has been replaced by a mercado with Mexican flags. It’s not the experience of ethnic pluralism that seems to be the problem but the fear that other ethnicities will eventually displace them.)

The percentage of U.S. residents who were foreign‐​born reached 13.7 percent in 2017, the highest percentage since 1910, when it was 14.7 percent. Moreover, since the Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1965, which abolished national quotas and favored family reunions, higher percentages of immigrants have been coming from Asia, Africa, Central America, and the Middle East, accentuating ethnic differences with the native‐​born population.

The Alternative for Germany, which started as a movement against the euro and has morphed into a populist anti‐​immigrant party, has drawn increasing support from less‐​schooled voters from the former states of East Germany. Such voters perceive their status as having fallen in recent decades, and they fear immigration far more than do more‐​schooled voters and those in the Western part of the country, which has seen far more immigration. In fact, the AfD support was strongest in those regions of the East that had seen the least population growth due to migration; people in those places feel that they are being left behind, and they blame immigrants, whom they see more on television than in their neighborhoods.

Similar analyses can be applied to Britain, France, Sweden, and other democracies that have seen surges of populism.

Hyper ethnic change is profoundly unsettling to many people, and it is helping to drive populist political responses. One can dismiss such reactions as irrational or small‐​minded, but many people feel them nonetheless. Moreover, many people are not satisfied with improvements in their conditions if they perceive others—especially outsiders—as doing even better. Envy and resentment have long been drivers of anti‐​libertarian movements, and they seem to be back in a big way. The problem is exacerbated by the increase of welfare‐​state transfer payments and benefits, which outsiders are believed to exploit or threaten.

I fear that we may be entering an age of authoritarian “groupiness” and that the consequences will be terrible for freedom and prosperity. Not to put too fine a point on it, but the rise of far‐​right and far‐​left authoritarian populist movements today is more than a little reminiscent of Europe in the 1930s.

#### European democracy is self-correcting, and the threat of populism is blown out of proportion.

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Constraints On the Populists’ Project of Power

How far populists in power will get in implementing anything like the agenda sketched by Pappas depends very much on a set of constraints that I would like to classify into five categories. First, there are the constitutional constraints. In the United States, Donald Trump has (to some extent) been checked by the courts and by Congress. The institutional arrangements in the United States and also in the democracies of western Europe are likely to inhibit the more extreme forms of populist autocracies that we know from the presidential systems of Latin America (Roberts [2017](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11615-020-00231-9#ref-CR68)). In the less established democracies of central–eastern Europe, however, populists in power meet with less institutional resistance and use their power to implement illiberal institutional reforms, as is illustrated by the Polish and Hungarian populists in power. The same has applied to Berlusconi’s governments in Italy, which have often adopted illiberal measures regarding the checks and balances of Italian democracy (such as media freedom, the judiciary, the constitution, and the president of the republic; Bobba and McDonnell [2015](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11615-020-00231-9#ref-CR10)).

The electoral system provides a little noticed but crucial institutional constraint. While majoritarian (or nearly majoritarian) systems allow populists to gain power undivided, proportional systems are likely to force populists to share power with coalition partners who are likely to be mainstream parties. This kind of power sharing goes a long way to moderate both populist parties and their voters. Thus, when the Austrian FPÖ entered the government dominated by Wolfgang Schüssel’s ÖVP in 2000, it was seriously weakened by the experience. Its cabinet members adopted more moderate positions, which led to an eventual split between the moderates and the radicals, with the moderates creating a new party, the BZÖ (Luther [2015](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11615-020-00231-9#ref-CR50), p. 143–5). Similarly, the Swiss SVP moderated its populist discourse once its leader was co-opted into the government in 2003, and it also split over the government experience of its leader (Bernhard et al. [2015](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11615-020-00231-9#ref-CR6)). Rooduijn et al. ([2014](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11615-020-00231-9#ref-CR70)) show that, after an electoral success, populist parties generally become less populist in their party programs.

It is when populists gain power undivided and get an opportunity to implement their project of political renewal that they may become a major threat to democracy. In such less favorable institutional circumstances, the strategies of the populists’ own parties and of related parties in their own camp become particularly important. Thus, for Levitsky and Ziblatt ([2018](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11615-020-00231-9#ref-CR46), p. 7), an essential test for democracies is not whether such populist leaders emerge but “whether political leaders, and especially political parties, work to prevent them from gaining power in the first place.” They are afraid that institutions—written constitutions and norms of mutual toleration and forbearance (i.e., patient self-restraint)—are not enough to rein in elected autocrats. For them (p. 19), parties are the essential gatekeepers. Successful gatekeeping requires that mainstream parties isolate and defeat extremist forces. It is “the abdication of political responsibility by existing leaders” that often marks a nation’s first step toward authoritarianism.

In this respect, it is worthwhile to remind ourselves of Linz’s ([1978](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11615-020-00231-9#ref-CR48)) analysis of the breakdown of democracy in the interwar period: He distinguished between loyal, semiloyal, and disloyal oppositions in democratic regimes. Fascists and communists were the disloyal oppositions, but most interesting from the contemporary point of view are the semiloyal opponents from less radical parties: Linz characterized them as willing to encourage, tolerate, cover up, treat leniently, excuse, or justify actions of other participants in the political process that go beyond the limits of peaceful, legitimate patterns of politics in democracy. Ultimately, he identified semiloyalty by its greater affinity for radicals on its own side of the political spectrum than for the supporters of the democratic principles. Thus, in the Weimar Republic, the semiloyal opposition contributed to the breakdown of the system by seeking the support of the disloyal opposition and by helping it into power. Building on Linz’s analysis, I would like to suggest that the politicians of the populist leaders’ own party and of related parties in their own camp become critical for his or her maneuvering space. To the extent that they condone the excesses of the maverick in power, they crucially contribute to the danger he or she poses for democracy. This is what has happened, tragically, in the United States, where most Republican leaders closed ranks behind Trump, and the election became a standard two-party race (Levitsky and Ziblatt [2018](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11615-020-00231-9#ref-CR46), p. 70, 201). Trump’s deviance has been tolerated by the Republican party, which has helped make it acceptable to much of the Republican electorate. And by spring 2018, Trump’s takeover of the party’s institutions has been largely complete. Another instance of this mechanism is the toleration of Victor Orbán within the ranks of the European People’s Party. By contrast, after many years of toleration, to be sure, the South African ANC has succeeded in ousting its maverick leader Jacob Zuma and replacing him with a democratic leader, Cyril Ramaphosa.

The third constraint is the international constraint. Following Levitsky and Way ([2010](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11615-020-00231-9#ref-CR47)), external leverage and linkage may be key factors for keeping populists in power in check. However, the recent survey of a number of key cases of populists in power suggests that “international actors do have a difficult time when it comes to dealing with populists in power” (Taggart and Rovira-Kaltwasser [2016](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11615-020-00231-9#ref-CR76), p. 356). This is related to the fact that international institutions such as the EU or the Organization of American States have a limited tool kit for defending democracy. In the case of the EU, membership is conditional on meeting several democratic conditions. However, once a country has become a member, the EU has limited capacity to impose compliance with democratic rules and procedures. This has been illustrated by the so-called Haider affair, which deeply traumatized the EU (Müller [2013](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11615-020-00231-9#ref-CR57), p. 139). It is equally illustrated by the way the EU has been dealing with Orbán’s Hungary and Kaczyński’s Poland. Moreover, as Taggart and Rovira-Kaltwasser ([2016](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11615-020-00231-9#ref-CR76), p. 356) suggest, outside interventions may backfire, as they give populists in government the opportunity to denounce coalitions between domestic and foreign actors that undermine the will of the people. This is perfectly illustrated by the Greek referendum in 2015, when the Greek voters turned down the austerity package offered by the international actors, although they were under great pressure to accept it.

A fourth constraint is the constraint imposed by the markets. Thus, during the final phase of the protracted Italian government formation in 2018, the markets reacted sharply when the leaders of the two populist parties submitted a list of prospective ministers to the president that included a finance minister who was an explicit opponent of Italy’s membership in the Eurozone. When the populists backed down and were prepared to compromise, the markets calmed down to some extent, too. The sanctioning potential of the markets seems to be much bigger than that of international political actors.

Finally, the most important constraint is constituted by the voters. Aspiring despots may be beaten at the polls. Of course, it is by no means certain that voters will vote against populists in power. As Schedler ([2018](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11615-020-00231-9#ref-CR73)) points out, it has been quite puzzling and disturbing “to see majorities (or at least pluralities) of voters supporting, once and again, illiberal governments who have been, step by step, dismantling their democratic rights and liberties.” Schedler suggests that voters might care more about other values (such as social justice, religious piety, security, or the national soul) than democracy; they may fail to see that democracy is being taken apart before their eyes; or they may have competing conceptions of democracy. However, let us not forget that liberal democracy is strong, because, as Galston ([2018](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11615-020-00231-9#ref-CR25)) suggests, to a greater extent than any other political form, it harbors the power of self-correction. It is possible that voters will unseat aspiring autocrats. Armenia, Malaysia, the Maldives, Turkey, and Ukraine provide recent examples from outside Europe of the voters’ power. In April 2018, a protest movement succeeded in ousting Serzh Sargsyan, who had ruled Armenia for the past decade, replacing him with Nikol Pashinyan, a journalist turned lawmaker. Meanwhile, in Malaysia’s general elections in early May 2018, a broad coalition of voters ousted Prime Minister Najib in spite of his shameless attempts to rig the elections and hold on to power. Malaysia’s citizens have finally been able to reassert their right to change the way the country is run. In the case of Malaysia, the sentiments reflect “less a revolution than a restoration”—a return to an earlier era of settled law, fair judges, and democratic accountability that has survived in the national imagination (The Economist, May 17, 2018). In September 2018, the opposition leader Ibrahim Mohamed Solih was elected to replace the authoritarian incumbent in the Maldives. The Turkish local elections that were equally held in spring 2019 indicate that voters are able to impose limits on the autocratic ambitions of President Erdoğan.

In Europe, we need to distinguish between regions. In northwestern Europe, where the radical right has been the main populist force, its illiberal potential has been curbed so far by institutional and partisan constraints—the division of power by proportional electoral systems and the need to form coalitions when getting into power. Moreover, the radical right constituency became less dissatisfied in all the cases where these parties got into power (see Kriesi and Schulte-Cloos [forthcoming](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11615-020-00231-9#ref-CR40); Haugsgjerd [2019](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11615-020-00231-9#ref-CR28)). In southern Europe, where the radical left has been the main populist force, its illiberal potential has also been limited so far by institutional and partisan constraints—proportional electoral systems and the need to enter into coalition with other parties, as well as by market constraints. The partisan constraints worked even in the case of the coalition of populists who governed Italy in 2018/2019: Because of their incompatible programs, the coalition partners imposed limits on each other. In central–eastern Europe, there are fewer constraints on populists in power because the electoral systems allow them to get undivided power in countries like Hungary and Poland. The market constraints as well as the international constraints have also proved to be weak so far. However, democracy’s power of self-correction may also assert itself in this part of Europe. Thus, Zuzana Čaputová’s victory in the presidential elections in Slovakia in March 2019 provides a signal that liberal democracy is recovering central-eastern Europe. And the Ukrainian presidential elections in April 2019, which were won by a complete outsider, confirm the power of self-correction that voters wield even in hybrid democracies.

Conclusion

There clearly are dangers for democracy, but let us underscore with Galston ([2018](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11615-020-00231-9#ref-CR25)) a less fashionable point: This is no time for panic. As we have seen, modernization theorists concur. They believe that democracy, in the long run, will impose itself as a result of the spread of fundamental values that underpin it, even if we find some short-term limited reversal of the long-term progress of democracy. In Europe in particular, there is no reason to dramatize. Among the European citizens, the principles of democracy are widely supported, even if dissatisfaction with democracy is widespread—especially in the European south and the European east. To be sure, there is widespread indifference and alienation in different parts of Europe, in particular among the youngest generations, which is indeed preoccupying. However, there are also large groups of critical citizens who combine support of democratic ideals with dissatisfaction with the existing democracies of their own countries, especially in southern and central–eastern Europe (see Kriesi and Vidal [2020](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11615-020-00231-9#ref-CR41)). It is these critical citizens who may reassert themselves and exercise the self-corrective power of democracy.

Democratic dissatisfaction contributes to the rise of radical challenger parties, especially on the radical left in southern Europe but also on the radical right across western Europe. These parties express widespread dissatisfaction with democracy and contribute to it by their populist discourse. The good news is that across western Europe, once these parties are in government, democratic dissatisfaction seems to evaporate among their voters, and they arguably become parties like any other mainstream party, provided they do not gain power undivided. Most dangerous are situations where populist challengers do not have to share power in government. In western Europe, parliamentary democracies and proportional electoral systems tend to guard against populists gaining undivided power. The Italian case shows that populists of different persuasions may join forces to govern, but it also suggests that they may not be able to govern effectively. The institutional context is less favorable for democracy in central–eastern Europe, where semipresidential systems (Poland, Romania) and electoral systems heavily skewed in favor of the largest party (Hungary) provide the possibility for populists to gain undivided power. Other safeguards—partisan, international, and market constraints—may be less reliable than often hoped for. In the final analysis, it is the voters who may resort to sanctioning aspiring autocrats in this part of Europe as well.

### 2NC INB—AT: Populism Turn—Populism High

#### Influence from Trumpist radicals is spurring a spike in European populism

Collinson 4-12-22, Stephen Collinson is a reporter for CNN Politics covering the White House, and politics across the U.S. and the world, “Trump-style populism rises in US and Europe as Putin assaults world order,” April 12th 2022, CNN politics, https://www.cnn.com/2022/04/12/politics/rise-of-extremism-us-and-europe/index.html

A fresh tide of extreme populism -- feeding on economic strain, hostility to immigrants and cultural warfare -- is challenging key democracies from the inside [at the same time Russia escalates](https://www.cnn.com/europe/live-news/ukraine-russia-putin-news-04-11-22/index.html) the most brutal assault on [the liberal Western order in decades.](https://www.cnn.com/2022/04/10/europe/french-presidential-election-results-intl/index.html) In France, [the United States,](https://www.cnn.com/2022/04/11/politics/donald-trump-mehmet-oz-pennsylvania/index.html) Hungary and elsewhere, the center seems to be dropping out of politics as moderates lose ground to radicals on the right and the left, amid widespread public discontent after a two-year pandemic that saw governments significantly curtail individual freedoms. Only 17 months ago, a US campaign won by a veteran establishment politician -- President Joe Biden -- who had campaigned as a moderate against a wannabe authoritarian -- Donald Trump -- appeared to herald the end of the road for the former commander in chief's populist crusade. Yet Republicans, still in thrall to Trump -- many of whom have signed on to his corrosive lies about election fraud to win the favor of his supporters -- appear on course to capture the House, and perhaps the Senate, in midterm elections in the fall. They are capitalizing on deep frustrations around the country over rising prices and high gasoline costs that Biden has been unable to stem. Many are also staking out fiery messages on racial, gender and LGBTQ issues and immigration, implying that traditional American culture is at risk of being destroyed. That theme dominated the Supreme Court confirmation hearings for Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson. In France, President Emmanuel Macron -- the epitome of technocratic elitism -- now faces a tough two-week fight to beat back the momentum of the anti-immigrant, anti-Islam and pro-Putin far-right candidate [Marine Le Pen.](https://www.cnn.com/2022/04/10/europe/marine-le-pen-profile-intl/index.html) The pro-Trump wing of European politics racked up one victory that would have pleased Russian President Vladimir Putin after [Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban](https://www.cnn.com/2022/04/03/europe/hungary-election-results-viktor-orban-intl/index.html) -- a scourge of press freedom, EU leaders and democratic values -- kept his job in a landslide election win earlier this month. Orban, a favorite of the "Make America Great Again" movement and conservative TV pundits, profited from his own gerrymandering of electoral districts and friendly propagandists in the press to defy predictions that his appeal was fading. Trump's continued hold on Republican politics, Orban's victory and Macron's tight reelection race underscore how the established structures of democracy in Western nations remain vulnerable -- not just from hostile outside forces like Putin's election meddling but also from a perception that traditional politicians are unable to solve people's problems.

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#### Increased European populism is challenging the continuity of democratic institutions

Pintsch et. al 6-15-22, Anne Pintsch is an associate professor at the Department of Political Science and Management and the coordinator of the Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence at the University of Agder in Norway; Dennis Hammerschmidt is a data scientist with a PhD in International Relations and Quantitative Methods from the University of Mannheim; Cosima Meyer is a data scientist with a PhD in political science from the University of Mannheim, “Introduction: the declime of democracy and rise of populism in Europe and their effect on democracy promotion,” June 15th 2022, *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09557571.2022.2082797

European countries, international organisations (IOs) and civil society organisations have a long history as major democracy promoters around the world (Calingaert et al. 2014; OECD-DAC 2020). Democracy promotion here refers to deliberate ‘activities engaged in by external actors to encourage the development of democracy within a given country’ (Stewart 2009, 647). However, democracy promotion is currently facing several challenges. First, democracy promoters are increasingly experiencing a pushback across the globe. Former recipient governments have passed laws or established practical hurdles that impede external support for democracy and non-governmental organisations (Carothers and Brechenmacher 2014; Dupuy and Prakash 2020). One of the latest examples is the closing of both Russia’s oldest human rights group Memorial and a related Human Rights Centre in December 2021. They were accused, among others, of having broken the foreign agent law by not labelling all their publications with the respective label indicating foreign funding (Osborn and Antonov 2021; Osborn and Kiselyova 2021). Second, the very model of liberal democracy has also lost attractiveness for citizens (Bridoux, Hobson, and Kurki 2012; Poppe, Richter, and Wolff 2018, 2). In democracies even more than in autocracies, people doubt that their voices are heard and governments act in their interest (Rasmussen Global 2018). Finally, democracy promotion ‘is simultaneously undermined by serious problems on the side of key democracy promoters’ (Poppe, Richter, and Wolff 2018, 1). One of those is the decreasing material leverage. As one of the most important democracy promoters worldwide, the European Union (EU) has lost relative economic power (Godfrey and Youngs 2019). Between 2009 and 2020, the EU’s share of world trade in goods and services declined from 18.1 per cent1 to 16.8 per cent, while China’s share increased from 9.6 per cent to 14.7 per cent (European Commission 2021, 21). Another problem runs even deeper and concerns the ‘phenomenon of democratic contestation and erosion “at home”’ (Poppe, Richter, and Wolff 2018 2018, 2). This global phenomenon has been described as a ‘long democratic recession’, which has been ongoing for 15 years (Repucci and Slipowitz 2021, 1). The European continent is no exception. As Smolka’s (2021) analysis of democratic decline in the European Union and decreases in democratic quality shows, both old and new member states are affected by the two phenomena. 20 EU member states2 faced at least one period of democratic decline between 2004 and 2016. While Smolka does not identify a systematic third wave of democratic decline in the EU, she calls the observations ‘gloomy’ (2021, 101). In many cases, this challenge of domestic democratic contestation and erosion is directly – if not exclusively – related to the rise of populism (International IDEA 2020; Kyle and Mounk 2018). Out of 22 countries in which Luhrmann and her co-authors determine a downturn of liberal democracy € between 2008 and 2018, 14 were governed by a populist government or president (Luhrmann et al. € 2019, 906).3 Hungary and Poland – democratic forerunners after the end of the Cold War and later advocates of democracy with a unique transition experience – have become the most prominent examples of this development (Stanley 2017). However, populist parties have achieved significant electoral successes in Western Europe too, and formed part of the government in various countries such as Austria, Greece, Italy and Switzerland (Taggart 2017, 248). As Copelovitch and Pevehouse point out, ‘[t]his rising populism/nationalism has been most prevalent in the very countries that founded and have been at the core of global leadership: the United States and Western Europe’ (2019, 170). At the same time, populism’s relationship with democracy itself continues to be debated. Overall, while populism has been identified as a potential challenge to both democracy and democracy promotion, we do not know much about its actual impact. That is, while we observe a rise in populism in Western democratic states, we know very little about the impact of this rise on states’ and their organisations’ policy-making and the consequences thereof.

#### Populists are making a comeback in Europe after their relative decline during the pandemic

Dettmer 6-29-22, Jamie Dettmer is an Opinion Editor of POLITICO Europe, and a former VOA global affairs correspondent, “Freedom comes at a price – European voters may not want to pay it,” June 29th 2022, POLITICO, Commentary, https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-freedom-france-marine-le-pen-boyko-borissov-andrej-babis-comes-european-voters-populism-crisis/

Last autumn, centrists delightedly seized upon signs that populism was finally ebbing. But as the world moves from one crisis to the next, Europe’s cohort of populist nationalist leaders have started making their moves, ready to mine voter frustration, exploit openings and make the most of the turbulence caused by the seismic economic effects of the pandemic, now compounded by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The game is changing once again — and populism is far from out. In 2021, two populist luminaries who rode to power on waves of anti-elitism anger — Bulgaria’s Boyko Borissov and the Czech Republic’s Andrej Babiš — were ousted. And although its voting numbers held up in the east of Germany, the Alternative for Germany party saw a national drop in support during the country’s parliamentary ballot last September. A survey [published](https://yougov.co.uk/topics/international/articles-reports/2021/11/18/european-support-populist-beliefs-declines) by British pollster YouGov in November similarly found support for populism had declined in 10 European countries across the previous three years, suggesting its electoral appeal may have peaked. The populist tenet that the “will of the people should be the highest principle in a country’s politics” no longer resonated as forcefully as it did, YouGov concluded. Other pollsters agreed, saying the political tide was seemingly turning against populists in Central Europe and elsewhere on the Continent, and that support for such sentiments across Europe had fallen sharply since the advent of COVID-19. Populist leaders had been unable to revive their fortunes by exploiting public frustration with pandemic restrictions or vaccine mandates as they had hoped. There was some restoration of public faith in expertise too. Tony Barber of the Financial Times [suggested](https://www.ft.com/content/9e49b94d-0cb9-4b27-ac34-6c3d73e4442d) populists’ “trademark scorn for expertise” helped Joe Biden defeat then United States President Donald Trump because it unsettled many voters who were “worried about their health and livelihoods.” And as incumbent governments and establishment parties strove to cushion lower-income and rural populations from the economic misery of the pandemic, they reduced recruitment opportunities for populists, whether left or right of the political spectrum. But this year, there’s a different story. The [outcome](https://www.politico.eu/article/macron-to-lose-parliamentary-majority-in-stunning-upset/) of the French parliamentary elections and far-right opposition candidate Marine Le Pen’s [electoral performance](https://www.politico.eu/article/macron-re-elected-for-second-term-as-french-president-projection/), the increasing strength of Giorgia Meloni’s national-conservative Brothers of Italy party, and Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s [landslide win](https://www.politico.eu/article/hungarian-pm-orban-set-to-clinch-fourth-straight-term-with-big-election-win/) in April all suggest populism has hardly given up the ghost. Populists have shifted political tactics and moderated their once broader Euroskeptic aims — [as in the case of](https://www.politico.eu/article/giorgia-meloni-valdimir-putin-italy/) Meloni. They now voice more interest in focusing on changing the bloc from within than following in the footsteps of Brexit. “I think after the COVID crisis, the EU needs to reinvent itself and find a new soul,” Matteo Salvini, leader of Italy’s League party, said. Far-right populists have also been quick to learn from Orbán, tailoring their economic policies to the left-behinds and the ballooning numbers of the middle class who are now falling behind. Along these lines, while [acknowledging](https://www.chathamhouse.org/2020/05/covid-19-will-reshape-our-relationship-state) that populists didn’t have a “good pandemic” last year, political scientist Matthew Goodwin predicted they’d bounce back, seizing on the political tumult that generally lies downstream from crises. “Emerging evidence shows it looks fairly certain the Great Lockdown will actually exacerbate divides in our society that began to sharpen a few decades ago, and were then worsened by the Great Recession,” he said.

### 2NC INB—AT: Econ Turn—Link Turn

#### European defense spending bodies economic decline.

The Economist 22, British weekly newspaper, 4/16/2022, “What bigger military budgets mean for the economy,” <https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2022/04/16/what-bigger-military-budgets-mean-for-the-economy>, RH

**In the wake of** the war in Ukraine, military budgets **around the world are about to get** bigger. This is most notable in Europe, where the threat of Russian aggression looms largest. Germany**,** Italy **and** Norway**, among others, have already decided to spend more on** defence. **America and China**, the world’s two biggest military spenders, **are also ramping up their allocations**. Pressure **on smaller countries to do likewise seems** inevitable. What are the economic consequences of this push? When governments spend more on soldiers and arms, they have less available for other things. A common assumption, therefore, is that extra spending on armies is harmful to growth and development. But the relationship is not so straightforward. In some cases bigger defence budgets may in fact yield substantial economic benefits.

That there is a trade-off between spending on the army and on, say, roads or hospitals is a lesson that students of economics internalise early on. The classic model for illustrating the concept of opportunity costs is guns versus butter: the more you produce of one, the less you can of the other. In any given year, that simple model holds true. Governments have finite budgets, which can only be pulled in so many different directions.

It is thus easy to see how spending on defence, taken to an extreme, could be corrosive for an economy. If a government shortchanges the education system in order to buy shiny new weapons, the long-run impact on productivity and, ultimately, growth would be baleful. Some economists think America is nearing that danger zone. The rand Corporation, an influential think-tank supported by the Air Force, not exactly known as a peacenik outfit, published a report in 2021 laying out two risks. First, when the government allocates money to defence at the expense of infrastructure, that may undermine long-run growth prospects, since America has a pressing need for better roads, ports and more. Second, defence spending contributes to the public-debt load. In both cases, the analysts conclude, anything that erodes America’s economic strength will ultimately hurt the armed forces.

Perhaps there is something to the point that these trade-offs are damaging to the economy at America’s levels (over the past decade its military budget averaged more than 4% of gdp, second-highest in the oecd club of wealthy countries). But **a complication emerges when examining** trends **over** time**.** **The** oecd member **that spends the** most **on** defence, at about 6% of gdp, is Israel. **It also consistently boasts one of the** fastest-growing economies **in the group**. By contrast, Japan **is one of the** lowest military spenders as a share of gdp in the oecd, **and one of the** slowest growers. In fact, it is almost impossible to discern a pattern in the data: there are also countries such as Ireland, with military budgets similar to Japan’s and growth records similar to Israel’s. A basic regression reveals no consistent relationship between gdp growth and military spending for the 38 countries in the oecd.

**A sprawling body of** research **has come to a similar**, albeit **more nuanced,** conclusion. In a discussion paper at Monash University in 2014, Sefa Awaworyi Churchill and Siew Ling Yew examined 42 separate studies. Effects are generally quite small, but they found two distinct categories: **military expenditure in** poorer countries **is often detrimental to growth**, **whereas in** wealthier countries **it is more likely to be** beneficial**.** One possible reason, they suggest, is weaker governance in developing countries; a big military budget is a juicy target for corrupt officials. Another possibility relates to the gun-versus-butter framework. **The potential** returns **on civilian investments, from** health care **to** education**, are so great in poor countries that** military spending **has a particularly high** opportunity cost**. In rich countries with good** schools **and** hospitals**, the** opportunity costs **ought to be lower.**

**One way in which** defence spending **might be said to** boost **the** economy **is as a** jobs programme. **If the** armed forces **were a** corporation**, they would be America’s** largest employer **with 2m workers** (counting active-duty personnel and civilians), beating Walmart and Amazon. That said, it would be an eye-wateringly expensive jobs scheme, running at nearly $400,000 per employee a year.

Defence spending **may deliver** better returns **as an undeclared form of** industrial policy. In a paper last year Enrico Moretti of the University of California, Berkeley, and two colleagues looked at government funding for research and development (r&d), with a focus on defence spending, in oecd countries. On average, they found that **a 10%** increase **in government-financed**r&d**leads to a 5%** increase **in** privately financed r&d**in the targeted firm or industry**. Moreover, there are knock-on benefits for productivity. **If** France **and** Germany **raised their** defence spending **to roughly the same level as in America,** Mr Moretti estimates that **their productivity** growth rates **would be slightly** higher **as a result.**

An obvious objection is that the government could achieve the same results by supporting r&d in general, without pumping money into the armed forces. In an economic sense that may be true. But there is a political constraint—namely, how to marshal support for experimentation that may fail. **Public support for defence is** less susceptible **to** mood swings. Without having to worry about its next grant application, **the American** military system **has been free to** *churn out*innovations**, from** duct tape **to the** internet**, without which modern life would be scarcely imaginable.**

Important as it is to trace the impact of military spending on growth or innovation, such exercises risk missing the wider context as demonstrated by Russia’s war in Ukraine. **A** foundational element **for any successful** economy **is** peace **and** stability**, giving** firms **the** confidence **to** invest **and people the space to flourish.** Textbooks may talk of guns or butter. But **in a world unsettled by** revanchist powers**, the truth is that it is both** guns **and** butter**. A strong defence is**, regrettably, **a necessity for a** strong economy**.**■

#### Military spending improves economic growth.

Carter et al. 20, Heather L. Ondercin, Glenn Palmer; Assistant Professor in the Department of Government and Justice Studies at Appalachian State University; Ph.D. and M.A. in political science; Executive Director of Peace Science Society, Liberal Arts Professor of Political Science and Director of Graduate Studies at Penn State; (Jeff, January 6th, 2020; “Guns, Butter, and Growth: The Consequences of Military Spending Reconsidered”; https://doi.org/10.1177%2F1065912919890417; Political Research Quarterly)

Figure 1 presents the quarterly effect of a one-period, one-standard deviation increase in Military Spending on Social Spending (with 95% confidence intervals) over twenty quarters for each of our four scenarios.

Chart

Description automatically generated

The first thing that stands out in Figure 1 is that the relationship between increases in military spending and social spending is conditional on the contemporaneous ordering of the variables in our VAR model. Most importantly, the first quarter following an increase in military spending sees a significant increase in social spending in scenarios 1 and 2 and a significant decrease in social spending in scenarios 3 and 4. This lack of a general, short-term trade-off between military spending and social spending is consistent with most empirical research on the topic. Furthermore, the relationship between military spending and social expenditures in the short run is not random. That is, when military spending increases, we observe a guns-versus-butter trade-off in the two scenarios that mimic leaders willing to reduce social spending (scenarios 3 and 4) and a complementary relationship between military and social spending when the variable orderings reflect leaders who want to protect or expand the social welfare state (scenarios 1 and 2). Our results, therefore, are consistent with research that finds the guns-versus-butter trade-off is conditional on decision-makers’ preferences regarding the social welfare state.

The results in Figure 1 also demonstrate that the marginal effect of military spending on social spending can vary over time. For example, increasing spending on national defense has a negative and significant marginal effect on social spending in quarter 1 and positive and statistically significant marginal effects in quarters 2 and 4 in scenario 3. Less dramatically, increasing military expenditures has a positive and significant marginal effect on social spending in quarter 1 and then negative and insignificant marginal effects in quarters 2–20 in scenario 2. The differences in the direction and magnitude of the marginal effects over time complicate our ability to identify the overall effect of military expenditures on social spending. Figure 2, therefore, plots the cumulative effect of a one-period, one-standard deviation shock to Military Spending on Social Spending (with 95% confidence intervals) over twenty quarters.

Chart

Description automatically generated

Figure 2 illustrates the utility of considering both the marginal and cumulative effects of military spending on social spending. This is perhaps most clear with scenario 4. Here, the cumulative effect of increasing military spending is a statistically significant reduction in social spending in quarters 1–3. However, the direction of this relationship reverses in quarter 4 and is positive and statistically significant between quarters 7 and 16. The cumulative effects of increasing military spending on social spending are informative but less dramatic in the other scenarios. The overall effect of military spending on social expenditures is negative and significant in scenario 3 in quarter 1 and statistically insignificant in the remaining quarters. Scenario 2 suggests a positive and significant relationship between military expenditures and social spending in quarters 1 and 2 and an insignificant relationship in subsequent quarters. Finally, the cumulative effects of increasing military spending on social spending are positive and statistically significant for quarters 1–15 in scenario 1.

Figure 3 reports the FEVD (with 95% confidence intervals) for each of the four scenarios for a one-quarter, one-standard deviation shock to Military Spending. FEVDs identify the importance of changes in military spending for changes in social spending relative to the other variables in the VAR model. The change in military spending has a large influence on social spending in scenario 1, explaining between 49 and 59 percent of the variance in social spending starting in the second quarter after the shock in military spending. The shock to military spending explains between 5 and 10 percent of the variance in social spending during the first four quarters and between 10 and 15 percent of changes in social spending in subsequent quarters in scenario 2. In scenario 3, changes in military spending explain approximately 35 percent of the growth in military spending during the second quarter following the increase and approximately 20 percent of social spending in subsequent quarters. Changes in military spending also have a significant influence on social spending in scenario 4, explaining roughly 30 percent of the growth in social spending in quarters 2–4 and 45–50 percent of social spending in quarters 5–20.

Diagram, engineering drawing

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The results presented thus far suggest that the direction and relative magnitude of the effect military spending has on social spending is conditional on variation in leaders’ preferences over how to finance national defense and can change over time. We now present our findings for the relationship between changes in military spending and economic growth.

The Effects of Military Spending on Economic Growth

Figure 4 presents the marginal effect of a one-period, one-standard deviation increase in Military Spending on GDP over twenty quarters in each of our four scenarios.

Chart

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Two things stand out about Figure 4. First, the IRFs identify the same qualitative relationship between military spending and economic growth in each scenario. Second, changes in military spending have a non-linear effect on economic growth that varies over time. The initial marginal effect of increasing military spending on economic performance is negative and statistically significant in each scenario. However, the marginal effect of military spending on the economy quickly changes signs and becomes positive and statistically significant for multiple quarters in each of the four scenarios (scenario 1: quarters 5–7; scenarios 2 and 3: quarters 4–7; scenario 4: quarters 4–8). Notably, the results in Figure 4 are substantively similar to Oatley’s (2015, 95–97) findings on the short- to medium-term relationship between security shocks, the military build-ups they induce, and economic growth.

#### Europe can afford to spend more on defense.

Hans Binnendijk 18, senior fellow at the Center for Transatlantic Relations at Johns Hopkins University, 7/9/2018, “What NATO’s burden-sharing history teaches us,” <https://www.defensenews.com/smr/nato-priorities/2018/07/09/what-natos-burden-sharing-history-teaches-us/>, RH

**NATO has dealt successfully with its** burden-sharing **problem before**, and it can do so again. History shows that the [pressure U.S. President Donald Trump is placing on key allies](https://www.defensenews.com/smr/nato-priorities/2018/07/09/trump-rips-nato-ahead-of-summit/) could have a positive impact if he does not overplay his hand at the Brussels summit.

In 1970, the relative defense expenditures of the United States and Europe were proportionally roughly what they are today. Europe spent only about 45 percent as much on defense, as did the United States. The U.S. was in the midst of the Vietnam War, which drove U.S. defense spending well above previous levels. **The burden-sharing imbalance then was one of the largest in NATO’s history.**

But the decade of the 1970s saw a dramatic increase in European defense spending of about $80 billion (in constant 2011 dollars), roughly comparable to the growth President Trump is now demanding. By 1980, Europe **was** spending **about** 76 percent **as much as the U.S. on** defense **― a massive improvement.**

Three **factors contributed to this remarkable growth.**

First, Russia was becoming more belligerent. The Brezhnev Doctrine was announced in November 1968, which was designed to forcefully crush anti-communist movements in other communist countries. Soviet military spending increased, and the country began to introduce the SS-20 intermediate-range nuclear-tipped missile, which directly threatened Europe.

Second, the United States appeared to be less reliable. Washington was focused on ending the Vietnam War, and the second half of the decade saw U.S. defense cuts and retrenchment under President Jimmy Carter. To stimulate European defense spending, Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield proposed amendments to withdraw U.S. troop from Europe.

And third, **European** economic growth **averaged about 3 percent, enough to** afford spending increases**.**

All three factors are present again today. Russian aggression in Georgia, Ukraine and Syria have already stimulated a surge in European defense sending. President Trump’s threats are not dissimilar to those of Mike Mansfield. And Europe **has** overcome **much of the recent** recession **with** growth **at** 2.4 percent **in 2017, the fastest pace in decades.**

By the end of the Cold War, **European defense spending was at about 2.5 percent of** gross domestic product. U.S. and European defense spending fell during the decade of the 1990s, with both sides of the Atlantic taking a peace dividend. **The burden-sharing balance by 2000 was** equitable**, with Europe contributing 78 percent as much as the U.S.**

Then the U.S. was attacked on 9/11. President George W. Bush drove U.S. spending from 3.3 percent to about 5.3 percent of GDP to finance trillion-dollar wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. While the European allies contributed significantly to operations in Afghanistan in particular, they continued to take their peace dividend. Their defense spending sank to 1.6 percent of GDP by 2013.

So today’s disparity, as was the case with the Vietnam War, flows at least partially from the fact that the U.S. was fighting wars outside of Europe.

The 2014 NATO summit in Wales turned the European decline around with the commitment by heads of state to seek to spend 2 percent of GDP on defense by 2024. Defense cuts have been reversed everywhere. The number of allies to meet that 2 percent goal has risen from three to eight in the past four years. More than 16 have clear plans to attain the goal by 2024.

In addition, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg has usefully broadened the definition of burden-sharing to include not only “cash,” but “capabilities and commitments.” Capabilities will flow from the NATO agreement to spend 20 percent of defense on new equipment. In this, 19 NATO countries are at or near the target. Enhanced capabilities will also flow from the new readiness initiative, which will be agreed upon at Brussels.

European commitments have been clearly demonstrated in Afghanistan, in the war against ISIS and with new forward deployments in the Baltic States.

**There are still** problems that President Trump has tried to address by writing letters to **those allies who are unlikely to meet the 2 percent goal**. The effort was excessively blunt, but it did address the remaining issues.

**The largest problem by far is** Germany, which currently spends less than 1.3 percent of GDP on defense and is unlikely to go much beyond 1.5 percent. Germans raise a series of reasons for their unwillingness or inability to meet the agreed target. They have domestic coalition problems. They would have difficulty absorbing all of that defense spending efficiently. They spend more than others on official development assistance to stabilize threats. They do not want to reward Trump. What would their neighbors think given their World War II history?

None of these reasons are convincing.

How should President Trump maximize his efforts at the summit to deal with those whom he calls “free riders”? He has actually set the stage to declare a victory. But if he pushes too hard and disrupts the unity and cohesion that summit planners seek to attain, it will backfire. NATO can not afford a broken summit as happened at the recent G-7 meeting.

Trump’s **best tactic is to** **recognize that burden-sharing is not only a** trans-Atlantic problem. It is also a European problem. About half of the allies plan to live up to their spending pledge, while the other half does not. The half will let down not just the U.S. but its own European neighbors. That should be Trump’s message.

**If handled with some dexterity**, **the** factors now **at work should** yield **results similar to those of the** 1970s. Overreaching will just create confusion and disunity at a time when the alliance needs to show strength in the face of tough challenges from the east and south.

### 2NC INB—AT: Econ Turn—Europe Not Key to Global

#### It won’t even affect the US

Scranton, 14 [Steve Scranton, Chief Investment Officer and Economist for Washington Trust Bank and is a CFA charter holder with over 30 years of investment experience with equities, tax-exempt and taxable fixed income securities, 10-16-2014, ‘How will a recession or poor economic growth in Europe impact the United States?’, Washington Trust Bank, <https://blog.watrust.com/financial-news/how-will-a-recession-or-poor-economic-growth-in-europe-impact-the-united-states/> /alundy]

Much of the volatile behavior of the stock and bond markets over the past few days has been attributed to fears that Europe is heading into a recession and that this will drag down the U.S. economy. Today’s post covers the age old adage “perception versus reality” and looks at how European growth could impact U.S. growth.

First, let us walk through a quick explanation of how international trade feeds into U.S. GDP growth. One component that makes up total GDP growth is a category called net exports. This measures the change in net exports from one quarter to the next. Net exports has two components:

1) Exports

2) Imports.

Exports are sales of U.S. made goods to the international markets (including Europe). An increase in exports from the previous quarter adds to GDP growth while a decline in sales from the previous quarter reduces GDP. Imports are purchases of foreign goods. Imports subtract from GDP growth because the money is not spent in the U.S. A rise in imports from the previous quarter subtracts from GDP growth while a reduction in imports from the previous quarter adds to GDP growth.

Data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis shows that since the 3rd quarter of 2010, net exports have contributed .02% to U.S. GDP growth.

With that primer covered, let us look at perception versus reality.

Perception:

1) Europe is sliding into a recession

2) Since Europe is the largest trading partner with the U.S., a recession in Europe will have a major impact on the U.S. and might even drag us into recession.

Reality:

1) Europe does appear to be sliding into recession. In fact, some of the European countries in the Eurozone are already in recession. The Eurozone’s GDP growth for the 2nd quarter of 2014 was zero and Germany’s GDP growth contracted (.2%).

2) Research by a Canadian economist (David Rosenberg) shows that exports to the Eurozone could fall by 50% and the total impact to U.S. GDP growth would be .6%. If U.S. GDP maintains its 2% level of GDP growth then, all else being equal, that would reduce growth to 1.4%.

The problem is that all else is not equal because there is another dynamic going on with international trade that positively impacts the import side of the equation. That dynamic is the energy complex. With U.S. oil production booming, the U.S. is now importing less oil than in the past. This has led to the trade deficit narrowing from over 5% of GDP in 2005 to less than 3% now. Falling imports are a positive for U.S. GDP growth that potentially offsets the negative impact from falling exports. Oil prices are another component of the energy complex. With oil prices falling, then the value of imported oil drops which is a reduction in value of imports. Once again, lower imports adds to GDP growth and is another potential offset to falling exports.

So, the perception that a recession in Europe will drag down the U.S. economy is not necessarily a reality, especially with the positive dynamics happening on the import side of the equation.

The reason for the high volality in the stock markets has more to do with the concerns over the exposure of U.S. companies to Europe, because of their foreign sales, rather than the concerns about the impact to U.S. GDP growth. Companies in the S&P 500 have approximately 40% of their revenue derived from international sales. So, a recession in Europe holds the real risk that U.S. companies that have heavy European sales exposure could see their stock prices impacted. The reality is that you could see high volatility in the stock market that would be independent of the economy.

#### Ukraine crisis thumps--- CP is the only way to escape economic crisis anwyays.

Blanchard & Pisani-Ferry, 22 [Oliver Blanchard, C. Fred Bergsten Senior Fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics and the Robert M. Solow Professor of Economics emeritus at MIT, PhD from MIT; Jean Pisani-Ferry, nonresident senior fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics, Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa Chair of the European University Institute in Florence and is a senior fellow at Bruegel, served as commissioner-general of France Stratégie, and as senior economic adviser to the minister of finance and executive chairman of the French prime minister's Council of Economic Analysis; 5-9-2022, ‘The war in Ukraine is likely to worsen Europe’s economic problems’, PIIE, <https://www.piie.com/research/piie-charts/war-ukraine-likely-worsen-europes-economic-problems> /alundy]

European policymakers must devise ways to protect consumers and businesses from economic hardship resulting from the war in Ukraine. This PIIE Chart lays out short- and long-term effects of the war, difficulties including loss of exports to Russia, the fallout of sanctions, and the humanitarian crisis of dealing with millions of refugees.

More specifically, the shocks on supply chains from COVID-19 as well as the war may prompt EU adjustments in just-in-time delivery models that sacrifice efficiency. Disruptions of food supplies from  Russia and Ukraine, particularly wheat, are raising prices and causing shortages felt most acutely in developing economies, which could increase immigration to Europe from food-insecure regions.

Europe's dependence on Russian energy varies across EU member states. An oil embargo like the one proposed by the European Commission should reduce Russian revenues. For gas, however, embargo is not a short-term option, and more targeted measures such as a tariff should be considered. The scramble to reduce EU dependency on Russian energy and find alternative suppliers will be costly and take time, requiring a faster transition to renewable sources. In the short term, consumers and firms will need protection from higher energy bills that does not undercut the efficacy of sanctions. Lumpsum transfers to low-income EU households are preferable to energy subsidies and can be financed through deficit spending. But policymakers need to be nimble as conditions change.

## Entrapment DA

### 1NC Entrapment DA

#### Security Cooperation triggers allied aggression. Conditional assistance avoids these entrapment risks.

Sullivan 11, Professor at UNC-Chapel Hill, with Brock Tessman, Assistant Professor at Georgia and Xiaojun Li, PhD in Political Science from Stanford (Patricia, “US Military Aid and Recipient State Cooperation,” *Foreign Policy Analysis*, No. 7)

The United States spends more than eleven billion dollars per year on direct military assistance to foreign governments and substate groups (USAID 2009). The American government expresses a wide variety of goals motivating their use of military assistance as a foreign policy tool. Frequently, US administrations have explicitly linked military aid or arms transfers to a quid-pro-quo expectation of compliance from a government (Sislin 1994). More generally, military assistance is expected to augment US national security by increasing recipient state cooperation with US objectives. According to the State Department's 2007 Report to Congress: Section 1206(f) of the 2006 National Defense Authorization Act:

Security cooperation remains a critical foreign policy tool that allows the United States to advance its national security interests worldwide…. Building partner nation security capacity is one of the most important strategic requirements for the United States to promote international security, advance U.S. interests and prevail in the war against terrorism (1).

Importantly, the policies that guide the provision of US military aid have changed significantly in recent years. Shortly after the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the Bush administration sent Congress an antiterrorism bill that would have lifted all restrictions on military aid and arms transfers to foreign governments in cases where such assistance could “help fight terrorism” (Federation of American Scientists 2002, 1). The provision specifically called for lifting bans on counterterrorism aid for states with a history of human rights abuses or noncooperation on counterterrorism.1 The bill was eventually modified to include “sunset clauses” and some requirements for Congressional oversight, but it initiated a year of radical changes in the way US military aid was allocated, restricted, and justified. In 2002, Congress amended the International Traffic in Arms Regulations, removing Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Tajikistan from a list of states barred from receiving US arms transfers. The United States has also extended military aid to Pakistan, the Philippines, Turkey, Georgia, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Oman, Yemen, Uzbekistan, and Columbia, among others, in the name of rewarding or encouraging cooperation in the fight against terrorism (DSCA News Releases, 2002–2008).

What are the consequences of US military aid in a rapidly changing, unpredictable global security environment? In this study, we systematically investigate the effects of US military assistance on recipient state behavior toward the United States between 1990 and 2004. Our analysis improves upon existing studies in several ways. First, we develop three competing, clearly defined, and falsifiable theoretical models of the relationship between military aid and recipient state behavior. These models—Arms for Influence, Lonely Superpower, and Reverse Leverage—range from a conventional understanding of US military aid as a way to buy cooperation from the recipient state to a more counterintuitive assessment of US aid as a sign of American dependence on the recipient government for the provision of some foreign policy good. Second, our focus on the post-Cold War era allows us to measure recipient state compliance using events data rather than the UN voting records that most studies rely on. Third, we employ multiple statistical methods in order to match our empirical models to the hypotheses we are testing. For example, a number of our hypotheses predict a reciprocal relationship between military aid and cooperation or anticipate selection effects. To address these challenges, we use both a simultaneous equations model with fixed effects and a two-stage Heckman model. Finally, we control for pre-existing preference similarity between the United States and aid recipients in our empirical analyses, so that our results capture the influence military aid has on recipient state behavior independent of any dyadic predisposition toward cooperation or conflict.

Our research is relevant to larger academic debates about the utility and limitations of foreign aid as a policy instrument. We attempt to evaluate the effectiveness of foreign aid, and security assistance more specifically, in terms of its ability to move recipients toward more cooperative foreign policies. We test the conventional “arms for influence” explanation of military aid but find that the relationship between US assistance and recipient state behavior is considerably more complicated. In general, we find that military aid does not lead to more cooperative behavior on the part of recipient states. With limited exceptions, increasing levels of US aid are linked to a significant reduction in cooperative foreign policy behavior with the United States. US reaction to recipient state behavior is also somewhat counterintuitive; instead of using a carrot-and-stick approach to military aid allocations, our results show that increased recipient state cooperation is likely to lead to subsequent reductions in US military assistance.

The results of our inquiry also have implications for US foreign policy. Policymakers and military advisors invariably justify military assistance to foreign governments on the basis of an expectation that providing military aid to these governments will increase US influence over the recipients' foreign or domestic policies. In the 1980s, despite concerns about Pakistan's efforts to develop nuclear weapons, the Reagan administration began providing direct military assistance to Pakistan and funneling money and weapons to Afghan rebels through Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) after the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan. The primary objective was to support Islamic insurgents fighting the USSR and the Soviet-backed government of Afghanistan. And, in one important sense, the US policy was a tremendous success. The Afghan rebels prevailed and the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan—a result some attribute directly to US assistance and, more specifically, to the highly accurate FIM-92 Stinger Surface-to-Air Missiles (SAMs) the US provided. However, several hundred of the Stinger missiles are unaccounted for, and Osama bin Laden is thought to have procured a number of Stingers and other SAMs with which he could target US military or civilian aircraft (Jane's Intelligence Review). Moreover, the Pakistan Army's Inter-Services Intelligence diverted an unknown quantity of US arms and assistance to groups it considered less threatening to Pakistan than the Afghan mujahedeen—including some radically anti-US Islamic factions (Debate in US House, June 22, 2001). After a total ban on military assistance to Pakistan throughout the 1990s, the United States resumed providing billions of dollars of military assistance and arms to Pakistan after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (Grimmett 2009). And, once again, there are concerns that Pakistan is channeling some of the money to extremist groups on its border with India. Perhaps more seriously, the ISI remains closely linked to the Taliban militants the American military is fighting in Afghanistan (Gopal 2008; Mazzetti and Schmitt 2009; Murphy 2010).

#### Multiple scenarios for NATO entrapment—causes escalation

Carpenter 19, senior fellow for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute, received his Ph.D. in U.S. diplomatic history from the University of Texas, (Ted Galen, November, “NATO: A Dangerous Dinosaur”, Cato Institute)

THE BALTIC REPUBLICS AS A FLASHPOINT

Other existing and potential NATO allies have greater potential to become tripwires for a war between the United States and Russia. That danger already exists with respect to the Baltic republics; and if NATO enthusiasts and anti-Russia hawks get their way and add Georgia or Ukraine to the alliance, the risk of such a calamity mounts.

One should not exaggerate the danger of the Baltic countries and Russia going to war, despite the hysteria in the United States and much of the West about Vladimir Putin’s alleged fondness for military aggression. 10 Menacing Russian actions toward those countries have been relatively few and mild. Still, the outbreak of an armed conflict there is an ever-present danger, if not as the product of outright aggression, then as a consequence of miscalculation or disputes that spiral out of control.

An especially troubling issue is the less-than-cordial relationship between the Baltic ethnic majority populations and Russian minorities. Lithuania’s population is only 9.4 percent Russian, according to that country’s latest census, but both Latvia and Estonia have larger ethnic Russian minorities. In Latvia, Russian speakers make up 27 percent of the population, and in Estonia, the figure is 26 percent. The ethnic Russians tend to be concentrated in major metropolitan centers. As a result, several cities in both countries have Russian majorities. Most of that population in all three Baltic republics are the descendants of settlers that Joseph Stalin’s regime imported when the USSR seized those countries at the beginning of World War II. That ugly history has fostered hostility and led to various forms of legal and social discrimination following the breakup of the USSR and the reemergence of independent Baltic nations.

The continuing discrimination against ethnic Russians is not a minor matter. Moscow has asserted a right to protect Russian minorities from abuse in all of the independent states that emerged from the wreckage of the Soviet Union. 11 That does not mean the Kremlin is itching to reconquer the Baltic republics. Even without the military risks that would exist because of the republics’ membership in NATO, the political, diplomatic, and economic drawbacks to Russia of taking such a drastic step are apparent, and there is no credible evidence that Moscow intends to do so. 12 Nevertheless, the persistence of ethnic tensions is a worrisome factor that could force the hand of a Russian government at some point or serve as a pretext for aggressive action.

Either development would create an awful dilemma for the United States. As a 2016 RAND Corporation study concluded, it would be nearly impossible for NATO to defend its Baltic members against a full-scale Russian invasion for more than a few days without an extensive upgrade of the alliance’s existing force deployment. 13 Washington would then face the horrid choice of either accepting the conquest of a NATO member or escalating the confrontation to the nuclear level. So again, from the standpoint of U.S. interests, it is hard to make the case that the Baltic republics are not strategic liabilities rather than assets.

TURKEY: A DANGEROUS , ROGUE ALLY

The danger that Turkey could drag the United States and other NATO members into a perilous confrontation with Russia is even greater than the ability or inclination of the Baltic republics to do so. A 2015 episode highlights Ankara’s willingness to engage in reckless actions that pose a danger to its alliance partners.

On November 24, 2015, a Turkish air force F-16 shot down a Russian Sukhoi Su-24 fighter near Turkey’s border with Syria, killing the pilot. An especially troubling aspect of the incident was the needlessly harsh and provocative nature of the Turkish action. Evidence indicated that the Russian plane had crossed into Turkish airspace for a trivial 17 seconds. 14 Indeed, even the exact demarcation of the border between Turkey and Syria in that area is not clear. Moscow could plausibly claim that its jet was still in Syrian airspace. Since Russian air and ground forces were in Syria at the invitation of the Syrian government to help suppress the armed rebellion against President Bashar al-Assad, the presence of Russian combat aircraft on that side of the border was legitimate under international law.

Ankara’s reckless belligerence was exceeded only by its hypocrisy. Turkish planes had violated the airspace of Greece more than 2,200 times in 2014 alone, and 2014 was a typical year for such incidents. 15 Greek officials have long complained that the country must devote an annoyingly large portion of its defense budget to intercepting Turkish aircraft engaging in such violations. Fortunately, though, Athens has not adopted Turkey’s apparent standard and blasted offending aircraft out of the sky.

The Turkish incident with Russia is the harbinger of potential peril. Fortunately, Vladimir Putin’s government responded to the November 2015 incident with restraint, merely imposing some economic sanctions. Even those penalties proved only temporary. Talks between Putin and Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan soon produced a rapprochement between the two governments. Indeed, bilateral relations have warmed so much that U.S. leaders worry that Russia and Turkey are becoming too cozy. The growing compatibility between the two autocratic leaders eventually produced a crucial arms sale in December 2017, with Russia selling Turkey S-400 air defense missiles over Washington’s objections. 16

Given the bilateral rapprochement since the 2015 crisis, worries about war between Turkey and Russia might seem irrelevant. Yet as events throughout history have demonstrated, circumstances can change quickly, and nations on friendly terms one moment can become staunch adversaries the next. The 2015 incident still highlights disturbing issues about Turkey’s behavior and the Article 5 obligation to regard an attack on one NATO member as an attack on all. The risks entailed in that obligation multiply as the number of members increases. Maintaining a commitment to defend the relatively stable nations of Western Europe during the Cold War is one thing—although the tensions between Greece and Turkey indicate the problems involved with even those obligations. Doing so on behalf of nearly twice that number of NATO countries, some of which are far less stable and predictable, is more perilous.

Even the task of sorting out which party to a conflict is the aggressor is not always easy. For example, it was far from clear whether the 2015 incident was a case of Russian aggression or a clumsy Turkish overreaction and provocation. Yet if Russia had responded to the downing of its plane by launching strikes against the Turkish missile batteries, it is a safe bet that Ankara would have demanded that its NATO partners, especially the United States, help repel such “aggression”—despite the potentially dire consequences of escalating a conflict with a nuclear-armed adversary. Wise American leaders should be wary of alliance commitments that enable any supposed ally to put the republic in such a quandary.

#### Entrapment dragoons the U.S. into nuclear escalation wormholes---multipolar transitions heighten the risk.

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The 1999 Kargil Crisis is representative of a crisis-escalation scenario in which smaller nuclear-armed states perceive that bigger powers will swoop in to save them from nuclear confrontation. Just one year after India and Pakistan became overt nuclear powers, the two countries approached the brink of nuclear war. Following an attempted land-grab by Pakistan in the hotly contested Kashmir region, the United States provided an off-ramp to de-escalate the conflict. At the height of the crisis, Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif “insisted” on meeting with President Bill Clinton, according to Clinton’s senior director for Near East and South Asian affairs on the National Security Council, Bruce Riedel.[56](https://tnsr.org/2020/07/wormhole-escalation-in-the-new-nuclear-age/" \l "_ftn56) The United States stepped in after Clinton called both India’s and Pakistan’s leaders. Washington also sent its senior military commander in the region and a senior State Department official to Islamabad. Later, former deputy secretary of state Strobe Talbott wrote that the world was closer to nuclear confrontation than during the Cuban Missile Crisis.[57](https://tnsr.org/2020/07/wormhole-escalation-in-the-new-nuclear-age/" \l "_ftn57) Clearly, diplomatic interventions that can deescalate a crisis and forestall a nuclear conflict should always be pursued. However, expectations that the great powers will step in to rescue small nuclear states caught in an escalatory spiral may shift the burden of restraint and reduce accountability and responsibility for managing strategic stability among regional actors in ways that may reinforce rather than reduce risk-taking. In such a scenario, the United States may not initiate an escalation wormhole, so much as get pulled through one.

Reckless Driver Escalation

Third-party, “escalation pull” dynamics may also emerge through extended deterrence when a nuclear “protectee” feels emboldened in its interactions with regional nuclear powers due to protection under a larger state’s nuclear umbrella. In these circumstances, smaller states — both nuclear and non-nuclear — may drive escalation in hopes of triggering intervention by other actors on their behalf. As the only country in the world to extend a formal nuclear umbrella over many of its formal treaty alliance partners, this risk is most acute for the United States. As Barry Posen writes, these “reckless drivers” may take bold actions with little regard for U.S. interests, despite their relative dependence on the United States.[58](https://tnsr.org/2020/07/wormhole-escalation-in-the-new-nuclear-age/" \l "_ftn58) These participants and stakeholders may have asymmetries of stakes and interests that drive their choices and behavior. In Asia, the complex dynamics between a small nuclear power (North Korea), larger nuclear powers (China and the United States), and extended deterrence alliance members (Japan and South Korea) underscore the challenge. In Europe, some of these dynamics play out along the “old NATO-new NATO” divide as states closer to the Russian periphery may feel the need to test NATO resolve. Some have argued risks of U.S. entrapment were not as high in the bipolar world of the Cold War, when the loss of any one smaller partner would not have dramatically upset stability, and there were no major differences in interests between the United States and its allies.[59](https://tnsr.org/2020/07/wormhole-escalation-in-the-new-nuclear-age/" \l "_ftn59) But today’s more diffuse global power structure is more conducive to “reckless driving,” as medium-size partners, such as India, may be more confident the United States would come to their aid given their greater importance to the global balence of power. Moreover, in a multipolar system, the interests of U.S. partners are more likely to diverge from the United States.

### 2NC UQ—Restraint Now

#### NATO is restrained now—Ukraine proves

Petrovics 22 (Ariel Petrovics is an Assistant Research Professor at University of Maryland’s School of Public Policy, “NATO’s restraint has made things worse for Russia in Ukraine” 3/15/22 https://responsiblestatecraft.org/2022/03/15/how-restraint-from-nato-has-made-things-worse-for-russia-in-ukraine/)

NATO’s decision to forgo direct intervention in Ukraine is proving to be a wise strategy for opposing Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. It immediately robbed Russian President Vladimir Putin of the ability to blame the United States and the West for its lack of military progress, thereby highlighting Russia’s inability to wield its own power against a much smaller neighbor. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has instead dragged into an ongoing siege against a surprisingly resilient Ukrainian defense that underscores the hollowness of Putin’s stories that he would liberate Ukraine from Western influence. Given its inability to overrun its much smaller neighbor despite a preponderance of power, Russia has proven to be its own worst enemy for its long-term plan in the region and beyond. Though the Kremlin has executed a comprehensive propaganda effort to justify and maintain support for its actions, it is increasingly clear that Russia is paying a heavy price in its international standing. As such, the international community’s — and namely Washington’s — choice to avoid direct military action might have done more to undermine Russia’s global standing and Putin’s stability at home than overt intervention might have done. While Putin might have been able to justify Russia’s slow advance and even its supposed liberation of Ukraine from Western influence if NATO and the United States had taken a more active role in the conflict, Ukraine’s irrepressible independence from its much stronger neighbor has undermined Russia’s position both as a “liberator” and even as a global superpower.

### 2NC L—Allied Manipulation

#### Unconditional assistance triggers aggressive and non-cooperative allied behavior

Sullivan 11, Professor at UNC-Chapel Hill, with Brock Tessman, Assistant Professor at Georgia and Xiaojun Li, PhD in Political Science from Stanford (Patricia, “US Military Aid and Recipient State Cooperation,” *Foreign Policy Analysis*, No. 7)

In this model, we anticipate a paradoxical effect of military aid in which powerful donor states become dependent on the recipients of their military aid (Mott 2002). The United States gives military aid to gain leverage and influence. But it is in a competitive market for leverage through aid; it must compete with other states to keep its influence over client states. At the same time, we can assume that the United States chooses to invest heavily in training and equipping the military forces of other countries, with all the attendant risks this entails, because it needs something from these states. Materially weak states can exploit the fact that a much stronger donor relies on them to provide some vital good—and the threat of defection to an alternative supplier—to exert influence over the donor. According to Mott (2002), during the Cold War, US security assistance recipients learned to manipulate the United States ‘‘by putting Moscow and Washington into an aid competition, by diversifying across suppliers, and converting the expected recipient dependence into a perverse sort of supplier dependence’’ (8). Although the Cold War competition with Moscow is no longer central to US foreign policy, other states and even nonstate actors have stepped in to replace the Soviet Union as alternative arms suppliers. Stokke (1995) observes that strong states have typically used foreign aid ‘‘as a lever to promote objectives set by the donor, which the recipient government would not have otherwise agreed to’’ (12). But Singer (2003) argues that the increasingly privatized military market ‘‘fundamentally alters this patron-client relationship’’ (211). Since weaker states can now purchase weapons on the open market, the patron’s ability to influence client behavior is greatly diminished. Generous US military funding runs the risk of creating militarily strong, assertive clients that become more willing to ignore US interests (Mott 2002). Recipient states should be more likely to defy the United States if they believe that the United States will be unable or unwilling to punish them for defection (Walt 2005). US dependence on recipient states for oil, troop basing, over-flight permission, counternarcotic and counterterrorism operations, etc… makes withdrawing aid potentially more costly for the United States than for the aid recipients. It may be easier for aid recipients to find alternative suppliers than it would be for the United States to find an equally valuable place to base its troops.

### 2NC L—Unconditional Support

#### Security cooperation during peacetime emboldens allies and causes entrapment during conflict scenarios—cooperation signals a willingness to cooperate.

Blankenship and Kuo ’20 [Brian Blankenship and Raymond Kuo; Brian Blankenship is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Miami. Ph.D. in Political Science from Columbia University, B.A. in Political Science from Indiana University, Bloomington, and Raymond Kuo holds a Ph.D. in politics, Princeton University; M.S. in international relations, London School of Economics and Political Science; B.A. in college of social studies, Wesleyan University; 3-3-2020; "Deterrence and Restraint: Do Joint Military Exercises Escalate Conflict?"; Sage Journals; https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/00220027211023147#:~:text=We%20find%20that%20JMEs%20do,the%20context%20of%20an%20alliance.; Accessed 7-16-2022; AW]

Consequently, JMEs are public and costly forms of interstatesecurity cooperation, and, as seen in Figure 1, their **frequency has** risen over time. They are “sharp in,” in that their inputs – national military contributions, chain of command, exercise objectives, timing, and other considerations – are clearly defined for all participants at the outset. The U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command Regulation 350-50-3 **outlines six purposes of mission command training programs,** including:6 1. Warfighting exercises, where troops simulate plausible defense scenarios; 2. Command exercises, where officers prepare for integrated command with Joint Staff (across military services) and geographic commands; and 3. Mission readiness exercises, where defined units test their ability to immediately carry out specific missions. The number of troops involved depends on the mission. The smallest are typically command post exercises, where participants focus on the battle readiness of staffs to handle simulated combat situations. Actions on the “battlefield” are simulated (often via computer), and these results are fed to participating officers, who then respond and issue orders, which are again carried out via simulation. Field training 3Michael R. Gordon, “U.S. War Game in West Germany to Be Cut Back,” New York Times, December 14, 1989, http://www.nytimes.com/1989/12/14/world/us-war-game-in-west-germany-to-be-cut-back.html. Arms export data drawn from SIPRI. 4Data drawn from McManus (2017). 5Calculation made using ATOP dataset. (Leeds et al., 2002). 6Mission Command Training Program (2014). 4 Figure 1: Number of Joint Military Exercises by Year, 1974–2010. exercises, by contrast, are “test runs” of often large-scale operations. They can involve thousands of troops, combat vehicles, and military and civilian transportation and logistics support, all overseen by cadres of commanding officers. Regardless of size, joint military exercises are typically self-contained, tightly controlled and coordinated, and last between a few days to a few weeks. In the United States, the Department of Defense or the Joint Chiefs of Staff will establish an exercise’s training objectives, force and equipment requirements, and the chain of command in coordination with all international participants. FM-25-4 recommends 13-14 months of lead time to prepare for an exercise.7 Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs) are signed to ensure 7Army Field Manual 25-4: How to Conduct Training Exercises (1984: Table 4). 5 all participants understand the JME’s terms, and there is a final meeting to confirm all parameters and restrictions. In addition, the exercise commander has terminal responsibility for all troops and their actions, and so is provided with extensive lists of personnel and equipment (down to the serial number). In total, JMEs are sharply delimited in their structure, purpose, and participants to ensure accountability at all levels. But while JMEs are “sharp in,” they are not “sharp out.” They produce strategic effects exceeding and not managed by their operational bounds and command structure. This can be best understood through the scholarship on “arms and alliances.” According to Morrow (1993), **states have** two general paths to generate security**. The first is “arms,” by which we typically mean the direct acquisition of military power solely under a single state’s authority. The second is “allies,” commitments of military support from one country to another. JMEs appear to advance both paths simultaneously.** Training improves warfighting performance, organizational resilience, and logistical efficacy (the “arms” pathway). Critically, this increases the likelihood of conflict escalation and war by prompting leaders to reach for military solutions to foreign policy challenges.8 Along the “allies” pathway, JMEs **signal, at minimum, the willingness of the two countries’ military forces** to cooperate in specific scenarios**. Moreover, as McManus and Nieman (2019) elaborate, exercises are an** integral means for (particularly powerful) states to demonstrate broader alignment **and support for a security partner**. In 1963, for example, the United States agreed to hold an exercise with and in Saudi Arabia to challenge United Arab Republic intervention in North Yemen and deter any further incursions into nearby Saudi territory (Department of State Office of the Historian, 1995: 290-291, 300). Despite not having an alliance treaty with Riyadh, the **JME implied that the United States would at minimum bolster Saudi defenses through training and material support, if not direct intervention. By signaling support through both the arms and allies paths, exercises are doubly effective at deterring adversaries**. But too much support**, as Snyder (1997) discusses, can lead partners** to escalate conflict through adverse behavior **– activities that one partner does not want to encourage in another partner, because such an action has negative repercussions for the first state’s security. Chief among these** potential risks is entrapment**, in which a state, emboldened by and seeking to stretch a partner’s support, escalates conflict for its own individual advantage while dragging its partner** into the conflict through reputational, strategic, and/or 8 See, for example, Stares (1975); Craft (1999); Kinsella and Tillema (1995); and Krause (2004). 6 audience cost mechanisms. Later authors contend that entrapment is rare because states can use ambiguity, conditionality, “backing up” from their commitment, and outright reneging to avoid being entangled in their partners’ conflicts (Kim, 2011; Benson, 2012; Beckley, 2015). However, **even if states are able to avoid having to support their partners in wartime, their signals of support in peacetime may** nevertheless embolden partners **to act aggressively** (Snyder, 1997; Cesa, 2010; Edelstein and Shifrinson, 2018).

#### Unconditional security cooperation entangles the US in allied conflicts. Only the counterplan solves.

Priebe et al ’21 [Miranda; Dec 2021; Ph.D. in political science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; M.P.A. in international relations, Princeton University; RAND Corporation “Do Alliances and Partnerships Entangle the United States in Conflict?,” https://www.rand.org/pubs/research\_reports/RRA739-3.html]

Advocates of a grand strategy of restraint or offshore balancing, also known as **restrainers, call for greater emphasis on diplomacy and** less U.S. military engagement abroad**.** These strategists call for reduced forward military presence, a higher bar for the use of force, and negotiations to settle conflicts of interest with U.S. adversaries diplomatically. They argue that **the United States should stop expanding its alliances,** renegotiate **alliances to reduce entanglement risks**, or even end some of its existing alliances and partnerships.

**Fear of entanglement is one of the reasons that advocates of restraint say the United States should reexamine its security relationships.** This is not to say that all restrainers believe that the United States should end all existing commitments. **Rather, many of these strategists argue that the United States should keep its security commitments** limited **to states that** help protect vital U.S. interests **and should take steps to mitigate entanglement risks.**

For example, some restrainers have called for maintaining the U.S. alliance with Japan to balance against China but have advocated for renegotiating the alliance terms so that Japan does more for its own defense.

Advocates of restraint highlight three ways in which alliances entangle. First, **allies and partners might see a U.S. security commitment as evidence that the United States will defend them regardless of how a conflict begins. This belief in an** unconditional U.S. commitment **could** embolden **allies and partners to adopt policies that make a conflict more likely because they think they have a “blank check” to bankroll aggressive policies. As** one group of restrainers put it, When someone else is going to pay the price for an ill-advised action— that is, when the United States is going to come “fix” any predicament that its allies get into—there is little incentive to avoid trouble. **It is easy to gamble with someone else’s money.**

Restrainers express the fear that, **if a crisis escalates, the United States might feel compelled to defend the reckless ally or partner because it believes that its own credibility is on the line, so failing to act could cause other allies and adversaries to question U.S. commitments elsewhere**. This combination of ally emboldenment and U.S. intervention to defend the ally constitutes entrapment.

### 2NC L—Strategic Blackmail

#### Freeriding enables strategic blackmail, which ensures entrapment

Ashford ’17 [Emma M.; Jul 6; Defense and Foreign Policy Studies, Cato Institute; Canadian Foreign Policy Journal “Hegemonic blackmail: entrapment in civil war intervention,” https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/11926422.2017.1341843#2b85d6ca-6520-4a3d-8e4a-aa9f2ee3f33d-357c6cfb-53ba-4fa0-8e6b-e69fc2b8ce9f]

Entrapment occurs largely when no national security interest is at stake; indeed, this is the key distinction between entrapment and the classic notion of “chain-ganging” (Christensen and Snyder 1990). The mechanisms by which **entrapment can occur include: (1) a state’s choice to defend its ally for reasons of credibility; (2) socialization, which encourages the adoption of an ally’s interests (so-called “self-entrapment”); (3) provocation, as alliance formation creates a security spiral; (4) an alliance emboldens a small state to attack a competitor**; or (5) a state, fearful of abandonment, initiates conflict in a last-ditch attempt to preserve the alliance (Snyder 1984, Betts 2011, Findley et al. 2012). Of these, **both credibility and socialization pressures are plausible drivers of involvement in civil conflict.**

In effect, each can be understood as a strategic interaction between State A (the potential intervener) and State B (A’s ally) over an intervention in a third-party state (State C). In the case of credibility, **State A may fear that its refusal to back B’s intervention in C’s civil war may** undermine its commitments **to other allies.** Alternately, **the process of** alliance socialization**, with** frequent meetings and joint military exercises **over time, may encourage State A to** absorb B’s interests**, including those it is pursuing in its intervention.** In both cases, alliance dynamics push A toward support of B’s ongoing intervention. In addition to these “natural” forms of civil war entanglement – i.e., pressures that are an inevitable result of strong security ties – **it is also possible for State B to increase the odds of an intervention by State A. Indeed, B sometimes has a strong incentive to do so, particularly when A has substantially higher military capacity.**

Put more simply, **small states can benefit substantially from the intervention of a major power ally, particularly if they lack the capacity or manpower to carry out an effective campaign alone.** African Union peacekeeping forces, for example, typically lack military assets required for their missions; **training, logistical support and equipment are often provided by the United States to overcome this deficiency** (Williams 2011). Such pressure is far less likely if A and B both have high military capacity, or if A is weaker, as State B wouldn’t need external support to achieve its objectives in these cases. Likewise, if both A and B have low military capacity, then A’s support is unlikely to be of help. In these three scenarios, **there is also a high potential for** free riding**, particularly in cases of humanitarian crisis** (Gent 2007). Thus, pressure from allies to join an intervention is likely to be highest when A is larger (i.e., relatively more capable in military terms) than B, and has the potential to tip the balance toward B’s intervention objectives. **There are two ways in which State B can seek to entangle A in its ongoing intervention.** First, **it can seek to manipulate public and policymaker opinion, purposefully using** diplomatic pressure**, as well as lobbying and media manipulation to shift public opinion on intervention.** Prior studies show that **media coverage is often a necessary, if not** sufficient, condition **for intervention**, particularly in humanitarian crises (Jakobsen 1996, Gilboa 2005). Second, State B can seek to alter the strategic balance inside C’s civil war in ways that alter A’s incentives. Indeed, actors within a civil war can deter third-party intervention using methods like salami tactics to reduce threat perceptions (Werner 2000); **State B can use similar tactics, seeking to empower rebel forces and increase the level of threat State A feels from the conflict.** B can also take steps which increase the odds of victory or shorten the projected time horizon of the intervention. **These two approaches form a rough type of strategic** “blackmail,” **allowing State B to entangle A in its ongoing intervention.**

### 2NC L—Interest Expansion

#### Security co-op opens the door to interest expansion which enables reckless driving

Priebe et al ’21 [Miranda; Dec 2021; Ph.D. in political science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; M.P.A. in international relations, Princeton University; RAND Corporation “Do Alliances and Partnerships Entangle the United States in Conflict?,” https://www.rand.org/pubs/research\_reports/RRA739-3.html]

Third, **once the United States makes a security commitment, it might begin to** define its interests more expansively**, effectively adopting the ally’s or partner’s interests as its own.** Diplomatic and military interactions **with the ally might cause the United States to become socialized to its concerns. Even having a seat at the table with U.S. leaders could give states opportunities to influence U.S. choices.** Domestic lobbying by allies and partners might further socialize the U.S. public or policymakers to ally and partner concerns. Through lobbying, these **allies and partners could create a constituency within the United States that promotes military involvement in a wider variety of issues involving those states.**

Restrainers also note that **there are forms of entanglement that remain short of U.S. involvement in military conflict**, which we do not evaluate in this report. Edelstein and Itzkowitz Shifrinson argue that **entanglement dynamics in Asia have affected U.S. force levels and the way the United States approaches its relationship with China**. Posen uses **the term reckless driving to refer to allies and partners that adopt** riskier policies **of all kinds because of an expectation of continued U.S. support. For example, Posen argues that U.S. military aid and political support have** freed up resources **for Israel to spend on settlement activities in the West Bank.** The U.S. association with Israel’s policies on settlements and toward the Palestinians more generally, Posen argues, has harmed U.S. standing in the Arab world and has undercut its foreign policy goals with these countries, including counterterrorism.

### 2NC L—Studies

#### Studies prove the link is significant

Sullivan 11, Professor at UNC-Chapel Hill, with Brock Tessman, Assistant Professor at Georgia and Xiaojun Li, PhD in Political Science from Stanford (Patricia, “US Military Aid and Recipient State Cooperation,” *Foreign Policy Analysis*, No. 7)

In the results from equation 1, we see that, contrary to Hypothesis 1a (Arms for Influence), but consistent with Hypothesis 3b (Reverse Leverage), there is a significant, negative correlation between levels of US military aid and recipient state cooperation. Economic aid, on the other hand, appears to have no effect on recipient state cooperation. The recipient country's GDP and S score are also not correlated with a state's behavior toward the United States. Recipient states that are democratic, and those that have US troops stationed on their soil, appear to be more cooperative with the United States, all else equal.

Table 3 presents results from using equation 1 to simulate the substantive impact of the statistically significant independent variables on recipient state cooperation. States that do not receive any US military aid display an average level of cooperation with the United States of +1.5 when all other variables are held constant at their means. The model predicts that states that obtain the average amount of US military aid ($20 million) will be less cooperative—scoring an average of −11 on the cooperation-conflict scale. An increase in US military aid to one standard deviation above the mean leads to an additional six-point reduction in the monthly cooperation score of the recipient state. In contrast, an increase in the number of US troops from its mean to one standard deviation above the mean raises recipient state cooperation almost one point. Democratic recipients are on average four points more cooperative than nondemocratic recipients.

#### Stats prove

Sullivan 11, Professor at UNC-Chapel Hill, with Brock Tessman, Assistant Professor at Georgia and Xiaojun Li, PhD in Political Science from Stanford (Patricia, “US Military Aid and Recipient State Cooperation,” *Foreign Policy Analysis*, No. 7)

In this paper, we attempted a systematic investigation into the relationship between US military aid and the level of foreign policy cooperation exhibited by the states that receive that aid. We aimed to improve on the existing literature by building and testing three explicit theoretical models (Arms for Influence, Lonely Superpower and Reverse Leverage), focusing on a new measure of cooperation generated from events data rather than UN voting records, and controlling for preference similarity, so that our results capture the influence military aid has on recipient state behavior independent of any dyadic predisposition toward cooperation or conflict.

We test seven hypotheses associated with three different theoretical models and find mixed results. There is little evidence in favor of the Arms for Influence model: there is an inverse relationship between absolute levels of US military aid and recipient state cooperation, and there is no relationship at all between recipient state dependence on US aid and recipient state behavior. Thus, while the Lonely Superpower hypothesis was on the right track by predicting an unorthodox relationship between aid and cooperation, it did not perform as well as some of the Reverse Leverage hypotheses when it came to explaining exactly what form such unorthodoxy would take.

In several ways, the Reverse Leverage model was quite accurate: (i) states receiving military aid from the United States exhibit lower levels of cooperation than states that do not receive military aid, (ii) in the population of all states, higher levels of military aid appear to produce more defiant behavior, and (iii) the United States does not punish defiance with reductions in aid or reward greater cooperation with increases in military aid. Together, these results suggest that US military assistance is allocated for reasons that are largely independent of overall recipient state behavior toward the United States. The Reverse Leverage model contends that military aid is delivered to states that the United States depends on for security reasons. Realizing their leverage over Washington, states that receive high amounts of aid are actually more able to engage in uncooperative behavior than are states that the United States does not depend so heavily upon. We attempted to test for the effects of an aid recipient's “security value” directly by comparing US allies to nonallies. Consistent with the Reverse Leverage model, we find that states with a defensive alliance with the United States are more likely to receive US military aid but less likely to respond to aid by increasing their cooperation with American preferences.

### 2NC L—Empirics

#### Libya proves NATO entrapment is certain and impossible to deescalate if we give them unconditional security cooperation

Ashford ’17 [Emma M.; Jul 6; Defense and Foreign Policy Studies, Cato Institute; Canadian Foreign Policy Journal “Hegemonic blackmail: entrapment in civil war intervention,” https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/11926422.2017.1341843#2b85d6ca-6520-4a3d-8e4a-aa9f2ee3f33d-357c6cfb-53ba-4fa0-8e6b-e69fc2b8ce9f]

In order to better understand these dynamics, this article offers a preliminary analysis of two recent cases where the United States has faced substantial pressure to intervene in civil wars: Syria and Libya. In both cases, **American allies have taken active military and covert actions, and have sought to induce the United States to join them.** These case studies do not aim to test a specific hypothesis – or to prove that alliance pressure is the only factor which influences intervention decision-making – but rather aim to further explore and illustrate the process of civil war entrapment. The two cases are distinct: **the United States chose to join a major** North Atlantic Treaty Organization **(NATO) intervention in Libya**, but has been more reticent to intervene directly against the Assad regime in Syria.

**Alliance dynamics in Libya**

During 2011, substantial pressure **was placed on American policymakers by France and the United Kingdom, both of whom strongly supported a pro-rebel intervention in Libya.** This intervention has sometimes been portrayed as a choice by the Obama administration, a policy infamously described as “leading from behind.” Yet the timing of pressure implies strongly that American allies instead actively lobbied **to obtain** necessary **American military support.** Indeed, **as then-Secretary of Defense Robert Gates noted in his memoirs, “Asked if the situation in Libya involved our ‘vital national interests,’ I honestly said** I did not think so **– but our closest allies felt that it affected their vital interests and therefore we had an** obligation **to help them”** (Gates 2014, p. 521). For France’s Nicholas Sarkozy, an intervention in Libya offered substantial domestic political benefits, while historical British animosity toward Gaddafi was enhanced by concerns about the growing humanitarian costs of the Arab Spring uprisings. Yet both **Britain and France would have struggled to conduct an intervention alone; as British Defense Secretary Liam Fox later admitted, “**NATO could not have done it without the US**”** (quoted in Wintour and Watt 2011).

Protests against the government of Muammar Gaddafi began as early as February 2011, but it was not until Gaddafi launched a military counteroffensive against rebel groups that international pressure began to grow for an intervention to protect civilians. Even then, as Chivvis (2012, p. 67) notes, “when the conflict in Libya began, another US military intervention in the Middle East seemed a distant possibility at best.” Instead, France and the United Kingdom took the lead, building momentum for intervention on humanitarian grounds through an aggressive public relations (PR) campaign (Adler-Nissen and Pouliot 2014).

Though the United States only agreed to join the intervention two days before the key vote on United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1973, American military capacity was instrumental (Barry 2011). Indeed, **though the United States tried to step back from the air campaign after the initial 10 days, it came under** consistent pressure to commit more resources**.** European states found it difficult to maintain a high-intensity air campaign without American support, and were only able to manage 150 of 300 planned daily strikes inside Libya. **The United States provided 80 per cent of all air-to-air refueling (Barry 2011), and “surged” hundreds of staff to the Combined Air Ops Centre in Italy in order to handle European intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) shortfalls (Chivvis 2012).** Despite this reliance, America’s allies sought to expand the campaign. Indeed, even as France and the United Kingdom were publicly calling on the United States to join them in creating a no-fly zone, they privately recognized the National Transitional Council as Libya’s government, and began to covertly assist rebel groups (Kuperman 2013).

**Allied pressure was most apparent in the run-up to the intervention, as concerted** diplomatic and public relations efforts **focused on obtaining American support.** Both Sarkozy and Cameron strongly favored intervention, a marked contrast to the skepticism and debate in the White House (Chivvis 2012). During a later parliamentary enquiry, British policymakers were clear that they felt it was their influence that tipped the balance in internal American debates. **As Liam Fox, British Secretary of Defence, later noted, “It is no secret that the US were quite reticent about getting involved militarily … in a Libyan campaign.”** William Hague, Foreign Secretary, concurred: “**I think in the UK and France we did influence the United States on this subject where there were divisions”** (House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee 2016).

It was under this pressure that President Obama sent his Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, to meet with Libyan opposition leader Mahmoud Jibril in Paris; her advocacy on Jibril’s behalf would later prove influential in the American choice to join the intervention (Becker and Shane 2016). **As Obama himself later admitted: “this is not so at the core of US interests that it makes sense for us to unilaterally strike against the Gaddafi regime. At that point, you’ve got Europe and a number of Gulf countries … who are calling for action”** (quoted in Mason 2016).12 Defense Secretary Robert Gates ultimately concluded in his memoir that “Qaddafi’s bloodthirsty rhetoric … the action of the Arab League, and strong British and French pressure for NATO to act**, I think, persuaded the president”** (Gates 2014, p. 518).

**French and British leaders took a two-pronged approach to achieve this influence, relying on private diplomatic channels and the media to build public support.** At the United Nations, British diplomats handled the drafting of several Security Council resolutions, building momentum for Resolution 1973 authorizing the use of military force. In order to bolster the case that the intervention was a widely accepted humanitarian mission, diplomats procured an Arab state amenable to the intervention (Lebanon) and a defector (Ibrahim Dabbashi) (Adler-Nissen and Pouliot 2014). French policymakers, including French Foreign Minister Alain Juppé, spoke openly of their unhappiness with Washington’s “slowness” on the issue (cited in Erlanger 2011). Both states sought to be the main source of information on the unfolding crisis, highlighting their joint narrative even when embassies in Tripoli presented contrary reports (Adler-Nissen and Pouliot 2014).

In parallel**, both governments pursued an aggressive media strategy, seeking to build popular support and making a concerted effort to keep Libya in the headlines, even as other Arab Spring crises and Europe’s financial meltdown threatened to knock it off the front pages. The implication that the United States was a bad ally for refusing to back the intervention was a key component of this strategy**; one only has to look at the treatment Germany received for its choice to abstain on Resolution 1973 to see how effective this strategy was (Brockmeier 2013). Germany’s abstention “provoked speculation that Germany wanted to shed its supporting role in the US-led Western alliance,” highlighting the credibility pressure that allies can face (Bremmer and Leonard 2012).

Despite this, **the primary focus of PR efforts in London and Paris was in using the “framing power of the media” to portray intervention as a humanitarian necessity, using Gaddafi’s own inflammatory rhetoric to build a case that mass casualties were imminent** (Adler-Nissen and Pouliot 2014). In fact, **as later studies would demonstrate, much of this evidence was found to be substantially exaggerated by Libyan expatriate groups** (Kuperman 2013). Nonetheless, France and Britain were able to use it to build public support, helping proponents inside the United States government to gain the upper hand in ongoing debates (Chivvis 2012). While other factors certainly affected the American decision to engage in intervention in Libya, **it is undeniable that this** pressure from America’s NATO allies played a key**, potentially** decisive role.

#### Syria proves increased US involvement facilitates NATO entrapment.

Ashford ’17 [Emma M.; Jul 6; Defense and Foreign Policy Studies, Cato Institute; Canadian Foreign Policy Journal “Hegemonic blackmail: entrapment in civil war intervention,” https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/11926422.2017.1341843#2b85d6ca-6520-4a3d-8e4a-aa9f2ee3f33d-357c6cfb-53ba-4fa0-8e6b-e69fc2b8ce9f]

**Pressure to intervene in Syria**

**The interaction between Middle Eastern countries and the United States over intervention against the Assad regime presents another illustration of the logic of civil war entrapment. With the notable exception of NATO member Turkey, the United States does not have formal commitments to any state in the region.** Yet the United States does have strong regional security ties, including a long history of military cooperation with Saudi Arabia, bases housing substantial numbers of troops in Qatar and Kuwait, and the headquarters of the United States Fifth Fleet in Bahrain. At the same time, the capacity deficiencies of regional states were more pronounced than those of America’s NATO allies; these states simply did not possess the capabilities to mount a successful intervention against the militarily powerful Assad regime. Though the Gulf States were not successful in obtaining a full-scale American military intervention, their efforts appear to have shaped America’s covert funding and training of Syria’s rebels.

Though the Syrian civil war began in 2011, the Obama administration initially chose to pursue non-military measures, such as sanctions, humanitarian aid and disruption of arms shipments. It was not until mid-2013, following the Assad regime’s use of chemical weapons, that the United States substantially increased its involvement**, orchestrating a surprising diplomatic deal with Russia to facilitate the disarmament of Syria’s chemical weapons, and authorizing the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to arm and train some rebel groups** (Londono and Miller 2013). Even with President Trump’s more recent use of cruise missiles against regime airfields – again in response to chemical weapons use the bulk of America’s involvement in Syria remains focused not on the Assad regime, but on the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS).

**This limited involvement has frustrated the Gulf States and Turkey, all of whom were actively engaged in arming and funding rebel groups inside Syria as early as 2012** (BBC News 2014). Unfortunately, this aid was poorly coordinated and served to create resource competition, contributing to the fragmentation and radicalization of the Syrian opposition (Ostovar and McCants 2013). Turkey is the only American partner to have directly committed troops to fight inside Syria (Ozdal and Davison 2016). As the ongoing Saudi-led intervention in neighboring Yemen highlights, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) remains largely incapable of mounting a military intervention without American logistical and intelligence support (Black 2016).

**The push for a United States-backed intervention began in 2012, when Qatar made strong representations at the United Nations in favor of arming the Syrian opposition, providing a no-fly zone, or overthrowing Assad** (Lynch and Gearan 2012). Diplomats attempted to mitigate the concerns of American policymakers about potential extremism, with Qatar’s Minister of State for Foreign Affairs arguing against “excluding anyone at this stage, or bracketing them as terrorists … . We should bring them all together and we should work on them to change their ideology” (Dickenson 2012). By the following year, the **Saudi and Qatari governments began to bankroll a substantial lobbying effort, led by Bandar bin Sultan, a former ambassador with strong Washington connections. Behind closed doors, diplomats tried to persuade the Obama White House to join them** (Gartenstein-Ross and Schanzer 2013). **At the same time, they took steps inside Syria to ameliorate American concerns. In response to concerns about the fragmentation of the opposition, Saudi Arabia and Turkey worked together to create a coalition of rebel groups (Jaish al-Fateh); to counter American concerns about extremists, they sought to bolster moderate groups** (Butler 2015).

Yet these strategies were ineffectual, and **the next few years saw a shift toward more public tactics. High-profile opinion articles made the case for intervention on the grounds of regional stability.** As Saudi Arabia’s Ambassador in London argued in the New York Times, “the West’s policies on both Iran and Syria risk the stability and security of the Middle East” (Bin Nawaf Bin Abdulaziz Al Saud 2013). **Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates were also among the top 10 foreign spenders on DC-based lobbying firms in 2013** (Sunlight Foundation); with the latter spending US$11.1 million and the former a whopping US$14.2 million (Itkowitz 2014). Certainly, this spending was not focused solely on Syria – for example, Saudi leaders also sought to smooth arms deals – but the role of lobbying firms in the intervention debate cannot be ignored. This effort spanned “both the inside game, which is lobbying and government relations, and the outside game, which is PR and other things that tend to reach a broader audience” (Ho 2016). **The public relations firm Qorvis, acting on behalf of the Gulf States, initiated a campaign to create the impression of a coherent, “moderate” Syrian opposition, capable of benefiting from Western intervention. In reality, it is doubtful such an opposition ever existed. But Qorvis created websites, ran a Syrian Opposition Coalition twitter account, and coordinated meetings on Capitol Hill, rarely disclosing their connection to the Saudi government (Quinn 2015).**

### 2NC L—AT: Plan is Narrow

#### Empirics prove entrapment even with narrow commitments

Priebe et al ’21 [Miranda; Dec 2021; Ph.D. in political science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; M.P.A. in international relations, Princeton University; RAND Corporation “Do Alliances and Partnerships Entangle the United States in Conflict?,” https://www.rand.org/pubs/research\_reports/RRA739-3.html]

**Advocates of restraint often present entrapment as a general risk that is associated with U.S. security relationships.** They have not made any explicit distinctions between alliances and partnerships as we do here. **These strategists have pointed to the potential entrapment risks associated with the U.S. alliances with** Japan, the Philippines, and **Eastern European and Baltic allies in** NATO**.** Restrainers also see risks in relationships with U.S. partners, such as Taiwan and Georgia. They argue that **Taiwan’s leaders would have been more cautious in their rhetoric about independence in the past if Taiwan had not had a long-standing security relationship with the United States**. Advocates of restraint also claim that **expectations of U.S. support led Georgia to adopt provocative policies toward South Ossetia in 2008, which led to** war with Russia**.** Although the United States was not drawn into this conflict, restrainers argue that **the case highlights how U.S. security relationships incentivize risk-taking by allies and partners.**

Second, alliances can entangle if the United States sees its credibility— specifically, its reputation for upholding its commitments—as being on the line in a wider variety of issues involving its allies and partners. **Even though a U.S. commitment might be narrow**, such as defending the ally’s homeland in the event of an attack, **the United States might worry that other allies and adversaries see a U.S. response to any issue involving the ally as an indication of U.S. commitment in different contexts. The United States might come to believe that, to protect its credibility, it has to fight wars over** peripheral interests **involving U.S. allies both to reassure allies and to deter adversaries.** Entanglement dynamics do not have to involve the ally or partner that the United States is defending. Rather, entanglement would be at work if the United States were to become involved in conflict to show its reliability to other allies and partners who might be watching. These mechanisms could result in the United States risking or fighting wars that it would not have considered absent the alliance or partnership.

### 2NC !—Comparative

#### Alliance entrapment is uniquely more likely than direct war—narrow foreign policy, nuclear innovation, and rising tensions drive entrapment.

Edelstein ’19 [David M. Edelstein; commentator for war on the rocks; 2-6-2019; "Competition with China and the Future of the Asian International Order"; War on the Rocks; https://warontherocks.com/2019/02/competition-with-china-and-the-future-of-the-asian-international-order/; Accessed 7-13-2022; AW]

Is this competition likely to lead to war between the United States and China, Russia, or other countries? In short, the **probability of great power war is higher now than it has been in some time**, but nuclear weapons continue to limit the likelihood of a systemic great power war breaking out. However, as the United States becomes more concerned about Chinese intentions and as **Beijing becomes more focused on short-term targets of opportunities in the South China Sea and elsewhere, the** probability of conflict rises**.** Where **war is most likely to occur is through** a process of alliance entrapment, a potentially volatile scenario that has been **underappreciated by advocates of an American-led global international order**. Skeptics of entrapment have typically pointed to the experience of the Cold War to argue that the likelihood of great powers becoming entrapped by their weaker allies is limited. **During the Cold War, however, both the United States and the Soviet Union defined their interests globally, making it difficult for either to be entrapped into a conflict it had not defined as part of its interests**. Today, the **U**nited **S**tates may be more tempted to **define its** interests more narrowly even as it recognizes the risk posed by a rising China. The result is a **higher likelihood of American entrapment** in conflicts it might otherwise prefer to avoid. Such **entrapment** is a particular **risk for great powers like the U**nited **S**tates that **remain absolutely powerful** but are arguably in relative decline. The United States has an interest in not seeing China become a hegemonic power in East Asia. At the same time, the **U**nited **S**tates is **not likely to confront China** directly over its growing interests and aspirations in the region. The **anticipated costs of direct conflict between the two countries** are **likely sufficient to dissuade either side** from initiating such a war. Instead, **conflict is more likely to emerge when a friend or ally of the United States** — such as Vietnam, the Philippines, or Japan — **finds itself in a crisis with Beijing. Washington** will be tempted to intervene on behalf of these friends in order to **put the brakes** on any growing Chinese influence in the region. Dangerously, **smaller powers may be tempted** to provoke China precisely **to generate this American response.** Military clashes in the waters of East and Southeast Asia are relatively easy to envision, and have already occurred in recent decades — consider, for example, the Mischief Reef disputes in the 1990s, or the Scarborough Shoal incident in the 2000s. Fortunately, such **clashes are likely to remain limited in scale**. While some worry that **innovations in nuclear weapons technology** have **made such weapons more usable and more practical** in the conduct of warfare, the dynamics of escalation from the use of a small, low-yield nuclear weapon are still difficult to predict. The dangers of a catastrophic nuclear conflagration will continue to place a lid on any possible future conflicts between the United States and China. Importantly, however, the **risks of continuous crises and skirmishes are** significant — and escalation is possible.

### 2NC !—Yes Entrapment—Top Level

#### Entrapment is a process, not an event. Critics of the thesis miscount case studies and underestimate the risk.

Edelstein and Shifrinson 18, \*David M. Edelstein, Professor of Foreign Studies at Georgetown, and \*Joshua R. Itzkowitz Shifrinson, an Assistant Professor of International Relations, Boston University, (“Entrapment Revisited: Strategic and Structural Dynamics”, <https://cpb-us-w2.wpmucdn.com/u.osu.edu/dist/5/66008/files/2018/12/Entrapment-Revisited-Strategic-and-Structural-Dynamics-1xpycy1.pdf>)

Recent efforts to examine entrapment, however, define the issue differently. In a widely cited study, for example, Tongfi Kim argues that Snyder’s definition, is “too broad” because it encompasses both military and non-military behaviors that may or may not be desirable from the perspective of the state in question. Instead, Kim argues that Snyder’s original definition should more properly be understood as “entanglement” – “the process whereby a state is compelled to aid an ally in a costly and unprofitable enterprise because of the alliance” – while “entrapment” more narrowly refers to “undesirable entanglement in which the entangling states adopts a risky or offensive policy not specified in the alliance agreement [emphasis added].”14 Beckley embraces Kim’s approach, arguing that entrapment occurs “only when an ally instigates a conflict with a third party in order to drag its alliance partners into the dispute.” Entanglement, by contrast, “occurs when a state is dragged into a military conflict by one, or more, of its alliances” – a definition very close to Snyder’s original – with “alliances” themselves requiring states to be bound by a formal treaty.15 Meanwhile, Lanoszka’s rigorous examination of mechanisms that might undergird entrapment relies on a similar distinction. As he writes, “Entrapment is a type of entanglement” that “occurs because of risky or offensive actions taken outside the parameters of the original alliance treaty.”16 And, just as Kim notes that entrapment is “undesirable entanglement,” Lanoszka argues that “entrapment by definition cannot take place if the defender wishes to fight in order to protect an ally that it sees as vital for the goods that it provides.”17 In short, recent redefinitions relabel Snyder’s original concept as “entanglement,” narrow entrapment to only include going to war for an ally in overt contravention of one’s interests, and narrow its applicability to formal alliances.

In this paper, we adopt a revised form of Snyder’s original conception because of conceptual and empirical limits in the revised definitions advanced in recent studies. Before offering our definition, it is first worthwhile noting the problems posed by the revised definitions. On one level, defining entrapment solely as an issue of formal alliances sidesteps the reality that many real world debates concern worries of entrapment via informal alliances. Critics of American backing for Ukraine, for instance, worry that informal-but-real American security engagement with Ukraine may end up pulling the United States into a conflict with Moscow for the sake of Kiev.18 Likewise, as U.S.-Indian ties strengthen as the U.S. seeks partners to confront China, it is reasonable to question whether the United States will end up courting an increased risk of conflict with China as Indian-Chinese relations themselves deteriorate for issues separate from those the United States has with the PRC.19

Not coincidentally, treating entrapment as only an issue of formal alliances also highlights questionable solutions to the problem, namely, crafting loop-holes and escape clauses into alliance treaties. In reality, even formal treaties with notionally clear obligations among its members are often the subject of significant intra-alliance haggling, and debates surrounding the credibility of states willingness to follow through on the terms of the agreements. After all, if alliance provisions (loopholes and all) were sacrosanct and a panacea for real political debates, there would be no questions of the scope and credibility of alliances at any point in international politics.20 That this is not the case – that states in practice bargain hard with their partners over even formalized alliance terms – suggests that linking entrapment to formal alliances creates erroneously adopts an essentially legal approach to thinking through a fundamentally political and strategic problem, in addition to narrowing the scope of analysis. 21

At the same time, narrowing the definition of entrapment solely to cover “undesirable” instances of military escalation for a partner virtually defines away the problem entrapment seeks to explain. To have Beckley, Kim, and others tell it, entrapment can only occur if states knowingly throw caution to the wind and roll the iron dice for a partner for uncertain or avowedly irrelevant ends. Setting entrapment at such a bar, however, ignores that Snyder’s original formulation heavily focused on the risks states run in the course of forming and adjusting alliances over time. Put differently, the new definition ignores the process by which policy and strategy evolve over time and, in doing so, may cause entrapment.

At a basic level, the decision to go to war is rarely a dichotomous or discrete event.22 Most international conflict is preceded by extensive diplomatic deliberations with both opponents and allies as states try to obtain their objectives through means short of war while preparing for conflict on the most advantageous political and military terms possible.23 Even fast-moving crises involve such diplomatic engagement and coordination: the run-up and immediate outbreak of World War One, for example, saw extensive negotiations across the Triple Entente and the Triple Alliance, diplomatic consultations within the alliances and domestic efforts within various states to prepare the policymaking apparatus and public for conflict. The net result is that dissenting voices on the necessity of a particular course of action (here, conflict) tend to be minimized; 24 by the same measure, policymaking elites may come to hold particular and debatable understandings of the national interest [d]riven by psychological, domestic, or decision-making biases.25 Hence, even an ally that – in Snyder’s terms – shares interests “only partially” with a partner may end up concluding that conflict on behalf of the ally is viable: the process of forming and managing the alliance in a competitive international system can alter how states perceive their interests. Not only does this make it problematic to treat entrapment as undesired conflict, but it makes it difficult – as scholars such as Kim and Beckley attempt – to assess the frequency of entrapment by evaluating states’ perceptions and decision-making deliberations in the run up to war.

Finally, missing from all treatments of entrapment is recognition that entrapment is not solely a problem of pre-war deliberations – entrapment can be a wartime issue as well. After all, even if Allies A and B agree on the necessity of confrontation and conflict against Adversary C, A and B may hold different preferences over how, where, and when to engage in this confrontation.26 This again reflects the reality that allies may share interests “only partially”: partners can disagree on what the form and substance of a confrontation with a common adversary should entail. In turn, as states try to keep an alliance together for the sake of prosecuting a conflict while still pursuing the conflict in ways that best serve their interests, states may end up entrapping (or being entrapped by) their partners by pursuing policies and accepting risks that they would not otherwise.

Recognizing these shortcomings, we adopt a modified version of Snyder’s original definition. For our purposes, entrapment constitutes a process whereby states seeking security progressively take on greater risks of being dragooned into a partner’s political or military endeavors by virtue of having an alliance, even if the state in question shares few interests besides the continuation of the alliance itself in the partner’s moves and even if the alliance is never formalized. There are several elements to this definition. First, and in keeping with Snyder’s original formula, entrapment can occur in stages, as states take on sequentially greater risks on behalf of partners in the hopes of creating security for themselves. This may or may not be seen as “desirable” in the moment – the key for this concept is that states can be seen to accept real risks of confrontation or conflict that they would not otherwise if not for the existence of the alliance. Second, this conceptualization is agnostic as to the degree of formality in the alliance – entrapment can manifest in informal as well formal alliances. Third, entrapment is not limited to pre-war behaviors: entrapment during wartime is also a logical possibility. Finally, entrapment is fundamentally a byproduct of the politics of alliance management: states may take on progressively greater risks on entrapment owing to the existence of the alliance and its partners moves both therein and vis-à-vis an adversary.

#### Public announcements of reaffirmations lock in public support and military spending

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American political leaders often frame U.S. security interests by emphasizing the specific details of U.S. defense commitments. For example, during a recent high-profile diplomatic visit to the Philippines in July of 2021, Secretary of State Blinken privately affirmed the US commitment to President Duterte. The United States also signaled its intentions to China directly. An American warship was deployed to conduct freedom of navigation operations in the South China Sea to coincide with the visit.

However, in addition, Secretary Blinken took time to both publicly call attention to the [specific details of a longstanding alliance](https://www.cnn.com/2021/07/12/asia/us-philippines-south-china-sea-intl-hnk/index.html) between the US and Philippines and explain its meaning; “We also reaffirm that an armed attack on Philippine armed forces, public vessels, or aircraft in the South China Sea would invoke US mutual defense commitments under Article IV of the 1951 US-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty.”

When political leaders focus public attention on existing security commitments in this manner, it is unlikely that they are only attempting to send a signal to potential adversaries. The conventional wisdom is that, in direct state-to-state communication, actions speak louder than words. For instance, as noted above, during Blinken’s trip the US sent a clear signal to China’s leaders by detaching a naval vessel to the region.

We believe that public statements are better understood as political acts designed to mobilize domestic opinion and communicate to potential adversaries that there is sufficient popular support to follow through on promises to defend a security partner. Indeed, mobilizing domestic political support within an alliance during a crisis is critical to the success of deterrence threats, and emphasizing formal security commitments is, in part, intended as a guardrail against shifting domestic foreign policy preferences.

So, does this communication strategy work? The answer is unclear. Foreign policy research has traditionally focused on the degree to which formal alliances shape the expectations of external audiences—allies and adversaries—in the lead-up to conflict. Interestingly, recent scholarship has demonstrated that international law sometimes also works in the opposite direction; it can shape domestic attitudes about conflict behavior.

For example, there is evidence that the public is less likely to support military action when it violates explicit legal commitments to protect human rights. This result extends to the broader obligation that governments should attempt to protect civilians during conflict.  However, because the primary focus of existing research is on human rights law that emphasizes moral obligations to others, this scholarship might not extend to self-interested national security concerns.

To answer this question directly, we conducted a novel survey experiment on a representative sample in the United States. We presented respondents with a narrative describing a military crisis on the Korean peninsula. Half of our respondents received a cue about the American mutual defense treaty with South Korea. The other half of our respondent pool did not receive this treatment. Subjects were then asked (1) whether they would support the use of U.S. combat troops in defense of South Korea, (2) how many U.S. military casualties they would be willing to accept, and (3) how many North Korean civilian casualties they would tolerate.

In a second wave, respondents received a stronger and more detailed experimental treatment that included information about the specific content of the U.S.-South Korean defense agreement. In addition, our experiment included several questions designed to evaluate the causal mechanisms by which defense treaties might potentially influence public support for military action.

Our research produced several interesting findings. First, emphasizing the defense treaty between Washington and Seoul increased support for military action on behalf of South Korea. However, the magnitude of this effect depends on the specificity of the information provided. Merely noting the fact of a prior commitment only affects attitudes of self-declared Independents. Democrats and Republicans, by contrast, were initially less responsive to our subtle priming on the U.S-Korean defense agreement. However, once individuals receive more detailed information describing the specific legal nature of the treaty – modeled on the kind of statements by American officials noted above – the gap between Independents and partisans largely disappears.

Second, we find that the reason defense treaties increase support for military action is that they elicit a belief that the United States is morally obligated to defend its ally and that backing down damages America’s international reputation. Third, formal alliances increase public “casualty tolerance.” Individuals in our treatment groups were both more tolerant of U.S. military deaths and more willing to accept North Korean civilian casualties than other respondents in the study. Interestingly, the subtle prime only influenced casualty tolerance among strong conservatives. However, again, as subjects received information about the specific legal nature of the U.S. obligation the gap between strong conservatives and others largely disappeared.

So, is framing conflict decisions around prior security commitments an effective way to shape public perceptions about conflict? The results reported here suggest that it is. Highlighting an existing promise to defend allies increases public willingness and resolve for military action. We find that this effect is not uniform across individuals and that support for military action and casualty tolerance increases as people receive more specificity about their country’s obligation.

These results demonstrate that security commitments, in addition to shaping the expectations and incentives of external actors, also contour the domestic political incentives for foreign policy action. This is, in part, why pollical leaders take such great pains to detail the nature of their country’s defense obligations to domestic audiences, even as they are communicating directly with allies and potential adversaries. Taken as a whole, these findings reveal a nuanced set of relationships between security commitments and individual-level attitudes about conflict and, as a result, generate new insights into the conditions under which leaders can use existing security agreements to mobilize the public.

### 2NC !—Yes Entrapment—Credibility Gaps

#### Entrapment true – state credibility gap proves

Elizabeth Calos 12 — (Elizabeth Calos; Published: 2012; "The Weakest Link: Credible Deterrence Threats and Alliance Entrapment"; Inquiries Journal; Accessed: 7-5-2022; http://www.inquiriesjournal.com/articles/1614/the-weakest-link-credible-deterrence-threats-and-alliance-entrapment)//Pen-SY

However, this paper argues that there is a codicil to this argument. In order for a defensive alliance to act as an effective deterrent to external aggression, the alliance must be able to pose a credible threat, which will prevent states outside of the alliance from threatening its members. Thus, defensive alliances must present a strong enough deterrent threat to protect even the weakest members of the alliance. This means that the weak or medium powered states within an alliance are particularly invested in maintaining the strength of the deterrent signal sent by the alliance. The deterrent signal that is sent by the alliance is the combination of each state's relative strength and military capability, thus any loss of strength by one alliance member decreases the efficacy of signal sent by the alliance as a whole. Since weaker states depend on this signal to protect the state from potential adversaries, there is an inherent obligation for lower powered states to ensure that the signal remains strong. Conversely, great powers or strong states depend less on the deterrent signal sent by the alliance and more on the military and economic strength of the state itself. Thus, weaker states within a defensive alliance would be drawn into conflicts where the other alliance members are the aggressor because if the alliance member should lose, the credibility of the alliance's deterrent threat would be diminished. Even though the mandate of the defensive alliance does not cover entry into non-defensive conflicts, states involved in defensive alliances could find themselves involved in conflicts originated by weaker alliance members. Figure 1 demonstrates the logic of this argument visually.

### 2NC !—Yes Entrapment—Timing Entrapment

#### Timing entrapment creates multiple scenarios for war – Russia proves

David Edelstein 18 — (David Edelstein; Vice Dean of Faculty in Georgetown College and a professor in the Department of Government, Published: December 2018; "Entrapment Revisited: Strategic and Structural Dynamics"; Accessed: 7-5-2022; https://cpb-us-w2.wpmucdn.com/u.osu.edu/dist/5/66008/files/2018/12/Entrapment-Revisited-Strategic-and-Structural-Dynamics-1xpycy1.pdf)//Pen-SY

Timing entrapment occurs when members of an alliance disagree over the optimal moment at which to confront an opponent. Weaker members of an alliance, for example, may feel proportionally more threatened by an adversary at an earlier date than proportionally stronger members of an alliance, and so be more inclined to adopt hardline policies that increase the likelihood of war before the alliance’s stronger members reach that point. 30 Likewise, unsettled domestic politics may give some members of an alliance incentive to go to war sooner than its allies prefer if a ruling coalition seeks to resolve an external threat but fears being turned out of office before its allies are prepared for joint action.31 Under these circumstances, even if Ally A might eventually be willing to assertively confront or fight alongside Ally B against a common opponent, B may initiate a confrontation at a time that State A finds unattractive, yet A feel compelled to back B for fear of later having to stand alone later (when it would prefer to fight). Put differently, Ally A left to its own devices might prefer to address an external threat without resorting to behaviors that increase the risk of conflict, feeling it has the capacity to wait or hoping that war can avoided through deterrence or a negotiated settlement; nevertheless, Ally B may behave in ways that makes war more likely in the short-term for fear that time is no longer on its side. In theory, states seeking to entrap partners at times its partners would rather avoid can do so in a number of ways. Some states, for instance, may spoil negotiations with an opponent designed to settle outstanding disputes so that a diplomatic standoff festers or escalates.32 Alternatively, states may engage in provocative behavior over disputed issues designed to trigger an aggressive stance by an opponent that merits an allied response. And, in extremis, states can simply begin hostilities despite allied opposition, thereby daring its partners not to back it up. In all these situations, Ally A is faced with the choice of either being drawn into an escalating crisis or war, or abandoning B. When A chooses to support, entrapment occurs. To not act, despite the ill-advised timing of B’s provocations, would potentially leave B weakened and vulnerable to a defeat in the face of a seemingly pressing threat that, in the end, may be far worse for State A. Russia’s involvement in World War I on behalf of Serbia presents an example of timing entrapment. Few would deny that Russia believed it had a strategic interest in defending Serbia and bolstering the pan-Slav identity. As Jack Levy and William Mulligan argue, however, the timing of this support poses a puzzle. If Russia was perceived by Germany as a rising power and a potential threat, then it would have been sensible for Russia to lay low and avoid provoking Germany into a wider war. Yet in the dangerous summer of 1914, St. Petersburg stood by its Serbian allies even as they issued an ultimatum to Austria-Hungary that made war considerably more likely. As Levy and Mulligan note, “1914 was not Russia’s favored year for war.” But the Russians were also fearful of the diplomatic consequences of an unfavorable outcome to the Austro-Serbian crisis.” And, “Although Habsburg control of Serbia did not present an immediate threat to Russian territorial integrity, a more prominent consideration was Russian credibility. In the context of Balkan politics, Russian inaction in the face of Austro-Hungarian aggression could have had severe consequences.”33 To reiterate, our contention is not that Russia supported Serbia despite strategic interests wholly to the contrary. Rather, our claim is that entrapment occured in a more subtle yet very consequential manner: rather than waiting for a more opportune moment for war, Russia was pulled in on behalf of its ally, Serbia, at a time more of Serbia, than Russia’s, choosing.34

### 2NC !—Yes Entrapment—Goal Entrapment

#### Goal entrapment undermines alliance unity

David Edelstein 18 — (David Edelstein; Vice Dean of Faculty in Georgetown College and a professor in the Department of Government, Published: December 2018; "Entrapment Revisited: Strategic and Structural Dynamics"; Accessed: 7-5-2022; https://cpb-us-w2.wpmucdn.com/u.osu.edu/dist/5/66008/files/2018/12/Entrapment-Revisited-Strategic-and-Structural-Dynamics-1xpycy1.pdf)//Pen-SY

A third type of entrapment is goal entrapment. Here, Ally A may be willing to initiate a confrontation or fight alongside Ally B, but the two states diverge in their preferences for the goals of the contest and/or terms for settling the dispute. In theory, this can occur through two different pathways. First, if Ally A has more modest goals than Ally B, A may become entrapped in the more ambitious goals of its ally once confrontation begins simply by B’s refusal to end a standoff or conflict when A desires. Again, A’s only alternative is to abandon its ally, a risky proposition with a confrontation looming or war at hand. Second, and closely related, one ally may entrap another by expanding the scope of a confrontation. Here, Ally B might seek broader gains or more ambitious terms than A, and so layer on new demands or carry a contest into new venues. This move risks entrapping Ally A, as failure to back B may result in B’s defeat, the loss of crucial resources, and opening up inter-allied political fissures that may dissolve the alliance. As an example of goal entrapment, consider the sequence of decisions that led to the allied Operation Torch landings in northern Africa in 1942. In May 1942, President Franklin D. Roosevelt promised Josef Stalin that the allies would shortly alleviate the pressure that the Germans were putting on the Soviet Union. Great Britain, however, resisted a cross-channel attack, seeing in an assault against the main body of German strength in Western Europe – which would have to be led largely by British forces as the U.S. forces were still mobilizing – an exercise that risked exhausting British strength. British leaders instead preferred an assault on North Africa, a move that would be less costly, divert (at least in theory) German resources away from the Soviet Union, and relieve continued Axis threats to British colonial holdings in the Mediterranean/Middle East. The resulting Anglo-American dispute over military strategy continued throughout the summer of 1942 and, as Mark Stoler showcases, significantly undermined Allied unity. Ultimately, American leaders faced with sustained and immutable British opposition to a 1942 attack on France acceded to British demands. Though many American leaders suspected that Britain’s efforts were motivated less by military factors and more by a political effort to bring American resources to bear to protect British influence in the Mediterranean, no cross-channel assault was to come until 1944.35 What is striking about the decisions leading up to Operation Torch is how the driving considerations were simultaneously the pledge of assistance made to Stalin, and Britain’s successful efforts to channel these pledges into a campaign that widened the European war to include North Africa. Once again, entrapment does not have to entail fighting a war against one’s own interests - it can mean pursuing certain objectives for little reason other than to accommodate a partner. Vincent O’Hara offers a damning critique of Operation Torch, “"Torch was a rushed, half-baked experiment in the art of war, full of untested ideas and amateur touches. The politicians mandated if for political reasons over the objections of most of their military chiefs." O’Hara’s political reasons were precisely Roosevelt’s determination to meet the obligation he felt he had to intervene in a way that would distract Germany from its assault on the Soviet Union.36 The entrapment in this case was in terms of the goal of the war, not the general decision to fight in the first place.37

### 2NC !—Yes Entrapment—Means Entrapment

#### Commitment trap ensures allied entanglement

David Edelstein 18 — (David Edelstein; Vice Dean of Faculty in Georgetown College and a professor in the Department of Government, Published: December 2018; "Entrapment Revisited: Strategic and Structural Dynamics"; Accessed: 7-5-2022; https://cpb-us-w2.wpmucdn.com/u.osu.edu/dist/5/66008/files/2018/12/Entrapment-Revisited-Strategic-and-Structural-Dynamics-1xpycy1.pdf)//Pen-SY

Finally, means entrapment describes a situation in which Ally A is maneuvered by Ally B into committing more resources to confrontation than it otherwise desired. This is distinct from goal entrapment: even if A and B agree on their strategic objectives, B may still end up dragging A into a costlier commitment than intended by underproviding the capabilities required and pushing A to make up the difference. This situation can either be intentional – where B withholds available resources from a contest in order to deploy them elsewhere and/or shift the burden onto its partners – or unintentional – where B underestimates the capabilities required to achieve a specified end and, lacking the requisite resources, turns to A. In either case, A is compelled to intervene for fear of harming the alliance’s credibility, prestige, and future functions. Metaphorically, and occasionally literally, B calls for A’s cavalry to ride over the hill to its assistance. Although poorly catalogued, means entrapment may be the most common form of entrapment. States, after all, regularly promise one another the military tools required for joint military action, only to change course and leave their partners high and dry. During the opening days of World War One, for example, Austria-Hungary reneged on agreements to deploy most of its forces against Russia while Germany attacked France, exposing Germany to Russian assault and requiring Germany to alter its own war plans.38 Similarly, Soviet and Chinese officials only agreed to back North Korea in the Korean War when assured by North Korea that the contest would be quickly won and limited in scope; when this assumption proved overly optimistic following the American-backed intervention in June 1950, the USSR and China were forced to commit their own forces rather than see their client collapse.39 As we discuss below, the 2011 allied intervention in Libya also demonstrates means entrapment as the United States found itself committing substantial resources in support of the intervention despite an initial instinct to limit its involvement.

### 2NC !—Scenario—Norway/Russia—1NC

#### Norway will escalate-to-deescalate – increasing US cooperation inculcates the cult of offensive.

Heier, 18—professor, Norwegian Defence University College (Tormod, “Avoiding War: How Should Northern Europe Respond to the US-Russian Rivalry?,” Arctic Review on Law and Politics Vol. 9, 2018, pp. 267–286, dml)

Norwegian willing compliance with allied injunctions has contributed to making Norway a “small middle power” in Europe.44 This is because NATO guidance has helped Norway stir a military transformation that has channelled scarce resources from a large mobilisation force into a more agile professional force. Despite a lack of sustainability however, prospects for more permanent US reinforcements – seen since 2014 – have to some extent eased Norwegian apprehensions. This is particularly so as Russian “snap exercises” and cyberattacks towards critical infrastructure have increased over the past few years.45 Burden sharing in Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria, as well as intensified intelligence gathering towards Russia’s Northern Fleet have nevertheless cemented transatlantic ties. This logic has long roots in Norwegian strategic thinking. According to Defence Minister (1986–1989) Johan Jørgen Holst, a potential crisis with Russia should not end up as a war with Norway, but rather as a war about Norway.46 Burden sharing abroad would make it easier to get US attention and support if a Norwegian tripwire needed to be triggered in the High North. This burden sharing takes place in part through military channels in the Norwegian Intelligence Service, as well as in various parts of the Navy, Air Force and Special Forces commands, which on a daily basis operate closely with US forces in the United States, Norway, Belgium, Germany, Jordan, Iraq and the United Arab Emirates. It also occurs through Norway’s extensive diplomatic networks embodied in the Ministry of Defence and Foreign Affairs, which on a daily basis cultivates US ties in Washington D.C., Brussels and London.47 Norway’s fears of abandonment by NATO have been allayed, in accordance with Snyder’s theoretical assumptions.

In addition, these networks can be interpreted as a sort of deterrence towards Russia. A more visible US presence in Norwegian airspace and territorial waters, as well as in the northern counties of Finnmark, Troms and Trøndelag underscores a more credible US deterrent component in Northern Europe. Combined with updated reinforcement and readiness plans, as well as more allied exercises, this enhanced NATO presence sends the signal to Russia that Norwegian and US security are inseparable, at least in theory. The credibility of this claim is further seen through a softening of previously self-imposed restraints, such as restrictions on allied bases and exercises closer to Russia’s second strike capability on the Kola Peninsula. Other examples are found in the US Marine Corps’ presence on a rotational basis in Mid-Norway,48 high intensity combat exercises in Finnmark county with extensive US participation,49 new infrastructure for US Air Forces in southeast Norway, and new facilities for the US ground forces in Troms county.50 These developments are consistent with Walt’s expectation of a small state’s balancing behaviour towards an assertive neighbour.

Coupled with more security arrangements between Sweden, Finland, the US and NATO, Norway’s renewed “policy of invitation” has tied US commitments more explicitly to the Nordic states’ national security concerns. Vulnerable states on Russia’s border are assured, while the United States gets a firmer grip on the geopolitical challenge of providing Baltic NATO allies with credible reinforcements while preventing Russian submarines and aircraft access to the North Atlantic. Lifting the Cold War’s self-imposed restraints can be interpreted as a way of compensating for the abnegation of a sustainable territorial force, which during the 1980s enabled Norway to solve national episodes, incidents and crises alone – and even sustain national operations for more than four weeks.51 The contemporary absence of trimmed and well-functioning command structure in NATO increases the validity of this perspective.52

5.1 The Disadvantage of Allied Compliance

Relinquishing an adequate defence in the lower end of the conflict spectrum has long-term implications. The most serious but often neglected side effect is that Norwegian forces have become more inclined to pursue a more robust combat posture closer to Russia’s border. This means that deterrence is favoured before restraint; the “stick” becomes more important than the “carrot”. Minor bilateral events, episodes and crises are more likely to escalate than de-escalate, at least up to the point where Russian forces consider withdrawing out of fear of possible US involvement. How can this slide towards a more robust combat posture be explained?

Propensities to go on the offensive are closely linked to inadequate sustainability, which is a key characteristic for smaller allies that have undergone a cost-intensive transformation in NATO. Lack of volume and sustainability therefore makes it more rational to communicate resolve and combat agility. This is because a decisive outcome becomes critically important on short notice – preferably within a few days. The alternative, which would be a prolonged and indecisive situation, would instantly stir operative deterioration and a subsequent collapse before a clear political outcome has been reached. This is because troops that are put on a ‘24–7’ alert status face grave problems in sustaining agility without the constant support of sufficient logistics, maintenance and extra troops.

Ambiguous incidents, episodes or crises that are neither proper war nor proper peace, but something in between, may thereby reduce prospects for rapid assistance, and may ultimately lead to a diplomatic fait accompli where Norway ends up in a bilateral crisis with Russia before a US tripwire has been activated. This would complicate the Norwegian Armed Forces’ strategy, which – in the wording of former Chief of Defence (2005–2009) General Sverre Diesen – is as follows: faced with “… a limited military provocation, Norwegian forces must […] create a conflict which is so intense that our allies, due to reasons of national and collective credibility, are forced to get involved”.53

By default, then, Norwegian forces might be forced to pursue an aggressive “deterrence by punishment” 54 strategy in situations where disputes could be solved diplomatically with more patience, and a more cautious modus operandi. Maintaining a more agile force closer to Russia’s border counteracts a defensive posture, which during the Cold War was accomplished by a strategy labelled “deterrence by denial” in Troms county, approximately 1000 kilometres from the Russian border.55

Norway’s slide towards a more agile posture is underscored by empirical evidence from the Norwegian Defence Concept. Since 2012, the threshold defence concept has emphasised deterrence rather than assurance towards Russia.56 By rapidly raising the costs of aggression, scaring Russia from assertive action has become more important than pursuing self-restraints as a means of building confidence. Moving more forces closer to the Northern Fleet thereby challenges Norway’s previous self-imposed restraints codified in limitations on US exercises in Finnmark, or US bases in Trøndelag and Troms in peacetime.57 During the Cold War, keeping military forces further away from the border provided both Russia and Norway with longer strategic warning time.58 As these restraints have been removed, Norway’s strategy towards Russia has also evolved. From following a logic of absolute security for both states during the Cold War, which according to Johan Jørgen Holst was called “a silent cooperation”,59 the contemporary strategy seems to emphasise relative security for Norway at the expense of Russia. More emphasis on this kind of ‘zero-sum’ logic is also found in the political rhetoric of the Stoltenberg-II (2009–2013) and the Solberg Governments (2013–).60 Empirical evidence is also found in the conceptual idea of Threshold defence, 61 as well as in the pattern of contemporary joint exercises. According to Norwegian senior staff officers, NATO exercises, such as Cold Response, are more focused on rehearsing high intensity warfare after “deterrence failed”, than on mechanisms for de-escalation, mediation, and civil-military cooperation, which characterised most of the joint exercises between 2002 and 2010.62

6. Conclusion

Based on the Norwegian case, how should Northern Europe respond to the Russian assertiveness? Is closer integration into Western security arrangements a viable approach, e.g. for smaller non-aligned states like Sweden and Finland? Three conclusions can be deduced.

First, as Northern Europe increasingly aligns with the US and other NATO forces, states like Sweden and Finland may more easily gain access to US decision makers. From this vantage point, national concerns can be voiced more clearly in tough competition with numerous other European allies striving for US attention and reinforcements. Such access increases US awareness, and thus prospects for successful activation of US security guaranties if needed. This logic is anchored in the traditional tenets of alliance theory, where balancing is more commonly pursued by smaller states than bandwagoning.63

But such a strategy may also increase the risk of more tension, instability and unpredictability. This is arguably so because Russia’s strategic forces will need an extended zone of security to protect their forces from US or other NATO allies’ precision guided missiles. As an extended part of Northern Europe opens up for US and NATO operations on their own territories, this reassuring effect could be nullified by Russian counter efforts aiming to protect its force. Balancing with the stronger part thereby creates a typical security dilemma because Russia, according to Snyder, will respond with more assertiveness.64 In particular, Sweden and Finland’s slide from “buffer” to “springboard” may increase the risk of geopolitical change in Northern Europe. This is because both states’ territories play a more prominent role in US and Russian defence planning.

It can be argued that this is not likely to provide the population with more security because their national territories will be more exposed to unwanted Russian attention necessary for military planning and readiness. A question for further research could be to examine to what extent accelerated Nordic-Baltic defence cooperation could alleviate a situation where smaller states more vigorously can address a military vacuum currently filled by US and Russian forces.

Second, the slide from “buffer” to “springboard” also means that domestic policy in Sweden and Finland will be more exposed to US expectations and demands. Based on the Norwegian experience, this is particularly so with regard to US expectations of reciprocity abroad. As in the case of Norway and Denmark, more troops from Northern Europe will be expected to participate in open-ended engagements in Central Asia, the Middle East and possibly Africa. This logic is consistent with another alliance dilemma raised by Snyder, which is that clients may easily become entrapped into a patron’s war elsewhere because clients are afraid of being abandoned at home.65

Deployments abroad may on the one hand energise combat experience and critical competence among forces that will also operate at home. But they may also increase the risk of fragmentation and critical shortcomings within a national force structure that needs to be cohesively trained at home. Vulnerabilities deriving from this over-stretch problématique may accelerate US dependency because simultaneous engagements abroad and at home are detrimental to small states’ military readiness and cohesiveness in the lower end of the conflict spectre. This trend, it may be argued, may hamper efforts undertaken by small states, such as Sweden and Finland, to exert influence on how the strategic balance between deterrence and restraint can be tailored vis-a-vis Russia.

A question for further research however, would be falsify this assumption, and explore alternative ways to cope with small states’ endemic over-stretch problématique. Could it be that “pooling and sharing” among small states would provide more security than outsourcing defence responsibilities to US forces even at the lower end of the conflict spectrum?

Third, increased US dependency may increase the risk of energising a “cult of the offensive” among smaller states in Northern Europe. While dependency may favour integration and interoperability among like-minded states in the West, it may also lead to a deterioration in diplomatic relations with Russia. This is because national vulnerabilities make smaller states more inclined to escalate rather than de-escalate tense situations; seeking to avoid a fait accompli with Russia, a decisive outcome on short notice will be required in order to trigger a US tripwire.

Such a strategy may – in a narrow sense – provide more security for Northern Europe because Russia will gain less security in relative terms. But in absolute terms, it will also, in accordance with the logic put forth by both Schelling and Holst, create less security for Northern Europe and Russia. This is because US forces will be increasingly important at a much earlier stage in a potentially tense situation, which forces Russia to take precautionary efforts.66 It is important to note that Russia does not fear the smaller states in Northern Europe. Russia only fears that the region will become a ‘stepping stone’ for US operations towards Russia. A question for further research could therefore be to what extent self-imposed restraints put forth by smaller North European states are possible without displaying weakness and thus invoking more Russian assertiveness. Could stronger mutual dependency between Russia and Northern Europe, e.g. on energy and trade, alleviate some of the military tension currently fuelling the regional security situation?

### 2NC !—Scenario—Norway/Russia—Yes Emboldenment

#### Norway’s perception of unconditional US backing fuels securitization of Russia which makes war structurally inevitable.

Wilhelmsen and Gjerde ’18 [Julie and Kristian Lundby.; Dec; Senior Researcher, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI); Research Fellow, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI); Arctic Review on Law and Politics, “Norway and Russia in the Arctic: New Cold War Contamination?,” https://arcticreview.no/index.php/arctic/article/view/1334/2948; Vol. 9, 2018, pp. 382–407]

While this **greater emphasis on Russia as human rights violator is voiced mostly by the Norwegian MFA and the Prime Minister, also MoD representations construct Russia as an** opposite to Norway/the West/NATO in terms of values. Further, MoD texts now represent Russia as a security-oriented big power in the North. **Modernization of the Russian military is no longer associated with “normalization” as in 2012, but with Russia’s rising big-power ambitions.** Norway is held to need new military capabilities in the North to defend its sovereignty and protect its interests. **Presenting a strong NATO as prerequisite for Norwegian security, the new government also seeks to** strengthen transatlantic bonds **and reinforce** collaboration with NATO**.** These entities are represented as trustworthy, orderly, and reliable, whereas Russia’s status is tilting toward threatening. According to MoD texts, greater collaboration is needed within the transatlantic community, not necessarily with Russia. The NATO–Russia Council is seen as the best multilateral forum for relating to Russia. **We also note the expressed ambition of giving Norway a more central role in NATO and of taking the NATO footprint North, through more allied training and exercises as well as military capabilities.** In sum, and building on the changes in Norwegian Self/Other representations, **we find a clear re-orientation toward a realist mode of policy** already before the annexation of Crimea—in MoD understandings of the High North as primarily a security space, as well as in policies aimed at making national security a priority in the North.

4.2. A tectonic shift, 2014–2016

These **new representations of “Russia,” “Norway,” and relations in the High North become amplified following the crises in Ukraine, which official Norwegian discourse describes as a tectonic shift in international relations**, heading nearly every official account of international developments in 2014, 2015 and 2016. **According to Minister of Foreign Affairs Børge Brende, Russia had “moved into a fundamentally new phase in relation to the outside world,” pursuing “power-politics belonging to a different age” and “acting in a way nobody had done since the Second World War.”** In sum, the Russian Other becomes a rule-breaker**, a thief, even a liar, an actor that disregards established institutions and cannot be trusted.** “The High North,” and even “the Arctic,” are reframed in Norwegian government discourse with reference to Russia’s actions in Ukraine (later also to its actions in Georgia in 2008 and in Syria from 2015). **The discursive positioning of the High North into the new orbit of potential conflict with Russia grows stronger and stronger**, at least in MoD texts. In late 2016, **the Minister of Defense states, with clear reference to Russia, “we cannot preclude that military force will not be used against Norway**… It is no longer so that war is declared through diplomatic messengers.”

The Arctic is still seen as a space governed by collaboration and international law, but Russia is, with reference to its actions in Ukraine, projected as a potential rule-breaker. Hence, Norway as a principled actor must hold Russia accountable. The government continues to speak of preserving cooperation, but the North now figures increasingly as a military strategic space. **Security becomes a key priority for Norwegian foreign policy, with special reference to the North: With the new challenge from the eastern neighbor, the Norwegian Self figures as a small power in need of protection.** Good-neighborly relations in the North are now construed as the result of Norway being firm, predictable, principled, and adhering to international law. By upping the civilian and military presence in the North and anchoring Norwegian security more firmly in NATO, Norway can contribute to “stability” and “predictability” in the North. **It is even indicated that increasing such transatlantic presence and making Norway into “NATO in the North” may be required to keep tension levels low and preserve the Arctic as a “peaceful region.”**

**As in all securitization processes, calls for unity and protection follow such re-phrasing of the Other from partner to threat. The** Norwegian government’s discourse **now projects the need to strengthen NATO collaboration and** cooperation with the USA **(implicitly or explicitly given as the guarantor of Norwegian security)** and Europe. These three entities are represented as being trustworthy and having “good values.” Noteworthy is how **“the West,” “NATO,” “the USA,”** “Europe,” “the EU,” “the Nordic countries,” and “Norway” as “friends,” “allies” or “likeminded” **get merged into one positive social unit/Self—juxtaposed to a Russian Other with no positive distinctions.** The strength of the transatlantic vector in Norwegian foreign policy is now explicitly given as the precondition for good relations with Russia in the North—it is no longer an issue of what Russia and Norway can do together.

Could the crises in Russian–Western relations be limited to the specific situation in Ukraine? Judging from the texts reviewed here, the Norwegian government’s answer was no. **Relations had changed** irrevocably**: not even a solution to the Ukraine crises could alter the new security situation in Europe. The reason was Russia’s use of force against another European country, but also its poor democratic and human rights credentials.** In breaking international law, Russia was undermining the international order and its entire underlying set of values. Russia is now represented as a power inclined to use military means instead of diplomacy, incapable of respecting other states’ political goals. **“We” had been naïve, failing to understand Russia’s true intentions and ambitions. Russia had not become like “us” in terms of values. It was “assertive” and “aggressive,” and its military was now highly capable of “rapid,” “precise” operations that also Norway had to be prepared for.** The modernization of Russia’s Northern Fleet is explicitly included in this narrative. The phrase Russia “has both the capacity and will to use military power for political gain” recurs, and by 2016 also the idea of Russia acquiring a “strategic advantage” in the North. **Norway is no longer capable of “area denial.” Although Russia is never directly named as a “threat” to Norway in official discourse, taken together, the various representations constitute Russia as a threat in the North.** The proper response is no longer “strategic partnership” and “constructive engagement” but “firmness” and “deterrence”—and “reassurance” not of Russia, but of the Baltic states and Poland. “We” must realize that the deterioration in Russian–Western relations might spill over into the North. Standing by our allies and speaking out on negative developments in Russia becomes essential.

Both MoD and MFA texts put the blame for deteriorating relations firmly and solely on the Russian side. Russia must “change its ways” first, before any improvement can take place. Here the MoD texts represent Russia as a threat to military security, and MFA texts more as a threat to international law—Norway’s “first-line defense.” The “liberal interventionist” position, which accords fundamental importance to the political system of a foreign state in defining how to relate to that state and the kind of policies to be pursued toward it, also becomes stronger in MFA discourse in this period.

This new interpretation of Russia and relations with Russia in the North indicates that Norwegian polices on Russia have changed substantially since 2014, making it reasonable to label the mode of Norwegian policies on Russia as primarily realist. Norway immediately and unconditionally joined the EU sanctions regime on Russia in 2014. **The policy initiatives taken in recent years, made acceptable by the changes in official representations of the Russian Other, have largely** abandoned the Cold War practice of “balancing” **between deterrence and reassurance: since 2017, 330 US Marines have been stationed at Værnes/Trondheim in mid-Norway, initially on a rotational basis but now apparently de facto permanently.** The Norwegian MoD has also been lobbying for the establishment of a new maritime command in the North and has proposed a Norwegian contribution to the European missile shield, with reference to the “Russian threat.” This has been **accompanied by a significant** decline in diplomatic contacts**.** Between 2014 and mid-2016 not one Norwegian minister visited Russia. In June 2016, the Minister of Fisheries went to St Petersburg. Not until March 2017 did the Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs travel to Russia, to attend the conference “Arctic—Territory of Dialogue” in Arkhangelsk. **Norwegian ministers would go to Kiev, London or various NATO capitals instead, to discuss greater collaboration, often in the military-strategic sphere and in the High North.**

#### Unconditional security cooperation drives Russian perceptions of Norway as a geopolitical puppet for the US, which triggers aggression

Wilhelmsen and Gjerde ’18 [Julie and Kristian Lundby.; Dec; Senior Researcher, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI); Research Fellow, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI); Arctic Review on Law and Politics, “Norway and Russia in the Arctic: New Cold War Contamination?,” https://arcticreview.no/index.php/arctic/article/view/1334/2948; Vol. 9, 2018, pp. 382–407]

Russian officials elaborate on relations with Norway especially in the context of ministerial visits, but also in commenting on specific events and answering questions from the press. **In this explicit, official Russian discourse on Norway, we find** several distinct representations of Norway, fairly stable, but with **a shift in emphasis since 2014:** Norway is increasingly seen as the prolonged arm of NATO and the USA**—a significant point, given the representation of NATO as a threat.**

Initially, Norway appears mainly as a good neighbor, in bilateral relations and through multilateral institutions like the Arctic Council, the Northern Dimension, and the Barents Euro-Arctic Council. Norway is often mentioned in the energy context, with Statoil as a promising corporate partner for Russian companies and an example of a successful state corporation. Norway gets recognition for its contribution to cooperative efforts aimed at removing chemical weapons from Syria. In particular, the 2010 maritime delimitation agreement between Russia and Norway is hailed as a key achievement under the Medvedev presidency, and is later defended against internal Russian accusations that the treaty was a “gift” from Russia to Norway—the treaty is presented as “just and in accordance with international law,” and “advantageous to both states.”

Prior to Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs Brende’s visit to Moscow in January 2014, his Russian counterpart Lavrov had a clear and positive message:

The relations between Russia and Norway are developing dynamically and with good results within all the important directions. The dialogue at the level of the states’ leadership is deepening: last year there were two meetings between the prime ministers—April 5 in St Petersburg and June 4 in Kirkenes. The perspectives for organizing new contacts are being discussed.

During the visit itself, Lavrov dismissed insinuations from the press that rising Russian–Western tensions had negative impacts on Russian–Norwegian relations. However, he would soon start answering such questions differently.

**Representations of Norway as a “good neighbor” are increasingly complemented by representations of Norway as a country that consciously chooses to be a less good neighbor. Catering to its Western partners, Norway is seen as acting against both Russia’s and Norway’s own interests.**

In October 2014, Lavrov visited the border town of Kirkenes on the occasion of the 70th anniversary of the Soviet liberation of Northern Norway in World War II. Amid praise of the veterans, Norway’s honoring of the wartime history, and the shared “joint combat brotherhood” that “substantially strengthened the fundament for good-neighborliness and friendly relations,” **Lavrov also commented on the current state of affairs in bilateral relations:**

**Today these relations are of course experiencing a certain tension in connection with Norway’s joining of the unilateral restrictive measures against Russia for reasons, as we understand it, lie outside of the country. (…) We hope that common sense and each country’s national interests—and** not external pressure**—in the end will prevail.**

**Lavrov notes how Russia’s and Norway’s joint interests are threatened by “various directions of the bilateral cooperation being subject to** artificial restrictions, based on Euro-Atlantic solidarity **and with reference to the Ukrainian crisis.”** Here **Norway is presented as part of a Euro-Atlantic social entity seen as hostile toward Russia.**

This identification has also framed events on Svalbard. In Russian–Norwegian relations, disagreements on the Norwegian management of Svalbard have a long history. In the period under study, one episode is particularly instructive—one that also taps into the discontent expressed by Lavrov.

On April 18, 2015, Russian Deputy Prime Minister Dmitrii Rogozin paid a brief visit to Svalbard as his plane made a layover before he headed further north into the Arctic. **In 2014 Rogozin had been added to the EU/Norwegian sanctions list and banned from entering Norway. The Norwegian authorities reacted negatively to what they saw as a Russian provocation and breach of Norwegian sovereignty. In turn, their Russian counterparts accused Norway of not respecting the Svalbard Treaty of 1920, which allows access to Svalbard for all citizens of the signatory states, and regretted this “unfriendly step” from the Norwegian side.** The Russian MFA saw this not as an isolated incident, and expressed doubt over Norwegian willingness to continue “the spirit of partnership in the Arctic that Norway until now always has shown.” In the same statement, it acknowledged problems in the bilateral relationship: “We regret Norway’s initiative to join the EU’s anti-Russian sanctions, which will have negative consequences for Russian–Norwegian relations and, we believe, leads to our Norwegian neighbors having a distorted perception of reality.” Again, Norway’s acting in concert with its Western partners is presented as harming good-neighborly relations.

**One distinct and important representation of Norway could be seen as the logical extreme of Russian concerns about Norway’s Russia policy being dictated by its allies. This representation places Norway as part of the US military system, and that system as an** offensive force directed against Russia**.** Addressing the Seliger Youth Camp in August 2014, Putin stated:

The Arctic plays a very important role for us when it comes to safeguarding our security, because—unfortunately—it is the case that US attack submarines are concentrated there, not far from the Norwegian coast, and I remind you that the missiles they carry would reach Moscow within 15–16 minutes.

**It is in this narrative that Norway’s decision to invite** 330 US Marines **to be based near Trondheim on a “rotational” basis is placed.** As explained by the Russian MFA spokesperson Mariya Zakharova:

Obviously, we have taken note of this fact. We believe that it contradicts the Norwegian policy of not allowing foreign military bases in the country in peacetime. (…) **This decision by the Norwegian government appears to be yet another link in a chain of US-led military preparations that have markedly intensified lately against the backdrop of the** anti-Russian hysteria**.** This step **clearly does not contribute to maintaining stability and security in the North of Europe.**

Also in other fields of the bilateral relationship, **Norway is represented as essentially obeying orders from Washington, as when the Russian MFA criticized Norway for extraditing a Russian citizen to the USA at the request of the US Secret Services, arguably at the expense of respect for international law—a “**politicized” approach that Russia would “take into account **in the further development of relations with Norway.”**

**Russian representations of Norway change during the period under study, effectively merging Norway into NATO/the USA, a social entity long construed as the threatening Other.** Representations of Russia that appear through the texts also evolve, although more in degree than as a qualitative change: the **representations of Russia as a responsible international actor promoting predictable relations between equal partners stand out even more clearly as Norway is increasingly presented as working against these ideals to the benefit of NATO.**

**In line with the changing Russian representations** of the Arctic and the key actors in this region, **we observe changes in Russian military policies.** Examples include the **establishment of the Joint Strategic Command North in 2014 and the creation in early 2015 of the 80th Arctic Brigade, both ahead of schedule**. We also note the **increase in Russian snap military drills in the Arctic and in naval and air patrols near Norwegian territory, as well as enhanced submarine training in Arctic waters.** All these changes are presented as responses to NATO **activity in the North.** Overall, it is reasonable to label the mode of Russian policies in the Arctic as increasingly realist.

In sum, then, **Russia’s developing mode in relation to Norway** in the Arctic 2012–2016 **shows an unmistakable drift—from an institutionalist mode based on the perception that both states benefit from pursuing their own interests in a predictable manner, to a more realist mode.** Seen from Moscow, this drift is due to policy changes on the Norwegian side—in particular, Norway’s acting in concert with its Western partners. As a result, **security concerns may seem to crowd out other aspirations in relation to Norway.**

### 2NC !—Scenario—Norway/Russia—Yes Emboldenment—Studies

#### Best studies conclude yes entrapment

Wilhelmsen ’20 [Julie.; Sep 30; Norwegian Institute of International Affairs; Journal of Global Security Studies, “Spiraling toward a New Cold War in the North? The Effect of Mutual and Multifaceted Securitization ,” https://academic.oup.com/jogss/article/6/3/ogaa044/5916402; Vol. 6, 2021, pp. 1–19]

This study builds **on** in-depth, systematic scrutiny of official statements **from the years 2014 to 2018. The Norwegian data are statements, press releases, speeches, etc., from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), the Prime Minister's Office, and the Ministry of Defense (MoD). The Russian data are transcripts and statements from the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and transcripts from the public appearances of the President.** The texts have been “scraped”—downloaded in full—from www.regjeringen.no, www.mid.ru, and www.kremlin.ru. Using the open source “corporaexplorer” software (Gjerde 2019), we then extracted a clearly defined subset of this large document collection: The **final text collection contains documents that include references to both Russia and the Arctic on the Norwegian side, and documents that include references to Norway or the Arctic on the Russian side**—the difference being due to the far higher number of documents on the Norwegian side. In certain parts of the analysis, the official texts retrieved through web-scraping have been supplemented by media articles referring to comments from Russian and Norwegian officials. **The aim has been to sample more statements at** particularly critical events **in order to study action–reaction patterns.**

**The texts have been studied by using discourse analysis** in the tradition of Laclau and Mouffe (1985), **with emphasis on the contested nature of meaning-making.** This has implied **systematically mapping the changing pattern of self and other representations in official texts. The method has been designed to foreground the constitutive power of language and capture securitization as a process by studying a plethora of official utterances over time** (Wilhelmsen 2014, 58–64; Stengel 2019). I focus not only on how **certain verbs, adverbs, and adjectives attached to nouns might help to constitute the other as increasingly different and dangerous to the self** (Milliken 1999, 232–33), but also on how **linguistic repetitions, mergers, and comparisons might contribute to such a process.** The article also lists **concrete policy practices that have been implemented in line with Norway's changing representations of Russia** in the section “A new Norwegian approach to Russia.” These have been retrieved from Norwegian media and from Norwegian MOD and MFA websites. While the combination of **systematically reading and manually coding such large bodies of text** is exceptionally time-consuming, the mixture arguably **strengthens the reliability of interpretivist endeavors** such as this (Hopf and Allan 2016, 20).

More generally, **the approach used here recovers the identity categories from texts and other sources of shared meaning** (Hopf and Allan 2016, 27). That Norway and Russia are securitizing **each other is thus not a claim made a priori, but a conclusion I draw after consulting a plethora of texts.** In the fifth section, on internal cohesion and external offense, the challenge has been to stay within the confines of relying on **explicit utterances to capture the interactive dynamics at play when two social entities engage in mutual and multifaceted securitization.** This has entailed trying to reach conclusions on **strategies of externalization and mirroring by consulting texts where one party explicitly refers to something the other party said or did.**

### 2NC !—Scenario—Norway/Russia—Yes Escalation

#### NATO is militarizing the arctic but only Norway can start a conflict and hybrid war is escalating

Johnjo Devlin, 6-15-2022, "Beyond the Wall: The NATO Soldiers Guarding the Arctic from Russia," No Publication, <https://www.vice.com/en/article/n7zj87/norway-russia-border-ukraine-arctic>//EZAY

It may seem odd that Østtun is defending this barren tundra. But make no mistake: Control of the Arctic is of vital strategic importance for the Kremlin.

Much of Russia’s oil and gas production sits within the Arctic Circle, and about 20 percent of Russian exports are generated here. As global warming thaws the ice, sea trade routes are beginning to open up too. Controlling these may give Russia influence over global commerce in decades to come, and the invasion of Ukraine has shown just how far Vladimir Putin is willing to go to achieve his strategic goals. Not since the Cold War has Arctic security been such a high priority for NATO.

Norway isn’t the only treaty member with an Arctic presence – the US, Canada, Denmark and Iceland all have control over northern waters – but it is the only one sharing a land border with Russia. That puts this Scandinavian nation in a difficult position. Here, unlike in the US or Britain, Russia is not a distant bogeyman but an ever-present danger. The notorious Russian security service the FSB – the main successor to the Soviet Union’s KGB – staffs the border towers just over the Jakobselv river; a constant reminder of the nature of this violent and unpredictable neighbour.

As the conflict in Ukraine has dragged on, once positive relations between Russia and Norway have deteriorated. The geopolitical fault lines in the Arctic are deepening, and the role of conscripts like Østtun and Trettenes is more important than ever.

As a founding member of NATO, Norway has long carried the heavy weight of Arctic security on its shoulders. But soon, it won’t be alone: After decades of military non-alignment, Sweden and Finland could be poised to become part of the alliance.

The countries submitted joint membership applications in May. Finland Prime Minister Sanna Marin said the move was an ”act of peace", while Swedish leader Magdalena Andersson said, with a characteristic lack of bombast, that the country was "leaving one era and beginning another”.

But the shift in policy cannot be overstated. If the bids are successful – and NATO member Turkey has said it will veto them because of what it sees as their support for Kurdish groups – it will mark the most significant geopolitical realignment in the region since the Iron Curtain came down 30 years ago.

Finland has an 830-mile border with Russia, and it was invaded by the Soviet Union in the 1940s. But despite a difficult history, polls have shown consistent opposition to NATO membership in the Finnish population. That changed when Vladimir Putin rolled tanks into Ukraine.

“I think there’s this sense that the eastern bear has shown its face,” says Charly Salonius-Pasternak, lead researcher at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs. “As the president [of Finland] said, the masks are off now.”

“You have a young generation of Finns who didn't have this personal connection to World War II, but now they've seen [the invasion of Ukraine] and they realize this is what the Russians could do and that Finns just need to prepare and prepare and prepare.”

Charly Salonius-Pasternak, lead researcher at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs.

CHARLY SALONIUS-PASTERNAK, LEAD RESEARCHER AT THE FINNISH INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS.

While Sweden shares no border with Russia, it has been at pains to avoid conflict with the Kremlin. The country has remained neutral for more than 200 years, and the change in attitude marks a momentous shift.

The fact that both Sweden and Finland are on track to join the alliance is perhaps the greatest irony of Putin’s assault on Ukraine. The man who has repeatedly warned against NATO expansion has inspired it.

But who could be surprised by the Nordic change of heart?

Both Sweden and Finland are Davids to the Kremlin’s Goliath, and as evidence of Russian atrocities in Ukraine have come to light, fear and loathing for Putin’s war machine has grown.

“It was very predictable; the Russian army even has a culture of violence against its own people,” says Pekka Toveri, former chief intelligence officer for the Finnish Army.

A red hut on the Norwegian side of the border.

A RED HUT ON THE NORWEGIAN SIDE OF THE BORDER.

“That has happened in every fucking war that [Russia] has done. It’s always been war crimes, rapes, looting. In the Chechnyan wars, in Georgia.”

“It’s amazing how stupid the Russians can be not understanding that this creates a huge reaction in the Western government against them.”

Many defence experts have predicted that Finland and Sweden may officially join the organisation during this year’s NATO conference, taking place in Madrid at the end of July.

But this is by no means a done deal as Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has opposed ratification of these potential member states. US Secretary of State Antony Blinken says Ankara will come around, but behind closed doors NATO officials have said that their applications could take up to a year.

During that time, Sweden and Finland will remain exposed.

Putin has made ominous warnings against both countries following their bids. As a show of support, a number of Western nations, including the US and the UK, have promised to step in should the Kremlin decide to start yet another war.

But with most of his troops tied up in Ukraine, another invasion may be a bridge too far, even for Putin.

“Russia has proved to be amateurish when it comes to conventional warfare,” says Kjell Inge Bjerga, director of the Norwegian Institute for Defense. “It's not likely at all that we see some kind of conventional attack on the Nordic countries.”

“But this will make them more focused on developing their hybrid and cyber toolbox, and we are already in the midst of a hybrid war.”

Norwegian soldiers patrol the Arctic border with Russia.

Bjerga says that such hybrid attacks could see Russia attempt more large-scale hacks of Nordic computer systems, airspace violations or increased radio jamming in the Arctic.

Of course, even if the Kremlin did decide to strike out with conventional military force against its neighbor, Toveri says the Finns would be ready:

“We have this total defence concept,” he says. “We have general conscription – all males are required to serve – and civil society is prepared for a crisis too.”

“In Finland if you build a block of flats, you’re legally required to have a [bomb] shelter in the basement. Bridges are built so that they are easy to rig with explosives, so Finnish engineers can blow them up.”

“Finland doesn’t have a defence force; Finland is a defence force.”

Sweden boasts an impressive airforce and financial muscle. Strategically, the Swedish island of Gotland is also a huge boon for Baltic defence. Should a conflict with Russia ever arise, the alliance could use it as a staging point for air and naval forces.

On the Russian border itself, the battle-ready Finns can field almost a million reservists, and figures from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute show that the country already spends more per capita on its military than any other in the EU. While that still doesn't amount to the 2 percent of GDP technically required of NATO members, both Sweden and Finland say they will build up to this in the coming years.

Bjerga, of the Norwegian Institute for Defence, says that if and when these Nordic nations join forces with Norway, they will form a bulwark against future aggression.

“Norway takes care of the navy, Sweden has the air force, Finland has the army. From Moscow this is close to a catastrophe. Because you have a very strong NATO complement close to the border.”

All three nations are set to increase military spending, and in Norway, that money will flow toward the Arctic. In March, its government announced hundreds of millions of dollars in new spending, for frigates, corvettes and subs to defend the northern sea passage. The border guard will see a marked increase too.

Winter helmets inside a Norwegian border post.

“The defence establishment in Norway is definitely worried.” says Bjerga, at his office in Oslo’s Akershus Fortress, a 13th-century castle, parts of which are still used by defence authorities. “They started to worry in Georgia in 2008 and more so after the annexation of Crimea in 2014.”

“Defence spending has increased by 30 percent since 2015. Parliament bought the argument about a much more dangerous Russia [even before the invasion of Ukraine].

“Of course we have this government line in which they tell the public that there is no tension in the High North.”

Norway has long walked a diplomatic tightrope with the Kremlin. While inviting NATO forces into its Arctic seas, Norway has secured deals with Russia on everything from fishing to environmental policy. For years it has tried, and arguably succeeded, to fly under the radar.

But Eivind Vad Petersson, state secretary of the Norwegian Foreign Ministry, told VICE World News that the days of working closely with Russia are largely over: “Norway built a broad, practical cooperation with Russia through 30 years. Continuing this is impossible. We have reduced our cooperation to a minimum and are facing an uncertain future.”

While the national conversation in Norway has shifted, the story isn’t so simple in the border regions.

A keystone of the Norwegian policy on Russia has been its “people-to-people” strategy. The country has poured cash into schemes that promote better relations through trade, sports and cultural exchange.

### 2NC !—Scenario—Norway/Russia—Miscalc

#### Arctic securitization spills over and causes tit-for-tat hostilities that spiral into military escalation, even if nobody intended it.

Wilhelmsen ’20 [Julie.; Sep 30; Norwegian Institute of International Affairs; Journal of Global Security Studies, “Spiraling toward a New Cold War in the North? The Effect of Mutual and Multifaceted Securitization ,” https://academic.oup.com/jogss/article/6/3/ogaa044/5916402; Vol. 6, 2021, pp. 1–19]

Focusing **on the changing relations between Norway and Russia**, I show how **rising tension spread from the 2014 crises in Ukraine to the North**.1 Initially, both parties declared that they neither wanted nor believed that the new strategic tension between Russia and the West would spread to or define relations in this region. This was not surprising. Norway and Russia had managed to build a close and practical partnership in the North following the end of the Cold War. **Relations in the region had been characterized as pervaded by a spirit of cooperation and a “culture of compromise”** (Hønneland and Jensen 2015). **However, by October 2018, NATO was conducting “Trident Juncture,”** the largest military exercise since the Cold War **on Norwegian territory, with twenty-nine NATO countries participating, as well as Finland and Sweden, involving** 50,000 troops **in all**.2 While this exercise was underway, **Russia unexpectedly announced that it would conduct missile tests in the Norwegian Sea simultaneously**.3 Few could deny that the **new Russia–West tensions had spread to the North**. **Although the Norwegian authorities were reluctant to identify Russia as a “threat” for an entire year after the annexation of Crimea, today they openly speak of and prepare for hostilities. Russia, for its part, recently claimed that Norway has become “the frontier of deterrence of Russia” in the policy plans of the United States and NATO**.4

This development will be explained with reference to changing **Russian and Norwegian representations of each other: toward construing the other part more as a threat than a partner in one issue-area, the** rippling outward of this representation **to other issue-areas, the** policy changes **effectuated in line with these shifting representations, and how these changes have been** (re-)acted upon by the other side. Within such a process of **mutual and multifaceted securitization, attention to domestic audiences, quests for internal unity, and coherent identity articulation in volatile times send signals of offense and non-recognition across the border to the foreign state audience—playing into a mutual blame game,** shaping interaction**, and further** escalating tensions to the point where the threat of hostilities seems imminent**.** As long acknowledged by security-dilemma theorists, both the classical realist and newer constructivist proponents, interaction has a dynamics of its own (Herz 1950; Jervis 1978; Mitzen 2006; Booth and Wheeler 2008). I argue that **the emerging and mutual pattern of representing the other as a threat, not only in the military sphere, but also across issue-areas, has become an “**autonomous” driver **of conflict—regardless of whether either side (Norway/NATO/West, and Russia) might originally have had offensive designs on the other**.5

By invoking the new Cold War in this article, I do not intend to measure the level of threat and distribution of power between the parties or suggest that these are the same as in the old Cold War. This article does not speak to the recent discussion on the similarities and differences between the old and the new Cold Wars (Legvold 2016; Lieven 2018). Rather, I put the spotlight on the mutual and evolving social identification processes between political entities that can help to push a relation to the point where an outbreak of hostilities seems imminent. **Just as during the Cold War, the parties today hold increasingly and mutually incompatible descriptions of self and other** (Ringmar 2002) and focus on blaming each other (Legvold 2016). I believe **the totalizing “blame game” now underway and the mutual and intensifying descriptions of the other, metastasizing to a level where the other stands out as an “existential threat” at every encounter, are central to understanding the unlikely return of high military tension in the North.**

**Drawing on a detailed study of Russian and Norwegian official texts in the years following the annexation of Crimea in 2014, and applying a discourse-theoretical approach to securitization theory**, this article offers two theoretical contributions to second-generation securitization theory post-Copenhagen School (Balzacq 2005; Stritzel 2007; McDonald 2008; Salter 2008; Floyd 2010; Hagmann 2015; Wilhelmsen 2017; Stengel 2019, building on Wæver 1994 and 1996; Buzan et al. 1998). First, I propose that **securitization processes should be understood and studied in dyads because the shift to more radical representations of the other—i.e., a higher degree of securitization—often unfolds in a mutual pattern of identification and interaction between political entities.** Second, an **issue-specific securitization—say, representing the other part as an existential threat in the military domain—may spread to other dimensions of the relationship, making the other part appear as different and dangerous at every encounter.** Such **multifaceted securitization can intensify a negative spiral, ultimately blocking the chances for positive mutual representation and recognition. Military means then become a logical and legitimate way of relating to the other: contact and collaboration in other issue-areas are precluded.** With this approach, I seek to expand on and integrate a discourse-theoretical version of securitization theory into the study of how and why relations escalate to the brink of war.

Although the post-positivist foundation of this study complicates direct communication and compatibility with much of the classical literature on the security dilemma and spirals, it does **speak to the central question of how collective actors, such as states, become unsure of whether the other has defensive or offensive intentions and why they come to see and act toward each other as aggressive, regardless of the “true intentions” of the other** (see e.g., Jervis 2001; Mitzen and Schweller 2011). The positivist literature on the security dilemma and spirals usually theorizes such pathways to conflict as an encounter between actors reasoning through preference structures in rational games, or a set of games (Jervis 1978; Fearon 1995; Mearsheimer 2001; Glaser 2010; Copeland 2011; Mitzen and Schweller 2011). In contrast, my approach, building on the fundamental insight that **political entities are socially constituted and that the identity of self and other is subject to change through linguistic practices, theorizes such pathways to conflict as emerging through many encounters and gradually changing relations where identity dynamics serve as the causal engine.**

This article proceeds as follows: I first lay out the theoretical and methodological underpinnings of the argument, building on second-generation securitization theory and the concept of ontological security. Then, after a short presentation of the historical background of Russia–Norway relations in the North, I turn to changing Russian and Norwegian mutual representations in 2014–2018, and the shapes taken by the securitizing narratives on both sides. Investigating the Norwegian side in depth, I show how **the image of Russia as a threat has solidified over time, spilling over into non-security issue-areas, and made a string of initiatives that reject Russia’ logical and legitimate policies in a new Norwegian approach.** I examine how Norwegian official securitization of Russia has been driven by the quest for unity and continuity in representations of the self in a time of uncertainty and disruption. The fifth section concerns this driver and the unintended consequences of skewed attention to internal cohesion and domestic audiences at the expense of Russia. **I point out how Russia has interpreted and (re-)acted to Norway's securitizing moves and policies, showing how mutual and multifaceted securitization unfolds in practice—and results in escalation.**

### 2NC !—Scenario—Norway/Russia—Security Spirals

#### Ontological effects of Norwegian securitization lock in escalation.

Wilhelmsen ’20 [Julie.; Sep 30; Norwegian Institute of International Affairs; Journal of Global Security Studies, “Spiraling toward a New Cold War in the North? The Effect of Mutual and Multifaceted Securitization ,” https://academic.oup.com/jogss/article/6/3/ogaa044/5916402; Vol. 6, 2021, pp. 1–19]

Studying Escalation through Mutual and Multifaceted Securitization

While some hold that the growing rhetoric of confrontation between Russia and the West can be employed without running the risk of war (Lieven 2018), I take this use of words seriously. Political language serves to make some courses of action legitimate and logical, while precluding others (Hansen 2006, 21; Jackson 2006; Wilhelmsen 2017). According to this fundamental discourse-theoretical insight, **securitization—defined as a process where the other is increasingly cast as different and dangerous to the self—will manifest itself in concrete policy practices** (Hagmann 2015, 9; Hayes 2009, 985; Wilhelmsen 2017, 28–29). Thus, there is a link between the rhetoric of confrontation that produces the subjectivities of threatened self and threatening other, and the policy responses initiated in the course of such a securitization.6 **The more different and dangerous to the self the other is construed as being, perhaps even to the level of “existential threat,” the more reasonable and logical will the use of force against this other appear** (Bandura 1990, 7–8; Wilhelmsen 2017, 24–26).

Securitization, viewed through a discourse-theoretical lens, emerges through a plethora of utterings and is, therefore, best theorized as a gradual process, not one specific happening (Ciuta 2009; Hagmann 2015, 21–22; Wilhelmsen 2017, 21–24). That is not to say that securitizations cannot end up in a radical black/white juxtaposition, where They represent an existential threat to US and can be related to only through the barrel of a gun. Indeed, the aim of this article is precisely to show how the gradual and increasing securitization of Russia in Norway, and of Norway in Russia, is bringing relations to a point where the threat of hostilities seems imminent. But **there is no necessary evolution to this point of possible destruction: it is a** contingent process (Guzzini 2011). When securitization is produced through a myriad of statements that together make the other stand out as a threat, **there is always a possibility for more and more statements that construe the other as “defensive” or even “potential partner” to feed into the process,** bringing the threat image a few levels down **and making possible a policy of restraint or even collaboration.** Here, however, I seek to identify mechanisms that push securitization upward to the point where the buildup of force seems necessary and hostilities imminent.

My first suggestion is to conceptualize and study securitization processes in dyads, that is, as a mutual process. **The shift to more radical representations of the other** (a higher degree of securitization) often **occurs in a reciprocal pattern of identification and interaction between political entities** (Wilhelmsen 2020, 30). How political entities such as states identify, talk to (or about) each other, and the policies they launch in accordance with and following such speech, play into and shape the speech and policy courses of other states. **There are essential effects of securitization processes where the other party is cast as different and dangerous to the self** (Wæver 1995; Buzan et al. 1998; Stritzel 2007; McDonald 2008; Hagmann 2015; Wilhelmsen 2016). **Within a dyad of political entities that increasingly identify the other as a threat to the self, a self-perpetuating logic sets in, with the two securitizations fueling each other.**

Under what conditions and how does this happen? As noted by Mitzen (2006) and others, **states do seek not only physical security, they also seek security of the self (**ontological **security),** mainly because agency requires a stable cognitive environment.7 Particularly **at a time of crisis states strive to create continuous narratives of self** (Steely 2008a; Zarakol 2010; Subotic 2016). Routinized security talk and the **projection of the other as a threat delivers** ontological **security.** It creates inner cohesion in the referent group and the ability to act (Wilhelmsen 2017, 27–32). This is because **representations of self and other are bound together,** dependent **on each other**. Collective identities and the social groups they refer to are constituted in relation to difference and **maintained through the continued juxtaposition and drawing up of boundaries between self and other** (Barth 1969; Connolly 1991). However, **securitizing the other for enteric use also creates a “**securitization dilemma**”**—“a difficult choice where a securitizing move represents a powerful and attractive opportunity for political mobilization, but with the danger of perverse and unintended consequences” (Van Rythoven (2019, 2). The unintended **consequences of securitization have been suggested to be of several kinds: contextual, social, and temporal** (Van Rythoven 2019, 10). Within the social type of contingency, which concerns how an audience can interpret a security claim in unexpected ways, much attention has been given to situations in which a securitizing move can be rejected by the audiences it is meant to mobilize (Wæver 1989,1; Collins 2014; Van Rythoven 2019). Of particular relevance for relations between political entities, but less investigated, is the unintended consequences that a securitization within one political entity of another political entity may have on that other political entity.

To maintain ontological security, actors must not only be able to assure themselves of who they are (endogenously)—and **protecting a continuous narrative of self becomes particularly pressing in a time of crisis—but they also need to be identified and recognized by others, and on their own preferred terms (exogenously)** (Steely 2008b, 51–52; Zarakol 2010, 3; Ringmar 2014). A securitizing actor's firm (but probably unconscious) attention to ontological security and the domestic audience at a time of crisis can communicate non-recognition to the other (foreign) audience. **If both parties in a dyad of political entities push securitization of the other upward for enteric use but disregard how the other will interpret it, as well as the non-recognition of the other party that such securitization implies, a negative spiral sets in.**

For example, a **securitization of NATO as different and dangerous to Russia creates both inner cohesion in the Russian polity and makes possible a policy of “**military modernization**” and a posture of “defensive deterrence,”** but it can have unintended consequences. It can be taken as a **rejection of NATO's self-constituted identity as a legitimate, reliable, security-seeking actor and elicit a string of representations of Russia as different and dangerous on the NATO side**.8 Failure to be recognized by the other on one's own preferred terms might not necessarily result in **feelings of inferiority and shame, triggering efforts to reconstruct one's own identity**, as Bially Mattern has suggested (2004, 12–13) or “progressive change” of self to become like the other, as Ringmar (2014) holds. As Lupovici (2012, 818) notes a collective actor that experiences ontological threat can “redefine the situation in order to protect identity.” “Avoidance,” he says, building on Giddens (1991, 188) “allows an actor facing an ontological dissonance to revalidate its identity rather than to change it or to change its behaviour.” Lupovici explores the strategy of avoidance in situations where dissonance is created endogenously, between conflicting self-identifications and the responses undertaken to offset threats to these self-identifications within one political entity.

Avoidance may play out differently when the ontological dissonance emerges exogenously in a dyad of political entities. To reduce the dissonance between the understanding of self and the explicit identification of one's own political entity by the other as being something different and dangerous, **revalidation of own identity can be achieved through externalization, by simply returning the negative identification**. This strategy is manifest as a clear pattern in the texts by Norwegian/Western and Russian leaders studied below. It is hardly surprising that a collective actor would respond to the non-recognition implicit in being securitized with externalization in the form of talking and hitting back instead of undertaking some form of internal revision. **Responding by mirroring the securitization of your group by the other party can be rewarding in terms of delineating and maintaining self-identity, particularly in a time of crisis.** To restate and return to the case in focus: **the non-recognition implicit in Russia's securitization of NATO can elicit highly antagonistic representations of Russia from the NATO side, triggering another round of representations and accusations from the Russian side, and so on.**

Such **a negative spiral of mutual representations and accusations can be driven further when the different non-military issue-areas in which collective political entities engage also become subject to securitization.** While **relations** between such entities usually take place on different international arenas addressing different issue-areas and exhibit a mixed pattern of friendly and hostile interaction (Jervis 2001, 37; Bially Mattern 2004), they **may become subject to patterned all-encompassing friendly or hostile interaction.** The latter, I propose, can happen when security concerns take center-stage in relations, **through a spillover from mutual securitization in the military sphere into other arenas of potentially neutral or friendly interaction, such as trade, culture, or even diplomacy.**

In more scholarly terms, a negative spiral in relations is intensified when the other is securitized, i.e., construed, through speech, as different and dangerous at every encounter, and when every policy move **in any issue-area is represented as a tool in the hands of this threatening other.** Such multifaceted securitization pushes the representation of the other upward on the scale of difference and danger and can create a situation where positive recognition is not granted in any sphere. **In this situation, the collective actor experiences an exogenous rejection of its self-ascribed identity in every policy sphere where it seeks outside confirmation—making the experience acute. In turn, this experience of acute ontological dissonance may be met by a strategy of avoidance and externalization: a counter-securitization that mirrors and matches the near-total rejection to which the political entity itself has been subjected.** In the course of the ensuing spat, **with hostile representations flung back and forth on every arena of encounter, the other is finally left with no face but that of** an enemy**. That resolves the dilemma of knowing what the intentions of the other are, as each party is now quite certain that the other has offensive designs.**

### 2NC !—Scenario—Norway/Russia—Support Angers Russia

#### Unconditional security cooperation with Norway antagonizes and draws the US into conflict with Russia

Wegge ’22 [Njrod.; Mar; Norwegian Defence University College, Norway; Arctic Review on Law and Politics, “The Strategic Role of Land Power on NATO’s Northern Flank,” https://arcticreview.no/index.php/arctic/article/view/3428/6330; Vol. 13, 2022, pp. 94–113]

**The defence of Norway, including its arctic islands, must be seen** in the context of the NATO **alliance.** Experiencing the failed policy of neutrality in 1940, followed by five years of German occupation, **Norway has, since the foundation of NATO in 1949**, looked westward for her security**. After deciding to join NATO, Norway sought to** improve the likelihood of receiving support **in crises and war through several means, including the active policy of inviting foreign troops to exercises in Norway, and** increased military coordination and integration **with other western powers, especially the USA.** To adapt the Norwegian force structure, including its operational concepts, to conform with her key NATO partners, particularly the USA, and to some degree the UK, has, since 1949, been given high priority, influencing both ways and means. In this perspective, working to ensure both American willingness as well as ability, to assist Norway on NATO’s northern flank has been crucial in Norway’s effort to deter potential Soviet aggression. From this perspective, the **massive nuclear capabilities of the Northern Fleet represent not only a Norwegian problem, but also a challenge for the USA and its NATO allies.** Norway has both overlapping interests with NATO, as well as its own unique national interests. As a state directly bordering Russia, Norway has a particular need to combine the deterrence policy of invitation and integration of allied forces, with certain screening measures and self-imposed restrictions. These restrictions are most notably, disallowing the siting of foreign bases with regular combat units during peacetime, restrictions forbidding nuclear weapons in Norway, and restrictions on how far east allied exercises and training in Norway can take place. Norway’s policy-line, influencing both ideas about military objectives, concepts and resources, captures the country’s dual approach, and can be summed up in the phrase “integration and screening”.

Norway has been of particular interest to the US given the country’s proximity to the Kola Peninsula and the Russian Northern military district. This location was, and remains, an unusually well-placed location for the collection of military intelligence in addition to potential force projection. In addition, **Norway’s closeness to the North Atlantic and the crucial transit route for Russian submarines seeking to enter central areas of the Atlantic Ocean and posing a threat to trans-Atlantic communication**, has been another vital aspect of US military interest in Norway.

**In the post-Crimea (2014–) international environment, familiar dilemmas from the Cold War can be seen. In welcoming a larger number of US Marines to cold weather training in central and Northern Norway, the government continues to emphasize military integration with the USA**, while still avoiding the construction of any permanent bases. The move to invite more US Marines **has spurred external** complaints from Russia as well as opposition from certain sections of the political spectrum in Norway today. **The “Supplementary Defense Cooperation Agreement”**, signed 16 April 2021 between Norway and the USA, **represents the latest development in this area.**

# Aff

## AT: QPQ CP

### Deficit—Say No—Cost

#### Say no—defense spending is too costly

Wohlforth 16 (William C. Wohlforth, Daniel Webster Professor of Government in the Dartmouth College Department of Government, “The Right Choice for NATO,” This chapter will appear in: Sustainable Security: Rethinking American, National Security Strategy, edited by Jeremi Suri and Benjamin Valentino, <https://www.tobinproject.org/sites/tobinproject.org/files/assets/Wohlforth%20-%20The%20Right%20Choice%20for%20NATO.pdf>)

A further, critical implication of this assessment of the strategic environment is rarely noted: it is entirely inconsistent with shock therapy’s assumption about the lack of serious threats to European security to say that calling the United States’ Article 5 commitment into question will cause European governments step up and create more military capacity via increased spending or cooperation. On the contrary, a relatively benign security setting is arguably more conducive to allowing (p.260) narrow national perspectives to trump EU-wide initiatives and to foster the continuation of minimalist defense efforts than the status quo of US leadership. America’s NATO allies make up nearly a fifth of global military spending. Britain is the fourth biggest military spender in the world, with France close behind (after another US ally, Japan) as sixth. Germany, Italy, Turkey, and Canada all rank among the world’s fifteen biggest spenders.41 Very secure states like Norway and Canada purchase sophisticated weaponry from the US military-industrial complex and order their soldiers into battle in America’s wars in far off lands. Why? A major reason is the alliance with the United States—it is the existence of the overseas hegemon and the perceived need to retain access to it and standing with it that drive much of this behavior.42

Options 1 and 2 are based on the assumption that the international system generates strong pressures for European states to do one or all of three very costly things: ramp up spending on defense; reform entrenched domestic defense practices and institutions; and set aside national prerogatives to generate genuine supranational military defense and decision making at the EU level. Take away Uncle Sam’s “welfare for the rich” and the logic of anarchy will somehow force this outcome. It cannot be ruled out that there is something special about Europe that would cause it to act in this collectively martial way without the US umbrella. But that expectation is inconsistent with most of what we know about international politics and with the lived experience of the EU’s European Security and Defense Policy and Common Foreign and Security Policy. Governments just don’t do extremely expensive and politically costly things without a major prod of some sort. The problem is that there is neither a compelling external security incentive nor a European hegemon to help solve the collective action problem. Germany may play this role in economics, but it is not going to do so in security.43 The likelihood that a US revocation of Article 5 would spur France and Britain to set aside national feeling and unite defense efforts—and that middle powers from Poland to Turkey would acquiesce—is exceedingly low. Indeed, the downward trend in European defense spending has continued despite the continuing decline in American military forces in Europe and despite increasingly loud calls for retrenchment.

Three consequences follow from this analysis. First, doubling down is unlikely—because Americans won’t pay for it—and neither form of retrenchment will work—because Europeans won’t pay the political or economic costs even if the United States steps aside. Second, major changes to the current benign macro-security environment are likely to occur only after substantial strategic warning, and therefore projected low costs and risks for US security provision will likely remain adequate. And third, there is no net security benefit to the United States (p.261) of administering a shock to NATO via even more dramatic reductions in presence or commitment. Indeed, there are serious expected costs in terms of lost security cooperation and even less capable and interoperable allies. With militarily capable allies like NATO and the Republic of Korea, a major benefit of presence is security cooperation (joint training, planning, etc.) that is difficult or impossible to replicate with rotational deployments. According to a recent comprehensive RAND study, the US presence in NATO is getting near the floor of deployed personnel needed to sustain security cooperation at current level.44

#### Countries have limited budgets and can’t afford defense

Gilli 17 (Andrea Gilli is post-doctoral fellow at Stanford University’s Center for International Security and Cooperation. “The Trump administration wants Europe to pay more to defend itself. It’s not that easy.” Washington Post. Feb. 3, 2017. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/02/03/europe-may-not-be-able-to-expand-its-defenses-like-president-trump-wants/)

The transatlantic gap in military capabilities — how much defense output the two sides of the Atlantic are able to generate, respectively — has three main causes that cannot easily be addressed:

1) European countries have limited defense budgets — On average, defense expenditure in Europe is just over 1 percent of GDP, while the U.S. defense budget is well above 4 percent of GDP. Would a U.S. retrenchment push European allies to fix this imbalance, and bring NATO members closer to the 2 percent threshold they pledged to move toward in 2014?

Maybe. But half of NATO’s members are small countries with small defense budgets, well below $2 billion per year. Thus, a substantial bump in their military spending won’t bring about a significant increase in Europe’s overall military investments. Estonia’s 2 percent GDP defense expenditure amounts to just $500 million, for instance. That might pay for the operational costs of a few of middle-sized U.S. warships, but wouldn’t push back a Russian invasion.

With the exception of Germany and Poland, large E.U. countries face financial and political constraints to increasing military expenditure. The U.K. is going through Brexit, which will also affect several countries, in particular the Netherlands and Ireland. Italy’s bank problems loom large, and Spain and France have limited financial and political room for additional public spending. This points to a broader problem.

In part, U.S. security assurances may have freed up state funds in Europe for other priorities, including a robust system of social services. However, cutting welfare state provisions in Europe to fund defense expenditures is going to be extremely difficult, if not counterproductive.

On the one hand, those who receive these benefits are far more numerous, and thus politically more influential, than those receiving a direct benefit from military spending. On the other, cuts in welfare spending risk actually bringing additional support to anti-establishment parties like the Five Stars Movement in Italy, Die Linke in Germany or Podemos in Spain — all of which have strong anti-defense stances.

2) European countries pay more in defense overhead — All armed forces require military bases, training facilities, and administrative support. So in a continent with several small, national armed forces, overhead necessarily absorbs a higher fraction of resources than in the United States.

A solution for Europe would be to share some military assets and functions. In recent years, there have been important bilateral and multilateral initiatives in this respect — but there are strong political limits as well.

Countries have no guarantees their partners ultimately will support them in a military crisis. Thus, if sharing turns into a lock-in, countries run the risk of having access to fewer military capabilities than they might need. This explains why the width and depth of past initiatives have been generally limited.

However, this comes at the cost of intra-alliance inefficiency and thus an inferior capacity to generate military capabilities. An E.U. Defense Union could address these problems, but efforts to set this up face many of the same challenges: Why should a country tie its destiny to others? How can it ensure that its interests will be respected? And what tangible benefits would it observe in the short term, beside loss of jobs and income, following base closures and defense industry consolidation?

3) Implementing defense cooperation in Europe won’t be easy — Some analysts think that by promoting cooperation among NATO allies, any U.S. retrenchment from Europe would help address existing problems, but there are strong reasons to be skeptical.

With Europe’s limited funds to spend on defense, large cooperative projects will be difficult to launch. In the past, countries in Europe abandoned cooperative projects because of their negative domestic implications for jobs, technological know-how or military exports. In an age of austerity, amid a refugee crisis and high youth unemployment, this mind-set is unlikely to change anytime soon.

And some countries may have little interest in cooperation. They may operate in completely different environments — Mediterranean vs. North Sea, for example. Or they perceive a different strategic threat at home — think Russia vs. the Islamic State. Some countries may even have a strategic interest in leaving unaddressed some capability gaps — to compel proximate allies to come to their defense. This was Finland’s military strategy during the Cold War.

### Deficit—Say No—Domestic Politics

#### Say No—Domestic politics and faith in US security guarantee

Zannella, 20 [Anthony Zannella Seton Hall University, majored in Political Science and Philosophy, 4-7-2020 "An Analysis of Burden Sharing in NATO and the Problem of Free Riding," Political Analysis: Vol. 21 , Article 5, [https://scholarship.shu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1058&context=pa#](https://scholarship.shu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1058&context=pa) /alundy]

The literature on burden sharing has shown great development over the years moving from a more pecuniary focus, to a focus that incorporates a variety of inconspicuous factors. From a deterrence and pure public goods standpoint, the United States is bearing an unfair share of the burden. The simple fact that it is leading the way economically (and in turn with the efficiency and effectiveness of its forces) shows that non-U.S. NATO allies are indeed benefitting unfairly from its ally’s efforts. The decline in NATO allied defense spending indicates the acceptance of relying on U.S. capabilities and letting their own forces bear less of the financial responsibility associated with collective defense. However, the simplicity of this model does not consider other factors that can be just as important to burden sharing. The joint product model would seem to take better account of factors that do not seem immediately pertinent to burden sharing but are without a doubt just as important. The dedication of alliance forces can produce strain in a political manner due to the potential loss of life and the ramifications such losses can have back home. Furthermore, the introduction of excludable goods levels the playing field in different ways. The massive output of defense provided by the U.S., incurs significant benefits that are only a positive for the U.S. alone**.** The expansion of the defense industry, for example, can provide jobs and further stimulate the U.S. economy; however, this is a good that other nations cannot benefit from directly. This same idea can be redirected back to non-U.S. NATO allies. Many of them intend to focus more on domestic issues at home while letting their forces weaken under the greater protection of the United States. With new threats on the rise and a turn to out-of-area operations, it becomes apparent that if the U.S. “is able to provide politically or physically sufficient levels of security for the rest of NATO’s members in response… then other members can free ride and will provide little additional assistance. Therefore, we should expect even more free riding than in the past,” (Siegel 2009).

### Deficit—Say No—Nationalism

#### Nationalism breeds distrust—prevents support for burden sharing

Kluth 19[Andreas Kluth is a columnist for Bloomberg Opinion, was previously editor in chief of Handelsblatt Global and a writer for the Economist, “A European Army? It’ll Never Happen,” Dec 2, 2019, https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2019-12-02/a-european-army-will-never-happen-nato-remains-essential]

The complications that caused that stillbirth linger. The nations in what is now the European Union still care about their sovereignty, which is expressed above all in the decision to send young soldiers into harm’s way. They also have different interests. The French are busy in their former African colonies. The Poles and Balts feel most threatened by Russia. Germany, caring not a whit about all that, is merrily building itself a second gas pipeline to Russia, circumventing the eastern EU.

Member states also have dissonant historical traditions, which make integration into one command hierarchy almost impossible. Postcolonial France considers military action a legitimate tool of foreign policy, and its president has ample powers to direct its army. Germany, still atoning for World War II, disavows military interventionism. Unlike France, it has a “parliamentary army,” which must get explicit approval from the Bundestag to do anything. Would a French president patiently wait for the German legislature before deciding whether to shoot at little green men speaking Russian in an Estonian forest? Would 27 states cede that decision to Brussels?

The fundamental problem, as Jan Techau of the German Marshall Fund puts it, is distrust: The French and Germans don’t fully trust each other, the Italians trust neither of them, the Germans don’t even trust themselves, Warsaw distrusts Berlin, Bucharest and Budapest distrust each other, people in the Balkans don’t trust anybody, and so forth.

That’s why Macron is seen in central Europe as a neo-Gaullist. When he talks about “strategic autonomy” or “European sovereignty,” he seems mainly to be eager for France, the EU’s only nuclear power after Brexit, to lead Europe, snubbing its nose at the U.S. and accommodating Russia. To advance that vision, he’s sponsored a fledgling alliance called the “European Intervention Initiative,” which is part of neither NATO nor the EU. Needless to say, the EU’s eastern members would much prefer to keep relying on the U.S.

### Deficit—Say No—AT: Pressure Solves

#### Say no and the cp collapses NATO

Wohlforth 16 (William C. Wohlforth, Daniel Webster Professor of Government in the Dartmouth College Department of Government, “The Right Choice for NATO,” This chapter will appear in: Sustainable Security: Rethinking American, National Security Strategy, edited by Jeremi Suri and Benjamin Valentino, <https://www.tobinproject.org/sites/tobinproject.org/files/assets/Wohlforth%20-%20The%20Right%20Choice%20for%20NATO.pdf>)

A further, critical implication of this assessment of the strategic environment is rarely noted: it is entirely inconsistent with shock therapy’s assumption about the lack of serious threats to European security to say that calling the United States’ Article 5 commitment into question will cause European governments step up and create more military capacity via increased spending or cooperation. On the contrary, a relatively benign security setting is arguably more conducive to allowing (p.260) narrow national perspectives to trump EU-wide initiatives and to foster the continuation of minimalist defense efforts than the status quo of US leadership. America’s NATO allies make up nearly a fifth of global military spending. Britain is the fourth biggest military spender in the world, with France close behind (after another US ally, Japan) as sixth. Germany, Italy, Turkey, and Canada all rank among the world’s fifteen biggest spenders.41 Very secure states like Norway and Canada purchase sophisticated weaponry from the US military-industrial complex and order their soldiers into battle in America’s wars in far off lands. Why? A major reason is the alliance with the United States—it is the existence of the overseas hegemon and the perceived need to retain access to it and standing with it that drive much of this behavior.42

Options 1 and 2 are based on the assumption that the international system generates strong pressures for European states to do one or all of three very costly things: ramp up spending on defense; reform entrenched domestic defense practices and institutions; and set aside national prerogatives to generate genuine supranational military defense and decision making at the EU level. Take away Uncle Sam’s “welfare for the rich” and the logic of anarchy will somehow force this outcome. It cannot be ruled out that there is something special about Europe that would cause it to act in this collectively martial way without the US umbrella. But that expectation is inconsistent with most of what we know about international politics and with the lived experience of the EU’s European Security and Defense Policy and Common Foreign and Security Policy. Governments just don’t do extremely expensive and politically costly things without a major prod of some sort. The problem is that there is neither a compelling external security incentive nor a European hegemon to help solve the collective action problem. Germany may play this role in economics, but it is not going to do so in security.43 The likelihood that a US revocation of Article 5 would spur France and Britain to set aside national feeling and unite defense efforts—and that middle powers from Poland to Turkey would acquiesce—is exceedingly low. Indeed, the downward trend in European defense spending has continued despite the continuing decline in American military forces in Europe and despite increasingly loud calls for retrenchment.

Three consequences follow from this analysis. First, doubling down is unlikely—because Americans won’t pay for it—and neither form of retrenchment will work—because Europeans won’t pay the political or economic costs even if the United States steps aside. Second, major changes to the current benign macro-security environment are likely to occur only after substantial strategic warning, and therefore projected low costs and risks for US security provision will likely remain adequate. And third, there is no net security benefit to the United States (p.261) of administering a shock to NATO via even more dramatic reductions in presence or commitment. Indeed, there are serious expected costs in terms of lost security cooperation and even less capable and interoperable allies. With militarily capable allies like NATO and the Republic of Korea, a major benefit of presence is security cooperation (joint training, planning, etc.) that is difficult or impossible to replicate with rotational deployments. According to a recent comprehensive RAND study, the US presence in NATO is getting near the floor of deployed personnel needed to sustain security cooperation at current level.44

Now let’s consider how this vision of NATO aligns with American grand strategy. The US grand strategy of deep engagement is essentially about three objectives: managing the external environment to reduce near- and long-term threats to US national security; promoting a liberal economic order to expand the global economy and maximize domestic prosperity; and creating, sustaining, and revising the global institutional order to secure necessary interstate cooperation on terms favorable to US interests.45

NATO’s declining capability for large-scale optional expeditionary operations to address conjectural security threats or humanitarian ideals does little to impede this grand strategy. The Obama administration’s policy pronouncements and military deployments do not in any way represent a change away from deep engagement. They reflect a refocus on the strategy’s core. For that core, NATO retains value as an institutional framework for:

• Coordinating transatlantic security cooperation;

• Maintaining key infrastructure and lines of communications to sustain a US-led containment strategy in the greater Middle East;

• Reducing inefficient duplication of defense efforts among allies, preventing full renationalization of security;

• Hedging against the emergence of a more threatening Russia or the appearance of a new, serious security threat.

The retrenchment options (One and Two) put these benefits at risk. Full retrenchment does so because it is obviously inconsistent with deep engagement. “NATO-friendly” retrenchment does so because it confuses secondary aims with the grand strategy’s core aims. It is willing to trade US leadership of the alliance for ephemeral and likely unattainable gains in indigenous European capability. Doubling down on NATO makes the same mistake of viewing optional capacities as essential, and magnifies it by ultimately imposing its costs on the US taxpayer, as it has no answer to the “free rider” problem aside from exhortation.

If the United States engineers a dramatic shift in its grand strategy to a strong version of restraint that devalues the capacity to mount light footprint military operations around Eurasia as well as the incipient “coalition in waiting” represented (p.262) by NATO, then the alliance would cease to make sense. But if, as is likely, it pares the deep engagement strategy to its core objectives, then muddling though, with no new grand bargains, no grand “rebooting” of the alliance, no sudden new infusion of defense dollars and euros, and no “post-American” NATO emerges as the optimal choice. In other words, the transatlantic bargain should contain three parts: NATO should continue to guarantee territorial defense; external operations in Europe’s neighborhood where the United States has no interest should fall under the EU or individual European allies (e.g., France in Mali, Central African Republic); and NATO should only engage beyond Europe’s borders when the United States wishes to be involved.

#### NATO says no to pressure

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Yet there inevitably are areas of national strategy that a process alone cannot shape. We maintain that national strategic cultures, national political economies, and E.U. macroeconomic and fiscal policy decisively influence how countries allocate resources to defense – before NATO and E.U. planning processes take place. Specifically, the more Atlanticist (a preference for a transatlantic approach to European security, in which the United States’ role is central) a country’s national security strategy was, the more it contributed to shared operational priorities during NATO’s “out of area” period (from 2000 to 2012). As European states experience increased unemployment, they “slightly decrease top-line defense spending in response to unemployment, while shifting much more substantial amounts within defense budgets out of equipment and into personnel.” E.U. members respond similarly to supranational (E.U.) fiscal constraints agreed to by heads of state and government as part of the Maastricht Treaty on European Union, and “monitored” (enforced) by the European Commission. Processes cannot address these tough choices, which amount to rival claims on strategic resources, but politico-strategic dialogue may. For example, when NATO allies agreed to a “pledge on defense investment” at their 2014 Wales Summit, their heads of state and government gave broad but clear guidance not only to defense ministries to “meet[] capability priorities,” but also to finance ministries to “reverse the trend of declining defense budgets.” Two years later, E.U. heads of state and government formally adopted the NATO goals of moving toward spending two percent of GDP on defense and 20 percent of defense spending on equipment modernization. Early indications are that these political agreements are having some effect on resource allocation, as Figure 3 shows. European allies’ defense spending increased by $87 billion from 2014 to 2018. That this would occur in spite of disagreements regarding threats, economic fragmentation within Europe and the broader transatlantic community, and fiscal austerity in the European Union, points to the importance of cultural factors like Atlanticism. However, as Figure 3 also shows, increases may be stalling – a transatlantic divide may harm burden-sharing and, perhaps paradoxically, weaken Europe as a strategic actor. Figure 3: Annual Real Change in Defense Spending, NATO Europe and Canada Source: NATO, Defence Expenditure of NATO Countries (2013-2019), 2020. NATO and European Union agreement on exigent defense investment guidelines, as well as the downstream effects on coordinated capability development, point toward other opportunities for the two organizations to cooperate strategically. This is especially true given the tight interconnection between the economic strength of the transatlantic community and its military strength. For example, NATO and the European Union could build on current cooperation proposals to include the grand strategic area of resource allocation, ensuring that NATO and E.U. defense spending goals are not in competition with E.U. fiscal rules for scarce resources. Italy’s 2015 defense White Paper, for example, suggests the possibility that some defense spending “could be excluded from the thresholds of the Stability and Growth Pact.” Trouble Behind, Trouble Ahead At some level, all states must prepare for war. Robert Osgood called alliances “latent war communities” – they are designed for that purpose. Indeed, Bear Braumoeller’s recent work extends Charles Tilly’s insight that “war made the state and the state made war” to international orders, which he argues prevent war among their members but are dangerous to non-members. Processes like those that NATO and the European Union have developed during the last eight decades of relative calm and prosperity are central to the transatlantic community’s ability to prepare for, and perhaps forestall, future wars. They are the best tools its members have to convert political will into capabilities that they believe will have strategic effects, like deterring adversaries or, if necessary, defending national territory and shared interests. Processes are, however, no substitute for grand strategic vision. Such vision animated the creation of both NATO and the European Union. There is now a strong case for a bolder vision of transatlantic cooperation in defense planning and grand strategy to keep the “fog of peace” from turning into the “fog of war.” What might such a vision look like? Some scholars have proposed to address the fog of peace by “rediscovering geography” to regionalize NATO defense planning, enabling allies to focus on capabilities that are most directly relevant to their own strategic priorities. Others have argued that it is time for Europe to seek – and achieve – true strategic autonomy, either by “Europeanizing” NATO (whereby the United States would reduce its footprint in the alliance and concentrate on its strategic challenges elsewhere), or by subsuming NATO into a broader European political-security framework. Even the possibility of extending France’s nuclear deterrent to its European allies has been raised, first by French scholars discussing “nuclear solidarity,” and then by President Emmanuel Macron, who invited European partners to “be associated with the exercises of French deterrence forces” in the interest of a “true strategic culture among Europeans.” Macron further clarified his intent in an interview with Wolfgang Ischinger at the 2020 Munich Security Conference, pointing to an “unprecedented dialogue” on nuclear deterrence among Europeans. Challenges abound. First, transatlantic discord creates challenges for European Atlanticists, making it more difficult to align national strategies, and may even incentivize countries to curb defense spending to appeal to domestic electorates that bristle at external pressure. Second, the combination of economic recession and fiscal austerity that plagued Europe during the 2008 crisis appears likely to return in a more virulent form, which is almost certain to dampen defense investment. Taking Europe’s “destiny in its own hands” is easier said than done. Years of low defense investment, the complicating effects of Brexit, the rise of populist politics across Europe, and uncertainties about Turkey, among other issues, cloud prospects for greater European defense autonomy. While retaining the transatlantic bond, in an era of great-power competition when conflict would almost certainly not be confined to one operational theater, it may be wise to encourage allies to “concentrate on those tasks for which they are most geographically suited.” For example, Baltic Sea states could focus on defending their territory from Russian aggression, while states along the Mediterranean could focus on combatting terrorism and building partner capacity – each without fear of being criticized for inadequately supporting allies. Doing so would help link operational and strategic planning to threat assessments, while also helping to blunt conflict among allies about defining the array of threats, risks, and challenges that characterize the emerging security environment. It would enable the transatlantic security community to incentivize and leverage the national defense planning efforts of its members. Specializing like this would enable institutional work to focus on harmonizing, which encourages burden-sharing, as opposed to dominating, which incentivizes free-riding. But such specialization demands trust, which is currently in short supply in the transatlantic community and beyond.

### Deficit—Say No—vs 2% of GDP

#### The 2% standard is not an accurate representation of contribution--- destabilizes the alliance by calling out competent countries.

Kivimaki, 19 [Timo Kivimaki, 2-13-2019, professor of International Relations and Director of Research at University of Bath, European Security, Volume 28, ‘Power, Contribution, and Dependence in NATO Burden Sharing’, <https://researchportal.bath.ac.uk/en/publications/power-contribution-and-dependence-in-nato-burden-sharing> /alundy]

The national GDP share of defence spending is often used as an easy, parsimonious, quantitative measure of contribution in some of the formative studies in the field and in most studies that aim at complete mathematical models of burden sharing in military alliances (Olson and Zeckhauser [1966](https://www-tandfonline-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1080/09662839.2019.1578750), Boyer [1989](https://www-tandfonline-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1080/09662839.2019.1578750), Oneal [1990](https://www-tandfonline-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1080/09662839.2019.1578750), Sandler and Hartley [2001](https://www-tandfonline-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1080/09662839.2019.1578750)). The use of national defence spending is justified by the fact that much of NATO’s operations and activities are funded by national defence spending, while only some funding is channelled through the NATO budget. Thus, the idea of measuring contribution to NATO by considering GDP shares of national military spending makes some sense, but it is neither an accurate, nor a necessarily useful, indicator of contributions (Zyla [2009](https://www-tandfonline-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1080/09662839.2019.1578750), Techau [2015](https://www-tandfonline-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1080/09662839.2019.1578750), Kunertova [2017b](https://www-tandfonline-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1080/09662839.2019.1578750)).

US military spending in 2017 was at a level of 610 billion USD, thus representing not only a majority of NATO spending, but 35% of the military spending of the entire globe; 9.2 times that of Russia and 2.7 times that of China (These calculations are based on data by SIPRI [2018](https://www-tandfonline-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1080/09662839.2019.1578750)).[3](https://www-tandfonline-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1080/09662839.2019.1578750) Thus, if we use the GDP share of national military expenditure as an indicator, it seems clear that the US, with about a 45% share of the NATO GDP , (GDP data is calculated from “The World Factbook — Central Intelligence Agency” n.d.) has a too high a national expenditure, as it add up to more than 50% of the sum of national defence expenditures of all NATO countries.

If we look at the funding of NATO itself and of such functions and operations that are under the direct control of the alliance rather than member countries, the picture changes dramatically. If security is a public good and there is an agreement on how best to protect it, one could assume that NATO countries should have no difficulties in channelling their military spending through a common, rather than a national, decision-making structure. The fact that this is not the case already challenges the credibility of seeing security as a public good for NATO countries.

Direct NATO funding is proportional to each member country’s GDP, with the exception of the US, which is compensated in its NATO shares for its superior national spending. According to NATO statistics on defence spending (NATO 2018) from 2016 and the CIA World Factbook (“The World Factbook — Central Intelligence Agency” n.d., NATO [2018](https://www-tandfonline-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1080/09662839.2019.1578750)) data on GDPs, all NATO countries contribute more to NATO’s budget than their GDP share (the GDP share equals the GDP of the country divided by the GDP sum of all NATO countries), excepting Luxembourg and the United States. While NATO’s budget share from Luxembourg is likely to be a result of fluctuation in GDPs and a specific year’s (2016) contribution, and while the share of Luxembourg’s contribution to the NATO budget is still very close to its share of GDP, the case of the US is different. US funding for NATO is systematically lower than its GDP share, less than half of it. Obviously, this relates to US superior national military spending, but again, it highlights problems with the assumption that the security needs of NATO countries are identical. If the US actually contributes 22% of the NATO budget while its GDP share would be 45%, then we either have to believe that US national defence spending serves NATO’s security needs or relinquish the conclusion that the US is such a disproportionate contributor to NATO**.** However, the question of burden sharing is much more complicated than the debate on defence expenditures may suggest.

#### Allies are unwilling to meet 2% burdens---it’s not realistic

**Techau 15** [Jan Techau; director of Carnegie Europe, a part of Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; 9/2/15; THE POLITICS OF 2 PERCENT; [https://carnegieendowment.org/files/CP\_252\_Techau\_NATO\_Final.pdf]](https://carnegieendowment.org/files/CP_252_Techau_NATO_Final.pdf%5d)

If **2 percent has become the gold standard for defense spending** in the debate on NATO’s future, then how realistic is it that the goal will ever be reached? Pessimism prevails on this issue. “The guideline . . . **if taken literally, would create an impossible situation for some allies**,” writes Ian Anthony of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. A country like Germany would have to absorb €74 billion ($82 billion) of defense spending instead of its current €37 billion ($41 billion), something it **would be unable (and unwilling)** to do and that would in turn lead to “inefficiency and waste, rather than an increase in useful capability.”20 Germany is also the focus of another argument that aims at making 2 percent look unrealistic. The enormous increase in absolute defense spending in Germany, with its large economy, that would result from 2 percent could also lead to a degree of nervousness among some of the country’s allies. As Karl-Heinz Kamp of the German Federal Academy for Security Policy argues, “If Germany spent 2 percent of its huge GDP, it would produce a defense budget overshadowing those of France and the UK, arguably causing more concern than reassurance among its neighbors.”21 This is a weak argument, as it essentially questions the political reliability of a key NATO partner that is most under pressure to spend more The strength of the 2 percent metric is its triumph of simplicity over complexity. 12 | The Politics of 2 Percent: NATO and the Security Vacuum in Europe on defense. For the most part, it is a self-serving defensive argument against higher defense spending that has been used primarily by Germans themselves, not so much by other NATO allies. **But the lack of capacity among member states to absorb significantly increased defense budgets is not the only factor that leads to doubt about hitting the 2 percent target. The biggest concern comes from the fact that many NATO countries agreed to the 2 percent pledge in Wales but have no real intention to make good on the promise.** “The problem is not that most NATO allies will fail to reach the 2 percent bar. The trouble comes with those that don’t even try,” as Kamp puts it.22 Initial budget decisions made around or after the Wales summit and even public announcements by many member states seem to indicate that the **political will to really reach 2 percent is indeed underdeveloped across NATO**. Overriding economic concerns are also reasons for skepticism that the 2 percent pledge can be fulfilled. “As long as austerity remains the eurozone’s economic mantra, it is unlikely that European allies will meet the target,” one researcher argues.23 Under the prevailing economic circumstances, it is often claimed that a reversal of the downward trend in defense spending would already be a success, but that an **increase to 2 percent would be too much to realistically expect.** The Wales summit declaration itself makes **2 percent dependent on** positive **economic development, stipulating that allies “aim to increase defence expenditure in real terms as GDP grows.”**24 This conditionality is meant to generate more defense spending from the moment economic recovery sets in. The volume of growth that would be needed to increase defense spending is not specified, nor is a time reference for growth given. Should spending be measured against absolute GDP growth on an annual basis, or should the growth rate be the metric? Or should GDP growth be measured against a fixed point in time—for instance, GDP before the financial crisis?

### Deficit—Credibility

#### **Conditional leadership in NATO can’t solve—creates a power vacuum and unconditional leadership is empirically better.**

Lagon & Moreland ’19 [Mark Lagon and Will Moreland; Chief Policy Officer at Friends of the Global Fight Against AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, as well as Distinguished Senior Scholar in the Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, and associate fellow with the Brookings Institution's Project on International Order and Strategy; 2-14-2019; "Burden-Sharing Doesn’t Need to Be Burdensome"; National Interest; https://nationalinterest.org/feature/burden-sharing-doesn%E2%80%99t-need-be-burdensome-44572; Accessed 7-9-2022; AW]

The president’s critique is not unfounded. American power today differs from its heights in 1945, or even 1990. The United States will need help shouldering the maintenance of a liberal international order that has increased global security, prosperity and freedom these past seven decades. Nevertheless, the **manner in which an American administration approaches the burden-sharing issue matters**. Trump has pointedly called for NATO allies to pay more for defense and his team at the United Nations has circulated a potential policy to make foreign aid contingent on alignment with U.S. positions, so that aid dollars “only go to America’s friends.” Though increased action among allies and partners is necessary, **to simply demand greater burden-sharing** is insufficient**. Policymakers confront two central questions if they are to promote effective burden-sharing**: first, **how to ensure other** stakeholders do step forward**, rather than leave a** vacuum around an issue; and, second, **how to protect and advance U.S. interests if burden-sharing cedes the initiative** to others. Demands for increased activities from partners **must be coupled with** coordination and a measure of U.S. leadership **for an effective burden-sharing campaign**. A **number of cases, therefore, reveal bases for eliciting burden-sharing of the quality and variety the United States should want—as well as the risks of forcing burden-sharing via disengagement**. The notion of **compelling other nations i**nto taking actions—**particularly by** arousing skepticism **around U.S. credibility**—is a **recipe for** shortchanging American interests. Consideration of both **UN peacekeeping operations** and the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria **illustrate how effective burden-sharing requires** continued U.S. commitments in order **to spur burden-sharing over inaction**. Furthermore, the success of the Global Fund, the **worsening of some crises in** the Middle East, such as in **Yemen, and the mixed record of the U.S. withdrawal from** the Trans-Pacific Partnership (**TPP**), similarly **demonstrate that leadership creates the leverage necessary for Washington** to advance U.S. interests **when others do step up to act.** Americans may legitimately want others to do more, but how that aim is pursued matters. **Nowhere is this more evident than the debate over NATO.** Even before the signing of the Washington Treaty, concerns around NATO burden-sharing arose. U.S. military planners worried that an American security guarantee would perpetually deter defense spending by the new European allies. This concern dogged the allies throughout the Cold War. Disagreements flared almost immediately in the Senate’s “great debate” over deploying troops to Europe without additional European support in the Korean War, a peripheral interest to many European leaders. **Disagreements resurfaced in the 1960s as Western European economies recovered from their postwar devastation**. The Kennedy, Johnson and Nixon administrations repeatedly sought to navigate clashes between security interests in Europe and trade or balance of payments deficits. Compounded by the strains of Vietnam, both the **security and economic arrangements boiled over in the Nixon administration with the resulting shifts of the Nixon Doctrine** and the shocks to the Bretton Woods system. Though the transatlantic partners were in sync on détente and then counterbalancing in face of the Soviet Union in the 1970s and early 1980s, disagreements surrounding approaches to European security, particularly around the deployment of intermediate-range nuclear missiles, maintained a measure of tension between the Euro-Atlantic allies. The subsequent Soviet collapse transformed the global security environment; yet, it **did not take long for a new generation of burden-sharing issues to emerge. The Clinton administration at first evidenced ambivalence on respective roles and responses on Balkans crises. Others, like then-French foreign minister Hubert Vedrine, derided the U.S. “hyperpower**.” During this period even Paul Wolfowitz admitted a “need to believe that others are doing their share.” Frustrations persisted in the George W. Bush and Barack Obama administrations. Under both presidents, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates forewarned of a potential “two-tiered alliance” at the 2008 Munich Security Conference and the “the growing difficulty for the United States to sustain current support for NATO if the American taxpayer continues to carry most of the burden in the Alliance” in his 2011 farewell address at NATO. Jeffrey Goldberg further captured this sentiment in President Obama’s derision of “free-riders” in his revealing 2016 article “The Obama Doctrine” in The Atlantic. **Surviving these crises, NATO’s story reminds that the organization has been and remains, like many of America’s global partnerships, inherently reformable**—**provided the United States engages with** tangible and realistic ambitions. **Without** initial U.S**. involvement, no effective collective defense organization would have developed in Europe** sufficient to manage the Soviet threat. **Without continued engagement** that same **organization would not have changed as needed, for instance, to be a stalwart partner in Afghanistan. NATO** and the broader transatlantic partnership certainly **require further shifts to manage today’s era of resurgent great power competition; however, this past precedent** emphasizes the need for active U.S. leadership **and reasonable agenda-setting**. Pragmatic engagement will yield practical results. Peacekeeping by the United Nations offers an important example of what burden-sharing means and what elicits it. During the Cold War, UN peace operations were confined to interposing a deployment between formerly warring parties. The clash of the Cold War superpowers as veto-wielding United Nations Security Council (UNSC) members meant that was all the traffic would bear. In settings like Cyprus and Lebanon, long-standing deployments kept additional military duties off the U.S. plate through decades of the Cold War. **The Cold War’s end ushered in more numerous and ambitious UNSC mandates—as the United States and Russia were more often willing to align on authorizing peace operations**. In the 1990s, along with a couple of dramatic failures marred by murky mandates (in Bosnia and Rwanda, where excessive impartiality left atrocities to occur on peacekeepers’ watch), an **array of peace operations took hold with a variety of governance** and post-conflict goals beyond the traditional interpositional model.

### Deficit—Delay

#### Delay and say no—adequate burden sharing takes years

Hoffman & Dinneen 18 [Frank G. Hoffman, board of advisors at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, serving the National Defense University as a Research Fellow; Molly Dinneen, Research Intern at the National Defense University, 7-6-2018, Foreign Policy Research Institute, ‘Examining NATO’s Progress: Common Goals, Shared Burdens’, <https://www.fpri.org/article/2018/07/examining-natos-progress-common-goals-shared-burdens/> /alundy]

In anticipation of the 2018 NATO Summit, analysts have commented on [several positive regional security enhancements](http://www.atahq.org/2018/02/projecting-stability-adapting-nato-readiness-action-plan/): command and control structure changes, new headquarters for maritime forces, and higher defense spending levels. European scholars and policy experts would like to see the Summit move past the issue of burden sharing**.** Certainly, there is much more than burden sharing to discuss. Yet, a lack of consensus about Russia and threats from terrorism have limited the progress the Alliance should have gained since Wales in 2014. Coercive tactics with tariffs and trade imbalances will only increase resistance and weaken consensus on a way ahead with regard to security arguments.

At the Summit, the attendees will be able to see a clear reversal of declining defense spending as several NATO members are expanding their defense budgets. Despite President Trump’s desires for rapid achievement of the 2% threshold, European disarmament occurred over a long period of time, and given economic realities in Europe, it will not be overcome in a matter of one or two years, as Frank Hoffman noted [last year](https://www.fpri.org/article/2017/03/making-nato-less-obsolete/) on this topic. However, as shown in Figure 2, European and Canadian defense expenditures are on a clear upward trend. Given U.S. persistence, and a bit of patience from U.S. leaders, these positive improvements should continue.

### Deficit—Cohesion/Relations—2AC

#### Threats of abandonment cause allied backlash and destroy cohesion

Blankenship 18, Brian Dylan Blankenship is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Miami and a researcher with a focus on international security and international cooperation, “Promises under Pressure: Reassurance and Burden-Sharing in Asymmetric Alliances,” 2018, Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, Columbia University, p. 28-29

2.5.1 The Reassurance Dilemma. One might thus conclude that reassurance is suboptimal, and that patrons are best served by casting their protection into doubt. The reality is not so simple, however. Because the patron’s side of the bargain entails providing protection to its allies, if that protection comes into doubt then allies have less reason to honor their end of the bargain: namely, to remain loyal to the patron by siding with it against its adversaries, providing basing access, and supporting its other foreign policy priorities (Morrow, 1991; Lake, 2009). The patron thus faces a dilemma. It must choose between withholding reassurance to maximize burden-sharing, on the one hand, and providing reassurance to ensure that allies have incentives to remain loyal to it, on the other. Directly studying the relationship between reassurance and burden-sharing is difficult, however. The first two problems are methodological. Any relationship that exists between patron reassurance and allied burden-sharing may be spurious. For example, U.S. troop presence is likely to be correlated with threat, which may have an independent effect on allied military spending. Second, the relationship between reassurance and burden-sharing may be endogenous; patrons may withhold reassurance from allies which are under-contributing and then reward them with assurances of protection once they have increased their efforts. The third problem is theoretical – even if troops are present, allies may fear (and, indeed, the patron may threaten) that they will be withdrawn. It is difficult to know, for example, whether a large U.S. troop presence in a country indicates that the host is highly dependent on the United States, or whether it is instead the United States that is dependent upon the host. Indeed, while Lake (2007, 2009) and Machain and Morgan (2013) find that states which host U.S. troops have lower defense contributions, Allen, VanDusky-Allen, and Flynn (2016) show that NATO allies’ defense efforts are positively related to U.S. military presence. Moreover, Bennett, Lepgold, and Unger (1994) find that states with a large U.S. military presence – which they treat as a proxy for partners’ dependence on the United States – were more likely to contribute to the 1990-91 Persian Gulf War.

### Deficit—Cohesion/Relations—Abandonment Fears

#### CP causes allies to perceive lack of US commitment

Benitez 19, Jorge Benitez is a senior fellow in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security at the Atlantic Council, specializing in NATO, transatlantic relations, European politics, and U.S. national security, “U.S. NATO Policy in the Age of Trump: Controversy and Consistency,” Winter 2019, The Fletcher forum of world affairs, vol. 43

Since its creation in response to Soviet aggression after World War II, the majority of the U.S. public has consistently held favorable views of NATO. But Trump’s repeated public criticism of NATO may be having an effect on popular support for the Alliance. Support for NATO by Republicans decreased from 52 percent in 2016 to 47 percent in 2017, during the first year of the Trump administration.81 Nevertheless, a strong majority of Americans polled have a favorable view of NATO. While Republican support for NATO may have gone down slightly, support for NATO by Democrats and Independents has increased significantly. As a result, overall public support for NATO has grown, from 53 percent in 2016 to 62 percent in 2017. 82 Still, Trump’s tough NATO policy is putting great strain on the Alliance. It will not convince the majority of U.S. allies to meet NATO’s 2-percent defense-spending pledge by 2024. Moreover, reducing U.S. commitments to NATO and cutting contributions to the Alliance will only make the problem worse and may make hostile powers more willing to test the Alliance by using force or engaging in a hybrid attack against a NATO member. Instead of focusing on threats, Trump’s NATO policy should propose feasible burden-sharing ideas that can be implemented quickly.83 But the key to a successful NATO policy from the Trump administration must be a more accurate perspective on the central role of NATO in U.S. national security. Trump needs to stop overestimating the harm from burden-sharing and underestimating the value of NATO to U.S. national interests. The security that NATO provides Europe, the North Atlantic, and the Mediterranean is worth much more to the United States than the 5 percent of the Department of Defense budget allocated to U.S. forces in Europe. It is critical that Trump appreciate the unique value that previous presidents saw in NATO. As George W. Bush described it,“These trans-Atlantic ties could not be severed by U-boats. They could not be cut by checkpoints and barbed wire. They were not ended by SS-20s and nuclear blackmail. And they certainly will not be broken by commercial quarrels and political debates.”84 NATO must not be evaluated simply as a transactional cost. It is a unique asset for the United States that protects American citizens, interests, and values. As Barack Obama explained,“Our nations are stronger and more prosperous when we stand together. In good times and in bad, our alliance has endured; in fact, it has thrived—because we share an unbreakable commitment to the freedom and security of our citizens. NATO is a force multiplier…. There is nothing else like it on Earth.”85 Notably, on July 6, 2017, Trump gave one of his most powerful foreign policy speeches in Warsaw. In the speech, he made two strong statements. “Americans know that a strong alliance of free, sovereign and independent nations is the best defense for our freedoms and for our interests. That is why my administration has demanded that all members of NATO finally meet their full and fair financial obligation,” he said.86 It is important that Trump recognize how his threats and demands are jeopardizing the significant value that NATO offers. If Trump leaves NATO or unintentionally breaks up the Alliance, the United States will not be able to replace it. Rather, the Trump administration should pursue alternative options to produce more responsible and fair behavior from NATO allies. As President, it is in Trump’s interest to strengthen NATO and find more positive and feasible policies to resolve the burden-sharing problem. NATO is the most powerful alliance in history and a key asset in U.S. national security. None of our competitors have anything like it. The loss of NATO would be a major victory for U.S. adversaries. As former Secretary of Defense Mattis has explained to the Senate Armed Services Committee, “history is clear: nations with strong allies thrive, and those without them wither.”87

#### Using the threat of abandonment to induce burden sharing causes allied distancing and wrecks assurance.

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If the benefits of coercion—especially the capricious sort in which Trump specializes—are small, the costs may be sizable. As we have seen, postwar American leaders saw value in asymmetric alliances in part because, by taking on the burden of defending others, they gained control over allies whose territory replaced the homeland as America’s front line. Washington spent more on defense than its allies, but got far more out of its alliances than any one of them did. If the United States continues to emphasize cost-sharing above all other strategic priorities, it will reduce its ability to assure and control allies, which may in turn weaken the defense and deterrence benefits those allies provide. America may pay less, but it will also get far less in return.

A loss of allied control may take the form of political distance, as allies look for other relationships to replace their faltering partner. German Chancellor Angela Merkel has already declared that Europe can no longer depend on the United States, and French President Emmanuel Macron has lamented that, amid US neglect and browbeating, NATO is “experiencing brain death.” South Korean President Moon Jae-In has prioritized his ongoing negotiations with Kim Jong Un, distancing himself from the United States. Both South Korea and Japan have improved their relations with China.16 Distance undermines policy coordination and can seriously diminish a guarantor’s political influence. It may even foster conditions in which allies to tilt toward rivals.

#### CP kills assurances – freeriding accusations and contested metrics

Foucalt and Mérand 12, Martial Foucault is a professor of political science at Sciences Pro Paris and a researches of political economy and political behavior, Frédéric Mérand is a profession of political science and the Scientific Director of the Centre for International Studies at the University of Montreal and a researcher in international relations and global security, “The Challenge of Burden Sharing,” Spring 2012, *International Journal*, Vol. 67, No. 2, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/23266017>

Accusations of free-riding have marred transatlantic relations ever since the creation of the Atlantic alliance in 1949. Then as now, the rhetoric of burden-sharing has served as a useful rhetorical weapon to blame those who were seen as not contributing enough to the cause. Each time, however, Washington's call has fallen on deaf ears, at least in public. In private, European and Canadian officials highlight other contributions they think they are making to NATO operations, for example in the shape of development aid or considerable troop casualties in Afghanistan. They mention UN peacekeeping missions, such as in Lebanon, where the US is not involved. Cynics admit that they never really bought much into the military adventures into which the US threw them, and that the US itself did not seem to believe much in the Libya mission. The reality, French foreign minister Alain Juppe retorted to Gates, is that it is the Europeans who "think the Americans aren't doing enough."3 The evolution of the transatlantic debate suggests two things. First, burden-sharing is about more than NATO. One cannot just look at defence spending at a time when humanitarian aid, diplomatic mediation, and the fight against climate change can all be considered contributions of a sort to collective security.4 Disentangling what counts as a contribution to which public good is no easy thing. Second, burden-sharing is a contested political concept. Statesmen and diplomats do not speak the abstract language of public choice, with its "non-excludable" and "non-rival" goods. Rather, they talk about "being fair," "doing what you can," and "making a real contribution." In other words, they speak the normative language of justice rather than the utilitarian language of economics.

### Deficit—Cohesion/Relations—Trump Proves

#### Conditional U.S. aid undermines allied cohesion – Trump’s public views on NATO prove

Benitez 19, Jorge Benitez is a senior fellow in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security at the Atlantic Council, specializing in NATO, transatlantic relations, European politics, and U.S. national security, “U.S. NATO Policy in the Age of Trump: Controversy and Consistency,” Winter 2019, The Fletcher forum of world affairs, vol. 43

These statements echo some of Trump’s remarks about NATO. They demonstrate that American leaders are becoming more impatient with the persistent burden-sharing imbalance with European allies, marking a frequently overlooked yet nevertheless dangerous decline in the U.S. attitude toward the behavior of its allies. They are proof that Europe has underestimated the corrosive effect of its attitude toward fulfilling the NATO defense commitment. These comments demonstrate that the problem of burden-sharing is serious and will continue to jeopardize transatlantic relations after Trump, unless significant progress is made. Trump no doubt feels validated by these criticisms from previous presidents. But Trump also feels that previous presidents were unsuccessful because they did not make sufficient effort to pressure NATO allies to fulfill their defense commitments. As a result, Trump appears willing to take greater risks than any of his predecessors. Trump summed this up after his last NATO summit in 2018: Now, what has happened is, presidents over many years, from Ronald Reagan to Barack Obama, they came in, they said, “Okay, hey, do the best you can,” and they left. Nobody did anything about it. And it got to a point where the United States was paying for 90 percent of NATO. And that’s not fair. So it’s changed.13 To properly understand this widening gap between the United States and NATO allies, it is essential to recall the timely warning from Secretary of Defense Robert Gates. In 2011, Gates spoke in very direct language to emphasize to Europe the gravity of the problem, stating, “I am the latest in a string of U.S. defense secretaries who have urged allies privately and publicly, often with exasperation, to meet agreed-upon NATO benchmarks for defense spending.”14 He then made one of the starkest warnings about the health of the Alliance, stating, “[I]f current trends in the decline of European defense capabilities are not halted and reversed, future U.S. political leaders— those for whom the Cold War was not the formative experience that it was for me—may not consider the return on America’s investment in NATO worth the cost.”15 Gates did not advocate for such a change in U.S. NATO policy, but he feared that if allies did not make a significant change, future U.S. leaders would lose faith in the most powerful alliance in U.S. history. This warning may now seem prophetic with the rise of Trump, but even Gates must have been surprised at how quickly his warning proved true. TRUMP BREAKS FROM HISTORICAL PRESIDENTIAL SUPPORT FOR NATO As we have seen, Trump is not the first president to complain that NATO allies are not contributing their fair share of defense spending to the Alliance. But Trump has done two things his predecessors avoided. First, he has publicly questioned the value of NATO to U.S. national security. Second, Trump has publicly questioned the validity of U.S. defense commitments to NATO allies. These two deviations from decades of bipartisan presidential support for NATO have weakened the cohesion of the transatlantic alliance and caused fears in allied capitals that under the Trump administration, the U.S. may not help defend them should they face a foreign attack. Trump’s views on NATO should be understood and examined in two phases: his statements about NATO as a candidate during the 2016 presidential campaign and his statements about NATO since he became president.

### Deficit—Deterrence

#### The CP’s pressure undermines deterrence

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These responses from European leaders show that startling allies into thinking the United States will abandon them has influenced allies to increase defense spending in line with the [2014 Wales Pledge](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_112964.htm). However, in the long term, NATO policymaking should employ a balanced approach. If the United States brings its security guarantee of the alliance too much into question, Russia or other states may take action to test the United States’ resolve. During the Cold War, US leaders continually reaffirmed their commitment to allies, effectively deterring a Soviet invasion. Deterrence works best when allies clearly express their mutual obligations to all actors on the international stage.

The experience of the United Kingdom and Germany leading up to World War I provides an example of how the United Kingdom’s lack of a solid commitment to its allies allowed German leaders to think the British would stand aside in the war. [Barbara Tuchman](https://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=92J9wTgKBOMC&oi=fnd&pg=PR7&dq=Guns+of+August&ots=mOLWViY-lK&sig=TOaFasP065_hkRLQIjryq6MJ6PI%23v=onepage&q=Guns%25252520of%25252520August&f=false) details this situation in her book The Guns of August. The failure of King George V and the UK Foreign Secretary to give a definite guarantee of joining the war should Germany invade allowed the Kaiser to think that he could attack without a British intervention. If the British had made a direct declaration of support for its allies, German leadership might have decided against escalating the war. This case gives policymakers an idea of what could happen if the United States does not maintain a firm commitment to its NATO allies. US leaders must watch how far they allow the US commitment to NATO wane in competitors’ eyes or risk possible adventurism on the eastern flank of NATO.

What do these two conflicting options mean for US policymakers? If the United States wants allies to meet the defense spending requirements, it needs them to fear the possibility that the United States may abandon them because their interests no longer align. The allies will only fear abandonment if the United States sends costly signals to them, such as troop withdrawals. As of 2020, the [majority of allies](https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2020/10/pdf/pr-2020-104-en.pdf) that meet the elusive two percent spending goal sit on NATO’s eastern flank, fearing Russia and desiring US protection. Nevertheless, [spending across the alliance](https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2020/10/pdf/pr-2020-104-en.pdf) has increased since 2014, in part, due to the Trump administration’s application of political pressure calling into doubt US interests in Europe. However, in the medium- and long-term, threatening to abandon allies will decrease the appearance of US security guarantees and invite competitors to push boundaries.

### Deficit—Conditions Fail

#### Conditional SC fails—it doesn’t induce behavioral change

Munson 13 (Peter J. Munson is senior vice president for preventive services and global crisis management for a private sector corporation and a retired U.S. Marine Corps officer. “THE LIMITS OF SECURITY COOPERATION” 9/10/13 <https://warontherocks.com/2013/09/the-limits-of-security-cooperation/>)

Planners should go to great lengths to ensure that SC is seen as a tool for a specific purpose, not a reward to condition behaviors. SC-as-a-conditioning-tool becomes bribery with diminishing returns. If policymakers want a quid pro quo, they need to admit as much and use much more precisely targeted incentives: paying a fee for access or head-of-the-line transit privileges for example. This becomes a much more predictable business transaction than trying to use SC funds, winks, and nudges to get one’s way. Finally, in the land of perverse incentives, SC is often seen as a means to drive defense business to U.S. contractors. This is true. By creating arms races and supplying prestige weapons, however useless, to unstable areas of the world, they are creating U.S. jobs. But wouldn’t taxpayer money and efforts be better spent if officials more precisely targeted domestic concerns with taxpayer funds rather than hoping that efforts trickle down predictably from collaboration with corpulent and unsavory foreign generals? In the land of perverse incentives, SC funding is one of the most egregious—and in the post-9/11 era, many officials see SC as a critical tool of strategic positioning. However, the premises of SC must be reconsidered before the U.S. military squanders more resources on white elephant projects.

### Deficit—AI—Say No

#### Despite talks and rhetoric, there’s no way that NATO cooperations on AI and Tech.

Franke ’21 (Ulrike Esther Franke, Senior policy fellow at the European council on Foreign Relations, “ARTIFICIAL DIVIDE: HOW EUROPE AND AMERICA COULD CLASH OVER AI”, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep29123>) //sethlee

Both sides of the Atlantic are already motivated to cooperate with each other on AI. But, despite these shared interests, transatlantic cooperation on AI may not be straightforward. Four trends, in particular, could pose problems: transatlantic estrangement; European digital autonomy efforts; differing views on China; and, potentially, Brexit. The transatlantic alliance has had a bad four years. The Trump administration’s criticism of the United Nations and the World Trade Organization, the president’s threats to leave NATO, and his active criticism of the EU all made Europeans wonder whether they had lost their most important partner. Moreover, in light of the conflict over 5G, in the minds of many Europeans, technology in particular has become an area that creates conflict in the transatlantic relationship rather than fostering cooperation. Although transatlantic relations are likely to improve under Biden, substantial damage has been done, and it will take some time to mend these ties. But, even if relations improve, it is becoming increasingly obvious that US has a diminishing interest in Europe as a geopolitically important part of the world. This trend was already visible under Trump’s predecessor, Barack Obama. It is, therefore, unsurprising that, on technology cooperation, both sides emphasise the importance of working with other actors as well as each other. The US National Security Commission on AI, for example, recommends that the US Departments of State and Defense “should negotiate formal AI cooperation agreements with Australia, India, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, and Vietnam”. Its March 2020 report emphasises on several occasions the importance of the Five Eyes intelligence alliance. Meanwhile, Europeans are pursuing the idea of an alliance for multilateralism. And, on technology and AI more specifically, they have also begun to reach out to other democratic allies. The most important aspect of transatlantic estrangement, however, is not the loss of trust between the US and Europe – which they will eventually reverse. Rather, during the four years of the Trump administration, and partly in response to isolationist tendencies in the US, Europeans have become much more comfortable talking about European strategic autonomy or sovereignty. Without encouraging the narrative that these efforts are directed against the US, or were primarily an answer to Trump, Europeans aim to empower Europe as an actor in its own right. In the technological realm, this led to the idea of European digital sovereignty, the aim of which is to build up European technological capabilities. Although European digital sovereignty is not specifically targeted at the US, it has led, among other things, to efforts such as the possible regulation of American technology companies and concerns over American firms acquiring European start-ups. European campaigners and some policymakers believe US tech giants such as Google, Apple, Facebook, and Amazon are forces to protect against. European thinking on technology partly developed in opposition to the US and US companies. Thus, European efforts to build up digital sovereignty may impede transatlantic cooperation. The EU’s effort to strengthen ethical AI, and to make ‘trustworthy AI’ a unique selling point for Europe, might also end up creating problems for transatlantic cooperation. Many EU policymakers believe that the EU’s insistence on ethical AI will eventually become a location advantage for Europe (much like data privacy): as more people become concerned about unethical AI and data security, they will prefer to use or buy AI ‘made in Europe’ rather than elsewhere. In this respect, two European aims are at odds with each other: on the one hand, Europeans want to ensure that AI is developed and used in an ethical way. Partnering with a powerful player such as the US on this matter should be an obvious way to help them achieve this goal. However, if the EU considers ethical AI not just a goal for humanity but a development that may also create commercial advantages for Europe, then transatlantic cooperation on this issue is counterproductive, as it would undermine Europe’s uniqueness. Finally, many Europeans have expressed scepticism about the extent to which Europe and the US are indeed aligned on ethical AI principles. For example, the Danish national AI strategy argues for a common ethical and human-centred basis for AI. It describes ethical AI as a particularly European approach: “Europe and Denmark should not copy the US or China. Both countries are investing heavily in artificial intelligence, but with little regard for responsibility, ethical principles and privacy.” Many Europeans feel that the US “has no idea how to regulate” cyberspace and continues to show little enthusiasm for doing so. The EU, however, likes to think of itself as a trailblazer when it comes to digital rights, such as the 2014 “right to be forgotten” or the 2018 General Data Protection Regulation.

### AT: Blankenship

#### Their “threats key” evidence is a mis-reading of Blankenship. They think the latent and implicit threat of abandonment is preferable to overt QPQs.

Blankenship – 1NC solvency advocate - 18 (Professor of Political Science at the University of Miami in Coral Gables, PhD political science at Columba, MPhil & MA political science at Columbia “Promises under Pressure: Reassurance and Burden-Sharing in Asymmetric Alliances,” Columbia University PhD dissertation)

The credibility of a patron’s threat of abandonment is shaped by far more than just the level of reassurance it provides. As a result, the extent to which reassurance and burden-sharing are positively or negatively correlated depends in large part on whether the patron can couple its assurances with threats. When a patron’s threat to abandon allies is credible ex ante, it can afford to reassure its allies without worrying as much about free-riding. Indeed, the literature on coercion shows that reassurance is equally as important as threats in making for effective coercion, although it is much less studied (Davis, 2000; Sechser, 2007; Carnegie, 2015; Gerzhoy, 2015). The target of coercive bargaining needs to know that if it gives in, its partner will simply punish it anyway (Schelling, 1966). Thus, reassurance can actually be a positive tool that is used to increase burden-sharing, though only if it is backed up by threats. These threats do not necessarily need to be explicit, and indeed may be most effective if they are not. Allies are likely to consider how likely patron abandonment is, and thus their burden-sharing efforts will in no small part be a reaction to the patron’s latent threat of abandonment.

3.2.1 What is Exit? By exit, I refer to attempts by states in an alliance to loosen themselves from the partnership and reduce the benefits they provide to their partners. For allies, exit takes the form of efforts to reclaim their autonomy and pursue a foreign policy more independent of the patron, while for patrons exit takes the form of efforts to reduce the security it provides. Exiting the alliance is more credible to the extent that a state has attractive outside options for meeting their security and/or autonomy needs. Violation or abrogation of the alliance treaty are only the most extreme forms of exit; a party to an alliance need not expect that its partner will outright terminate the partnership. Rather, exit is a spectrum, and states may fear the consequences of the more moderate step of their partners “distancing” themselves from the alliance. Distancing is undesirable for two reasons. The first is that the perception of disunity may weaken deterrence by tempting adversaries to drive a wedge between the allies or by emboldening them to behave more aggressively (Weitsman, 2004; Crawford, 2011). Second, distancing raises questions about the amount of support that the partner will 35 furnish. Allies may fear that the patron will give only minimal support if they are attacked, while the patron may anticipate that more autonomous allies will be less likely to provide basing rights, less likely to support its foreign policy initiatives, and more likely to come to a separate understanding with adversaries (Lake, 2009). In early 2018, for example, steps toward détente between North and South Korea – including North Korea’s participation in the Winter Olympics and discussions of potential bilateral talks – worried many in the United States, who feared that such a rapprochement might undermine South Korea’s support for the United States’ preferred policy of putting military and economic pressure on the North.3 Two general forms of outside options are available to alliance partners: self-sufficiency and search. In the case of the former, states reduce their need for partners. Allies, for example, can attempt to increase their own military capabilities such that they no longer need protection. Patrons, for their part, can reduce their need for loyal allies by pursuing a more unilateral or isolationist foreign policy, and by striking a deal with adversaries. In terms of search, patrons and allies can seek alternative partners. While the types of outside options weaker allies can pursue – ranging from nuclearization, to neutrality, to finding other countries to rely on for support – are diverse, and in many cases will not be the precursor to actual alliance termination, their causes are fundamentally similar, and they share common features that will make them worrisome to the patron. First, all of the forms of exit I discuss reduce allies’ dependence on the patron. This, in turn, makes them less likely to cave into its pressure in the future, and gives them less incentive to be automatically loyal. As a result, a patron has good reason to discourage allies from pursuing any of these options. Second, allies will be most prone to consider all of these forms of exit when relying on the patron’s protection becomes less attractive – whether because the patron seems unreliable, because the severity of the threat environment makes trusting the patron risky, or because the barriers to exit decrease. I am ultimately agnostic as to which form of exit allies will be most likely to pursue in a given situation. Indeed, in many cases, allies can pursue multiple options in tandem, such as unilateral military arming coupled with efforts at rapprochement with adversaries. Nevertheless, I treat the threat of all forms of exit as a key driver of patron reassurance.

### Perm Do the CP Definitions

**“Resolved” doesn’t require certainty**

**Webster’s 9** – Merriam Webster 2009

(http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/resolved)

# Main Entry: 1re·solve # Pronunciation: \ri-ˈzälv, -ˈzȯlv also -ˈzäv or -ˈzȯv\ # Function: verb # Inflected Form(s): re·solved; re·solv·ing 1 : to become separated into component parts; also : to become reduced by dissolving or analysis 2 : to form a resolution : determine 3 : consult, deliberate

**Or immediacy**

**PTE 9** – Online Plain Text English Dictionary 2009

(http://www.onelook.com/?other=web1913&w=Resolve)

Resolve: “To form a purpose; to make a decision; especially, to determine after reflection; as, to resolve on a better course of life.”

#### “Should” is advisory, not certain. It also equals “ought.”

Richman ’16 [James; August 17; Judge on the Second Circuit, California’s Court of Appeals; Westlaw, “Marin Assn. of Pub. Emps. v. Marin Cty. Employees' Ret. Assn.,” 2 Cal. App. 5th 674]

There is, of course, no bar to the Supreme Court adopting a Court of Appeal's reasoning as its own. Yet there is legitimate reason to question whether that was what the Supreme Court intended in 1983. First, as just shown, only the least authoritative of the three sources cited \*\*385 actually supports the word “must,” while the two Supreme Court decisions employ “should.” Second, barely a month later, the Supreme Court—speaking though the same justice—filed another decision which used the “should” formulation from the 1955 Allen decision as quoted in Abbott.20 Third, the 1983 Allen decision involved retirees (and Flournoy the widow of a retiree), who historically receive a heightened degree of judicial protection. (See fn. 19, ante.) Fourth, and most significantly, the “must” formulation has never been reiterated by the Supreme Court, which has instead uniformly employed the “should” \*699 language from the 1955 Allen decision. (Olson v. Cory, supra, 27 Cal.3d 532, 541, 178 Cal.Rptr. 568, 636 P.2d 532 [“Although an employee does not obtain any ‘absolute right to fixed or specific benefits ... there [are] strict limitation[s] on the conditions which may modify the pension system in effect during employment.’ [Citation.] Such modifications must be reasonable and any ‘ “changes in a pension plan which result in disadvantage to employees should be accompanied by comparable new advantages” ’ ”]; Legislature v. Eu (1991) 54 Cal.3d 492, 529–530, 286 Cal.Rptr. 283, 816 P.2d 1309 [quoting Olson]; City of Huntington Beach v. Board of Administration (1992) 4 Cal.4th 462, 472, 14 Cal.Rptr.2d 514, 841 P.2d 1034 [“changes in a pension plan which result in disadvantage to employees should be accompanied by comparable new advantages,” citing Allen v. City of Long Beach, supra, 45 Cal.2d 128, 131, 287 P.2d 765].)

It thus appears unlikely that the Supreme Court's use of “must” in the 1983 Allen decision was intended to herald a fundamental doctrinal shift. “Should,” not “must,” remains the court's preferred expression. And “should” does not convey imperative obligation, no more compulsion than “ought.” (Lashley v. Koerber (1945) 26 Cal.2d 83, 90, 156 P.2d 441; see People v. Webb (1986) 186 Cal.App.3d 401, 409, fn. 2, 230 Cal.Rptr. 755 [“the word ‘should’ is advisory only and not mandatory”].) In plain effect, “should” is “a recommendation, not ... a mandate.” (Cuevas v. Superior Court (1976) 58 Cal.App.3d 406, 409, 130 Cal.Rptr. 238.)

#### “Should” refers to the future.

Brown ’8 [Mary Ann Brown; May 14; Judge on the Court of Appeals of Iowa; Westlaw, “In re Est. of Guthrie,” 752 N.W.2d 452]

Brock and Kaitlyn look to the word “should” in the phrase “in the event any of my children should predecease me” and claim the district court improperly found the word looked to the future. They claim the word should be interpreted as the past tense of “shall” to imply a duty or obligation. See Black's Law Dictionary 1379 (6th ed.1990). Looking at the phrase as a whole, however, rather than at a single word, we determine the phrase is considering possible future events. See In re Estate of Grulke, 546 N.W.2d 626, 627 (Iowa Ct.App.1996) (noting we must ascertain a testator's intent from the entire will).

#### “Security cooperation” is defined in government documents to require the DOD.

JCS ’17 [Joint Chiefs of Staff; May 23; publishing with the Army, Marine Corp, Air Force, Navy, and Coast Guard; Security Cooperation, Joint Publication 3-20, “Glossary,” https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3\_20\_20172305.pdf]

PART II—TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

defense institution building. Security cooperation conducted to establish or reform the capacity and capabilities of a partner nation’s defense institutions at the ministerial/department, military staff, and service headquarters levels. Also called DIB. (Approved for inclusion in the DOD Dictionary.)

foreign military sales. That portion of United States security assistance for sales programs that require agreements/contracts between the United States Government and an authorized recipient government or international organization for defense articles and services to be provided to the recipient for current stocks or new procurements under Department of Defense-managed contracts, regardless of the source of financing. Also called FMS. (Approved for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)

international military education and training. Formal or informal instruction provided to foreign military students, units, and forces on a non-reimbursable (grant) basis by offices or employees of the United States, contract technicians, and contractors, and the instruction may include correspondence courses; technical, educational, or informational publications; and media of all kinds. Also called IMET. (Approved for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)

partner nation. 1. A nation that the United States works with in a specific situation or operation. (JP 1) 2. In security cooperation, a nation with which the Department of Defense conducts security cooperation activities. (JP 3-20) Also called PN. (Approved for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)

security assistance. Group of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended; the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended; or other related statutes by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services by grant, lease, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives, and those that are funded and authorized through the Department of State to be administered by Department of Defense/Defense Security Cooperation Agency are considered part of security cooperation. Also called SA. (Approved for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)

security cooperation. All Department of Defense interactions with foreign security establishments to build security relationships that promote specific United States security interests, develop allied and partner nation military and security capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide United States forces with peacetime and contingency access to allied and partner nations. Also called SC. (Approved for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)

### AT: INB—European Defense High

#### European Defense spending is high and increasing rapidly

Rolander ’22 (Niclas Rolander, Reporter, “Global Military Spending Tops $2 Trillion for First Time as Europe Boosts Defenses”, <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-04-24/military-spending-passes-2-trillion-as-europe-boosts-defenses>) //sethlee

Global military expenditure has surpassed $2 trillion per year for the first time, and looks set to rise further as European countries beef up their armed forces in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

In 2021, countries spent a total of $2,113 billion on their militaries, up 0.7% in real terms from the year before, according to a report released Monday by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, or SIPRI.

After a brief period of declining military spending between 2011 and 2014, outlays have increased for 7 consecutive years, according to SIPRI data. In the wake of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, several European governments have pledged a spending overhaul to boost their forces’ capabilities.

“Europe was already on an increasing trend, and this trend will accelerate and intensify,” Lucie Beraud-Sudreau, director of SIPRI’s military expenditure and arms production program, said in a phone interview. “Usually change happens slowly, until you are in a crisis and then change really happens. I think that’s where we are now.”

The upturn since 2015 has partly been fueled by higher spending in Europe, after Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea raised the perceived threat level at the same time as the U.S. administration under Donald Trump increased pressure on NATO allies to spend more on their armed forces, Beraud-Sudreau said.

European spending in 2021 accounted for 20% of the global total, and China’s defense budget, the world’s second largest, is estimated to make up 14%.

The U.S. remains by far the biggest spender, with $801 billion allocated to the armed forces in 2021, according to SIPRI. In the last decade, U.S. military spending has made up as much as 39% of global expenditures. While the country’s arms purchases have declined, more funds have been devoted to military research and development, suggesting that the U.S. is focusing more on next-generation technologies, according to SIPRI researcher Alexandra Marksteiner.

As European nations from Sweden to Spain have pledged to increase defense budgets, early indications are that modernizing and upgrading weapons systems will be a key priority, Beraud-Sudreau said. In doing so, they are facing a choice of whether to prioritize a quick buildup by buying equipment off-the-shelf from arms manufacturers in other parts of the world, or taking a more long-term approach by increasing funding for domestic industry.

#### Burden Sharing increasing now – data proves

Hazen ’20 (Bradley Hazen, intern in the Atlantic Council’s Transatlantic Security Initiative, “NATO’s progress on burden sharing remains strong” <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/commentary/infographic/natos-progress-on-burden-sharing-remains-strong/>) //sethlee

When NATO leaders met in Wales in 2014, strengthening allied burden sharing and reversing a downward trend in national defense spending were high on the agenda. In response to Russia’s comprehensive military modernization efforts and territorial aggression against Ukraine, member states [pledged](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_112964.htm) to increase their national defense spending to at least 2 percent of real gross domestic product (GDP) by no later than 2024.

European allies and Canada have now contributed five consecutive years of growth in defense investment, adding a cumulative total of [$130 billion](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_174406.htm#sg4) in new spending since 2016. In 2019, all but three NATO allies increased their defense spending in real terms, with nine allies reaching or surpassing the 2 percent goal (up from seven in 2018).

But progress has not been confined just to the realm of investment. Since 2014, the Alliance has stepped up [military exercises](https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2019_02/1902-factsheet_exercises_en.pdf) across Europe, strengthened multinational missions in the [air](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_132685.htm) and at  [sea](https://mc.nato.int/media-centre/news/2020/focused-nato-patrols-back-in-the-mediterranean), and reinforced its eastern flank with new enhanced Forward Presence missions in the Baltic States and Poland.

Looking ahead, the COVID-19 pandemic has left much regarding the [future](https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/coronavirus-and-transatlantic-security-implications-for-defense-planning/) of allied defense planning and investment uncertain, and it is likely that many allied governments will feel pressured to limit or cut defense spending as the pandemic’s economic toll continues to mount. That said, it is clear from the data that the Alliance-wide drive towards 2 percent, though uneven at times, continued apace through 2019, signaling NATO members’ commitment to strengthening and more evenly distributing their contributions to the common defense.

### AT: INB—European Defense High—Ukraine

#### NATO members have increased their defense budget after Ukraine War

Mackenzie ’22 (Christina Mackenzie, “[Seven European nations have increased defense budgets in one month. Who will be next?](https://breakingdefense.com/2022/03/seven-european-nations-have-increased-defense-budgets-in-one-month-who-will-be-next/)“ <https://breakingdefense.com/2022/03/seven-european-nations-have-increased-defense-budgets-in-one-month-who-will-be-next/>) //sethlee

PARIS: The war in Ukraine has been a strong wake-up call for a number of European countries who’d been basking in post-Cold War comfort thinking that armed conflict was relegated to history and that spending on defense could be minimal.

The turnaround since [Russia’s Feb. 24 invasion of Ukraine](https://breakingdefense.com/2022/02/russia-aiming-to-decapitate-ukrainian-government-us-official/) has been nothing less than stunning, to the point that six NATO members have now pledged defense increases of $133 billion so far; militarily neutral Sweden has also pledged an increase. And more nations seem poised to follow suit in the days and weeks to come.

The first to make a 180° turnaround was Germany. Just four days after Russia’s invasion began, Chancellor Olaf Scholz announced his government would ramp up its defense spending in 2022 alone by €100 billion ($112 billion) taking defense spending from 1.53% of GDP to above 2%.


That is the figure recommended by NATO estimated to have been [only met in 2021](https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2021/6/pdf/210611-pr-2021-094-en.pdf) by the US, Greece (3.82%), Croatia (2.79%), the United Kingdom (2.29%), Estonia (2.28%), Latvia (2.27%), Poland (2.10%), Lithuania, (2.03%), Romania (2.02%) and France (2.01%), according to NATO statistics. (That Germany had not met that threshold was a major political sticking point during the Trump administration, leading to tensions between Washington and Berlin.)

Scholz said in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine it had become clear “we need to invest significantly more in the security of our country, in order to protect our freedom and our democracy.” If the money Scholz has requested comes through, it will mark a dramatic moment for Germany, with Berlin becoming the largest overall defense spender in Europe. How that money will be spent will be important to watch for industry; currently,[only four European NATO member states](https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2021/6/pdf/210611-pr-2021-094-en.pdf) (Iceland, Slovenia, Portugal and Belgium) spend a lower percentage of their overall defense spending on procurement and defense-related R&D than Germany’s 18.6%.

NATO’s geographic home of Belgium followed suit days later, announcing on Feb. 25 it would raise its defense budget from the current €4.2 billion (0.9% of GDP) to €6.9 billion (1.54% of GDP) by 2030. But on March 16 Prime Minister Alexander De Croo told parliamentarians this was not enough, indicating more may come.

Romania announced on March 1 it will up its defense budget from 2.02% to 2.5% of GDP starting in 2023. The 2022 defense budget of RON25.9bn ($5.8bn) is already 14% higher than 2021. Florin Cîțu, president of the Romanian Senate, suggested a day later that a large proportion of the new funds should be used for capital investments, but gave no precise figures. A forecast released in December 2021 suggested investment would account for 40% of the total defense budget by 2025. That will likely increase further in light of the new 2.5% goal.

#### Ukraine has prompted NATO countries to massively increase spending--- CP does nothing.

Dowd, 22 [Alan W. Dowd, contributing editor with *The American Legion Magazine*, writes in U.S. foreign policy, national defense and international security, 5-12-2022, "No more free-riders in the free world," American Legion, <https://www.legion.org/landingzone/255773/no-more-free-riders-free-world> /alundy]

In the wake of Vladimir Putin’s beastly assault on Ukraine, multiple NATO nations have announced immediate plans to increase defense spending**.** This reawakening is long overdue. In this post-post-Cold War era, there’s no room in the free world for free-riders.

Rearming What Winston Churchill said of Josef Stalin and his commissars remains true of Putin and his henchmen: “There is nothing they admire so much as strength, and there is nothing for which they have less respect than for weakness, especially military weakness.”

Before hurling his army into Ukraine, Putin not only sensed weakness in NATO but saw it in a range of policies: evaporating defense budgets, lack of cohesion and commitment in Afghanistan, doubts about NATO sown by NATO leaders, the chaotic pullout from Kabul, the feckless response to his invasion of Georgia (2008) and annexation of Crimea (2014), flatfooted confusion over his misinformation campaigns and cyberattacks, a shortsighted dependency on his regime for energy supplies, the straitjacket self-restraint in NATO capitals.

Yet what Putin has seen in the months since he launched his catastrophic and criminal invasion of Ukraine is something he never anticipated.

For individuals and nations alike, danger on the doorstep has a way of rearranging priorities and refocusing the mind. That's what has happened among NATO's European leaders.

In a stunning 180-degree turn just 72 hours after Putin’s attack on Ukraine, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz announced that his government would increase defense spending to 2% of GDP – something NATO has been begging Berlin to do since 2006. That amounts to a near-doubling of Germany’s defense budget -- by next year. Scholz also unveiled a massive $112.7 billion modernization and rearmament fund and announced plans to replace Germany's aging fighter-bomber fleet with F-35s. And since energy security is inextricably tied to national security, it’s worth noting that he unveiled detailed plans to create a strategic LNG reserve and build new LNG terminals.

“The world,” Scholz explained as Putin began his siege to Ukraine, “will no longer be the same as the world before**.”**

Berlin’s extraordinary about-face was an early indication that other NATO nations would begin to lift their defense budgets – and finally see Putin for what he is, not what they hoped him to be.

Defense spending was inching upward in Europe even before Putin’s war, but Germany’s transformation that fateful last week of February heralds a far more dramatic and rapid return to deterrence across the 30-member alliance.

Poland – thrust to the frontlines of Cold War 2.0 by Putin’s invasion – announced that its defense budget will jump to 3% of GDP next year. Before the invasion, Poland had planned to invest 2.5% of GDP into defense. That’s a 20% spike in just one year. Mariusz Blaszczak, Poland’s defense minister, says Warsaw is committed to fielding “one of the strongest armies in NATO."

Just days after the invasion, French President Emmanuel Macron revealed that his government would increase defense spending, calling it “the price for peace, freedom and democracy.” To his credit, Macron has increased defense spending every year since 2017.

Italian Prime Minister Mario Draghi unveiled plans to “invest more in defense than we have ever done before” and to lift Italy's defense budget to the NATO standard of 2% of GDP.

Immediately after Putin launched his war, Latvia approved measures pushing its defense budget to 2.5% of GDP (up from 2.2%). That represents a one-year increase of 13%. Lithuania is increasing defense spending. And Estonia’s defense minister says the country will increase defense spending to accelerate equipment acquisitions.

Even before Russia’s February invasion, the Netherlands had increased defense spending. The Dutch government is working on an even bigger defense budget now, with Prime Minister Mark Rutte declaring, “The Netherlands will spend a lot of extra money on defense.”

Norway, which shares land and maritime borders with Russia, is making immediate emergency investments to- increase the number and tempo of naval deployments, increase the number of combat exercises, increase ammunition and fuel stocks, enhance its "ability to receive allied reinforcements," and "strengthen the armed forces' ability to prevent and stop digital threats."

Romania is increasing defense spending by 23.7% for fiscal 2023.

Thanks to major investments in defense announced in 2020, Britain is already riding its largest wave of defense spending since the Cold War’s end.

Sweden -- not yet a NATO member -- has unveiled a plan to rapidly increase defense spending from 1.3% of GDP to 2% of GDP.

As of this moment 10 members of the alliance meet NATO’sstandard 2%-of-GDP standard. But NATO is headed in the right direction. In 2016, just five members met that standard. And several allies are pouring significant sums into the common defense. Belgium’s defense budget is 10.9% larger than a year ago, Croatia’s is up 62.5% and the Greek defense budget is 49.6% larger. Italy’s is up 6%, Spain’s 7.7%, Britain’s 7.5% and France’s 5%.

### AT: INB—Burden Sharing Fails

#### No deterrence impact—burden sharing fails and gets circumvented.

Zannella, 20 [Anthony Zannella Seton Hall University, majored in Political Science and Philosophy, 4-7-2020 "An Analysis of Burden Sharing in NATO and the Problem of Free Riding," Political Analysis: Vol. 21 , Article 5, [https://scholarship.shu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1058&context=pa#](https://scholarship.shu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1058&context=pa) /alundy]

Regarding Libya and Afghanistan, it would appear as though NATO allies were contributing to a more balanced and fair system of burden sharing, but this is in fact not the case. In Afghanistan, alliance cooperation and burden sharing were on more equal footing with the initial invocation of Article 5. Countries were attempting to provide military assistance to the operations despite the limitations their economies and populations imposed upon them. However, there were only a few countries that provided enough force in any truly effective sense. While major allies such as Canada did indeed provide a great deal for the alliance in the beginning, support tapered off overtime. Several other capable countries did not dedicate as much as they could have, and even when they did, their support provided little strategic significance. Instead, U.S. forces were providing for the bulk of the operation while its allies were hampered by inefficient forces and a reluctance to give in to U.S. unilateralism. In addition, the restraints placed on rules of engagement and other factors significantly reduced the effectiveness of their combat roles. This forced the U.S. to pick up the slack, as it had done during the Cold War, with its deterrence abilities. The eventual decline in alliance involvement also indicates support for collective action theory as allies began to outweigh the costs to the benefits of participating in combat operations with the U.S. In Libya, on the other hand, the U.S. attempted to reduce its role in combat operations while NATO allies shouldered the burden of putting their forces in potential danger. While the U.S. was dedicating its budget to strategic command, its allies were making up for their lack of defense spending by taking more responsibility through both material and non-material variables. The involvement of more subtle factors completely changes the implications of collective action. However, the statistics indicated that the U.S. was still forced to engage in taking on a larger share of the burden than it had anticipated or even wanted. The other allies did in fact break through domestic constraints by putting their forces in harm’s way. But Hasebrouck’s work showed that such constraints were not as prominent because Libya was considered an easier operation, and the U.S. still took on a greater role. Furthermore, the implications of increased U.S. involvement show in a concrete way that free riding is occurring. The inability of European forces to deal with the realities of modern combat forced them to rely on the U.S. even though they were trying to take more of a leadership role in the operation.

#### European burden sharing fails

Economist 19 – (“**What would happen if America left Europe to fend for itself**?” March 14, 2019. <https://amp.economist.com/special-report/2019/03/14/what-would-happen-if-america-left-europe-to-fend-for-itself)//Wompus> =)

A pale shadow Yet the **Europeans would immediately face institutional hurdles.** Compared with Russia’s top-down system, command and control is hard enough in consensus-bound nato. **It would be a bigger challenge for Europeans alone, especially if they did not inherit nato’s command structure. The eu may want to take the lead, but military thinking is not in its dna.** Besides, an eu-only alliance would be a pale shadow of nato: after Brexit, non-eu countries will account for fully 80% of nato defence spending. **There would be gaps in capabilities, too. How bad these were would depend on the mission**, and how many operations were under way at the same time. The **European-led interventions in Libya and Mali exposed dependence on America in vital areas such as air-to-air refuelling and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance.** A detailed look at the sort of scenarios Europe might face would help to identify other gaps, and what it would take to fill them. Bastian Giegerich of the iiss, who is starting to work on such assessments, reckons that realistically the **gap-filling could take 15 years** or so. **That is a long time for places like Poland and the Baltic countries that feel under threat. Fear and mistrust could quickly conspire to make narrow national interests trump efforts to maintain European unity. Hence a second, perhaps likelier, version of what might follow an American withdrawal: Europe Divided.** Jonathan **Eyal** of the Royal United Services Institute in London **imagines a frenzy of activity, a cacophony of summits—and a renationalisation of defence strategies.** Lots of countries would seek bilateral deals. In central Europe he would expect an alliance between Poland and Romania to guarantee the eastern border. The **Russians and Chinese** would not sit idly by, he says, but **would play their own games with the Greeks, Hungarians and others. It is these games of mistrust that the American security guarantee has largely helped to avoid. They could all too easily resurface.** “**Establishing a purely European defence**”, warns Michael Rühle, a long-time nato official, “**would overwhelm the Europeans politically, financially and militarily**.”

### AT: INB—Burden Sharing Fails—European Disfunction

#### Increased defense spending fails—European disfunction thumps burden sharing effectiveness

Bergmann 21 -- Max Bergmann, a senior Fellow at the Center for American Progress, official at the U.S. State Department from 2011 to 2017. [The EU Is the Military Ally the United States Needs: Take the Pressure Off of NATO States and Embrace the Union’s Defense, 1-6-21, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2021-01-06/eu-military-ally-united-states-needs]

Insisting that European states hit two percent by 2024 is setting up the alliance to fail. Not only are these states unlikely to hit the target, but even if they did, the results would likely be underwhelming. The two percent metric is, after all, arbitrary, as it is not tied to specific defense requirements, and is moreover subject to broader economic fluctuations. Greece, for instance, hit two percent only because its GDP contracted so dramatically, increasing its military’s share of the shrinking budget. Indeed, marginal increases in any single country’s defense spending won’t automatically help improve the European pillar of NATO, which is plagued with inefficiencies. EU member states in total spend roughly $200 billion annually on defense, on a par with China. But Europe struggles to deploy forces; it runs out of munitions when it fights; and its forces are seldom prepared to fight.

The problem, then, is not really low spending but that European defense spending is fragmented, wasteful, and redundant. For instance, although Germany is the strongest economic power in Europe, few of Germany’s attack helicopters are ready for combat. France, by contrast, has a very capable military engaged in active combat operations in the Sahel. But French forces depend on U.S. support for those operations. When European states spend on defense, most of them allocate too little of their budgets to research and development and face stark tradeoffs between acquiring expensive new technologies and simply maintaining the forces they have. As the European defense analyst Sven Biscop of the Egmont Institute assesses, “The status of Europe’s armed forces and their dependence on the US will basically remain unaltered, even if they all spend 2 percent of their GDP.”

A Collective Concern

U.S. leaders have long viewed the EU as just another complicated, multilateral bureaucracy. To the extent that it got involved in defense, Washington imagined, the EU would duplicate and undermine NATO’s function. But the EU has transformed since its founding in 1993, becoming something much more like a state than a multilateral organization. Europeans in the EU are EU citizens, subject to EU law, free to live and work where they please in the union. They have their own currency, a de facto national language (English), and a federal government in Brussels.

As the union has drawn together, Europeans have come to perceive defense and foreign policy as more of a collective concern than a national one. Support across Europe for EU defense is extremely high, consistently polling above 70 percent. Within European states, however, there is considerably less support for diverting national resources away from domestic priorities, such as health and education, and toward the high-end weapons systems that are required to marginally improve NATO’s collective defense capacity. The lack of national interest in defense spending is therefore not a short-term problem for NATO; it is structural.

### AT: INB—No Impact—US increase spending

#### Independent of what Europe does, the US will just increase spending for strategic and nuclear dominance.

Thimm, 18 [Johannes Thimm, Head of Research Division “The Americas” at Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, German Institute for International and Security Affairs, 4-09-2018, ‘NATO: US Strategic Dominance and Unequal Burden-Sharing Are Two Sides of the Same Coin’, <https://www.swp-berlin.org/en/publication/nato-us-strategic-dominance-and-unequal-burden-sharing-are-two-sides-of-the-same-coin> /alundy]

US defense policy is made strictly on US terms.

Second, the US defense budget does not depend on Europe’s military spending. It is misleading to argue that Europe must spend more so that the United States can spend less. The Pentagon’s budget is determined by Washington’s assessment of the capabilities necessary to maintain US strategic dominance – on its own, not through any alliance. When Congress adopts the annual defense budget, European expenditures play a marginal role**.** In 2017, President Trump increased the US defense budget, despite the fact that European states also spent more (and Russia’s spending decreased by 20 percent). According to calculations by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, US spending on NATO and the defense of Europe amounts to $30 billion, or just over 5 percent of its defense budget. Comparing that figure to the roughly $240 billion of European spending for NATO, the imbalance no longer seems so great. Given these numbers, it is also hard to argue that Europe is principally to blame for a US defense budget of around $600 billion.

Looking specifically at the cost of the US nuclear arsenal, it becomes even clearer how detached the US budget is from burden-sharing in NATO. Washington defines the US nuclear strategy with little regard for Europe’s policy priorities. Over the next thirty years (calculated from 2017), Washington plans a massive qualitative nuclear build-up, spending $400 billion on modernizing its nuclear arsenal – in addition to the costs of maintaining existing systems. This move was partly a reaction to Russian aggression in Ukraine, but above all a concession by President Obama to the Republican Congress in exchange for its approval of the 2014 New START treaty, in which the United States and Russia pledged to limit numbers of strategic nuclear warheads. If Trump were really interested in reducing costs, he would make serious efforts on arms control. Instead, he refused Russia’s offer to extend the New START treaty beyond its 2021 expiration date and increased spending on nuclear weapons by almost 20 percent. So, yes, to some extent Europe is free-riding on US security guarantees. But the reasons include the US desire for unrivalled military and nuclear capabilities, and not simply European reluctance to spend money on defense.

#### No impact---defense spending is irrelevant.

Mira Rapp-Hooper 20, Political Science PhD at Columbia University, Senior Research Scholar in Law at Yale Law School, Senior Fellow at Yale's Paul Tsai China Center, Senior Fellow at Yale's Paul Tsai China Center., “Shields of the Republic: The Triumph and Peril of America’s Alliances,” Harvard University Press//Wompus =)

But it is also reasonable to argue that these spending gaps are of little consequence. The important question is whether it is cheaper to have a foreign policy that relies on sustained cooperation with allies afflicted by moral hazard than to have a unilateral policy with no burden-sharing at all. On this view, as long as US defense spending does not exceed national means, it is hardly tragic if allies spend a bit less as a proportion of GDP. There is no evidence that American defense spending hampers growth or makes the country less competitive. And while the defense budget makes up a sizable chunk of federal spending, a relatively small portion of that money goes to forward basing. To those who bemoan burden-sharing gaps, a reasonable rejoinder is that Washington should ensure that its own budget commitments are sound in national terms, rather than preoccupy itself with false equivalence abroad.7

Finally, when we think about the costs of alliances, we should be mindful that alliance agreements themselves impose no financial burdens on the US Treasury. What costs money—and potentially lives—is the associated force posture. Proposals for cutting US alliance spending are usually suggestions about curtailing overseas defense presence. This is not a semantic difference. It points to an important reality that many miss when they refer to alliances as extravagant: in order to generate substantial savings in its own defense budget—that is, to close the gap between its “allied contribution” ratio and those of its thriftier partners—the United States would have to close overseas bases and return the personnel and materiel to the continental United States. Simply consolidating bases and relying more on rotational deployments would not generate substantial cost savings.8 Leading scholars have argued for just this kind of move—ending alliances and shuttering related bases to curb commitments and spending. Such dramatic changes would require not just a transformed alliance policy but a completely different grand strategy— one that does not seek to secure the balance of power in Eurasia through forward defense, deterrence, and allied assurance and control.

### AT: INB—China—Asia Pivot Fails

#### Asia Pivot Fails - NATO and U.S pivot against China is both unnecessary and causes conflict

Shankar ’22 (Priyanka Shankar, Independent Journalist based in the Brussels, “Nato leaders say China is a ‘systemic challenge to Euro-Atlantic security” <https://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/3183564/nato-leaders-say-china-systemic-challenge-euro-atlantic-security>) //sethlee

It accused Beijing of employing “a broad range of political, economic and military tools to increase its global footprint and project power, while remaining opaque about its strategy, intentions and military build-up”.

The policy document said China’s “malicious hybrid and cyber operations and its confrontational rhetoric and disinformation target allies and harm alliance security”.

It said that China sought to “control key technological and industrial sectors, critical infrastructure, and strategic materials and supply chains. It uses its economic leverage to create strategic dependencies”.

After the strategy was adopted at the Nato Summit in Madrid, Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg told reporters: “China does not share our values, and like Russia is working on undermining our values.”

“China was not mentioned in our previous strategic concept,” he said. “In this year’s strategic concept, allies have stated that the People’s Republic of China’s ambitions and coercive policies challenge our interests, security and values.”

Chinese officials reacted almost immediately in refuting the claims.

“How can an Asia-Pacific China pose any challenge to the security of a North Atlantic military alliance? In fact, it’s the other way round. It’s Nato that dropped bombs on a Chinese embassy,” Wang Lutong the Chinese foreign ministry’s top official for Europe, wrote on Twitter.

He was referring to the strike that hit Beijing’s embassy in Belgrade in 1999 during the war in then Yugoslavia, killing three Chinese journalists.

“China is never engaged in exporting values. We don’t impose our ideas on anyone. Nato should not allow itself to be used by some superpower to maintain hegemony and suppress other countries,” Wang said.

Before the summit, China’s envoy to the United Nations, Zhang Jun said: “Nato’s five eastward expansions after the Cold War have not only failed to make Europe securer, but also sowed the seed of conflict.”

“We firmly oppose certain elements clamouring for Nato’s involvement in the Asia-Pacific, or an Asia-Pacific version of Nato on the back of military alliances,” he said.

The sentiment [was echoed](https://twitter.com/AmbLiuXiaoMing/status/1541999187394535424?s=20&t=wForbHRzAsuw0jrYfKVKKQ&module=inline&pgtype=article) by other Chinese diplomats on Twitter, in what appeared to be a coordinated response.

#### Pivot fails—no planning

Jackson 22, Van Jackson is a senior lecturer in international relations at Victoria University of Wellington, “America’s Asia Strategy Has Reached a Dead End,” January 9th 2022, *Foreign Policy*, Argument, https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/01/09/us-southeast-asia-china-biden-economic-strategy-geopolitics/

In December 2021, the Biden administration’s Indo-Pacific coordinator, Kurt Campbell, [detailed](https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/conversation-white-house-indo-pacific-coordinator-kurt-campbell) the shape of U.S. thinking about China and Asia during a conference on Indo-Pacific security. He hit all the familiar notes: the importance of alliances, weapons sales to counter China, the centrality of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and the optimistic view that Sino-U.S. relations could be at once competitive and stable. In any other era, such talk might have been comfort food for regional experts and policymakers. But absent from Campbell’s remarks at the conference, which was organized by Australia’s Lowy Institute, was any meaningful statement about political economy—the single aspect of statecraft most crucial to the Indo-Pacific region’s stability. It is in this arena of policy that China has done more to displace the United States than in any other, and it remains the glaring hole in Washington’s attempts to craft an Indo-Pacific policy. When pressed on this by his host, Campbell acknowledged that defense initiatives were not enough. But he could mention no concept, policy, or action to suggest economics was anything more than a throwaway gesture in a speech. Grand references to a forthcoming “economic framework” that would be “cutting-edge” lacked all specifics and stated no purpose other than wanting the United States to “design” the region’s standards. To the extent Campbell’s remarks reflect Washington’s view of Asia, they are at once modestly reassuring and highly troubling. Reassuring because Campbell’s bland rhetorical restraint is a refreshing departure from the volatility and pugnaciousness of the Trump administration. Troubling, however, because the ideas powering U.S. President Joe Biden’s Asia policy are as bland as the rhetoric itself. U.S. policy toward the world’s most important region is no more than a mashup of the residual inertia from Trump’s [military-first](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-10-19/sleepwalking-world-war-iii) Asia policy with a revival of then-U.S. President Barack Obama’s well-intentioned but ill-fated “pivot to Asia,” which also had a [heavily militarized](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/2021-03-12/americas-indo-pacific-folly) agenda. Consequently, the United States is misallocating its attention and influence relative to what would actually benefit the region most. Economic policy, not defense policy, is the only way to address the interrelated problems of development, pandemic recovery, and adaptation to climate change—issues that plague policymakers throughout Asia and threaten to derail the region’s peace and prosperity. Washington must also stop conflating economic strategy with stale tropes on free trade and coercive sanctions. This is precisely the trouble with U.S. engagement in Asia to date: The United States has no economic strategy for the region—at least not since Obama’s ill-fated attempt to negotiate a new U.S.-Asia trade agreement, the Trans-Pacific Partnership. And it is unrealistic to expect any economic strategy beyond the free-trade pabulum so sharply at odds with U.S. domestic political constraints.

### AT: INB—China—Asia Pivot Fails—Econ

#### Lack of U.S. economy strategy and diverted defense resources prevent success in the Asia pivot

Green & Medeiros 22, Michael J. Green is the Director of the Asian Studies Program at the Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, the Senior Vice President for Asia at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and served as the Special Assistant to President Biden for National Security Affairs; Evan S. Medeiros is the Penner Family Chair in Asian Studies at the Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, served as the Special Assistant to President Biden, and was the Senior Director for Asian Affairs at the National Security Council under the Obama administration, “Can America Rebuild Its Power in Asia?: Biden Started Strong, But Progress Is Halting,” January 31st 2022, *Foreign Affairs*, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/2022-01-31/can-america-rebuild-its-power-asia#author-info

MIXED MESSAGES But these same polls illustrate that Biden’s gains are limited, if not tenuous. The 2021 ISEAS survey showed respondents believe U.S. economic influence in Southeast Asia has decreased since Biden took office. The survey also found almost half of respondents think China has greater regional political sway than the United States. The Lowy Asia Power Index may have found that the Biden administration restored the United States’ diplomatic influence, but it docked Washington more than ten points (from 61.7 to 51.1) on economic sway. The index also found the U.S. military’s relative lead over China shrank in 2021—and that was before Beijing conducted its alarming hypersonic missile tests. For the United States, both these challenges will intensify. On the economic front, China is expanding its financial footprint across the Indo-Pacific. U.S. allies such as Australia and Japan have privately pledged to help keep Beijing out of the CPTPP and to hold a place in the trade agreement for Washington. But the Biden administration has said it has no plan to return to the CPTPP, and officials in Canberra and Tokyo warn they cannot hold off China for more than a few years without some positive signals from the United States. Meanwhile, in addition to trying to join the CPTPP, China has also asked to join the Digital Economy Partnership Agreement (DEPA) with Chile, New Zealand, and Singapore—yet another economic group with no U.S. seat at the table. The Biden administration has promised “the development of an Indo-Pacific economic framework” focused on a patchwork of issues—trade facilitation, digital trade, supply chain resiliency, clean energy, infrastructure, and worker standards. But at best, the United States’ closest Asian partners see the framework as a save-the-date card for what they hope will be the day when Washington decides to join the CPTPP or a comparable agreement. The announcement on January 21 of a new U.S.-Japanese economic dialogue helps, but most Asian policymakers and business leaders view the vagueness of the Indo-Pacific economic framework as indicative of a lack of focus and commitment to deep economic engagement. The relative strength of the U.S. economy continues to drive the region’s investment and trade with the United States, but as things stand, Washington is losing influence over the rules that will govern trade, investment, supply chains, and ultimately, geopolitics in Asia. The administration has no long-term economic strategy toward Beijing. The United States’ vague economic policies extend to its goals with Beijing. The Biden administration has rightly sought to limit sensitive technology transfers—particularly of semiconductor- and [artificial intelligence](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2017-12-05/artificial-intelligence-and-chinese-power)-related technology—to China. But the administration has no long-term economic strategy toward Beijing beyond seeking more Chinese agricultural and energy exports under the 2020 Phase One trade deal negotiated by the Trump administration to end the trade war the White House started in 2018. U.S. businesses cannot get a clear answer about whether the administration will promote trade and investment with China in non-sensitive sectors, such as retail and automobiles. (Washington originally championed the TPP to gain leverage in economic negotiations with China, but this tool is now missing.) U.S. defense policy faces different but equally formidable challenges. The Biden administration has clearly made gains at [deterring China](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2021-02-05/kevin-rudd-usa-chinese-confrontation-short-of-war) by strengthening its alliances, but it has been less purposeful about the types of military capabilities it deploys in Asia—and where it puts them. The Defense Department’s signature Global Posture Review resulted in almost no significant additions to U.S. military forces in the Indo-Pacific beyond what the Trump White House already had planned. The administration and Congress have failed to properly fund the new Pacific Deterrence Initiative (PDI), legislation that was designed to improve the composition of the military’s funding for much needed capabilities in the Indo-Pacific theater. Although many experts expect Congress to increase defense spending next year, the crisis in Ukraine could drain resources to the continuing detriment of the Indo-Pacific theater.

### AT: INB—China—Asia Pivot Fails—ASEAN Solves

#### Asia pivot fails – ASEAN is handling China’s conduct and is excluding the U.S.

Tuazon 21, Bobby M. Tuazon is the Director for Policy Studies and an analyst at the Center for People Empowerment in Governance and former head of the Political Science Committee at the University of the Philippines, “Biden’s ‘Pivot to Asia’ at a dead end,” September 28th 2021, *ChinaDaily*, From the Press, https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202109/28/WS6152da6aa310cdd39bc6c2cf.html

Biden's attempt to win over ASEAN to its side against China is doomed to fail. Not only is China the region's major trading partner, but the economic future of the US is tied to a harmonious relationship with the Asian giant. For years, ASEAN countries have refused to be dragged into any feud between the two major powers as they pin their future on an environment of peace and neutrality. To emphasize this point, ASEAN in 1995 signed the Treaty of Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone, where the member countries committed to keeping nuclear weapons out of the region. The treaty has been supported by China. In effect, the regional organization, not the US, provides the stability in this part of the world, parrying any destabilizing pressure from the current superpower, which is not part of Asia. Pursuing this role, ASEAN is in continuing talks with China for the Code of Conduct for the SCS. Both parties have agreed that the talks should continue without any interference by a non-ASEAN country. Nowhere is ASEAN's rejection of the US's gambit diplomacy more revealing than in their reactions to the recent formation of the new trilateral military alliance AUKUS (Australia, the UK and the US) and the reactivation of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) of the US, Australia, India and Japan. This month, the Indo-Pacific AUKUS pact forged an arms deal to equip the Royal Australian Navy with multibillion-dollar worth nuclear-powered submarines. Majority of ASEAN countries, led by Indonesia and Malaysia, warned about the destabilizing effect of AUKUS and the threat of an arms race. Influential former Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad rebuked Australia: "You have escalated the threat. This will elicit a response from China.″ Kuala Lumpur immediately announced that it will send a ministerial-level delegation to China to discuss the issue. In the QUAD summit he hosted, Biden argued for a "free and open Indo-Pacific," open navigation and an end to "Chinese military expansion" in the SCS. For years, the US has been cajoling India into playing an active role in the Indo-Pacific but New Delhi officials are reminded of their neutral foreign policy lest India slides into the dangerous orbit of the US As a key member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and BRICS, India is engaged in active talks with Russia and Iran and is expected to receive $5.4 billion worth of Russian surface-to-air missiles in the coming months, which could anger the US With all these misfortunes, Biden's "Pivot to Asia" and containment strategy against China appear to be at a dead end.

### AT: INB—Asia Pivot Bad—Russia

#### U.S Asia Pivot Signals European Weakness

Erlanger ’21 (Steven Erlanger, Chief Diplomat correspondent in Europe for the NY Times, “The Sharp U.S. Pivot to Asia Is Throwing Europe Off Balance” <https://www.nytimes.com/2021/09/17/world/europe/biden-china-europe-submarine-deal.html>) //sethlee

BRUSSELS — Until this week, the so-called “pivot to Asia” by the United States had been more of a threat than a reality for Europe. But that changed when the Biden administration announced a new defense alliance against China that has left Europe facing an implicit question:

Which side are you on? It is a question that European leaders have studiously sought to avoid since [former President Barack Obama](https://www.nytimes.com/2021/09/28/us/obama-presidential-center-chicago.html) first articulated that America should [“pivot” resources and attention to Asia](https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/09/world/asia/obama-laos-asia-asean-tour.html) as part of its rivalry with China. European leaders hoped that the relationship between the two superpowers could remain stable and that Europe could balance its interests between the two. Then the Trump administration sharply raised the temperature with China with tariffs and other trade barriers. And now the Biden administration on Wednesday announced an alliance between the United States, Britain and Australia that would help [Australia](https://www.nytimes.com/2021/09/17/us/politics/us-france-australia-betrayal.html) deploy nuclear-powered submarines in the Pacific — and, in doing so, also tore up [a $66 billion deal](https://www.nytimes.com/2021/09/16/world/europe/france-australia-uk-us-submarines.html) for Australia to buy a French fleet of diesel-powered subs. “Europeans want to defer the moment of truth, to not make a choice between the two,” said Thomas Gomart, director of the French Institute of International Relations, or IFRI. “The Biden administration, like the Trump one, is provoking the moment of choice.” [France was enraged](https://www.nytimes.com/2021/09/16/world/europe/france-australia-uk-us-submarines.html). Yet if it was a humiliation — as well as the cancellation of a lucrative defense deal — it possibly did have a silver lining for [France](https://www.nytimes.com/2021/09/17/us/politics/us-france-australia-betrayal.html)’s broader goals. President Emmanuel Macron of France has been Europe’s loudest proponent of “strategic autonomy,” the idea that Europe needs to retain a balanced approach to the United States and China. “We must survive on our own, as others do,” said Josep Borrell Fontelles, the European Union’s foreign policy chief, echoing the French line. The French embarrassment — the Americans also announced the submarine deal [with little if any warning](https://www.nytimes.com/2021/09/16/us/politics/france-us-biden-australia-submarine.html) — came after the disastrous fall of Afghanistan. European allies were furious with the Biden administration, blaming the Americans for acting with little or no consultation and feeding Mr. Macron’s argument that the United States is no longer an entirely reliable security partner. “The submarines and Afghanistan, it reinforces the French narrative that you can’t trust the Americans,” said Ulrich Speck of the German Marshall Fund in Berlin. But whether France will succeed in turning this bilateral defeat into a way to promote strategic autonomy is doubtful, analysts suggest. “Many Europeans will see this as a transparent way for the French to leverage their own interests,” said Robin Niblett, director of Chatham House, the London-based research institution. Even so, there seems little doubt that Europe’s balancing act is becoming trickier to maintain. “Europe needs to think hard about where it sits and what it does,” said Rosa Balfour, director of Carnegie Europe. A Europe that spends more on defense is to be desired, but it also needs allies — including Britain and the United States, she said. And a Europe that does more to build its own security capacity “is the best way to be listened to more by its partners,” she added. The new alliance, known as AUKUS, is an effort to integrate Australia and Britain into the broader American effort to create a security deterrent to China. For Australia, which has seen its once-strong relations with Beijing deteriorate, America and Britain provide a much stouter deterrent to China in the Indo-Pacific, analysts agree, than could the deal with France. “It’s sending a very big signal to Beijing, which is useful for the U.S., but especially useful to Australia,” said Ian Lesser, acting director of the German Marshall Fund and head of its Brussels office. “And the weight of that signal is important because of who the partners are.” Mr. Lesser also questioned why the American moves in the Pacific have to be interpreted as a zero-sum equation in which Europe’s importance is diminished. “I don’t see any diminution of American interest and commitment to European security in the wake of Afghanistan or the moves in Asia,” he said. The biggest issue for the European Union may be finding the political will for strategic autonomy, a point made by the president of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, in her [state of the European Union address](https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/strategic-planning/state-union-addresses/state-union-2021_en) earlier on the day the new Asian alliance was announced. France may be pushing autonomy, but whether the rest of the European bloc has an appetite for it — and for creating greater distance from Washington — is uncertain. “France could end up isolating itself,” said Mr. Speck of the German Marshall Fund, noting that in nearly every region where France has security concerns — including Russia, the Sahel and even the Indo-Pacific — the United States continues to be a critical partner. There are deeper questions about America’s future reliability as a security partner, especially if the conflict with China turns kinetic, which is part of Mr. Macron’s argument, Mr. Lesser acknowledged. “For all the U.S. commitment to Europe, if things go wrong in the Indo-Pacific, that would change the force structure in Europe pretty fast.” In Poland, a strong American ally in the European Union and NATO, the reaction to the new alliance was more positive, focusing not on a pivot away from Europe “but on the U.S., with the British and the Australians, getting serious about China and also defending the free world,” said Michal Baranowski, who heads the German Marshall Fund office in Poland. At the same time, he said, Poles see another case where the supposedly professional, pro-European Biden administration “again doesn’t consult and shoves European allies under the bus,” he said. “This time the French, but for us, it was Nord Stream 2, when we were thrown under the bus for Germany,” he said. That was a reference to Mr. Biden’s decision to allow the completion of a natural gas pipeline from Russia to Germany, bypassing Ukraine and Poland, that was a priority for European powerhouse Berlin. “The U.S. will say again that ‘We’re building strong alliances, with Germany and Australia,’” Mr. Baranowski said. “But who suffers? Other allies.”

### AT: INB—Populism Turn—2AC

#### European Defense spending causes populism spread

Fay 17, Director of Defense and Foreign Policy Studies @ Niskan (Matthew, also cites Andrea Gilli, a postdoctoral fellow at Stanford University’s Center for International Security and Cooperation, “THE PROBLEM WITH EUROPE PAYING ITS DEFENSE BILLS,” *Niskan Center*, <https://niskanencenter.org/blog/problem-europe-paying-defense-bills/>)

The European Union is also unlikely to force member states into a cooperation arrangement, according to Gilli. Given the rise of nationalist populist parties across Europe, any such assertion of power from Brussels will likely create a greater backlash. The two reasons Gilli notes for the inability of European states to increase defense spending also raise another question: should the United States want European states to do so? Writing at the end of the Cold War, political scientist John Mearsheimer warned that a Europe free from superpower domination would return to its recurrent patterns of interstate warfare. Europe’s major states would be forced to pay for their own defense absent American and Soviet security guarantees. To convince domestic populations to support investment in military capabilities—likely at the expense of welfare spending—state leaders would likely lean on nationalist rhetoric and policies. According to Mearsheimer, the reason they have not had to do so was because the American “pacifier” has remained in place even after the superpower standoff in Europe ended. An American withdrawal as an effort to induce greater defense spending in Europe might lead to the empowerment of the very nationalist populist parties that would like to see the European Union dismantled. The disintegration of Europe—coupled with increased spending on military capabilities by its largest states—could lead to the return of security competition and the dilemmas inherent in it. Meanwhile, smaller states—Estonia just being one example—unable to invest sufficiently in their own defense will be subject to manipulation and domination by the continent’s major powers. So the question of whether the Trump administration should consider withholding defense of America’s European to encourage them to “pay their bills” hinges on two things: whether they can, and if so, whether doing so is worth potentially undermining the peaceful integration of Europe.

#### Populism structurally guarantees more conflict and heightens escalation risks

Drezner 17, PhD, Professor of Int’l Politics (Dan, “The Angry Populist as Foreign Policy Leader: Real Change or Just Hot Air?, *41 Fletcher F. World Aff. 23*, Lexis)

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Leaders who rise to power in lower-probability scenarios are also likely to have a greater appetite for risk in foreign affairs. This matters, as Jeff Colgan notes: "risk tolerance leads to aggression in international affairs because it increases the perceived payoff of risky gambles." 17 Populist leaders more closely resemble revolutionaries than more established politicians. And as Colgan warns, "the ambition of revolutionary leaders also contributes to aggression. Ambition makes it more likely that a leader will reject the status quo internationally as well as domestically." 18 We can see this kind of ambition on display among elected populists. Hugo Chávez [\*30] persistently proposed radical alternatives to the Washington Consensus. One longtime friend of Viktor Orbán noted, "he has always wanted to upset the status quo, to become a change-maker." 19 Orbán himself, in a meeting with Polish Law and Justice Party head Jaroslaw Kaczynski, proposed a "cultural counter-revolution" in Europe. 20 Donald Trump's inaugural address categorically rejected the postwar liberal order, arguing in favor of an "America First" approach to international relations. Populists are therefore more likely to pursue high-risk, revisionist foreign policies. Populist leaders also care about recognition by others, and will be quick to anger if that recognition is not forthcoming. Populists build their legitimacy on their support from "their" people, but part of that support comes from displays of dominance over others. Russian president Vladimir Putin is well-known for his over-the-top efforts to look strong and powerful. These range from his shirtless photos to videos of him weightlifting to scoring eight goals in an exhibition game with former NHL All-Stars. 21 In Erdogan's first two years as Turkey's president, the government has prosecuted more than 1,800 cases of Turkish citizens insulting him--including a former Miss Turkey. 22 Donald Trump has insulted anyone who has criticized him since he started running for president, ranging from erstwhile GOP rivals to federal judges to media outlets to a former Miss Universe to Meryl Streep. When dealing with domestic rivals and critics, such displays of dominance are an easy strategy for elected leaders to pursue. Populist leaders engage in such behavior to project their strength and mastery over the political fates. It is tricky to do this on the international stage, however. Populist leaders will therefore be more concerned than most politicians about the personal respect afforded to them by others. At the international level, this leads to one of two outcomes: recognition by other heads of state, or a denunciation of leaders who fail to confer such recognition. If populists cannot exploit the respect conferred by others, they will be quick to reject and delegitimize the leaders who spurn them. We can see this kind of pattern at work in how populist leaders have reacted to setbacks on the global stage. Vladimir Putin began his tenure in office with a much warmer attitude towards the West. During the first decade of this century, however, Putin lost an ally during Ukraine's Orange Revolution, and witnessed NATO expanding to Russia's borders. It was at this point that Putin began adopting a more hostile attitude towards the West. After President Obama cancelled a meeting with Duterte, the Filipino president responded with a series of tirades insulting the American president. 23 In Trump's first week as president, he faced pushback from the [\*31] Mexican president Enrique Peña Nieto on his policies for the southern border. In response, Trump tweeted that Peña Nieto should not bother coming to Washington. The Mexican president responded by canceling his visit. Populists do not possess a monopoly on anger in politics, but most populists tend to project anger as part of their leadership style. Based on their pathway to power and their philosophy of governance, it should not be surprising that they are commonly associated with that emotion. As previously noted, populist parties do particularly well after financial crises. They are adept at exploiting the (often justified) anger that voters possess towards authorities that were in charge when the crisis happened. Former UKIP leader Nigel Farage warned of "political anger" if the United Kingdom did not follow through on Brexit. In a press conference blasting the United States, Duterte said, "If you Americans are angry with me, then I am also angry with you." 24 During one of the GOP primary debates, Donald Trump explicitly stated, "I will gladly accept the mantle of anger." Trump famously refuses to apologize when he makes controversial or problematic statements. 25 Numerous press reports suggest that Trump lost his temper with the Australian prime minister in their first phone conversation. This wave of populist anger reverses a centuries-long western effort to contain that emotion in international relations. 26 Recent scholarship on emotions in world politics suggest that sustained levels of anger carry risks in world politics. Anger was valorized in societies with strong honor cultures and warrior castes, biologically conditioning citizens towards that feeling. Furthermore, as Neta Crawford notes, "threats that evoke anger (if they are associated with perceived insults) tend to decrease the perception of a threat and simultaneously heighten risk-taking behaviors on the part of those who feel angry." 27 This is particularly true if populist leaders find ways to institutionalize anger and resentment through new laws, executive orders, or bureaucratic structures. This tendency towards angry rhetoric can be exaggerated through misperception and mistranslation. Conventional foreign policy leaders are prepped to stay within the lanes of "accepted" diplomatic discourse, so that observers can detect subtle shifts in phrasing as a foreign policy signal. In contrast, populists scorn diplomatic language as exercises in sophistry and hypocrisy. They rely on language designed to appeal to their base, which increases the likelihood that outside observers misconstrue their words. Angry tirades from leaders like Trump, Duterte, or Iran's Mahmoud Ahmadinejad have been mistranslated--and usually in a direction that [\*32] paints the leader as more bellicose than intended. 28 Populist leaders will be reluctant to correct such misperceptions, because that would require them to engage in the diplomatic discourse they have derided. Displays of righteous indignation might play well with a populist leader's domestic base. The international effect of angry outbursts, however, is to narrow the zone of cooperation between countries. If a leader unleashes an angry tirade against another country, that is sure to gain considerable public attention in both nations. This automatically raises the "audience costs" for both leaders. The larger the audience that is paying attention to any dispute, the greater the political costs a leader can suffer if they back down in that dispute. 29 Displays of temper make it harder for the populist to compromise, but it will also make it more politically difficult for the object of the tirade to make any concessions. Through effects on leaders and populations, provocations make negotiations more costly and conflict escalation more likely. 30 Perhaps the most important intellectual trait that populist leaders share is their tendency to think like hedgehogs. According to the classical Greek poet Archilochus, "a fox knows many things, but a hedgehog one important thing." Isaiah Berlin popularized that quote, arguing that intellectuals could be divided into foxes and hedgehogs. This works for decision-makers as well. Foxes will possess the necessary metacognition to adapt to new facts and new circumstances; hedgehogs will rely on their core beliefs, fitting the world into their preexisting worldview. 31 Populists are hedgehogs: the one big thing that they know is to reject the elites and technocrats who heretofore governed their country. As Philip Tetlock observed more than a decade ago, foxes and hedgehogs have different strengths when it comes to thinking about the world. 32 Foxes are much better than hedgehogs in their predictive accuracy about world events; simply put, foxes are better at incorporating new information and updating how they think about the world. Hedgehogs are better than foxes at anticipating big and unexpected events happening in the world, such as the collapse of the Soviet Union, the 9/11 terrorist attacks, and the 2008 financial crisis. Anticipating those events requires an assuredness about the way the world works that hedgehogs are more likely to possess. The effects of these different intellectual styles on foreign policy are straightforward. As hedgehogs, populists are more likely to have their expectations confounded in world politics. At the same time, populist foreign policy leaders will face psychological and domestic political barriers to admitting error or reversing a failing policy. Any public recognition of a misstep demonstrates a leader's fallibility--which is problematic for leaders [\*33] who claim that they can divine the general will of the people. At the same time, as hedgehogs, populists will be reluctant to take any action that deviates from the way that they think the world works. Stepping back, we can proffer some tentative predictions of how populist foreign policy leaders will behave in the coming years. Populist foreign policy leaders are likely to reject the pre-existing liberal international order and espouse a strong form of ethnic nationalism. They might try to create alternative international arrangements to the status quo, but these efforts are likely to be Potemkin efforts, with more pomp and circumstance than substance. Populist leaders will have greater appetites for risk and ambition on the global stage. These heads of state will crave recognition from their fellow world leaders, and be quick to anger if they are spurned in this area. These displays of anger could become institutionalized and will increase the audience costs of all the involved actors, making cooperation less likely. And populists are less likely to correctly perceive how the world works, and more likely to hold firm with policies that are not viewed as working terribly well. One disturbing conclusion to draw from this particular constellation of traits is that populist leaders are more likely to foment international crises. Breaking with pre-existing global governance structures can guarantee a crisis escalation. An international crisis can trigger rally-round-the flag effects within the domestic population and make it easier for a leader to suppress domestic dissent. At the extreme, one could envision populists threatening or launching diversionary wars to appeal to a nationalist base in times of trouble. Vladimir Putin employed this tactic. In early 2014, he was still reeling from protests over his return to the Russian presidency, and a slowdown in the Russian economy. He responded by annexing the Crimea after the fall of his ally in Ukraine, and bankrolling a secessionist conflict in Eastern Ukraine. These efforts caused his public support to skyrocket even though the Russian economy contracted in 2014 and 2015. It should be stressed that these are all probabilistic statements. Many of these traits are hardly unique to populists; other heads of state are likely to display some subset of these leadership traits. Still, this combination of [\*34] attributes suggest that the world is experiencing an increase in the number of revisionist, risky, and violent actions in world politics.

### AT: INB—Populism Turn—Burden Sharing Causes Populsim

#### More military spending directly contributes to populism across Europe by undermining the political power of centrist and establishment parties

Edoardo Saravalle 17, a Researcher at the Center for a New American Security, “NATO Funding Frustration Could Cause Friction in Europe”, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/nato-funding-frustration-could-cause-friction-europe-20216

Second, increased burden sharing may actively hurt the cause of EU stability. Military buildup in Europe would sap the political capital and limit the nondefense spending options of establishment pro-American leaders confronting the gravest threat to the EU and U.S. power on the continent, the insurgent populist movement.

Many EU countries are in a cycle of elections that could be decisive for the future of Europe and the West. Dissatisfaction over lackluster economic prospects and opposition to immigration have powered anti-EU and anti-NATO parties like Marine Le Pen’s National Front and placed electoral victories within their grasp. Brexit proved that EU integration is neither inevitable nor irreversible. Now, populist parties are trying to follow the example and reshape Europe in a more nationalistic vision.

The example of Italy shows the potential dangers of prioritizing military spending. The country currently spends [1.1. percent of its GDP](http://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2017_03/20170313_170313-pr2017-045.pdf) on military capabilities. It also boasts [an 11.5 percent unemployment rate](https://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2017-04-03/italian-unemployment-rate-decreases-as-fewer-sought-jobs), (35.2 percent for youth), [1 percent GDP growth](http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-italy-economy-oecd-idUKKBN15U1GY) and a caretaker government following Matteo Renzi’s resignation. Spending toward the NATO target would divert resources and embolden the populist parties opposing the government. This budgetary trade-off suggests the fundamental calculation of burden sharing. Between a reliable partner or a 2 percent contribution, the United States will choose the former. The 1.1 percent of GDP military spending under Italian prime minister Paolo Gentiloni of the Democratic Party will always be preferable to 2 percent under Beppe Grillo’s Five Star Movement.

#### Some examples of specific parties

Fay 17 - Director of Defense and Foreign Policy Studies @ Niskan (Matthew, “THE PROBLEM WITH EUROPE PAYING ITS DEFENSE BILLS,” *Niskan Center*, <https://niskanencenter.org/blog/problem-europe-paying-defense-bills/>)

Writing at the Washington Post’s “Monkey Cage” blog, Andrea Gilli—a postdoctoral fellow at Stanford University’s Center for International Security and Cooperation—identifies some of the domestic barriers to European states investing in their militaries. Gilli names three main constraints on the ability of European states to balance, but two of them are particularly important. The first is the inability of many European states to contribute financially to their own defense. Some European states simply do not have large enough economies to adequately invest in military capabilities. Gilli notes that Estonia is one of the few European countries to meet the minimum standard of defense spending for NATO member states—two percent of gross domestic product—but that still only amounts to $500 million in defense expenditure. Larger states have greater financial resources to invest, but they are tied up in welfare programs. As Gilli writes, [C]utting welfare state provisions in Europe to fund defense expenditures is going to be extremely difficult, if not counterproductive. On the one hand, those who receive these benefits are far more numerous, and thus politically more influential, than those receiving a direct benefit from military spending. On the other, cuts in welfare spending risk actually bringing additional support to anti-establishment parties like the Five Stars Movement in Italy, Die Linke in Germany or Podemos in Spain — all of which have strong anti-defense stances. It is possible European states could combine their military capabilities, but as Gilli argues, that option is also problematic. He notes, With Europe’s limited funds to spend on defense, large cooperative projects will be difficult to launch. In the past, countries in Europe abandoned cooperative projects because of their negative domestic implications for jobs, technological know-how or military exports. In an age of austerity, amid a refugee crisis and high youth unemployment, this mind-set is unlikely to change anytime soon. And some countries may have little interest in cooperation. They may operate in completely different environments — Mediterranean vs. North Sea, for example. Or they perceive a different strategic threat at home — think Russia vs. the Islamic State. Some countries may even have a strategic interest in leaving unaddressed some capability gaps — to compel proximate allies to come to their defense. This was Finland’s military strategy during the Cold War.

#### Increased defense spending mobilizes populist voters

**Henke 21** [Marina Henke; 17/2/21; Professor of International Relations at the Hertie School and Northwestern University, focuses on military interventions, peacekeeping, and European security and defense policy; “The populist challenge to European defense”; <https://www-tandfonline-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1080/13501763.2021.1881587>]

**Right-wing populist parties in the EU are broadly nationalist**, sovereignist, and Euroskeptic (Mudde, 2007; Vasilopoulou, 2018). But while these **parties sharply oppose supranationalism and the EU's broader integrative trajectory,** it is less clear whether their anti-EU sentiment extends to other forms of institutionalized cooperation, and in particular to coordination or collaboration with other EU member states on defense.12 We argue that **populist parties are likely to constrain European defense cooperation** under the following two conditions: First, **populist parties hold strong anti-EU, anti-globalization, and anti-establishment sentiment and a more general skepticism over the merits of international cooperation.** If these preferences are given clear precedence over national security interests or concerns, **we are unlikely to see these parties engage in defense cooperation**. This form of **populist challenge to European defense cooperation may come from either right-wing or left-wing parties.** While left-wing populist parties highlight economic anxieties and grievances, right-wing populist parties **emphasize threats to national identity, culture, and sovereignty** (De Vries & Edwards, 2009). They also often mix populism with nationalism (Camus & Lebourg, 2017). These nationalist sentiments are likely to stoke intra-EU divisions and constrain defense cooperation. Second, European defense is presented as an issue that populist parties may use to mobilize the mass public**, polarize the electorate, and win votes.** In other words, populist parties **politicize European defense issues for electoral purposes.** According to De Vries et al. (2021), **two key elements lead to the politicization of international cooperation: public discontent about existing forms of international cooperation and the mobilization of this discontent by political entrepreneurs.** Since most mainstream parties have not politicized European defense cooperation, **populist parties may perceive an incentive and opportunity to mobilize opposition on this issue to attract new voters,** and often in tandem with anti-immigrant and nationalist messages (Hobolt & De Vries, 2015).

### AT: INB—Populism Turn—Populism Low

#### Opposition parties are uniting to remove populist leaders.

Meyer ’22 [Brett; 6 Jan; Research Fellow; Tony Blair Institute for Global Change, “A Playbook Against Populism? Populist Leadership in Decline in 2021,” https://institute.global/policy/playbook-against-populism-populist-leadership-decline-2021]

In our annual update to our Populists in Power database, **we find that the number of populist leaders in power at the beginning of 2022 is down from 17 at the beginning of 2021 to 13 – the lowest** since 2004. Three of the four populist leaders who lost power were less ideological anti-establishment populists, meaning that the remaining populists are almost all culturally right wing.

**Two common factors appear to have contributed to this significant fall** in the number of populist leaders. First, **the pandemic may have reminded the public of the importance of seriousness and expertise in policymaking**. **Countries with populist leaders around the world had higher Covid-19 case and death rates than those without populist leaders, and populist leaders in Europe have seen a** sustained dip **in their polling popularity relative to more conventional parties** throughout the pandemic.

Second, unusually broad **opposition coalitions have emerged to depose populist incumbents. Historically divided opposition parties adopted a narrow focus in their election campaigns to remove the populist leader**. This happened in three out of four populist losses in 2021. **We also see evidence of opposition parties following this “playbook” in countries where populist leaders are facing elections in 2022.**

The danger posed by populism lies in the damage leaders can do to the norms and institutions of liberal democracy. However, we find that, **in most of the cases where populist leaders lost power last year, there is limited evidence that key norms such as a free press, an independent judiciary and the peaceful transfer of power have been obviously weakened**. That said, elections in the coming years in countries where populist governments have invoked more radical reform to entrench their positions give less cause for optimism.

Finally, if the formation of broad coalitions provides an emerging playbook for fighting populism, it’s important to examine how stable these coalitions are once in power. The danger is that, because the opposition parties have such substantive policy disagreements, they will prove unable to hold power for long, potentially threatening a reversal. To avoid instability, these coalitions should focus on a limited programme of reforms targeted at shoring up institutions against future populist threats.

The experience of the past four years shows that **countries with populist leaders aren’t sentenced to autocracy**. But while **the wave of early 21st-century populism appears to have peaked**, it will be some time before we can conclude that liberal democracy is no longer under threat.

### AT: INB—Econ Turn—Kills Growth

#### Military spending decks economic growth.

Muhammad Azam 20, Department of Economics, Faculty of Business & Economics, Abdul Wali Khan University Mardan, 12/28/2020, “Does military spending stifle economic growth? The empirical evidence from non-OECD countries,” *Heliyon*, 6(12), <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.heliyon.2020.e05853>, RH

Undeniably, peace **and long-term sustainable** economic development **are the prime** agenda **of all** countries**.** This study aims to empirically evaluate the impact of military spending on economic growth for a panel of 35 non-OECD countries over 1988–2019. A multivariate regression model based on the augmented production function is used to achieve the objective of the study. The panel autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL)/pooled mean group (PMG) technique is employed, while, in addition the robust least squares and fixed-effect estimators are implemented for the robustness of the results. **This study found a clear** negative effect **of** military spending **on** economic growth**.** The pairwise Dumitrescu Hurlin panel causality test results exhibit bi-directional causality between military expenses and economic growth. Overall, these **estimates provide strong support that** military expenditure **is** not beneficial **rather** detrimental **to economic** growth**.** **The** empirical **findings of this study suggest that policymakers need to redesign the** military budget **to stimulate** economic growth **and improve social welfare.**

The assessment of the economic and social effects of military expenditure remains an interesting desirable area of research. The ultimate objectives of underdeveloped and developed countries are to achieve sustainable economic growth and prosperity in the long-run. There is a substantial volume of literature about the economic consequences of military expenditure; however, no consensus has been developed, whether military spending is beneficial or detrimental to economic growth. Military spending according to the Keynesian approach is a component of government consumption, which stimulates economic growth by expanding demand for goods and services. Military spending affects economic growth through many channels. When aggregate demand is lower relative to prospective supply, rises in military spending tend to enlarge capacity utilization, raise profits, and consequently, enhance investment and aggregate output ([Faini et al., 1984](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7779781/#bib33)). Several prior studies have drawn findings that support the Keynesian military view of the positive influence of military expenditure on national output ([Benoit, 1978](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7779781/#bib17); [Khalid and Noor, 2018](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7779781/#bib45); [Raju and Ahmed, 2019](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7779781/#bib63)). In a study conducted by [Lobont et al. (2019)](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7779781/#bib51), it is ascertained that military spending has several positive effects on capital, labor, growth, and the effectual use of available resources in the economy as a whole.

The focus of academicians, researchers, and developmental economists for peace economics are useable as military spending is one of the main concerns of countries, regardless of their development status. According to conventional logic, **the** military formulation **is an** economic encumbrance. **While comparatively** more resources **are devoted to** military formulations**, and** lesser proportion **is left for investment in the** education **and** technology **sectors, which play a** vital role **in the** economic growth **process and provide a broader base for socio-**economic development. Generally, it is believed that in the insecure region, **each country deliberately allocates an** uneven share **of its meager** economic resources **to “unproductive”** military expenditure. In the absenteeism of international collaboration to minimize political pressure, military expenditures can be driven more and more across a region as each country goes beyond its neighbors to safeguard its security, raise the level of regional military expenditure and bring little rise or even a decline in the security of all. However**, there are two direct and interconnected ways by which higher** military expenditure **may** unfavorably **affect long-run** economic growth. First, military spending **upsurge may diminish the total** accumulation **of existing** resources **available for other domestic usages such as investment in** prolific capital**, education, and market-oriented** technological enhancement. Second, **high** military expenditure **can intensify misrepresentations that condense the efficiency of** resource distribution, thereby **diminishing the total yield factor**2.

Military expenditure tends to attenuate productivity because more funds diversion to military expenditure **causes the government to either increase** taxes **or get** loans **from the** foreign capital market **to balance its** budget. The second alternative **is therefore primarily** harmful **to** economic prosperity, since **it escalates the rate of interest,** decreases **investment and consumer demand, and drives** economic growthsluggish (Russett, 1969; Borch and Wallace, 2010). In a similar vein, some other studies including Lim (1983) noted that military expenses **are** harmful **to the** growth **of any economy.** Even, a study by Dunne (2000) focusing on the Keynesian framework reveals that military spending has no influence on growth at best, but most **probably has an inverse effect**; obviously, **there is** no indication **of a** positive influence **of** military burden **on economic** growth. This implies that disarmament certainly offers a prospect for augmented economic performance.

Despite the voluminous empirical studies on the military-growth connection, the empirical findings are still inconclusive6. The discussion in the present literature on the influence of military spending opened with the seminal work of Benoit (1978) which opined that military spending and growth have a positive correlation. Afterward, many studies are continuously performed to empirically verify the relationship between these variables by using different models, estimation techniques, set of countries, and data period. Several other studies support the positive effect of defense spending including Atesoglu (2002), who observed that there exists a significantly positive association in military outlays and aggregate output in the case of the United States from 1947:2–2000:2. The empirical analysis of the study by Yildirim et al. (2005) found that military spending boosts national income in the Middle Eastern countries and Turkey over 1989–99. Narayan and Singh (2007) empirically verified that defense expenses Granger causes exports, and exports Granger causes national income (GDP), indicating that defense spending indirectly Granger causes national income in the short-run for Fiji over 1970–01. According to Borch and Wallace (2010), higher levels of military expenditure are better prepared to stave off the harmful influences of an economic slump than states with lower levels of military spending in the 49 U.S. states during 1977–04. Malizard (2010) observed two-way causality between military spending and growth in France during 1960–08. Findings of Farzanegan (2014) study supported the positive impact of the military outlay on growth in Iran during 1959–07. Khalid and Noor (2018) concluded that military spending has a positive relationship with growth in sixty-seven developing economies during 2002–10.

On the other hand, some **prior studies**, for example, [Faini et al. (1984)](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7779781/#bib33) **detected that a greater** military burden **is related to** sluggish growth for 69 countries during 1952–70, whereas **a** rise **of 10% military** spending **leads to a** decrease **of annual economic** growth **by 0.13%**. [Deger (1986)](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7779781/#bib23) revealed that overall the direct and indirect effects of military expenditure will dampen growth rate and impede development in a panel of 50 developing economies during 1965–73. The author suggested that empirical indication goes against the conclusions of Benoit and others about the positive impact of military outlay on growth in less-developed economies. [Abu-Bader and Abu-Qarm (2003)](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7779781/#bib2)**found that military expenditure** hampers **economic** growth**, but civilian expenses have a positive impact on growth for Egypt, Israel, and Syria** (1975–98), (1967–98), and (1973–98) respectively. **The** empirical findingsof [Klein (2004)](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7779781/#bib46) **reveal** that overall **the military outlay has a** negative influence **on the** growth rate of Peru over 1970–96. [Chang et al. (2011)](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7779781/#bib20) found that **military expenditure leads to deleterious growth for low-income countries** in the whole sample of 90 countries during 1992–06. [D'Agostino et al. (2017)](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7779781/#bib32) observed a significantly negative effect of military spending on growth in 83 countries from OECD over 1970–14. [Saba and Ngepah (2019)](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7779781/#bib65) examined the causal link between military spending and economic growth for 35 African countries over 1990–15. The authors found that (i) no causal link in seven countries; (ii) one-way causality from military spending to growth in two countries; (iii) one-way link from growth one-way in 14 countries; and (iv) two-ways link in 12 countries. Overall, the GMM estimates reveal that **military spending has a significant negative effect on economic growth**in Africa.

Similarly, other studies provide evidence of mixed results on the economic effects of military expenses on growth, for example, the study of [Frederiksen and Looney (1982)](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7779781/#bib37) divided the economies into financial resource restrained and unrestrained groups over 1960–78. The findings revealed that enhanced military expenditures promoted growth in the unrestrained group, but a small visible impact was found in resource-constrained countries. In a study on three North American countries namely Canada, Mexico, and the U.S. during 1963–05, [Bremmer and Kesselring (2007)](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7779781/#bib19) found that enhanced military expenditure promotes nominal GDP in Canada and Mexico, while it declines the growth in nominal GDP in the U.S. [Aye et al. (2014)](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7779781/#bib8) observed no Granger causal association between military outlay and growth for South Africa during 1951–10. However, by using the bootstrap rolling window estimation approach, the study finds two ways Granger causality in different subsamples. The results of [Chang et al. (2014)](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7779781/#bib21) supported the neutrality hypothesis for France, Germany, and Italy, while, the military expenditure–growth hampering hypothesis for Canada and the UK, and unidirectional Granger causality running from national income to military outlay for China. Moreover, the results supported the feedback[7](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7779781/#fn7) between military spending and national income in the case of Japan and the U.S. over 1988–10. Using the “Hendry General-to-Specific modeling” methodology, the study of [Abdel-Khalek et al. (2019)](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7779781/#bib1) fails to find any causal linkages between military spending and economic growth in India over 1980–16. Some more related empirical studies are given in [Table 1](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7779781/table/tbl1/).

Several empirical studies are available on the relationship between military spending and economic growth, but their empirical findings are yet inconclusive. Undeniably, the economic effect of military expenditure is an essential issue for the developing world. Therefore, this research work aims to determine empirically the impact of military expenditure along with some other control variables on the growth, for a set of thirty-five countries from non-OECD over 1988–19. According to the nature of the data, the widely used panel unit tests are employed to check the order of integration of each variable. The results are found mixed (i.e., I(0), and I(1)) based on stationarity, and thus, the panel ARDL/PMG approach is applied. Afterward, the panel robust least squares and fixed-effect estimators are also employed as analytical techniques for parameters’ estimation to affirm the results, and the Dumitrescu –Hurlin Granger causality test is employed to find the direction of causality between the variables.

**The** empirical results **of all the methods suggest that** military spending **and** economic growth **have a strong** inverse relationship, suggesting that encouragingmilitary expenditure **is not a good option because it** discourages **economic** growth**.** Moreover, the Dumitrescu–Hurlin Granger causality test exposes bidirectional causal nexus between military expenses and economic growth in the sample countries. The bidirectional causal linkage between military spending and growth though exhibits a degree of interdependence between military spending and economic growth policy objectives. Thus, **the** execution **of economic** growth policies **should** not **be given more** primacy **over the** military burden **while other than** military expenditure **factors shall be considered.**

Overall, **the** empirical results **validated that** military spending **is** undesirable **for national** economic development**. The results of the significantly negative effect of military spending on national income go against the results obtained by**[Benoit (1978)](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7779781/#bib17), and others who claim that military expenditure positively contributes to the aggregate output, while, consistent with the findings by [Dunne and Tian (2015)](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7779781/#bib29) for 106 countries over 1988–10, Dunne and Tian concluded that “These results do seem to provide valuable robustness checks and support strongly the view that military spending hurts growth” (p.29). The findings of the present study are technically and statistically acceptable and plausible for frontwards policy recommendation purposes.

From these findings, **the unequivocal** negative effect **of** military spending **on** economic growth indicates that non-OECD countries are developing countries with scarce resources, and these **economies** can't afford **military spending**, while when these economies grow, governments can contemplate rising its military spending to strengthen its military power. **Enlarged** military spending **can't be used to boost** economic growth in the non-OECD countries, since any positive impacts it would have on the economic growth through augmented demand, modernization, and resource outset, would have overwhelmed by the damaging effects on economic growth through reduced investment. Policymakers **should thus** leave military spending **for security objectives only and restructuring public resources from the military sector toward civilian objectives**[11](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7779781/#fn8). Likewise, policymakers should focus on rationalizing their budget spending more on improving social welfare. Furthermore, incremental efforts are required to adopt an effective and prudent policy to further encourage growth, while shrinkage in military spending can largely benefit the economies. Therefore, military expenditures **need to be** reduced while expenditures on other developmental sectors including health and education sectors to be increased.

### AT: INB—Econ Turn—Europe K2 Global Econ

#### Yes collapse—small crises easily snowball into global economic crisis because of fundamental problems in European economics.

Collignon, 12 [Stefan Collignon, professor of political economy at Sant’Anna School of Advanced Studies, Pisa, founder of the Asia Forum, and the London School of Economics, UK, taught at Harvard University and Hamburg University, Deputy Director General for Europe in the German Federal Ministry for Finance, 7-2012, ‘Europe’s Debt Crisis, Coordination Failure, and International Effects’, ADBI Institute, <https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/156225/adbi-wp370.pdf> /alundy]

The European debt crisis started as a small local policy shock in Greece, but it has come to threaten the survival of the euro with potentially far reaching consequences for the world economy. Since December 2011 financial markets have stabilized somewhat, but fundamental issues remain unsolved. This crisis is due partly to fundamental economic developments, such as growth and competitiveness, and partly to uncooperative behavior between the main policy makers in Europe. One of the paradoxes of this crisis is that, despite all its problems, the euro has remained relatively firm in its internal (inflation) and external value (exchange rate). Financial markets may be concerned with some parts of the euro area, mainly in the south, but they still see the euro as a major currency in the world. However, the euro will only maintain this role if European governments can get the sovereign debt crisis under control. Whatever the ultimate conclusion of the drama, the experience has shown that Europe needs a much tighter form of economic governance if it wants to live up to the ambition of providing the world's alternative reserve currency. While a series of events has progressively deepened the European debt crisis, it is important to distinguish between sudden shocks and underlying fundamental problems in Europe’s economic governance. Their interaction has been the specific flavor of this crisis. There are two views to the European debt crisis. For the “fundamentalists”, the debt crisis is caused by the lack of discipline in sticking to the principles of “a sound and competitive macroeconomic base and solid public finance” (Weidmann 2001). Hence, the remedy is to implement “painful reforms” and consolidate budgets, which would rebuild trust and confidence in financial markets (Issing 2009). For the “monetarists”, the European debt crisis is a liquidity crisis. A small local liquidity shock causes a sudden deterioration in a specific class of asset values, can cause a global systemic financial crisis when the need for liquidity spills over to banks that then get distressed because the deteriorating asset prices put their balance sheets into difficulties and reduce bank capital (Chacko et al. 2011). In this case, a crisis can be stopped by a lender of last resort that provides the necessary liquidity and stops the crisis from turning into a default avalanche.

#### If anything, it’ll substantially affect the US economy.

Dadush, 10 [Uri Dadush, PhD, Business Economics, Harvard University, senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, focuses on trends in the global economy and is currently tracking developments in the eurozone crisis, 6-2-2010, ‘The Euro Crisis: A Threat to the US Economy’, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, https://carnegieendowment.org/2010/06/02/euro-crisis-threat-to-u.s.-economy-pub-40887]

The trade and investment links between the United States and the European Union (EU) are significant. Europe consumes twenty percent of U.S. exports and holds more than 50 percent of U.S. overseas assets, while the United States holds close to 40 percent of Europe’s foreign assets. Lower growth and higher volatility in Europe could therefore have serious consequences for the United States, hindering export growth and endangering assets. Europe has already shown itself to be the laggard in the global recovery—in the first quarter, European GDP was up only 0.3 percent (y/y), compared to 2.5 percent in the United States and 11.9 percent in China—and the situation may well get worse before it gets better.

IMGXYZ5032IMGZYXThe crisis will likely lead the euro to depreciate further in the coming months. The euro has already fallen more than 20 percent against the dollar since late November—two months before Obama unveiled his goal of doubling exports in the next five years—and it may fall to parity. In sectors where U.S. and European exports overlap (e.g., aircraft, machinery, professional services), a lower euro will hinder the competitiveness of U.S. goods on the global market. The depreciation will also reduce the purchasing power of European tourists traveling to the United States and make European goods relatively cheaper in U.S. markets at a time when policy makers are hoping to avoid a return to high current account deficits. With imports likely to rise and exports likely to fall, the U.S. bilateral trade balance with Europe will likely deteriorate. By definition, the profitability of U.S. companies operating in Europe will be affected by the Euro crisis when profits and assets on the balance sheets are expressed in dollars. U.S. companies selling in Europe and sourcing in dollars will see even sharper profit declines, though U.S. companies selling into the dollar area and sourcing in Europe will benefit.

Despite the negative effects a weaker euro would have on U.S. job creation, the most important consequences of the Euro crisis in the United States will operate through financial and, more specifically, banking channels. Though the exposure of [U.S. banks](http://carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=40707) to the most vulnerable countries in Europe is limited to $176 billion, or 5 percent of their total foreign exposure, their indirect linkages to these countries, which operate through all of the international banks, are much larger. Not surprisingly, European banks hold large amounts of their own countries’ bonds and, according to a recent World Bank report, these holdings exceed reserves in some instances. A string of bank failures in Europe could well trigger another global credit crunch.

### AT: INB—LIO Turn

#### Burden-sharing wrecks the LIO and decenters US dominance

McTague, 22 [Tom McTague, staff writer at the Atlantic, 3-24-2022, The Atlantic, ‘Biden Can’t Paper Over the West’s Disunity’, <https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2022/03/biden-nato-summit-russia-invasion-ukraine/627598/> /alundy]

Ideological incoherence is the main threat to the Western alliance, but a close second can be found in the West’s imperial center—the U.S. And here, again, we return to Trump. The essence of his complaint about Europe was not simply that it was not contributing enough; it was that he didn’t really believe in the U.S.-led order itself. Trump believed the whole structure was unfair to the U.S.: Why should it shoulder most of the burden of policing the world? But the thing with orders—liberal, “rules-based,” or any other—is that they need ordering, and this is the job of the hegemon. Burdens can be better shared, and Europe can do more to free America for its contest with China, but ultimately the U.S. either guarantees European security or it doesn’t**.**

Biden will undoubtedly speak a familiar language to European leaders—one of liberal values and the defense of democracy, and that will be comforting to them. But the question that nevertheless troubles European politicians, diplomats, and officials is whether instead of Trump being an eccentric one-off, his instinctive antagonism to the obligations of global leadership represents a trend in American public opinion more generally. The question that follows is whether the U.S. has the political will to be the hegemonic power it has been since the end of the Second World War, the basis on which the Western world functions.

As one former NATO insider put it to me, the alliance’s strength is its strategic capability, and this is possible only because the U.S. dominates it. An alliance of lots of similar-size states would not be the same: It would be the European Union—a worthwhile political and trade bloc, but not a capable military grouping. What happens if Washington decides it no longer wants the role of leader?

One somewhat counterintuitive conclusion from the past 20 years is that, if anything, America’s relative dominance over Europe has grown, not declined. After the financial crash, it was the Federal Reserve that stepped in to become the global lender of last resort, while Europe descended into a set of rolling crises. The fundamentals of U.S. economic strength remain extraordinary: the dollar, Silicon Valley, America’s universities, Wall Street. Europe lags behind on all of these, and Germany’s sudden commitment to additional defense spending will do little to bridge the yawning security gap.

The reality is that the West functions as an American-led alliance, but it is not clear that Europe entirely agrees on America’s principal strategic threats. Whether Trump returns to the White House or Biden is the one who returns to some future NATO summit, there will come a point when Europe and the U.S. must decide whether and how to renew their alliance for the next challenge—be that Russia, or China, or something else entirely. And if they do, it will take far more than a small uptick in defense spending and a change in energy policy to keep them united**.**

### Links to Entrapment

#### CP links to entrapment or the da is terminally non-unique—ideological prejudices, lobbying, and issue spillage drive commitments.

Lanoszka ’17 [Alexander Lanoszka; Assistant Professor of International Relations at the University of Waterloo; 12-18-2017; "Tangled up in rose? Theories of alliance entrapment and the 2008 Russo-Georgian War"; Taylor & Francis; https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13523260.2017.1392102; Accessed 7-11-2022; AW]

**Entrapment** could also **result from transnational** ideological factors. Driscoll and Maliniak (2016) suggest that defenders like the **United States get ensnared in conflicts “where their national interests are not implicated” for reasons of** “issue slippage**” (p. 593). This issue slippage occurs when the alliance takes on additional purposes, losing sight even of its original purpose. In the case of NATO, issue slippage ensued when the Soviet military threat no longer existed and the** alliance became instead a political community based on liberal democratic values. Accordingly, an actual or **potential ally can “position itself in the imagination of liberal idealists in the West” to maximize external support** (Driscoll & Maliniak, 2016, p. 594). Similarly, Cooley and Nexon (2016, pp. 77–82) argue that foreign elites can forge bonds of trust and friendship with American officials and politicians, thereby **eliciting more cooperation than what was strategically warrante**d. The common mechanism underlying these arguments is that the ally exploits some transnational connection via elite networks. This **connection often has an ideological character since foreign elites play to the** ideological prejudices **of the defender by professionalizing the national bureaucracy**, highlighting religious and political affinities with the West, **contracting with** lobbying firms **in the defender’s capital city**, and developing embassy connections (Cooley & Nexon, 2016, pp. 88–94; Driscoll & Maliniak, 2016, p. 601). Sometimes they **might instead play on ethnic ties if those ties exist**. The net effect is to make foreign policy-making in NATO capitals more amenable to a state’s particular interests. The **mechanism resembles** what Schimmelfennig (2003) calls **rhetorical action, which refers to the “strategic use and exchange of arguments to persuade other actors to act according to one’s preference**s” (p. 5). By appealing to the ideological sensibilities of the defender’s elites, the ally can co-opt that defender, thereby increasing the probability **that the defender would assist the ally even if doing so is detrimental to its strategic interests.**

### Links to Politics

#### Burden sharing sparks acrimonious debate in congress

Eyal 22 (Jonathan Eyal is associate director at the Royal United Services Institute in London, “Yes, Nato has a new vitality. But its united front could collapse when it has to deal with Russia” 7/3/22 https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2022/jul/03/yes-nato-has-a-new-vitality-but-its-united-front-could-collapse-when-it-has-to-deal-with-russia)

Nato calculates that its members have promised to spend £172.6bn in additional defence expenditure on top of existing defence budgets, with Germany accounting for perhaps half this amount. But the question is how this will be spent and over what period. The easiest way to improve European capabilities would be to use this cash to buy US equipment off the shelf: this offers substantial economies of scale and time. Yet such an approach will go against European aspirations to boost their defence industries; French diplomats are warning that the Ukraine war must not end up as a bonanza for US arms manufacturers. Chances are high that Nato’s eternal “burden-sharing” debate will continue, even if more cash is available. Across the Atlantic, Donald Trump and his disciples are poised to argue – as “The Donald” did when he was in the White House – that Nato is a scam to fleece American taxpayers. Even if he does not stage a comeback, the idea that the US is spending far more than it should to defend fat, wealthy Europeans is likely to feature prominently when a new Congress is elected this November. The sheer audacity of the Russian aggression has allowed the Biden administration to get the cash it needed from Congress. Still, it is taken for granted in Washington that the $40bn package recently approved by Congress for security assistance to Ukraine is unlikely to be repeated. And a future Nato burden-sharing debate is bound to get more acrimonious when it is joined with a parallel discussion about paying for Ukraine’s postwar economic reconstruction, a project estimated at an eye-watering $500bn.

## AT: Entrapment DA

### Turn—Relations Solve Entrapment

#### Stronger relations cause NATO to restrain US aggression- solves entrapment

Anika Binnendijk 19 — (Anika Binnendijk; senior fellow with the Scowcroft Center’s Transatlantic Security Initiative, a political scientist at the RAND Corporation, Published: 2019; "An Attack Against Them All? Drivers of Decisions to Contribute to NATO Collective Defense"; RAND Corporation; Accessed: 7-9-2022; https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1080712.pdf)//Pen-SY

Concerns about a mismatch of goals could be overcome if coalition participants are more confident in their ability to influence the coalition’s actions. Potential participants could have concerns about restraining any ally, but in a Baltic scenario, these concerns are likely to be most acute with respect to the most powerful and leading members of the coalition and the Baltic states. Typically, weaker states are thought to have less leverage in the alliance and, therefore, greater concerns about entrapment by a stronger ally like the United States.78 However, weaker allies do have some ways to restrain more-powerful allies. First, longstanding diplomatic and military relationships among NATO members mean that states might have insight into their allies’ decision making processes and the contacts needed to influence those processes.79 Second, allies also have some sources of leverage over a coalition leader, including the ability to withdraw participation or place limits on access to military bases or airspace.80 Such actions could restrain a coalition leader’s behavior by affecting its ability to carry out operations, raising the costs of a military action, or undermining the domestic or international legitimacy of the operation. To the extent that a coalition leader values the support of its allies in the longer term, threats of exit from the coalition or NATO itself could affect a coalition leader’s decisionmaking.81 There is evidence that NATO allies used NATO decisionmaking structures to restrain U.S. actions during the air war over Kosovo. Wesley Clark, who was NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander, complained about the influence of NATO members on military decisions, including campaign phasing and individual targeting.82 In a now-famous incident at the Pristina airport, the British commander of NATO’s Allied Rapid Reaction Corps was able to leverage his chain of command in London to thwart Clark’s plan to block the airport runway with helicopters—a move that the British commander believed could have triggered a security incident between NATO and Russia.83 Ultimately, concerns about constraints posed by NATO structures in Kosovo contributed to the U.S. decision to form a coalition of the willing for initial operations in Afghanistan in 2001.84 NATO members that do not participate could still face direct Russian retaliation or other consequences. Given that possibility, members who do not entirely support the aims of the operation might still participate in order to seek greater influence over operational decisions than they would have if they were on the outside.85 This logic appears to have influenced France’s decision to join NATO’s air war over Kosovo. French Secretary General for Defense and National Security Louis Gautier argued that French participation in the operation meant that France was “able in Kosovo to impose itself in the decisionmaking process and affect strategy.”86

### Entrapment False

#### No entrapment – Empirics

-allies restrain the us rather than embolden it

-draw-in is always domestic

Beckley 15[(Michael, Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at Tufts University, “The Myth of Entangling Alliances : Reassessing the Security Risks of U.S. Defense Pacts” International security 39(4) <https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/files/IS3904_pp007-048.pdf)p.46-48//> EZAY]

Conclusion

American concerns about entangling alliances are as old as the Republic itself. During the post–World War II era, however, there have been only five ostensible episodes of U.S. entanglement, and even these cases are questionable. The case in which alliance obligations had the largest impact on U.S. decisionmaking (the 1995–96 Taiwan Strait crisis) entailed minimal military action, and the case that entailed the most military action (the Vietnam War) contained only a marginal role for alliance politics in U.S. decisionmaking. In the other three cases (the 1954–55 Taiwan Strait crisis and the wars in Bosnia and Kosovo), both the effect of alliance obligations on U.S. policy and the costs suffered by U.S. forces were moderate. And beyond these cases, entanglement was virtually nonexistent in U.S. foreign policy. Against this limited evidence of entanglement are numerous cases in which alliances restrained the United States. Allies dissuaded the United States from escalating the Korean War and crises in Laos and Berlin, and struggled in vain to prevent the United States from entering or escalating other conflicts, the 2003 Iraq War being only the latest major example. Indeed, instances of alliance-induced restraint are evident even within the five cases of entanglement discussed above: in the 1954–55 Taiwan Strait crisis, concerns about European alliances discouraged U.S. policymakers from bombing the Chinese mainland and publicly committing to defend Jinmen and Mazu; in the Vietnam War, allies impeded U.S. entry into the war and then repeatedly implored the United States to get out; and in Bosnia and Kosovo, U.S. allies initially restrained the United States from lashing out violently and then provided all of the NATO ground forces and most of the postconflict peacekeepers for the eventual operations. There also are several cases in which the United States sidestepped inconvenient alliance commitments, restrained an ally from attacking a third party, or openly sided against an ally—and this list could probably be expanded by looking within other cases, including the five ostensible cases of entanglement. As explained earlier, the United States blatantly retracted a pledge to Taiwan to defend Jinmen and Mazu in 1955, refused to save the French at Dien Bien Phu in 1954, delegated ground operations and most of the postconflict peacekeeping in Bosnia and Kosovo to allies, and waited for eight months and the receipt of private security assurances before responding militarily to China’s provocative behavior near Taiwan in 1995–96. In sum, the empirical record shows that the risk of entanglement is real but manageable and that, for better or worse, U.S. security policy lies firmly in the hands of U.S. leaders and is shaped primarily by those leaders’ perceptions of the nation’s core interests. When the United States has overreached militarily, the main cause has not been entangling alliances but rather what Richard Betts calls “self-entrapment”—the tendency of U.S. leaders to define national interests expansively, to exaggerate the magnitude of foreign threats, and to underestimate the costs of military intervention.188 Developing a disciplined defense policy therefore will require the emergence of prudent leadership, the development (or resurrection) of guidelines governing the use of force,189 the establishment of domestic institutional constraints on the president’s authority to send U.S. forces into battle, or some combination of these.190 Scrapping alliances, by contrast, would simply unleash the United States to act on its interventionist impulses while leaving it isolated diplomatically and militarily.

#### Reject entrapment studies – They’re backward

Alexander Lanoszka (2017). Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science and in the Balsillie School of International Affairs at the University of Waterloo, BA (Windsor), PhD (Princeton);” Tangled up in rose? Theories of alliance entrapment and the 2008 Russo-Georgian War.“ Contemporary Security Policy, 39(2), 234–257. doi:10.1080/13523260.2017.1392102) //P.19 EZAY

The main problem concerns counterfactuals. The factors that allegedly generate entrapment risks can be so wide-ranging that imagining a world in which they operate differently would require changing other variables, which in turn can make war more or less likely. Alternatively, they might not exclude other factors that could lead to the same violent outcome. After all, conflict drives both alliance formation and the likelihood of war. States join alliances because they assess that the possibility of war is non-trivial. Similarly, a defender might be receptive to the overtures of an ally precisely because it has a pre-existing desire to see conflict with the adversary of that ally. In social scientific parlance, endogeneity problems are pervasive when trying to understand whether entrapment has occurred or is at risk of occurring. The case of the 2008 Russo-Georgian War is instructive by revealing these ambiguities. Many NATO members—especially those in Western Europe—were lukewarm towards Georgia’s bid to become a treaty ally, arguably because they recognized that Georgia posed certain entrapment risks. The United States was the most supportive of Georgia, but it might have overstated its support to Georgia in order to gain a bargaining chip with Russia. It might have even done so because Western European countries were so hesitant, thereby ignoring Saakashvili’s non-democratic tendencies. But by this very token, the United States limited its response to the outbreak of hostilities between Georgia and Russia in August 2008. The Georgian case suggests that states do not forge alliances mindlessly nor do they follow their allies off the cliff thoughtlessly. One cannot by definition want to be entrapped. The Russo-Georgian War of 2008 illustrates the need to disentangle the factors that push states to fight wars and to seek alliances while carefully investigating the mechanisms through which alliances fuel wars. As noted, some baseline probability of war had already existed between the two former Soviet republics when Saakashvili became President. Their conflict centered on an unresolved dispute regarding the political status of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Neither could commit to a durable settlement. Moreover, territorial concessions and submission to salami tactics could have signaled Georgian weakness, thereby encouraging new or more assertive territorial demands. Georgian leaders might have also faced domestic incentives to stand firm towards Russia—incentives that would have existed independent of NATO. To the extent that alliance politics mattered from Georgia’s perspective, Saakashvili might have cherry-picked information that confirmed his beliefs regarding Western support. Nevertheless, these factors are idiosyncratic because they stem directly from his personality. In a counterfactual world where NATO was not a factor, he could have had these and other cognitive biases that would have elevated the likelihood of war. By undertaking this sort of counterfactual analysis, scholars thus must take care to isolate the effect of an alliance commitment—to the degree that it exists—from the underlying propensity of war. Georgia bears a methodological and analytical lesson for thinking about entrapment: Just because NATO was an issue for Georgian security in 2008 does not mean the alliance was causally responsible for the war. Future research on alliances and war must not only identify correlations between alliances and conflict, but also sort out various causal mechanisms that connect different causal factors with war. Carefully disentangling the factors that could lead to entrapment matters not only for theory and methodology but also for policy. If entrapment concerns are real, then defense planners must have a clear idea as to where they come from. Some entrapment risks can be attenuated with active policy measures. Conditioning a political or military commitment when dealing with a risk-acceptant ally is one example. But doing so might not matter if we have reason to think that systemic forces make that ally more aggressive. Strong commitments could even make seemingly jumpy allies more secure. And so, armed with a better understanding of what drives entrapment risks, defense planners would be more confident in modulating political and military commitments appropriately. As such, critics of NATO expansion and American foreign policy may be overstating their case. NATO might bear some indirect responsibility for the Russo-Georgian War, but its culpability lessens when we consider the other factors that increased the likelihood of war: misperceptions, overconfidence, and the commitment problems underlying the territorial disputes themselves. If anything, the key policy challenge is for NATO to determine whether prospective partners like Saakashvili have psychological traits or cognitive biases that would make them unjustifiably optimistic about the level of support that they would receive.

### Entrapment False—AT: Reputational risk theory

#### Reputation alone is insufficient to trigger entrapment

Alexander Lanoszka 17 — (Alexander Lanoszka; Assistant Professor at the University of Waterloo, Published: 12-18-2017; "Tangled up in rose? Theories of alliance entrapment and the 2008 Russo-Georgian War"; Taylor & Francis; Accessed: 7-4-2022; https://www-tandfonline-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1080/13523260.2017.1392102)//Pen-SY

Scholars are divided about whether fighting for reputation is a rational motive for states and thus whether it creates perverse incentives for allies. Some claim that states calculate the credibility of an ally or an adversary on the basis of its willingness and ability to fulfill a threat or promise. Credibility thus does not depend on having a record of keeping pledges (Press, 2005). Accordingly, states cannot develop reputations for reliability among their own allies (Mercer, 1996; Tang, 2005). Fighting for reputation is irrational. However, some dispute the proposition that actions do not matter for building credibility since actions provide information as to the interests and resolve of a state. Moreover, a record of standing up to adversaries could generate credibility, which in turn helps develop a bargaining advantage (Weisiger & Yarhi-Milo, 2015). Whichever is the case, recent scholarship has cast doubt as to whether reputational concerns worsen entrapment risks. The Vietnam War is an oft-cited example of the entrapment of strong states by friendly states, but the evidence shows that American allies wished to restrain the United States because they feared that questionable wars of choice would divert resources away from them (Beckley, 2015, pp. 33–38, pp. 46–47). Another weakness of the reputational explanation for entrapment is its deceptively simple counterfactual. Simply stated, the counterfactual is that the defender does not care about its reputation. Yet the implications of this counterfactual are unclear. For example, does the defender not help the ally at all? And if it does assist the ally, is it doing so only because of reputational concerns? By offering an alliance commitment in the first place, the defender reveals that it has some common security interests with that ally (Walt, 1987; Yarhi-Milo, Lanoszka, & Cooper, 2016). A defender unconcerned with its reputation might still help that ally for various national security reasons, as its decision-makers understand them. Alternatively, a defender might even enhance its reputation by not assisting the ally in a militarized conflict that the very ally instigated. The defender could decide that following the reckless ally into an undesirable war will undermine its ability to protect other, less problematic allies. The defender could even limit the damage to its reputation by deflecting blame onto a misbehaving ally. These observations suggest that the ally might not necessarily want to wager that the defender would fight on its behalf simply because of reputational concerns. And so an ally that is willing to make this wager is the sort of state that might already be pre-disposed to risk-acceptant behavior. If war does break out because the ally made that gamble, then the war should not be attributed to the alliance per se but rather to the ally and its innate risk propensity.

### Entrapment False—AT: Cred Theory

#### Cred theory is fake – allies prefer peaceful policy and minimal intervention

Iain D. **Henry 20**, (Lecturer at the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, Spring 2020, “What Allies Want: Reconsidering Loyalty, Reliability, and Alliance Interdependence,” International Security, Vol. 44, No. 4)//EZAY

The events of the First Taiwan Strait Crisis illustrate the need to delineate between innate loyalty and observed reliability. Reliability is a broader and more useful concept that subsumes the idea of loyalty and reduces its unwarranted prominence. U.S. conduct was not judged against an objective standard of loyalty: allies desiring a confrontational posture, such as South Korea and the Philippines, invoked Quemoy and Matsu as symbols that required defending, and encouraged U.S. loyalty to the ROC. Most allies, however, were more concerned about the possibility of war, and so discouraged a U.S. defense of strategically unimportant territory. These allies did not mind that this would involve U.S. disloyalty to the ROC, but instead cared about whether Washington's policy goals were convergent with their own.

In this case study, several allies cooperated to restrain the United States and mitigate the risk of entrapment, while weaker allies fearing abandonment had little option but to complain about U.S. timidity. In other circumstances, however, allies fearing abandonment could respond differently. For example, in May 1950 Japan dispatched a secret delegation to Washington. Citing the concern prompted by the 1949 withdrawal of United States forces from the Korean Peninsula, and vacillating U.S. policy toward Nationalist China, Japan expressed its desire for U.S. forces to stay in Japan, even once the postwar occupation ended.[123](javascript:;) Similar fears of abandonment were sparked in the 1970s, when President Jimmy Carter planned troop reductions in South Korea. In response, Tokyo initiated a new period of military and economic cooperation with Seoul. As Victor Cha writes, “The most single decisive factor in this upswing in security contacts was anxiety over the Carter plan.”[124](javascript:;)

As explained, Mercer's argument about reputation is contingent upon what constitutes desired and undesired behavior. If states do not always desire allied loyalty, then this leaves open the possibility of interdependence being governed by assessments of interests and capability, but raises the question of when such interdependence might be observed. This article deployed a within-case study approach, but interdependence was also operative across iterative crises: allies were unsurprised by the United States’ initial response to the First Taiwan Strait Crisis, because they had just observed a similarly belligerent approach toward the PRC during discussions on Indochina. Although the United States ultimately backed down on Indochina in 1954, this did not lead its allies to expect a similar back down over the Taiwan Strait. This logic supports the argument made by Alex Weisiger and Keren Yarhi-Milo: by focusing on iterative security crises, previous research may have overlooked the possibility that during such events, “information gleaned from past actions … will have already been folded into the general assessment of interests.”[125](javascript:;) Studying prolonged security crises, where assessments of interests are regularly updated in response to new information, may provide fresh insight into not only how states assess allied reliability, but when and why these assessments change.

Although this article focuses on alliances, my findings raise new questions about the possible interdependence of threats. One assumption contested in this article—that allies always want to see their ally demonstrate innate loyalty—has an equivalent in deterrence theory. It is assumed that states always want their adversary to back down, but are there circumstances in which an adversary's decision to fight is welcomed?[126](javascript:;) A state may desire this if it saps public support, provides geography unfavorable to the adversary, or ties down an adversary's military force in an unimportant theater. China may not object to a display of U.S. resolve in the Middle East or Europe if it believes that this decreases the United States’ focus on Asia. This counterintuitive possibility requires further consideration and, if supported, would be further evidence to suggest that states assess national interests, rather than national character.

The policy implications of the alliance reliability concept are significant, especially given President Donald Trump's mercurial approach to alliance management. How should U.S. policymakers approach the possibility of alliance interdependence? First, they should realize that the national character of the United States is not on trial: allies will be looking for evidence of reliability, not loyalty. The idea of reliability is especially pertinent to current discussions about a U.S. withdrawal from the Middle East: allies may not invariably despair at withdrawal if it enables the United States to focus on other issues of greater allied concern. Second, U.S. policymakers should consider how specific actions might influence each ally, as different allies are likely to react in different ways. Officials will not need a crystal ball: this First Taiwan Strait Crisis case study suggests that allies will not hesitate to express their fears. Nor will allies rush for the door at the first sign of unreliability: in this case, their first instinct was to bargain with U.S. leaders and convince them that disloyalty to the ROC was actually in the best interests of the United States. The reliability concept shows that state interests are not totally exogenous to their alliance relationships: alliance unity can require hard bargaining over how states order their interests.[127](javascript:;) This bargaining is made more difficult if states in alliance are reluctant to consider situations where their interests diverge, even privately, for fear of upsetting alliance comity. Such discussions may be difficult, and frustrating for the United States if it expects unqualified support, but they provide an opportunity to understand what, in alliance interdependence terms, is at stake in a crisis. Finally, the United States should consider the desirability of likely allied reactions and factor these into decisionmaking. Fighting to preserve allied beliefs about U.S. reliability may be worthwhile if doing so prevents unwanted reactions such as dealignment, bandwagoning, or nuclear proliferation. On the other hand, it may be beneficial for allies to fear unreliability if this will almost certainly cause them to pursue policies—such as increased defense spending—desired by the United States.

Today, several flash points around the globe could create problems of alliance interdependence. The closest parallel to the events of 1954–55 is found in the Sino-Japanese dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, which are covered by the U.S.-Japan alliance. Another similar case is the recent reaffirmation, by Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, that the U.S.-Philippines alliance covers Filipino military assets in the South China Sea.[128](javascript:;) The instinct of many in the United States will be to regard any Chinese challenge in these areas as a test of national character. Instead, policymakers should consider their options and the likely allied reactions. Given the escalation risks present within the U.S.-China relationship, will other allies want to risk conflict—perhaps even nuclear war—over uninhabited territory of debatable strategic importance or the sinking of a single naval vessel?[129](javascript:;) Of course, arguments advocating disloyalty would have to be weighed against the likely effects in Japan, or the Philippines. Would Japan abrogate the alliance, conciliate China, or perhaps develop its own nuclear weapons? Or could it be reassured, thus avoiding undesired consequences? Would the Philippines react by bandwagoning with China? These questions will be even harder to answer during a security crisis, but neither deterrence theory nor reputation-skeptic perspectives would prompt decisionmakers to ask them. The concept of reliability and its effect on alliance interdependence do not solve such dilemmas, but they help to raise the right questions and more accurately identify the actual stakes involved.

### No NATO Entrapment

#### NATO entrapment’s wrong—no automatic involvement

Alley 20 (Joshua Keegan Alley-PhD. “Alliance Participation And Military Spending” , Dissertation, Texas A&M University Political Science, 2020 , [accessed](https://oaktrust-library-tamu-edu.www2.lib.ku.edu/bitstream/handle/1969.1/189551/ALLEY-DISSERTATION-2020.pdf?sequence=1) online via KU libraries , date accessed 2/24/21)

\*italics in original

After the end of World War II, the US sought a way to protect Europe from the USSR. Despite acute security concerns, fear of entrapment in unwanted conflicts led to limits on military support. First, as Poast (2019*a*) details, NATO members disagreed over how to define the North Atlantic area, which was a key condition on military support. The US and other states argued about whether France’s Algerian colony and Italy should be protected by the alliance. Second, active military support from NATO members depends on domestic political processes.18 Isolationists in the US Senate feared that an alliance would force America to intervene automatically if partners were attacked, bypassing the power of Congress to declare war and engaging the US in unwanted conflicts (Acheson, 1969, pg. 280-1). Therefore Article V of the NATO treaty states that if one member is attacked the others “will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, *such action as it deems necessary* (emphasis mine).” Military support was and is not guaranteed. Secretary of State Dean Acheson stated as much in a March 1949 press release defending NATO to the US public, where he said that Article V “does not mean that the United States would automatically be at war if one of the nations covered by the Pact is subject to armed attack” (Acheson, 1949). This claim and the emphases of the press release shows that promises of military support were highly salient to the US public.

#### A5 Flexibility prevents NATO from being forced into conflicts

Michael Kofman 16, Analyst at CNA Corporation and Fellow at the Wilson Center’s Kennan Institute, Former Program Manager at National Defense University, “Fixing NATO Deterrence In The East Or: How I Learned To Stop Worrying And Love Nato’s Crushing Defeat By Russia”, War on the Rocks, 5/12/2016, https://warontherocks.com/2016/05/fixing-nato-deterrence-in-the-east-or-how-i-learned-to-stop-worrying-and-love-natos-crushing-defeat-by-russia/

NATO’s best answer to compellence is strategic flexibility and ambiguity of response. While Article V dictates the defense of a member, it doesn’t stipulate what that defense must be, how it should take shape, or where it will be applied. With U.S. forces in place, NATO members can be assured that Article V will be triggered, but what happens next should be left a question mark. The more NATO emphasizes the Russian threat and argues for fixed forces in place, the less capably it can defend a challenge to its credibility as an alliance. Anyone can count the order of battle and the balance of forces. By introducing ambiguity in its potential response once Article V has been declared, NATO reduces the chance it can easily be manipulated into a credibility test. The objective should be shrouding a Baltic high-end fight in incalculable risk for Russia while maintaining uncertainty and strategic flexibility with air and naval assets.

#### Entrapment is wrong and adaption solves.

Cohen and Monie 19 [Jordan Cohen is a Political science Ph.D. student at George Mason University and Connor Monie is a Master's candidate in international security at George Mason University. "The True Value of a NATO Membership" The National Interest, 25 November 2019, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/true-value-nato-membership-99817.]

The second part of the counterargument deals with entanglement and entrapment. The idea that U.S. presence in an alliance with an extensive security commitment and an ever-increasing number of European countries and can entangle it in a conflict with Russia is persistent and not entirely incorrect.

On one hand, the academic literature suggests entrapment is far less common than perceived. Separate research by Tongfi Kim, Michael Beckley, and Alexander Lanoszka all finds that entrapment is an unlikely scenario in international politics. In fact, the work by Beckley finds that the United States has been able to avoid entanglement by using a large alliance portfolio to balance counteracting commitments.

Even if one is still concerned with the risks of entrapment, this is a major reason why NATO should adopt a strategy less focused on deterring Russia. As we noted previously, by constantly focusing on defense spending and balancing, NATO has threatened Russia. Thus, our argument actually suggests entanglement will be less likely if NATO begins to focus more on cooperative and humanitarian actions within the alliance.

By the mere fact of its continued existence, NATO has displayed a penchant for adaptation to new circumstances. To continue surviving, though, it needs to adapt once again. The focus on balancing against Russia made sense during the Cold War but has made Europe less secure while also decreasing the popularity of the alliance.

By shifting its focus to the promotion of shared values and broader international political cooperation, NATO can prove Macron incorrect, and revitalize its existence in a new era.

#### Consensus requirements prevent entrapment

Ariel Shapiro 17, Master of Arts Candidate at the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs at Carleton University, Worked at Parliament and as a Policy Analyst at the Federal Government, and Holds a Bachelor’s Degree in Political Science from McGill University, “NATO If Necessary, But Not Necessarily NATO: Critically Evaluating Canada’s Membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization”, Canadian Global Affairs Institute, October 2017, https://www.cgai.ca/nato\_if\_necessary\_but\_not\_necessarily\_nato

A final risk of continued NATO membership that Canada must consider is the possibility of being dragged into conflict. While the ADM (Policy) at DND claims that NATO increases global stability by preventing the formation of smaller alliance blocs, this logic must be re-evaluated in the post-Cold War era. We can turn to the international relations theory of alliances in multipolarity, as explained by Kenneth Waltz (and later, Jack Snyder and Thomas Christensen). One of the biggest dangers of a military alliance is “chain-ganging”50: that one ally will recklessly drag the others into war, as was the case between Austria-Hungary and Germany in 1914. It is true that the NATO alliance has a mechanism to stop this: Article 5 can only be invoked by consensus, which prevents the shooting down of a Turkish jet by Russia from immediately turning into global war. However, alliance theory argues that it isn’t about automatic triggers, but survival interests. As Waltz explained, in 1914, “If France marched, Russia had to follow; a German victory over France would be a defeat for Russia.”51 Similarly, if Russia today conventionally invaded a Baltic state and NATO ally, it is difficult to imagine that the alliance would not respond: not for the first time in its history, Canada would be dragged into a faraway, conventional European war. However, Canada can support countries around the world and advocate for their continued survival and independence without being bound to defend them. Canada’s relationship with Israel is a good example. Canada has supported this precariously situated democratic country since its creation in 1948, has engaged in numerous high-level visits and economic agreements with this state, and has frequently (especially since 2006) taken a stand against condemnation of Israel at the United Nations at significant cost to its own reputation. However, there is no defence agreement: should war erupt again between Israel and its neighbours, Canada would not come to Israel’s aid by sending soldiers. A different example is Canada’s relationship with Kuwait. While there is no long-standing mutual relationship of defence and support between the two, it was in the interest of global security to stop Saddam Hussein’s invasion of that country in 1990/1991. Canada answered the call then, but was not bound to support a future mission against Iraq in 2003.

### No NATO Entrapment—AT: Article V

#### Wars of aggression are unpopular – allies won’t follow and credibility isn’t sacrificed

Constantine **Atlamazoglou**, 9-23-2021, (master's degree in security studies and European affairs from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. "NATO is still living with the consequences of a historic decision it made hours after 9/11," Business Insider, https://www.businessinsider.com/nato-still-living-with-consequences-article-5-invocation-after-911-2021-9)//EZAY

The day after the September 11 attacks, most NATO countries called for the invocation of Article 5. This did not immediately happen since the origin of the attacks had yet to be determined to the satisfaction of some members.

It took until October 2, 2001 — when then-NATO Secretary General Lord George Robertson announced that the attacks had indeed been directed from abroad — for Article 5 to be invoked.

This was a watershed moment for the alliance. Failure to invoke Article 5 would have rendered NATO obsolete. Instead, the alliance, which had struggled to find its raison d'être following the collapse of the Soviet Union, was propelled into Afghanistan and the fight against terrorism.

A number of NATO allies were involved in the war from the very beginning.

The UK participated in the first airstrikes against Taliban and Al Qaeda targets. German and British special-operations units took part in the Battle of Tora Bora. A number of NATO countries contributed personnel, aircraft, and logistical support during 2002's Operation Anaconda, the successful mission to rout out Al Qaeda from Afghanistan's Shahi Kot valley.

After dismantling the Taliban and Al Qaeda networks in Afghanistan, NATO's role there only grew.

In 2003, at the request of the UN and the Afghan government, NATO took charge of the International Security Assistance Force. This was a landmark moment for the alliance.

ISAF would be NATO's first deployment outside of Europe and North America. All NATO members would contribute personnel to ISAF — some contributed more per capita than the US.

Eventually, the ISAF mandate would expand from securing Kabul to the whole country. This nominally transferred control of the war to NATO.

The war exposes NATO's weaknesses

Assuming control of such a high-stakes mission provided significant operational and organizational experience to NATO. However, as the war's toll increased, weaknesses within the alliance were exposed.

Participation in the war in Afghanistan had been a contentious issue in many European countries from the beginning.

In some, like Spain, parliamentary approval had not been obtained to dispatch troops to Afghanistan. In others, like Germany and Italy, the deployed troops were limited by legal constraints, which in some cases prevented them from actually fighting the Taliban.

Most NATO members had not fought a war in decades, so even limited combat casualties caused significant backlash at home. The 2004 Madrid train bombings and the 2005 London bombings — which brought Islamist terror to Europe in two of the continent's worst attacks in decades — further increased the war's unpopularity.

As a result, many NATO members only contributed a few support troops and tried to sidle away from combat operations and troubled areas. France even withdrew its combat forces in 2012. The lack of specificity in Article 5 meant members could abide by their NATO commitment without totally participating in the war effort.

In 2015, ISAF became the Resolute Support Mission. A non-combat mission, RSM significantly scaled down the number of NATO troops in Afghanistan as it focused on supporting and advising Afghan security forces..

The alliance emerges from Afghanistan with a mixed record.

On the one hand, it undertook its largest mission ever and the first outside its normal area of operations, learning valuable lessons about organization and interoperability that will be useful for future deployments.

On the other hand, the intractable problem at the alliance's core was exposed: the near-impossibility of getting all 30 members to agree on and commit to military and political priorities.

To apply those lessons and stay relevant, the alliance will need to ensure that alignment.

As NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg [wrote](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_186490.htm) on the 20th anniversary of the September 11 attacks, "Afghanistan will not be the last crisis for which North America and Europe need to act together through NATO."

#### Alliances aren’t honored mindlessly

– Quantitative analysis of every single alliance invocation

Berkemeier, M., & Fuhrmann, M. (2018). [Ph.D. Political Science, Texas A&M University M.A. Non-Proliferation & International Security B.A. Political Science, University of Chicago, 2012 “Reassessing the fulfillment of alliance commitments in war.” Research & Politics, 5(2), 205316801877969. doi:10.1177/2053168018779697]//EZAY

Table 1 lists the opportunities to fulfill alliance commitments from 1945 to 2003. This information offers some possible explanations for the sharp decrease in promise fulfillment after World War II. One thing that stands out is that offense pacts and neutrality agreements, which are honored at higher rates than defense pacts and nonaggression pacts, are less common in the modern era. Only 20% of alliance performance opportunities from 1945 to 2003 included offensive or neutrality-based commitments, compared with more than 70% from 1816 to 1944. Changes in the types of alliance commitments that are invoked in war over time might partially account for the puzzling trend that we identify. Yet we still see sizable variation in compliance within the same commitment type in the two eras. Defense pacts, for instance, were honored 61.02% of the time from 1816 to 1944 and only 13.95% of the time post-World War II. What else, then, could explain the changing patterns over time?

The invention of nuclear weapons offers one potential answer. In the post-World War II era, the world’s most powerful states possessed nuclear arsenals. Given the destructive power of these weapons, alliance commitments from nuclear powers – especially defense pacts – have rarely been challenged in war (Fuhrmann and Sechser, 2014). As a result, major powers appear just a few times in Table 1 and relatively weak states account for a sizable percentage of all “alliance performance opportunities” from 1945 to 2003. This is relevant because state power may affect alliance treaty fulfillment. Countries should be most likely to intervene in war when their participation might change the outcome (Morrow, 1994; Smith, 1995). Relatively weak states, according to this line of thinking, are less likely to fulfill their alliance promises because they lack the material capacity to sway a conflict’s outcome.7 Israel probably would have prevailed in the Six Day War, for instance, even if Saudi Arabia had joined its allies in the fight. From Riyadh’s perspective, this may have made it easier to largely remain on the sidelines. This is, however, merely a preliminary conjecture. Conclusion This study presented an updated assessment of the reliability of military alliances. Our analysis, which extended earlier work to include the post-World War II era and utilized updated war data, yields three main conclusions. First, the overall rate of alliance fulfillment in war is lower than previously reported. Second, defense pacts and nonaggression pacts are honored much less frequently than neutrality agreements and offensive alliances. Third, there is a large disparity in the rate of alliance fulfillment before and after World War II. This offers a lesson for researchers that extends beyond the realm of alliance politics: trends that apply in one period may not extend to other eras. It is important to consider whether relationships of interest vary over time – particularly when there are structural shocks, like World War II. What implications does the lower compliance rate carry for our understanding of alliance treaty reliability? Our analysis does not imply that military alliances are ineffective, nor does it challenge the evidence that defense pacts promote peace through extended deterrence (Leeds, 2003b; Johnson and Leeds, 2011; Fuhrmann and Sechser, 2014). The most effective threat is one that never has to be implemented (Schelling, 1966). NATO does not appear in our dataset, for example, precisely because potential adversaries perceive it as effective. However, when alliance commitments are invoked in war, allies uphold their promises less often than the conventional wisdom suggests. This implies that leaders are less restrained by treaty commitments than prior research would expect, a conclusion that carries implications for our understanding of international institutions (for a review of relevant literature, see Simmons, 2010). Our analysis opens up avenues for future research. Scholars could use our updated dataset to revisit enduring debates about alliance politics, such as whether democracies make more (or less) reliable allies (c.f., Gartzke and Gleditsch, 2004; Leeds, 2003a). The disparity in compliance rates over time also represents a puzzle worthy of examination in scholarship. Something may have changed after 1944 that fundamentally altered the nature of alliance politics. We have speculated about the sources of this variation, but further analysis is necessary in order to achieve more definitive answers. The disparity in compliance across commitment types is worthy of further investigation in scholarship as well. Dedicated studies on why offense pacts are so much more reliable than defense pacts would be especially welcome. More generally, future research might consider the implications of our findings for extended deterrence, war-fighting, and the efficacy of international institutions.

#### Article 5 itself doesn’t assure allies and if it’s invoked no impact

Joshua Alley 2020[Postdoctoral Research Associate (Politics) UVirginia Ph.D. Political Science (Department of Political Science) Texas AM B.A. International Affairs/Political Science Gettysburg college) Alliance Participation and Military Spending. Doctoral dissertation, Texas A&M University. Available electronically from <https://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/189551>.] pg.76-78//EZAY

I focus this brief case study on NATO treaty design for two reasons. First, information from NATO applies to multiple alliances, as other US treaties have similar designs. Most US alliances have conditional promises of military support and understanding why is important. Second, NATO is also the most important alliance in international politics, so understanding how the treaty formed is worthwhile. After the end of World War II, the US sought a way to protect Europe from the USSR. Despite acute security concerns, fear of entrapment in unwanted conflicts led to limits on military support. First, as Poast (2019a) details, NATO members disagreed over how to define the North Atlantic area, which was a key condition on military support. The US and other states argued about whether France’s Algerian colony and Italy should be protected by the alliance. Second, active military support from NATO members depends on domestic political processes.18 Isolationists in the US Senate feared that an alliance would force America to intervene automatically if partners were attacked, bypassing the power of Congress to declare war and engaging the US in unwanted conflicts (Acheson, 1969, pg. 280-1). Therefore Article V of the NATO treaty states that if one member is attacked the others “will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary (emphasis mine).” Military support was and is not guaranteed. Secretary of State Dean Acheson stated as much in a March 1949 press release defending NATO to the US public, where he said that Article V “does not mean that the United States would automatically be at war if one of the nations covered by the Pact is subject to armed attack” (Acheson, 1949). This claim and the emphases of the press release shows that promises of military support were highly salient to the US public. Military support from Article V did not assuage European fears that if the Soviets invaded, the United States would not fight. To increase the credibility of NATO, the United States took other measures. A 1951 presentation by Dean Acheson to Dwight Eisenhower argued European allies “fear the inconstancy of United States purpose in Europe. ... These European fears and apprehensions can only be overcome if we move forward with determination and if we make the necessary full and active contribution in terms of both military forces and economic aid” (Acheson, 1951, pg. 3). The first part of reassurance was the creation of the Atlantic Council, which is an international organization and the main source of depth in the NATO treaty itself. The United States used the Atlantic Council to coordinate collective defense and increase the perceived reliability of the alliance. By investing in the Atlantic Council and related joint military planning, the US addressed European fears of abandonment. For example, US officials thought that the British Foreign Minister viewed US provision of a supreme commander in Europe as “a stimulus to European action” in NATO (Acheson, 1950). Many Senators also opposed military aid to Europe (Acheson, 1969, pg 285), which limited efforts to add further treaty depth. These legislative constraints on the executive branch reduced the formal depth of NATO relative to what many ambassadors preferred (Acheson, 1969, pg 277). Bilateral agreements on troop deployments then became another instrument of reassurance. In 1950 the Germans formally requested clarification on whether an attack on US forces in Germany would be treated as an armed attack on the US- which the US said it would (Acheson, 1969, pg. 395). These bilateral arrangements and basing rights are not covered in the NATO treaty, but they added substantial depth.19 NATO negotiations reveal the tendency of democracies to use treaty depth to reassure their allies, rather than unconditional military support. Fear of foreign entanglement led the United States to offer conditional military support, but did not inhibit deep military cooperation, which helped reassure European allies. Limits on the promises of military support were an important public justification for the NATO treaty, while the Atlantic Council was less discussed. Still, the power of treaty ratification in the Senate limited formal NATO depth to the Atlantic Council. The Atlantic Council and associated bureaucratic machinery are the formal core of substantial defense cooperation. Altogether though Article V is limited, the US used treaty depth to increase the credibility of NATO.

### No Turkey Entrapment

#### No turkey entrapment

– Interdependence and assurance adjusting checks

-Turkey is a test case for resiliency and restraint

-have too much to lose to do adventurism

**Gulmez 20** (Didem Buhari Gulmez, an Associate Professor in International Relations at Izmir Katip Celebi University. She worked as a post-doctoral researcher at London School of Economics and Political Science and Oxford Brookes University from 2013 to 2015; “The resilience of the US–Turkey alliance: divergent threat perceptions and worldviews”; Sasakawa Peace Foundation; 2020; https://www.spf.org/en/jpus/spf-woldviews-on-the-united-states/woldviews-on-the-united-states007.html )//EZAY

Why does the US–Turkey alliance persist despite the low credibility of the US security guarantees after the Cold War? Both the rise of contestations against the US hegemony and the establishment of a single-party government by the AKP in Turkey led to significant divergences in threat perceptions and worldviews within the US-Turkey alliance. Given its regional leadership aspirations based on strategic autonomy, Turkey can be seen as a critical or ‘the least likely case’ (Eckstein, 1975) for the resilience of the US alliances. If the alliance proves resilient in this most difficult case, it is more likely to persist in other cases too.

Several factors such as the high credibility of the alliance and a shared sense of belonging in a security community between the allies explain why an alliance persists (Walt, 1997). Turkey maintains the US alliance in spite of the low credibility of the US security guarantees, the perceived leadership failure of the US in the Middle East and the divergence of threat perceptions and worldviews between Turkey and the US. As Turkey’s US alliance reflects a combination of transactional and ontological motivations since its eruption, both transactional and ‘order-centric’ arguments contribute to the resilience of the alliance.

According to the transactional view, the US alliance has served as a ‘hedge’ against alternative regional orders led by Russia or Iran. Turkey’s security dependence on the US and the costs of abrogating the alliance prevail over the AKP’s search for greater autonomy and a better status in the East. Turkey’s energy dependence on Russia and Iran curtails the AKP’s regional leadership aspirations. Furthermore, Turkey is uncertain about whether Russia would treat Turkey as an equal if it abrogates its NATO/US alliance (Turan, 2018). It failed to play an important role during the Arab uprisings as it found itself ‘punch[ing] above its weight’ and overinvolved in complex regional affairs (Öniş & Kutlay, 2017, pp. 176–177). Also, it lacks both a coherent vision of an ideal world order and the political will to assume global responsibilities (Parlar Dal, 2018). Accordingly, Turkey’s ‘double-track’ strategy and its contestations of the US hegemony can be interpreted as merely a warning to the West. Turkey would not have pursued a rapprochement with Russia had the US actively supported Turkey’s autonomy-based strategies, its defence industry and its fight against PKK and Gülen (Erşen & Köstem, 2019).

Alternatively, an ontologically-motivated alliance relies on an ‘order-centric’ nature that transcends the pragmatic motivations of transactional and threat-based alliances. By maintaining the US alliance, lesser powers like Turkey seek to benefit from the constitutive and legitimating effects of the alliance on their agency. Alliance abrogation means higher uncertainty and risk in terms of the emergence of alternative regional and global orders. Hence, Turkey does not abrogate the alliance because the alliance legitimates Turkey’s agency in the current world order as a rising middle power. Rather than preventing it, the US alliance helps Turkey assert its national role in world politics as an actor that transcends the East- West divide. For example, Turkey co-sponsors the UN Alliance of Civilisations project with Spain and it has become ‘the only country that co-chairs three distinct Friends of Mediation groups at three major international institutions’, namely, the UN, the OIC and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (Akçapar, 2019, p. 6). It has recently launched the ‘Asia Anew’ initiative in August 2019, emphasising its role as ‘the westernmost Asian and the easternmost European country’ (Demirci & Cam, 2019). It participates in both the Western-led ‘Geneva process’ and the Russian–Iranian–Turkish trilateral ‘Astana process’ about the Syrian conflict. In this context, Turkey’s alliance with the US is embedded in Turkey’s national role conception as an actor of world politics that is in between the East and the West. Hence, the US alliance’s legitimating ‘order-centric’ effects on Turkey’s multifaceted foreign policy contributes to the resilience of the alliance.

#### Turkey won’t invoke Article 5 – low cred and Turkey doesn’t think they say yes

İbrahim KARATAŞ 20 (10/20/2020, “Analyzing the Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty as an Assurance of Turkey’s Security”, Middle Eastern Studies, 13-2 (2021):155-176//) EZAY

Article 5 of the NATO agreement that orders collective defense for a member that has incurred an armed attack has always been a matter of debate in Turkey. Turks are suspicious of it if it involves Turkey in a likely war or conflict. This study analyzed whether Turkey and other members can rely on NATO’s assurance of security stemming from Article 5. After examining certain events and surveys measuring public opinion of member states about NATO, it has been concluded that it is not clear that other members will defend Turkey or any other member since the article was invoked only once in the history of NATO to protect the US against relatively small states and a terrorist group. However, regarding Turkey’s position, the claim that NATO will not protect Turkey cannot be proven since Turkey did not face an existential threat after becoming a NATO member. In addition, deterring the Soviet Union from attacking Turkey by making it a NATO member can be regarded as a benefit of Article 5 without invoking it. On the other hand, Turkey’s own preferences and compelling reasons in foreign policy made it to be in contention with its NATO allies. However, when NATO members’ attitudes are examined, it can be concluded that they could still have proposed better solutions for Turkey. In addition to the above, as per public opinion surveys, NATO members hint that they may not sacrifice themselves for others unless (1) they are at War, (2) the enemy attacks all, (3) all attack the enemy, and (4) the US leads. According to surveys, this thesis is valid for Turkey since it favors NATO least and does not seem to join a collective defense of its allies. Yet, NATO’s and some members’ failure or reluctance to address Turkey’s security problems has a significant impact on Turkish people’s views. Surveys also show that NATO members are not as much in allegiance to the organization as they were in the past, probably due to the non-existence of an imminent threat.

#### Turkey can’t entrap NATO---no draw-in, and NATO refuses.

Michael Moran 16, Visiting Media Fellow and author of The Reckoning: Debt, Democracy and the Future of American Power, “Turkey’s Article 5 Argument Finds No Takers,” Carnegie Corporation of New York, 2-24-2016, https://www.carnegie.org/news/articles/turkeys-article-5-argument-finds-no-takers/

The ferocity of the fighting between Syria’s government forces and various proxies vying for control of territory and resources has Turkey on edge and has already led to several deadly clashes involving the only NATO member state bordering the civil war.

With Turkey, Russia, Iran, Iraq, and Gulf states pursuing their own, often conflicting aims in Syria, all against the backdrop of a U.S.-led air and commando campaign against the Islamic State (IS), there is renewed concern at NATO’s headquarters in Brussels that Turkey could see the next flare-up as grounds for citing Article 5: in effect, demanding that its NATO allies deploy forces and come to its collective defense.

Turkey has already invoked the lesser-known Article 4—a demand for an emergency consultation of the alliance—following the downing of a Turkish warplane under disputed circumstances last spring. Incidents like this and the threat that Bashar Assad’s forces might launch Scud missiles into Turkey led NATO members—the United States, Germany, and Spain—to deploy Patriot anti-aircraft missiles along the border in early 2013, though the German and American batteries have since been withdrawn. Spain’s—a less capable version of the Patriot—is geared towards anti-aircraft, as opposed to anti-ballistic missile defense, and therefore deemed more appropriate

But could a new incident—a missile strike, an IS incursion, or Syrian artillery bombardment across the border—bring the full might of NATO into the war? Many are skeptical, and for good reason.

The history of invocations of NATO’s Article 5 is short and somewhat underwhelming. In the 68 years of the North Atlantic alliance’s history, plenty of low-intensity conflicts involving NATO nations have raged, from rebellion in France’s Algerian departments, to the U.S. war in Vietnam, through the Balkan wars of the 1990s. Yet only once has Article 5’s “all-for-one, one-for-all” facility been invoked: that was September 12, 2001, the day after the al-Qaida attacks on the United States.

Even then, its effect was primarily symbolic. While the United States expressed its deep appreciation at the time, NATO involvement in Afghanistan would be minimal for years to come, though British, French, and a handful of other elite forces arrived as early as November that year. In practice, though, it was not until late 2003, when NATO assumed command of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), that alliance troops arrived in force, and even then often under restrictive rules of engagement that limited their effectiveness.

Indeed, ISAF, the force NATO led from August 2003 to December 2013, was a UN-sanctioned operation that included not only forces from NATO’s 28 militaries but troops and specialists from 48 states, including such disparate contributors as Mongolia, Tonga, and Singapore. At its height in 2010–11, ISAF numbered more than 42,000 troops, augmenting 100,000 U.S. troops.

Turkey would sorely like a commitment of that scale. Yet the subtle diplomatic realities of the North Atlantic alliance—as well as the very unsubtle nature of its own activity inside Syria—make this highly unlikely.

For one thing, Turkey’s own military has acted aggressively in targeting Syria’s Kurdish rebels, the People’s Protection Units, or YPG, which Ankara views as little more than a proxy for the outlawed separatist guerrillas of the Turkish Kurds, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, or PKK. Last week, the Turks opened up on the Kurdish-held air base at Aleppo, in spite of the fact that the city is surrounded by forces loyal to Assad, the presumed enemy in Syria. The act enraged almost everyone. Russia demanded at an emergency Security Council meeting a censure of Turkey’s violation of Syrian sovereignty, and President Obama, who regards the Kurdish as the most reliable ground force in the fight against the IS, urged Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan in an 80-minute phone call on February 19 to avoid provocative actions.

While NATO has taken no official position on the question of Article 5—not surprising, since no formal request has been made—through back channels the alliance has been telegraphing a resounding “no” to Turkey for weeks. Last week, Luxembourg’s Foreign Minister Jean Asselborn told Germany’s DerSpiegel that “NATO cannot allow itself to be pulled into a military escalation with Russia as a result of the recent tensions between Russia and Turkey.”

Whatever the fate of the current U.S.-push to secure a cease fire, a large NATO ground force, of the kind that deployed to Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan, is not on the table.

### No Norway Entrapment

#### Norway isn’t interested in conflict, but US support causes deterrence—solves wider scale conflicts

Frank Bakke-Jensen, 1-11-2021,(writing when he was the Norwegian minister of defense; "Norway’s defense minister: We must ensure strategic stability in the High North," Defense News, https://www.defensenews.com/outlook/2021/01/11/norways-defense-minister-we-must-ensure-strategic-stability-in-the-high-north//EZAY

The United States and Norway have a strong and longstanding bilateral relationship based on mutual interests and common values. The trans-Atlantic link remains the cornerstone of Norwegian security, and our two countries cooperate closely on almost every aspect of military operations. Looking ahead, the two key dimensions for Norwegian security policy are the Arctic and Russia.

**Strategic environment in the High North**

Since Russia began its military reform effort in 2008, it has built layered, integrated and scalable defenses. Russia’s armed forces have become an increasingly useful political instrument for the Kremlin across the entire conflict spectrum, from peace to crisis and war.

The annexation of Crimea in 2014 added a more threatening undertone to the development. In recent years, Norway has experienced Russian simulated air attacks on Norwegian targets and jamming of GPS signals that threaten the security of civilian aviation. Last fall, Russia conducted a sophisticated cyberattack on the Norwegian parliament, a serious incident that affected our country’s most important democratic institution.

The Russian so-called active defense emphasizes high readiness, agility, mobility and close coordination, as well as the ability to launch massive firepower. Russian prioritization of the Arctic has resulted in a large-scale modernization of the armed forces and infrastructure reestablishment in the Russian north. The key task of the Russian capabilities on the Kola Peninsula is global deterrence, making horizontal escalation a lasting concern for Norway. There is no indication that Russia will slow down its engagement in the Arctic — rather, the opposite.

China’s ambitions and increased involvement in great power competition introduces new challenges. China’s interest in the Arctic is growing, especially in light of its Belt and Road Initiative. Beijing has a broad range of means available, as it invests in research, ports and infrastructure in the region. Although China currently does not pose a military threat in the Arctic, Norway closely monitors China’s engagement in the north and its growing cooperation with Russia.

**Key priority**

Norway’s key priority is to [maintain the Arctic as an area characterized by cooperation and predictability](https://www.defensenews.com/smr/nato-air-power/2020/08/06/bring-allied-attention-to-air-power-in-the-arctic/). The newly published whitepaper on the Arctic emphasizes its strategic importance for Norway, and our new long-term plan for defense outlines significant investments in relevant military capabilities.

Furthermore, Norway welcomes the increased presence of key NATO allies in the High North. In recent years, the Pentagon has published Arctic strategies illustrating that the U.S. views the High North as an area that requires attention in order to preserve strategic stability and a rules-based international order. Along with the U.S. Navy, Marines and special forces, the Air and Space Forces are now developing strategic cooperation with likeminded nations in the region. This includes increasingly regular allied naval and air presence in the High North. Norway aims to participate in these activities when they take place in the waters off the Norwegian coast, in order to enhance allied interoperability. We consider these activities as a sign of alliance solidarity and cohesion.

[**Norway’s allies share their views on the country’s new defense plan**](https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2020/04/16/allies-share-views-on-enhancing-defense-of-norway-and-the-high-north/)

Norway's allies recognize the country as punching above its weight and playing a critical role in the defense of the North Atlantic and High North. But there is no time for complacency.

NATO also emphasizes the strategic importance of the Arctic. Exercise Trident Juncture, hosted by Norway in 2018, proves that the alliance is able to conduct large-scale exercises in harsh weather conditions with an Article 5 scenario. As part of a more persistent allied presence, we look forward to hosting the biannual exercise Cold Response in 2022. This exercise will also test allied ability to protect NATO interests in the Arctic. This is deterrence in action.

**Deterrence and reassurance**

The balance between deterrence and reassurance is our main approach to achieve our security goals for the High North. At the same time, we continue to be prudent and avoid unnecessary provocation.

We remain Russia’s neighbor, and we continue to cooperate with Russia on issues such as search and rescue, border patrol, and coast guard operations to control fisheries. To preserve stability, we uphold dialogue while at the same time remain firmly committed to our values and a rules-based international order.

I would like to commend the U.S. for the continued leadership in defense and commitment to European security. Norway and the U.S. cooperate closely on maritime surveillance and intelligence in the High North. We also have close cooperation on integrating fifth-generation capabilities into the force structure, and our special forces work shoulder to shoulder around the globe. As maritime nations, the U.S. and Norway cooperate on naval matters around the world. In 2023, we plan to launch two satellites into orbit in a bilateral effort to establish broadband satellite communications in the Arctic.

Under shifting administrations, the U.S. has built lasting relationships with allies and partners all over the world, including in the north. We look forward to continuing the close cooperation with the U.S. and NATO allies to protect our common values and interests.

#### Norway is stable, covered by article 5, and cooperative with Russia

Koivurova 16, is Research Professor and Director of the Arctic Centre at the University of Lapland. (Tim, 11-18-2016, “Analysis: The Arctic conflict - truth, fantasy or a little bit of both?” High North News, https://www.highnorthnews.com/en/analysis-arctic-conflict-truth-fantasy-or-little-bit-both)

What do we mean by a conflict? Since Arctic countries have so much practical cooperation, it is important to ask what sort of conflicts could occur in the region. If we are claiming that the general deterioration of relations between Russia and the West is about to lead to some sort of a conflict, it is important to stop and think what kind of a conflict we are talking about. If a conflict means, for example, an unresolved dispute over where a maritime border should lie, this does not shock many experts. Arctic states have disputed over their maritime borders bilaterally and sometimes even at the International Court of Justice, but such disputes have been settled sooner or later. It took more than 40 years for Russia and Norway to resolve a border dispute in the Barents Sea, but even this was settled in 2010. Furthermore, the dispute did not prevent cooperation between the countries. Norway, a NATO member, and the Soviet Union used to jointly manage fish stocks in the disputed region. In fact, most of the Arctic maritime disputes occur between close allies, like the United States and Canada. Or, does a conflict refer to a single event, which causes diplomatic slanging match? If, for example, the Coast Guard of the US or Norway seizes a Russian fishing vessel or a person subject to sanctions travels to Svalbard, can this be defined as a conflict? It is very rare that single events escalate into worse conflicts than a mild war of words, which is quickly lost in the mists of time. A case in point is when a Russian fishing vessel Elektron escaped in 2005 from the Norwegian Coast Guard to the Russian territorial waters, after having been arrested for illegal fishing. While the case lingered for some time, it did not affect general long-term Russian-Norwegian relations in the Arctic. What would it mean, then, if the geopolitical tension expanded to the Arctic region? In general, if Russian tensions grow with NATO, it is important to keep in mind that the Arctic plays a crucial role in Russia’s global military strategy: its Northern Fleet requires access to the Atlantic. We could also claim that since Russia has now increased its military presence in its Arctic regions, we have a security dilemma at hand: Could armament in Russian Arctic also lead to increased military investment from the part of its neighbors, and such investments reinforce each other in a vicious circle? Although the Arctic states have sometimes declared they will boost their investments in measures guaranteeing Arctic security, this has not actually occurred. The United States has so far been unable to even purchase one new icebreaker for its Arctic areas. Overall, it is important to ask for what purpose Russia is militarily equipping its Arctic areas. Due to the difficult circumstances in the region, militaries are needed in many tasks in the Arctic, ranging from rescue tasks to safeguarding shipping in the Northern Sea Route. It is also important to monitor whether Russia implements all the planned military investments in its Arctic areas. They are expensive measures in a country whose economy is not doing well. It is also important to consider for what strategic purposes could Russian military act in the Arctic. Russia has demonstrated to have the ability and will to use also military power to achieve its aims in foreign policy. This has been visible for a long time, since Russia’s Georgia operation in 2008, and it has accelerated in 2014 with the annexation of Crimea, war in Eastern Ukraine and military support for the Syrian government. This consideration leads to two questions: "Could Russia gain anything by military occupation in the Arctic and what would it even mean in the Arctic?", and: "What is the difference between Ukraine, Georgia and the Arctic?" To the first question: Could it be possible for Russia to also use military power in forcibly claim the Lomonosov Ridge, if Denmark-Greenland and perhaps Canada, too, want it? We could also ask, what would Russia celebrate as a foreign policy win, if it did conquer the Lomonosov Ridge? It is very likely that Russia receives a large part of the Lomonosov Ridge and its hypothetical hydrocarbon resources just by complying with the UNCLOS rules. Furthermore, most likely they have nothing economically exploitable and even if something was found, it would take decades for Russia to even dream of drilling oil in these areas. As regards the second question on differences between Russian actions in the Arctic and Eastern Europe, Russia has used military power against two states, which both were part of the former Soviet Union and which are not NATO members. It is a different matter to carry out attack in the Arctic Ocean against NATO member states, which are covered by alliance security guarantee. But could Putin’s regime, then, attack the non-NATO members, Finland and Sweden? Although these countries are EU member states and thus enjoy a softer form of security guarantee, the famous fifth article of the North Atlantic Treaty would not push the alliance to defend Finland and Sweden. It is important to ask these types of questions, since they allow us to reflect what Putin’s Russia is prepared to pursue with military means in actual terms. There are no signs of Russia’s military strategy being completely unpredictable. Russia has enabled the de facto separation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia from Georgia and annexed Crimea. All the regions have had a Russian majority, even though they were part of Georgia and Ukraine. To be sure, safeguarding the Crimean naval base and access to the Black Sea contributed to the decision to annex Crimea. Considering Putin’s military strategy so far, it is difficult to draw any parallels between the Georgian regions and the Crimean Peninsula on one hand and Finland and Sweden on the other. The Arctic region lacks similar reasons for any military confrontation. If the general tension in the relations , however, leads to military actions between Russia and Western powers elsewhere, however, these confrontations are very likely to expand to the Arctic region. This is for the present, though, an unlikely course of events. A more crucial question is this: When do the relations between the US and Russia freeze to a point where it starts to affect Arctic cooperation, which has so far been largely shielded from tensions from outside the region? The recent signs are not promising: The plutonium agreement was suspended by Russia, the United States and Russia are again on opposite sides in Syria, and the situation in Eastern Ukraine continues to be difficult. The situation is constantly changing, and we cannot exclude the possibility that we reach a point where the deterioration of the relations also leads to difficulties in the Arctic cooperation. Did we receive answers to these questions from the election of Donald Trump as the next US President? On one hand, it seems, Trump and Putin seem to pull in the same direction, perhaps leading to less confrontational relations and better Arctic co-operation. However, it is the unpredictability of Donald Trump that makes it very difficult to say anything clear on what his foreign policy agenda will eventually look like. Moreover, the Arctic Council may not be the forum where Trump would like to pursue his policies, given that the climate change is at the core of what the Arctic Council does – a phenomenon that does not seem to exist for the president-elect.

#### Norway wants peace and won’t provoke Russia.

Wrenn Yennie Lindgren & Nina Græger 17, Research Fellow at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, Associate Fellow at the Swedish Institute of International Affairs, Ph.D. candidate in International Relations at Stockholm University, M.A. in International Policy Studies from the Monterey Institute of International Studies; Research Professor at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, Head of the Department of Political Science at the University of Copenhagen, “The Challenges and Dynamics of Alliance Policies: Norway, NATO and the High North,” in “Global Allies: Comparing US Alliances in the 21st Century,” pp. 91-113, June 2017, http://dx.doi.org/10.22459/GA.06.2017.07

Whereas the end of the Cold War implied that ‘for most other states than Russia the region has remained either marginal or peripheral’, the importance of the High North was revitalised in Norway with the Norwegian High North strategy from 2005 onwards.73 The significant Russian military build-up on the Kola Peninsula from the mid-2000s also raised concerns about security among Norwegian politicians, diplomats and militaries. In particular, the Russian reopening of old military bases, the increased level of military exercises and, not least, the increase in overflights of Russian bombers and strategic bombers off the coast of Norway sparked a new round of ‘New Cold War’ rhetoric and media headlines.

Certainly, a more aggressive Russian foreign policy towards Eastern Europe and Ukraine in 2014 in particular has also put the High North, where Russia has ‘geo-political and military-strategic interests’, back at the top of the Norwegian security and defence policy agenda.74 For instance, the main focus of the expert commission was the security challenges that Russia represents in the region, which they describe as ‘an arena for geopolitical struggle’.75 The forward-leaning Russian foreign policy has also gained a lot of attention in Nordic academic environments.76 Even after the Ukraine crisis, however, Russia has not been considered as a direct threat to Norway, at least not at present.77 As formulated by the head of Norwegian military intelligence, ‘Russia has not suddenly become a military threat—not in the short term. But, in the long term the picture is more uncertain’.78 Hence the focus on strengthening the military presence in northern Norway in subsequent defence plans and reports.79 Rather than seeing any impending security threats in the region, the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affair’s Arctic slogan, ‘high north, low tension’, emphasises the safety aspect of Arctic activity.

All of the peacetime, cooperative military bilateral and multilateral arrangements in the Arctic are between the nation states in the region. For instance, the Ilulissat Declaration of 2008, signed by the five Arctic coastal states, established a common framework for maritime sovereignty in the Arctic Ocean. All signatories have agreed that claims and disputes are to be negotiated between the Arctic coastal states to prevent the escalation of political disagreements into security issues. Norway and Russia, who have had overlapping claims in the Barents Sea for decades, finally managed to conclude negotiations and sign an agreement in 2010.

The role of NATO in the region has been brought up from time to time. NATO is not, however, likely to increase its activity in the Arctic in peacetime and instead encourages the continuation of the cooperation between all of the Arctic states. The defence establishments of the Arctic states promote peacetime confidence-building measures.80 There are regular bilateral and multilateral military exercises in the region that include Russia and the individual NATO members among the Arctic states. There are annual informal meetings between military leaders from all of the Arctic states where ‘soft security’ measures and military support to civilian agencies responsible for safety-related matters are discussed. These matters have become increasingly important with growing levels of human activity in the Arctic Ocean. This emphasis on safety capabilities corresponds with recent efforts under the auspices of the Arctic Council that resulted in a new search and rescue agreement (2011) and an oil-spill preparedness and response agreement (2013).

The requirement for monitoring and safety arrangements depends on the volume and scope of future civilian activities. The Arctic may be a promising area for commercial opportunities. There is a potential for shorter transcontinental maritime transit though the Northern Sea Route, increasing the profit and value of extraction of onshore and offshore petroleum and mineral resources. Analysts, however, have recently addressed several factors dampening the most optimistic future predictions. Operations in the Arctic environment can be complex, difficult (extremely low temperatures and icing contribute to this) and costly. Profitability of commercial ventures in the Arctic may also be influenced by the dynamics in the market itself and evolving concepts for production and distribution.

The Arctic—where Norway has invested significant political and economic capital—can be seen as a unique arena for the country as a place where Norway meets and interacts with many non-Arctic states. Meeting both Arctic and non-Arctic partners in the High North has been a priority for Norway. For instance, the rapidly growing economies of Asia have expressed a particular interest in the Arctic, which has coincided with Norway’s recognition of Asia as an increasingly important arena for Norwegian foreign policy.81 Similar to its other Nordic regional partners, Norway has been forthcoming and welcoming of Asian states’ Arctic interests, as it encourages broad dialogue on issues affecting the Arctic and competence sharing. Norway welcomes the diverse opinions, complementary expertise and outside-of-the-Arctic thinking that non-Arctic states can provide. Norway has developed especially close bilateral ties on Arctic issues with Singapore, South Korea and Japan. South Korea has prioritised Norway as a cooperation partner in Arctic and regular bilateral interactions between Norway and Singapore and Norway and South Korea have also strengthened collaborative commitments and interest in the region.82 Norway proclaimed its support of the Asian states’ inclusion in the Arctic Council in early 2013 and continued to play a role in the states’ ultimate acceptance and inclusion in the council’s ministerial meeting in Kiruna, Sweden, in May 2013. This receptive attitude towards the Asian states can be in part explained by a Norwegian interest in revitalising the Arctic Council.83 Given its geographic placement and record in the High North, Norway can play a significant role as a gatekeeper and facilitator of non-Arctic states’ interests in the region, which can in turn have positive offshoots in other bilateral, regional and international settings.84

#### No Norway-Russia war---robust cooperation and mutual interests.

Andreas Østhagen 18, Senior Fellow at The Arctic Institute, Senior Research Fellow at the Fridtjof Nansen Institute, Ph.D. in International Relations from the University of British Columbia, “How Norway and Russia avoid Conflict over Svalbard,” The Arctic Institute, 06-19-2018, https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/norway-russia-avoid-conflict-svalbard/

In 1977, Norway established a maritime Fisheries Protection Zone (FPZ) around the Arctic Archipelago of Svalbard. Norway avoided claiming an outright Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) fearing it would be challenged due to stipulations (or lack thereof) concerning extended maritime zones in the Svalbard Treaty from 1920.1) A dispute with Russia over the status of the Zone arose, although the two countries quickly agreed to disagree as long as Russian fishermen would have access to fisheries in the Zone.

In the late 1990s, Norwegian fisheries enforcement in the FPZ became stricter, in tandem with declining fish stocks and fear of considerable illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing in the Barents Sea. This led the Norwegian Coast Guard to attempt to arrest Russian fishing vessels on several occasions, resulting in reactions from Russian fishermen, as well as officials in Murmansk and Moscow.2) In 1998, 2001, 2005, and 2011 specifically, incidents had the potential to escalate beyond a fisheries issue.

Today, the risk of events spiralling out of control in the FPZ remains a primary concern for both the Norwegian Coast Guard and the Norwegian Ministry of Defence. Echoing these fears, in 2017 the Russian Defence Ministry deemed Svalbard a potential area for future conflict with Norway, and in consequence NATO.3) Given the potential volatility of events in the FPZ, how do Norway and Russia manage to avoid escalation in the case of a crisis? Two intertwining relationships are integral to answering this.

Interest alignment

First, cooperation can be the product of discord. In other words, states cooperate when they disagree. Sometimes institutions are needed to overcome the self-help tendencies of the international system. Along this line of argumentation, cooperation between Norway and Russia concerning shared fish stocks, oil spill response, search and rescue, and ship traffic management are formalised arrangements set up to manage potential areas of discord. Along the same line of argumentation, the Barents Sea maritime boundary agreement in 2010 was a result of interests between the two states converging sufficiently.4)

In other words, the reason why Norway and Russia manage to keep crises from escalating further is mutual interest in preserving aspects of their cooperation; cooperation that benefits both parties. This relates to multiple issue areas. Concerning resource management, Russia is assumed to be satisfied with the current quota scheme, in contrast to what might be achieved if an actual debate over the status of the FPZ took place.5) Concerning the UNCLOS-regime, both parties benefit from a stable legal regime in the FPZ specifically, but also in the Arctic at large.6) And concerning national security, both parties have an interest in low levels of conflict for fear of coercive efforts by other actors within and outside the Barents/Arctic region.7)

The interests that drive cooperation might, however, be subject to change (over time). We can see changes taking place within all the issue-areas addressed: as climate change continues to alter the marine resource base in the Barents Sea; as external actors challenge the validity of the UNCLOS-regime in the Arctic; or as the power relations between various actors fluctuate. The institutions set up to manage cooperation are also challenged and questions of institutional resilience become salient: how will cooperative mechanisms adapt as conditions influencing the premise for cooperation change?8)

For example, as Norway and Russia struggled to reach agreement on a reduction of annual quotas for the Barents Sea in the early 2000s, several institutional measures were taken. In 2002, a harvest control rule was introduced in the Joint Fisheries Commission to set quotas according to scientific advice while also limiting fluctuations from year to year. This has been described as the most important change in the work of the Commission, removing a source of friction between the two states (which had spill-over effects into the FPZ).9)

Talking to your neighbour

Second, as emphasised by officials in the Norwegian Coast Guard, former Coast Guard officers, and multiple scholarly works written on the management of shared fish stocks in the Barents Sea, personal contact between individuals constitute a core element of conflict management in the Barents Sea. The importance of dialogue during a crisis is given much credit for solving incidents between the Norwegian Coast Guard and Russian fishing vessels. This includes communication between the Coast Guard and Russian trawlers (including the use of Russian interpreters); between the Norwegian Joint Military Headquarters and the Chief of the Russian Northern Fleet at Severomorsk; and between the negotiating groups in the Joint Fisheries Commission.

Having various means of communicating, and keeping channels open as a crisis is unfolding, constitute central elements in the management of conflict in the FPZ. This can be linked to the notion of ‘track two diplomacy’, albeit without an immediate large-scale international crisis as an impetus. Still, instilling so called low-level or ‘soft’ dialogue in addition to other more formal channels of communication, have – in this case – provided an effective approach to conflict management.10)

This concerns the larger concept of personal relations, as social contact between two or more individuals representing different sides in a dispute. The theory of socialisation emphasises not only the communication component, but also the fact that a change occurs between the parties. Norms (expected behaviour) socialise (change) actors according to a logic of appropriateness.11) By interacting regularly with the same individuals on the same issues (fisheries, quotas, inspections) over time, mutual understanding emerges as the individuals themselves better comprehend the position of the other party.

Maintaining low tension

Personal relations have formed the basis for the institutionalisation of some of the mechanisms described above, that enable cooperation between Norway and Russia in this specific instance. Examples include the exchange of coast guard officers from Norway and Russia, as well as the formalised sharing of information and annual meetings between the Chiefs of the coast guards. This institutionalisation and its relevance for the issues at hand in the Barents Sea at large, and the FPZ specifically, played a central part in sheltering the coast guard cooperation from sanctions and restrictions put in place between Norway and Russia in 2014.12) There is thus a feedback loop taking place between institutionalisation and personal interactions.

This article does not attempt to outline a monocausal explanation for success in maritime dispute management. Instead, the aim is to showcase how multiple explanations emphasising different aspects of conflict relations contribute to the outcome. In sum, several factors concerning the dispute in the Svalbard Zone help explain why it has been managed adequately in the context of a larger quarrel.

Looking ahead, the writing on the wall is relatively clear: to maintain low tension in the zone around Svalbard, Norway and Russia need both be aware of the factors that keep their relations civil. Upholding dialogue between the two countries’ coast guards regardless of fluctuating international relations is crucial. So is establishing and re-developing cooperative mechanisms such as the Joint Fisheries Commission, as the resource situation in Arctic waters might change.

### No Escalation—Moral Hazard

#### No impact to moral hazard---the higher the hazard, the less likely conflict occurs

Benson 14, Associate Professor of Political Science and Asian Studies at Vanderbilt University (Brett, “Inducing Deterrence through Moral Hazard in Alliance Contracts,” *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 58.2)

Do military alliances cause allies to act so aggressively that their behavior undermines the security goal of the alliance? If so, then leaders may be cautious about joining an alliance, doing so only if they can select safe alliance partners or design the terms of the treaty in a way that captures the deterrence benefits while managing the dangers of overaggression. We show that while alliance commitments may cause alliance partners to behave aggressively, under some conditions the added aggressiveness actually enhances deterrence. From this perspective, the effectiveness of an alliance is related both to the structure and to the content of the treaty.

This view stands in contrast to the standard explanation that the content of an alliance agreement is designed to balance the benefit of deterring an enemy against the risk of emboldening an ally (Fearon 1997; Snyder 1997; Yuen 2009). Our approach builds on existing models of alliance formation (Morrow 1994; Smith 1995) but adds intra-alliance contracting over the benefits from successful deterrence. Specifically, avoiding a conflict that they otherwise might expect creates a surplus equal to the foregone cost of war, which may be divided among alliance partners.

To facilitate an understanding of the intuition, we suggest that military alliances share many similarities with standard insurance contracts. Much as an auto insurance policy stipulates how much a policy holder will receive if he or she is in an accident, an alliance agreement likewise often describes how much aid an ally will provide to the attacked party if there is a war. For example, the 1656 Treaty of Defensive Alliance between Brandenburg and France enumerates precisely the amount and form of aid each ally would provide to the other if it was attacked: Brandenburg pledged 2,400 men and 600 horses to France while France promised 5,000 men, 1,200 horses, and artillery to Brandenburg. In the 1893 Franco-Russian alliance, France promised to supply 1.3 million troops and Russia pledged to contribute 700,000 to 800,000 troops in a conflict against Germany.1

Furthermore, in an insurance contract, the size of the insurance premium the insured pays usually depends on the amount of risk being indemnified by the insurance provider: the more risk for the insurer, the higher the premium. Our explanation of the content of alliance commitments likewise ties the level of support to the amount of security risk alliance partners face. That is, leaders of threatened countries may look to team up with each other, and the amount of support they promise one another may depend on the amount of threat each faces. However, insurance against risk carries with it the potential problem of moral hazard, which occurs when the guarantee of indemnity distorts the insured's behavior because the insurance policy insulates her from the risks of her actions (Pauly 1968, 1974; Shavell 1979). Just as insured motorists may exercise less caution in their driving, states insured by alliance treaties have an incentive to behave more aggressively in negotiating with other states.

Generally, scholars of alliances take the position that moral hazard creates potentially harmful effects. Most notably, Snyder (1984, 1997) and Christensen and Snyder (1990) claim that alliances “embolden” state leaders to “entrap” unwilling allies in wars that they would prefer to avoid. Yuen (2009) shows that moral hazard increases allied states’ level of aggression in crisis bargaining, and this added aggression may heighten the risk of war or affect the bargaining settlements. As a result of the potential harmful effects of moral hazard, scholars argue that leaders may either avoid alliances, screen alliance partners based on their likelihood of behaving recklessly, or attempt to design treaties carefully so as to balance their dueling goals of deterring external threats while restraining alliance partners (Snyder 1984, 1997; Jervis 1994; Zagare and Kilgour 2003, 2006; Yuen 2009).

A more subtle side effect of moral hazard, however, is that states may be attracted to alliances because the tendency of an ally to behave aggressively actually enhances deterrence. The possibility that an allied state will negotiate aggressively may cause third-party adversaries to refrain from initiating a crisis. Likewise, a defensive alliance might make an alliance partner more willing to retaliate if challenged because it benefits from its ally’s support in war; this may cause a prospective adversary to be reluctant to initiate a challenge targeting the alliance partner (Smith 1995).

In cases where moral hazard advances the deterrence objective of an alliance, there is little cost to entrapment, because the third-party adversary calibrates its hostility toward the allies based on its expectation about its likelihood of winning a conflict if the target of its challenge does not capitulate. The combination of added resources from an ally and the increased willingness of the target to fight back encourages the third party to refrain from initiating violence. When encouraging an alliance partner to fight back if it is attacked enhances deterrence, then the goal of the contract is to induce a maximal amount of moral hazard so as to deter potential aggressors to such an extent that the risk of conflict is negligible. In this case, allies are not called upon to expend costly resources in support of their partners, as no conflict occurs. Thus, a priori, it seems equally likely that moral hazard will deter would-be challenges or increase the likelihood of conflict. Therefore, an important challenge for a theory of alliances is to identify the conditions under which moral hazard serves the deterrence purpose of the alliance rather than causing harmful effects that undermine the alliance’s objective.

### No Escalation—Diplomacy

#### Even if entrapment’s true, it’s never driven escalation – nuclear umbrella encourages peaceful resolution

Narang and Mehta 19 [Neil Narang, Department of Political Science, University of California, Santa Barbara, Rupal N. Mehta, Department of Political Science, University of Nebraska–Lincoln, "The Unforeseen Consequences of Extended Deterrence: Moral Hazard in a Nuclear Client State", 2019, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0022002717729025?casa\_token=fjphBVEC1bcAAAAA:s1NRigLIcYYxZXkDz9eLxekB42NjmCbbcbFMw\_HyiWfIAQl2rkicA4CWZa6pN7ACXfmR6slngz2Jlg]

In this article, we explore the relationship between nuclear umbrellas, militarized conflict, and crisis bargaining. Drawing on existing bargaining theories of war, we argue that, because war is costly, both parties in a crisis have an incentive to avoid fighting. This implies that—in equilibrium—the impact of a nuclear umbrella on the risk of war between a client state protected under a nuclear umbrella and a potential target should generally be zero, assuming information is complete, commitments are credible, and the stakes are divisible. However, this does not mean that such commitments are benign, or that they pose no risk to potential targets and nuclear patrons. Instead, we argue that a client state’s expectation that its power will be augmented in the event of war (by that of its nuclear patron) will make it more likely to expand the scope of its demands and seek to revise the status quo. Because war is generally ex post inefficient, leaders of target states are likely to offer concessions in the amount that reflects the changed balance of power, rather than fight a costly war. Thus, we argue that the risk of moral hazard from nuclear umbrellas should be observable in the bargaining outcomes short of war, if not in the observable patterns of militarized conflict.

We begin by investigating whether nuclear umbrellas generate a risk of moral hazard by increasing the risk of militarized interstate disputes (MIDs). We find evidence that protection under a nuclear umbrella slightly increases the risk that a client state protected under a nuclear umbrella will initiate an MID compared to a state that lacks this protection. However, we find that this overall effect is driven entirely by one-sided use of force initiated by the client state protected under a nuclear umbrella that never escalates to the reciprocal use of force by the target state. At the same time that targets appear to avoid the reciprocal use of force, we find strong evidence that a client state’s protection under a nuclear umbrella is positively associated with the likelihood that a crisis will include a peaceful settlement attempt and an increased likelihood that a target will offer policy concessions to the client state. Together, the results along both dimensions—conflict and bargaining outcomes—are consistent with the observable implications of the theory.

#### That means the aff is the wrong response—prefer comparative evidence

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Conclusion

In this article, we address a long-standing question in the academic and policy communities about the role of nuclear umbrellas in broader interstate relations. Specifically, we examine how client states behave under the protection of a nuclear patron by investigating two important dimensions of behavior: the initiation of militarized disputes and bargaining outcomes short of war. We find that, although client states protected under a nuclear umbrella are no more likely to initiate MIDs against a target state that escalate to war or the reciprocated use of force, these states, nevertheless, appear more emboldened to initiate crises. However, these crises tend not to escalate to higher levels of militarized conflict because target states appear to act in equilibrium: preferring to settle disputes peacefully rather than resist militarily through costly fighting. We find that client states protected under a nuclear umbrella are more often the recipients of policy concessions from their targets compared to states that lack protection under a nuclear umbrella. Together, these results provide comprehensive support for our argument that there is some risk of moral hazard in a client state protected under a nuclear umbrella, as clients appear more emboldened and more successful at revising the status quo in expectation of a patron coming to their aid. The urgency to understand the strategic consequences of nuclear umbrellas is perhaps most real today, as the United States seeks to rebalance its overall security portfolio to the Asia-Pacific in anticipation of a rising China and to provide additional assurances to its allies in the Middle East in light of potential proliferation challenges. And yet, we have surprisingly little evidence that such commitments are effective at reducing the risk of conflict on net, given the widely presumed, but still untested, risk for moral hazard in the client state. Meanwhile, policymakers in the United States and abroad continue to propose expanding the US nuclear umbrella while further reassuring allies covered within it. Our research suggests that the expansion of the nuclear umbrella may perversely exacerbate the concerns of potential targets and inadvertently destabilize the status quo by increasing the risk of a crisis and the opportunity for bargaining to fail. If client states protected under a nuclear umbrella are encouraged to pursue more aggressive military and diplomatic policies toward other states, this may pose an increased risk of conflict to patrons, particularly as nuclear patrons like the United States seek to strengthen and reaffirm their commitments to their allies. Of course, this risk must be balanced against any risk of moral hazard that might flow from a client state protected under a nuclear umbrella, or any potential nonnuclear state, acquiring its own nuclear weapons in the absence of such commitments (N. Narang 2015). It may very well be the case that nuclear umbrellas cause emboldenment/moral hazard, but that this is nonetheless preferable to the nuclear emboldenment that would result if the state acquired nuclear weapons (Kapur 2007). In so far as the net effect is unclear, it is possible that policymakers might want to persist in offering nuclear umbrellas to states in order to prevent proliferation despite their moral hazard inducing consequences (Mehta 2017).16

### No Escalation—No Interest

#### No great power entrapment – conflicts stay local

Elizabeth Calos 12 — (Elizabeth Calos; Published: 2012; "The Weakest Link: Credible Deterrence Threats and Alliance Entrapment"; Inquiries Journal; Accessed: 7-5-2022; http://www.inquiriesjournal.com/articles/1614/the-weakest-link-credible-deterrence-threats-and-alliance-entrapment)//Pen-SY

This argument has been supported by the data gathered from the Correlates of War Project. The data showed that for both weak and medium powered states, alliance membership with a conflict originator had a significant impact on the decision of the state to enter into a conflict that it did not initiate. However, the same level of significance was not found for high-powered states. Thus, the first hypothesis, that a great power or strong state will not necessarily feel compelled to join in conflicts initiated by alliance partners because the state is stable enough that changes in the strength of alliance member do not impact the security of the state, has been supported by this study. The second hypothesis, that a weak or medium power state will be compelled to join in conflicts initiated by alliance partners, even when the conflict may go against the state's desires or the mandate of the alliance has also been supported by the data. This indicates that the explanation of alliance behavior backed by the logic of rational deterrence is more accurate than the explanations provided by the grievance model, which predicts that this joining behavior would not occur across all three groups, or the Rubicon model, which predicts that it would occur uniformly across the groups.